Clairmont v. Cilley

153 A. 465, 85 N.H. 1, 1931 N.H. LEXIS 69
CourtSupreme Court of New Hampshire
DecidedFebruary 3, 1931
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 153 A. 465 (Clairmont v. Cilley) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of New Hampshire primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Clairmont v. Cilley, 153 A. 465, 85 N.H. 1, 1931 N.H. LEXIS 69 (N.H. 1931).

Opinion

Allen, J.

The defendants concede the sufficiency of the evidence to show Clifton’s negligence in assigning the plaintiff to a task of unnecessary ' danger, but say the risk was assumed.

. In telling the plaintiff he could not hold the truck Clifton informed him that it was likely to start in motion at any instant. Whatever caused the motor to stall and whatever the reason the truck could not be held, the danger of backward motion was brought to his attention and he acted with knowledge of it. If the stationary position of the truck until he was hurt gave him reason to think it would continue to hold, he was not entitled to further warning because Clifton had no more reason to anticipate the starting than he did. The truck held for a time and Clifton is not shown to have had reason to expect it would not remain held any more than the plaintiff. It is true the plaintiff thought Clifton wished to have the truck trigged so it could be held on the hill while Clifton might crank and start the motor. But it remains that he was told it could be held only if he *3 trigged it, and notice of the danger of its starting was not affected because of Clifton’s probable action after it might be securely held. Clifton needed his help because the truck could not be held without it. That is what was told him and he was given fair warning of what was likely to, and what did, happen.

Under the definition of assumption of risk as usually expressed its rule would seem clearly applicable. The plaintiff was ignorant of no fact material to his safety and of which he was entitled to be informed. His knowledge of the danger was equal to Chiton’s.

But the plaintiff acted in an emergency under direct orders from his employer and the emergency might be found caused by his employer’s negligence. In the present state of the law these conditions may show that the danger was not voluntarily encountered. If it was formerly the rule in master and servant cases that when the servant acts in the face of known danger his intentional conduct not physically compelled was always voluntary, the law does not now so regard it in cases where there is no reasonable opportunity to decide between the action taken and other action or non-action. Such change as has taken place in the law is a change of the meaning of the rule and not of its definition. Voluntary assumption of risk of obvious dangers remains a defence. But freedom of choice and time to make it in taking action are required to give the action a voluntary character.

So far as the law has thus changed, the change may be ascribed to a number of reasons. The tendency of public thought to give more emphasis to social protection in its adjustment with the welfare of industrial enterprise is reflected, aside from legislation, in the common law as well. The growth and extension in the law of the duty of protection has tended to narrow the area of irresponsibility for injury incurred in the course of action intentionally taken. And considerations of natural and normal conduct show that force of circumstances may give such moral compulsion to action as to make it voluntary only under a strict and severe test. Allowance for other than physical coercion is a reasonable demand of justice.

The sense of duty to obey and the stress of emergency may so outweigh and displace other thought as to make its requirement arbitrary in taking action. If there is no time to weigh danger against safety in a normal and natural way, the law is not so rigid as not to recognize it. The fact that the servant is acting under direct orders of the master is not enough to excuse him from making a choice and assuming the risk if he continues his work. O’Hare v. Company, 71 N. H. *4 104. But if there is also an emergency which in a practical way shuts out the opportunity of choice, the risk is not voluntarily incurred, at least if the emergency is due to the master’s fault.

It is the law here that one may not recover when as a volunteer he incurs danger to save the lives or property of others carelessly by them placed in peril. Clark v. Railroad, 78 N. H. 428, 430; Smith v. Company, 83 N. H. 439, 446. It is also the law as to one acting, not as a volunteer, but in the course of public duty. lb. But a practical and substantial difference exists between such cases and cases where the person helped owes the duty of protection to the one helping him. In the cases of the volunteer and the public servant no duty of protection is owed them, because no relation exists out of which a duty may be imposed. They intervene without inducement from the party they protect. The situation is not the same in the case of the private servant acting in the line of duty. Owing the service, he is not a volunteer, and his assumption of risk is imposed, not because of non-relationship with his employer, but as an incident of the relationship. Cases of intervention therefore do not help to solve the problem of defining the scope of assumption of risk in master and servant cases where the servant acts within his employment.

In the widest latitude of the rule the servant assumes only known and appreciated risks. Even when by the terms of the service he is to act in emergencies as they may arise, if it goes too far to say that he does not thereby waive or lose his right to know about the danger of a particular emergency when it does arise, at least this is so when the emergency is brought about by the master’s negligence and the servant is acting under his direct orders. Bound to use care for the servant’s protection, the master is bound to be careful to avoid emergencies likely to expose the servant to danger. He may not carelessly create a situation of emergency although the terms of service may call for the servant to act in it. Otherwise the rule of public policy against contracts of release from liability for future negligence would be invaded. The master’s own breach of duty may perhaps not entitle the servant to disobey orders but it does give him the right to leave the service. This right is more than theoretical and the law seeks to give it practical value. Fair and reasonable opportunity for its exercise must appear, or the risk will not be held to be assumed. What constitutes such opportunity is of course a question of fact. If time enough is given the servant to weigh his own safety in the balance with his interest of employment, choice of action is afforded him. Otherwise he is not assuming the risk of obvious dangers in *5

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
153 A. 465, 85 N.H. 1, 1931 N.H. LEXIS 69, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/clairmont-v-cilley-nh-1931.