Clairmont Investments, LLC. v. Montpellier Holding Co., LLC; and Jeff Teel

• Court: Superior Court of The Virgin Islands
• Decided: May 26, 2022
• Docket: SX-09-CV-417
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS DIVISION OF ST CROIX

CLAIRMONT INVESTMENTS, LLC,

PLAINTIFF,

V SX 09 CV 417 Cite as 2020 V 1 Super 061U MONTPELLIER HOLDING Co , LLC, AND JEFF TEEL

DEFENDANTS

Appearances ‘

Scot F McChain, Esq For Plamtzfi”

H A Curt Otto, Esq For Defendants

MEMORANDUM OPINION

WILLOCKS Presiding Judge

{[1 THIS MATTER is before the Court on the Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment

(hereinafter ‘Plaintift‘s Motion”) filed May 27 2010 The Defendants filed an ‘Opposition to Motion

for Summary Judgment and Cross Motion for Summary Judgment (hereinafter Defendants

Opposition ) on June 16 2010 The Plaintiff responded with an Opposition to the Cross Motion

(hereinafter ‘ Plaintiff‘s Opposition ’) on June 29, 2010 and a Reply to the Opposition to Motion for

Summary Judgment (hereinafter ‘Plaintiff’ 5 Reply”) on June 30, 2010 The last filing made in this

matter was the Defendants’ Reply to the Opposition to the Cross Motion (hereinafter Defendants’

Reply) on July 9 2010

BACKGROUND

112 Clairmont Investments, LLC (hereinafter Clairmont ) states that Montpellier Holding

Company LLC (hereinafter Montpellier ) borrowed $250 000 (two hundred fifiy thousand dollars)

Wm that both Attorney McChain and Attorney Otto haw “ ithdrawn from this matter Howet er, there is indication that the Plaintiff is tepresented by Attorney Mark Eckard Clairmom lmeslments LLC 1 WontpeI/ier Holding Co LLC 2020 V 1 Super 061U SX 2009 CV 417 Memorandum Opinion Page 2 of 8

from it on February 13, 2008 and executed a promissory note for repayment of the principal on

February 12 2009 (Mem of Law to Mot I See lnglehart Aff Si 3 ) The promissory note also included

provisions requiring monthly installments of interest to commence on March I, 2009, but these were

allegedly set aside mutually by Clairmont and Montpellier in favor of a requirement for quarterly

payments of 60% (sixty percent) of net rental revenue from Clairmont’s property at the Residences at

Villa Greenleaf (Unit 2B the Clainnont Suite) (Mem of Law at 2 See lnglehart Aff fl 6 7)

Clairmont states that the agreement for a share of rental income (hereinafier the Revenue Agreement ’)

was to remain in effect until full satisfaction of the promissory note and was to be secured by the

exchange of a warranty deed to the Ciairmont Suite at Residences at Villa Greenleaf (Mem of Law

at 2 ) The Revenue Agreement reads as follows

The relevant text of the Revenue Agreement is as follows

By and between Montpellier Holding Col LLC Jeff Teel (MHC) and Clairmont Investments, LLC (CI) The parties agree to set aside the interest payment provision of a certain promissory note of the same date and replace it with the following

MHC will pay CI sixty percent (60%) of the net rental revenue of the Clairmont suite (Unite 2E) at the Residences at Villa Greenleaf MHC will deduct normal operating expenses to include utilities, taxes grounds and unit maintenance that are properly apportioned to that unit Payments will be made on a quarterly basis along with a detail [sic] summary reconciliation

This agreement will be in effect until the payment of the promissory note of even date has been satisfied It is the intent of the parties to satisfy the payment of such note with the exchange of a Warranty Deed to Unit 2E Clairmont Suite at the Residences at Villa Greenleaf at which time the note will be canceled

$13 JeffTeel (hereinafter ‘Teel’ ) executed a Guaranty of Payment of Performance on February 13,

2008 which promised the full and prompt payment of the amounts due under the promissory note (Id

at 1 lnglehart Aff if 4 ) The Guaranty provides that [Teel] agreed to pay all costs and expenses which

may be incurred by [Clairmont] in collection of the Guaranty, including, but not limited to, reasonable

attorneys fees and costs (Mem of Law at 4 ) Clairmont Investments LLC‘ v Montpelher Holding Co LLC 2020 V 1 Super 061U SX 2009 CV 417 Memorandum Opinion Page 3 of 8

{[4 According to Clairmont Montpellier did not make any of its quarterly payments and never

delivered a warranty deed to the Clairmont Suite (Id at 3 ) Despite demands for payment, ‘ [t]he

indebtedness was not paid promptly or at maturity on February 12 2009 or otherwise or at all

(Id See Inglehart Aff ii 10 ) On September 1 2009 Clairmont notified Teel of Montpellier s default

and demanded payment of the principal sum, plus interest but was denied (Mem of Law at 4 )

{is Clairmont argues that there are no genuine disputes that it is entitled to relief because the

Revenue Agreement ‘clearly did not amend the due date of the Note or the repayment provisions,

which require payment on February 12, 2009, ofthe principal sum of$250,000 ’ (1d at 6 ) ‘Therefore,

[Montpeliier] and [Teel] are liable to [Clairmont] for the outstanding debt, unpaid net rental revenues,

costs and fees associated with this matter ”(Id 6 )

116 Montpellier and Teel state that renting the Clairmont suite has produced no net rental revenue

(Opp n 3 ) The Defendants aiso allege that the Revenue Agreement is unambiguous that “[i]t allows

for the continued payment of the promissory note by payment of net income from the [Clairmont suite]

until there is an exchange of a warranty deed to Unit 2E Clairmont Suite at the Residences at Villa

Greenleaf, at which time there would be cancellation of the note ” (Id) In other words, ‘the loan will

be paid by exchange of the deed, thereby fully modifying the terms of the note ’ (Id at 6, citation

omitted)

{[7 As to the warranty deed, the Defendants state that it has not been possible to obtain the

financing to remove the two mortgages that underlie the property at issue ” (Id at 4 ) They state that

Clairmont Investments, LLC was apprised of the mortgages, and understood full and well that there

existed the underlying mortgages and that it would be necessary to obtain a release of that portion of

the property relating to the proposed condominium unit, and without that, there could be no transfer

(Id) The Defendants assert that Teel, working on behalf of Montpellier, is working in good faith to

have the mortgages released, but the failure to make progress is not breach (Id) Clairmont Investments LLC v Montpelliei Holding Co LLC 2020 V 1 Super 06iU SX 2009 CV 417 Memorandum Opinion Page 4 of 8

118 The Defendants also argue that summary judgment is inappropriate because discovery has not

been conducted (or rather, had not been completed at the time the Plaintiff’s Motion was filed), and

discovery would assist the Court if it found the Revenue Agreement to be ambiguous (Id at 7 )

1i9 In the Plaintiff 8 Opposition Clairmont contests the Defendants’ interpretation of the Revenue

Agreement According to Clairmont the Defendants have asserted that the note will not be satisfied

until the deed is exchanged and that the exchange constitutes payment ofthe loan but Clairmont argues

that the Revenue Agreement ‘does not contain either ofthese provisions as alleged by the Defendants

(Pl ’3 Opp n 4) The language of the Revenue Agreement states that it replaces the provision that

requires the payment of interest with payments of quarterly net rental revenue and does not amend the

other contract terms such as the maturity date of the note or the payment of the principal $250 000

(Id ) Clairmont’s interpretation is that the promissory note would be satisfied if a warranty deed was

provided, (10') which it has not

1110 Clairmont also points out that the Defendants interpretation is flawed because if true, ‘this

would result in there being absolutely no maturity date for the Note and absolutely no requirement that

the funds loaned by the Plaintiff would ever need to be repaid by the Defendants,’ which could not

have been the intention (1d at 5, emphasis removed) Clairmont maintains that if it had been the

parties’ intent to fully modify the contract, such an intent would have been clearly stated in the Revenue

Agreement As support, Clairmont provides correspondence with Teel from after the maturity of the

promissory note, wherein Teel requests an extension on the note and payments ofone thousand dollars

each month and discusses the money owed to Clairmont Clairmont alleges that these emails are proof

that Teel was aware of his obligation to repay the note (Id at 5 6 )

1111 Clairmont further argues that this summary judgment can proceed without complete discovery

because the contractual provisions are clear and unambiguous (Pl ’5 Reply at l 2) Additionally,

Clairmont asserts that the only fact really disputed by Teel in his affidavit provided with the

Defendants Opposition is related to the amount of rental income Clairmont concedes that this point Clairmom Investments LLC v Montpellrei Holding Co LLC 2020 V I Super O61U SX 2009 CV 417 Memorandum Opinion Page 5 of 8

is not ready for summary judgment but notes that the affidavit did not otherwise dispute the facts

because the assertion that the terms of the contract were fully modified is conclusory (Id at 2 5 )

STANDARD OF LAW

1112 When parties enter into multiple written agreements relating to the same subject matter as part of the same transaction, courts consider the meaning of each document and the surrounding circumstances to determine the parties’ intent Contract interpretation, that is ascertaining the meaning of contractuai language, involves mixed questions of law and fact If a contract is unambiguous, ‘the meaning of its terms is a question of law ” If however a contract is ambiguous and extrinsic evidence offered in support of interpretation is disputed the meaning of the contract 3 terms is a question of fact

To determine whether a contract is ambiguous we resort to principles of contract interpretation, keeping in mind that our primary purpose is to ascertain and give effect to the parties’ objective intent

Phillip t Marsh Monsanto 66 V I 612 624 25 (V I Sup 2017) (citations and internal brackets omitted)

1113 A determination about ambiguity does not depend only on the clarity of the language used but

also on extrinsic evidence in support of each party’s interpretation White v Spenceley Realty LLC,

53 V I 666 (V I 2010) (quoting Teamsters Indus Employees Welfare Fund v Rolls Royce Motor

Cars Inc 989 F 2d 132 135 (3d Cir 1993) Extrinsic evidence to be considered may include each

party 5 conduct if it indicates their understanding of the contract’s meaning thte, 53 V I at 678

(citing CAT Aircraft Leasmg Inc v Cessna Aircraft Co 22 V I 442 (D VI 1986) ‘Where the

language of a contract is clear and unambiguous, the parties intent must be derived from the plain

meaning of its terms ” Phillip, 66 V 1 at 625

{[14 Further, the Court may grant summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Virgin Islands

Rules of Civil Procedure V IR Civ P 56 ‘Summary judgment is a drastic remedy ’ [and] is only

appropriate where the pleadings, the discovery, and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits

show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment

as a matter of law Anthony v FtrstBank Virgzn Islands 58 VI 224, 228 (Sup Ct 2013) (citing

Willzamsv United Corp 50V] 191 194 (Sup Ct 2008) Gunman! Imeslmenls LLCt Montpellier Holding Co LLC 2020 V 1 Super 061U SX 2009 CV 417 Memorandum Opinion Page 6 of 8

DISCUSSION

1 There is no genuine dispute of fact that the Defendants are indebted to the Plaintiff $250,000 in principal, plus quarterly net revenue

1115 In this case, the primary question is whether the Revenue Agreement is ambiguous The Court

has reviewed the language used in the Revenue Agreement and the parties’ extrinsic conduct and now

finds that it is unambiguous The Revenue Agreement clearly evinces the parties’ intent to set aside

the interest payment provision and replace it ” This statement is unambiguous and the Court applies

the plain meaning of the words the Revenue Agreement modifies and replaces the provisions of the

promissory note that required Montpeliier to pay interest after the payment of the principal

1116 The Revenue Agreement then says that Montpellier ‘will pay sixty percent (60%) of the net

rental revenue Here the use of the word ‘will’ plainly indicates a future obligation Though

historically the word shall’ has perhaps been more common in contract to denote a legal obligation,

the use of the word “will” is not problematic This is because the context of the sentence regarding

payment of the net rental revenue supports the creation of an obligation, as does the Revenue

Agreement’s attachment to the promissory note

1117 The meaning of net rental revenue’ also requires only its plain meaning whatever income is

received after the subtraction of associated expenses The parties have specified that this amount to be

deducted is the ‘normal operating expenses which is utilities taxes grounds and unit

maintenance The Court notes a distinction between the word ‘including,’ which would typically

indicate a non exhaustive list, and the parties’ use of the phrase ‘to include,” which considered in

context indicates a closed list of specific items

{[18 Furthermore, [p]ayments will be made on a quarterly basis ” This means that the net rental

revenue is to be paid to Clairmont four times per year, in a manner following the standard calendar

quarters as widely understood in business and society The parties then express a duration for the

agreement to pay net rental revenue by stating that it will be in effect until the payment of the Clan mom Investments LLC 1 Wontpellter Holding Co LLC 2020 V I Super 06lU SX 2009 CV 41'] Memorandum Opinion Page 7 of 8

promissory note has been satisfied ” This means that quarterly payments will continue until the entire

note is deemed satisfied within the meaning of the complete agreement

1119 The parties also give meaning to the term ‘ satisfied” in the remaining portion of the Revenue

Agreement it is their intent to satisfy the payment of such note with the exchange of a Warranty

Deed at which time the note will be canceled ” Here, Montpellier has asserted that the provision

means there is no requirement to pay the principal amount because the warranty deed is the new means

of complete payment Clairmont argues that the provision regarding payment of the principal remains

unchanged In order to make a proper determination regarding ambiguity, the Court has examined

extrinsic evidence including the parties conduct and concluded that there are no latent ambiguities

$120 In support of this determination is the fact that the Revenue Agreement ciearly and

unambiguously states that its scope is to replace the interest provision of the promissory note Taking

the contract as a whole, including the promissory note it is possible that the parties intended to modify

all the terms of payment by adding a clause to the Revenue Agreement, but this is very unlikely The

parties specifically stated that the interest provision of the note was being replaced but did not state

that the other terms were being modified and did not otherwise indicate an intent to redraft the terms

of the note As Clairmont points out, those specifications could easily have been made if they were

intended Additionally Montpellier s interpretation would mean that Clairmont might never be repaid

in any form This is especially true if as the Defendants claim, the property is not producing any net

rental revenue and they are continually unable to execute a warranty deed despite acting in good faith

to do so In considering the intent of the parties at the time of contracting, the Court doubts that

Clairmont intended to give Montpellier $250 000 without assurance of repayment That is, afier all,

the purpose of a promissory note Moreover Clairmont has provided exhibits indicating that Jeff Tee]

understands the note and Revenue Agreement to require payment of cash, as opposed to only the deed,

to satisfy the Defendants’ obligations Claitmon! Investments LLC‘ 1 Montpe/lier Holding Co LLC‘ 2020 V I Super 061U SX 2009 CV 417 Memorandum Opinion Page 8 of 8

{[21 In light of all the circumstances, the Court must find in favor Clairmont using the common

sense and plainest interpretation of the Revenue Agreement The warranty deed provision can only be

interpreted to mean that, after the principal is repaid and/or in addition thereto, Clairmont is entitled to

revenue payments (replacing the interest payments) until Montpellier gives Clairmont a warranty deed

to the subject property At the time the deed is given to Clairmont, Montpellier’s obligation to pay

rental revenue is extinguished because the note will be fully satisfied To this end, there is no genuine

dispute of fact that Clairmont is owed the principal due under the promissory note, plus quarterly

payments of net rental revenue (minus normal operating expenses) The quarterly payments must

continue until the deed is delivered

CONCLUSION

1122 In sum the materials on file demonstrate that there is no genuine dispute of fact that Clairmont

Investments is owed $250,000 in principal under the promissory note executed by the Defendants

Clairmont is also entitled to quarterly net revenue payments from the rental of the Clairmont Suite, as

stated in the Revenue Agreement, to continue until such time as the Defendants deliver a warranty

deed to the property to Clairmont The Court will grant summary judgment and award attorney fees to

Clairmont Accordingly, it is hereby

ORDERED that Clairmont Investments LLC 5 Motion for Summary Judgment is

GRANTED The Court will issue the judgment in a separate document MA DONE and so ORDERED this 269 day of May 2020

ATTEST pig/J; i/éc g 7/”W Tamara Charles HAROLD W L WILLOCKS Clerk of the Court Presiding Judge of the Superior Court ‘ 41.3) EMA-v ’ Coupervisor

Dated .74" JD SUPERIOR COURT OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS DIVISION OF ST CROIX

CLAIRMONT INVESTMENTS LLC

V SX 09 CV 417

MONTPELLIER HOLDING COMPANY LLC AND JEFF TEEL

ORDER

AND NOW in accordance with the Judgment of even date, it is hereby

ORDERED that this case be CLOSED The Court will retain jurisdiction over the matter for

sixty (60) days to allow the parties to make any necessary filings

DONE and so ORDERED this Qwfiy of May 2020

ATTEST L ’/ flJ76 7 Tamara Charles HAROLD W L WILLOC Clerk of the Court Presiding Judge of the Superior Court

By «I.» ’W Co w ervi or Dated I 171/JO