C.K.U., Petitioner-Respondent v. DARRELL W. HURT

• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals
• Decided: March 21, 2025
• Docket: SD38623
• Status: Published

Opinion

Missouri Court of Appeals Southern District

In Division C.K.U., ) ) Petitioner-Respondent, ) ) v. ) No. SD38623 ) DARRELL W. HURT, ) Filed: March 21, 2025 ) Respondent-Appellant. )

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF CAMDEN COUNTY

Honorable Heather Miller

JUDGMENT VACATED

In three points relied on, Darrell W. Hurt (“Neighbor”) appeals the “Judgment of the

Full Order of Protection – Adult” (“the Order”) in favor of C.K.U. (“Petitioner”). Finding

merit in Neighbor’s second point relied on that claims the Order’s conclusion that Neighbor

“stalked” Petitioner is not supported by substantial evidence, we vacate the Order.

Standard of Review & Governing Law

“In reviewing the trial court’s grant or denial of full orders of protection [under the

Missouri Adult Abuse Act (“the Act”), we] will sustain the judgment of the trial court unless

there is no evidence to support it, it is against the weight of the evidence, or it erroneously

declares or applies the law.” R.K. v. Kelly, 630 S.W.3d 904, 908 (Mo. App. W.D. 2021)

1 (alteration in original) (quoting L.M.M. v. J.L.G., 619 S.W.3d 593, 596 (Mo. App. E.D.

2021)). “Because the trial judge is in the best position to gauge the credibility of the

witnesses, in cases under [the Act], the discretion of the trial court should not often be

superseded.” Id. (quoting L.M.M., 619 S.W.3d at 596).

“Nevertheless, courts must exercise great care to ensure that sufficient evidence

exists to support all elements of the statute before entering a full order of protection.” Id.

(quoting L.M.M., 619 S.W.3d at 596). “Substantial evidence is evidence that, if believed,

has some probative force on each fact that is necessary to sustain the circuit court’s

judgment.” L.M.D. v. Gauert, 622 S.W.3d 712, 717-18 (Mo. App. W.D. 2021) (quoting

Ivie v. Smith, 439 S.W.3d 189, 199 (Mo. banc 2014)). “We view the facts and reasonable

inferences in the light most favorable to the judgment.” R.K., 630 S.W.3d at 907 n.2

(quoting L.M.M., 619 S.W.3d at 596).

The Evidence

As viewed in that light, the relevant facts are as follows. Petitioner and Neighbor

own adjoining tracts of land and have on-going property disputes about whether a driveway

located on Petitioner’s property is an easement benefiting Neighbor and where the correct

boundary line between their respective properties is located. Petitioner, her husband, and

their two minor children moved into a newly constructed house on the property in

December, 2023. Neighbor’s property contains a well and a partially-constructed house.

On August 14, 2023, when Petitioner visited her property to check on the progress of

her house construction, a heated encounter occurred between the parties. Neighbor, with a

beer in hand, was driving a four-wheeler around while intoxicated. After driving on

Petitioner’s property without having permission to do so, Neighbor inadvertently drove into

2 a pile of trash located on his own property. After observing the mayhem, Petitioner

“jokingly said [to Neighbor], ‘Hey, when [are] you going to move that trash?’”

Neighbor was annoyed by Petitioner’s remark, and Neighbor began yelling and

screaming at her, calling her “stupid” and a “dumb b****.” Neighbor and Petitioner

continued to argue about the trash. In addition to Petitioner’s children, Petitioner’s father

was present during the exchange. Petitioner’s father heard Neighbor yell at Petitioner that if

she didn’t shut her mouth, Neighbor would shut it for her, and Petitioner’s father observed

Neighbor “make several movements around that would be considered threatening.” No

physical contact occurred between Petitioner and Neighbor.

Neighbor has repeatedly used the driveway he claims as an easement, and he has

continually entered other parts of Petitioner’s property without permission. On one

occasion, Petitioner demanded that Neighbor leave her property, but Neighbor refused to do

so. Neighbor has also texted Petitioner’s husband, telling him that Petitioner is a “dumb

b****” and that people think she is crazy. Petitioner testified that Neighbor’s actions have

made her fear for her physical safety and have caused her to lose her inner peace such that

she does not want to be home unless her husband is present.

The circuit court found these facts to be sufficient to support a one-year order of

protection against Neighbor in favor of Petitioner and entered the Order on April 25, 2024.

Among other things, the Order granted exclusive possession of Petitioner’s property to

Petitioner and ordered Neighbor not to use the driveway and instead use another route to get

to his property.

Analysis

Neighbor’s second point claims:

3 The [circuit] court erred in entering [the Order] for [Petitioner] because the [circuit] court’s determination that [Neighbor] stalked [Petitioner] was not supported by substantial evidence, in that the evidence adduced at trial did not substantially satisfy the statutory requirements for a protection order per the [Act], sections 455.010 through 455.085, for the reason that evidence of a single incident is not sufficient to support a finding of “stalking” as defined by statute. [(Alteration in original.)]

We agree. “The Act provides that a person who has been subject to domestic

violence or has been the victim of stalking or sexual assault may seek an order of

protection.” L.M.D., 622 S.W.3d at 718 (citing section 455.020.1, RSMo 2016). As

Neighbor and Petitioner are not related, nor are they members of the same household, an

order of protection could only lawfully be entered against Neighbor if Petitioner presented

substantial evidence that Neighbor was “stalking” Petitioner. See id.

“The Act defines ‘[s]talking’ as ‘when any person purposely engages in an unwanted

course of conduct that causes alarm to another person ... when it is reasonable in that

person’s situation to have been alarmed by the conduct.’” Id. (quoting section

455.010(15)) 1 (emphasis added). “‘Course of conduct’ means a pattern of conduct

composed of ‘two or more acts’ over a period of time, however short, ‘that serve[s] no

legitimate purpose[.]’” Id. (quoting section 455.010(15)(b)). “‘Alarm’ means ‘to cause fear

of danger of physical harm[.]’” Id. (quoting section 455.010(15)(a)).

Therefore, to obtain relief under the Act, a petitioner must demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence: (1) that the respondent engaged in a pattern of conduct of at least two or more acts, (2) which served no legitimate purpose, (3) causing the petitioner to fear danger of physical harm, and (4) that the petitioner’s fear was reasonable.

Id.

1 Unless otherwise stated, all references to section 455.010 are to RSMo Cum. Supp. 2021.

4 For the sake of argument, we assume (as Neighbor implicitly does in his point) that

the August 14, 2023, encounter constituted an incident that caused Petitioner to be in fear of

danger of physical harm. That said, the record is devoid of any substantial evidence of a

subsequent encounter that would have caused a reasonable person to be in fear of danger of

physical harm. Although Petitioner testified that she feared Neighbor, no evidence was

adduced at trial of aggressive, intimidating, or forceful acts or threats committed by

Neighbor after the initial August 14, 2023, encounter. See R.K., 630 S.W.3d at 910-11

(order of protection vacated when second incident between the parties consisted only of

obscene language and hand gestures directed at the petitioner). If it is true that Neighbor has

repeatedly trespassed upon Petitioner’s property, excluding the disputed driveway easement,

it may be illegal or tortious, but it does not constitute substantial evidence of stalking as

defined in section 455.010(15).

Although we certainly do not condone the outrageous conduct described at trial, we

must be cautious in sustaining an order of protection between neighbors, especially when

there are ongoing property disputes between the parties. “[T]he stalking provision of the

[Act] was not meant to be a panacea for the minor arguments that frequently occur between

neighbors.” L.M.D., 622 S.W.3d at 718 (alteration in original) (quoting N.L.P. v. C.G.W.,

415 S.W.3d 800, 804 (Mo. App. E.D. 2013)).

Because no substantial evidence of a second incident that would have caused a

reasonable person to fear danger of physical harm was presented, we grant Neighbor’s

second point and vacate the Order. 2

DON E. BURRELL, J. – OPINION AUTHOR JENNIFER R. GROWCOCK, C.J. – CONCURS BECKY J. WEST, J. – CONCURS

2 Because Point 2 is dispositive of this appeal, we need not reach Neighbor’s first or third points relied on.