Civill v. Wright
This text of 13 Wend. 403 (Civill v. Wright) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New York Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
held that the provision of the revised statutes, that, “to entitle a defendant to a set-off, he must plead or give notice of the same, specifying the nature of his claim with reasonable certainty, at the time of joining issue on a question of fact upon the merits of the cause,” 2 R. S. 235, § 51, although more specific than the former act on this subject, 1 R. L. 389, § 6, is onl y declaratory of the law in relation to pleadings in justices’ courts as it existed previous to the revision. 9 John R. 366. 3 Wendell,492. Thatitwas sufficient, on the join[404]*404ing of an issue in a justice’s court, for a defendant to say ^at he plead the general issue, and gave notice of set-off, unless the plaintiff at the time objected to the defence for want certainty, or required a specification of the nature of the defendant’s claim; and if he did not so objector require such specification, he could not- subsequently, on the trial of the cause, object to evidence of set-off on the ground that the nature of the claim had not been specified, at the time of joining the issue, with sufficient certainty. The court- therefore adjudged that the justice erred in exc'uding the evidence offered, and that, t íe common pleas, instead of affirming, ought to have rever .ed the judgment of the justice. See 3 Johns. R. 436.
Judgment reversed.
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13 Wend. 403, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/civill-v-wright-nysupct-1835.