FILED MAY 16, 2024 In the Office of the Clerk of Court WA State Court of Appeals Division III
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON DIVISION THREE
CITY OF YAKIMA, ) ) No. 39535-9-III Petitioner, ) ) v. ) ) HEATHER R. KILLION, ) UNPUBLISHED OPINION ) Respondent. )
COONEY, J. — The city of Yakima (City) appeals a superior court order that
directs the Yakima Municipal Court to grant Heather Killion’s petition to vacate the
record of a decades-old conviction. This appeal asks us to decide whether the superior
court applied the correct standard of review and whether, for purposes of RCW
9.96.060(2)(a), Ms. Killion completed the terms of the sentence for the offense.
Answering both questions in the affirmative, we conclude Ms. Killion is statutorily
eligible for vacatur of her conviction and remand for the municipal court to meaningfully
consider her petition.
BACKGROUND
On February 24, 2003, the Yakima Municipal Court found Ms. Killion guilty of
possession of drug paraphernalia. She was sentenced to 90 days in jail, with 89 days
suspended, $615 in legal financial obligations, and two years of probation. Under the No. 39535-9-III City of Yakima v. Killion
terms of her probation, Ms. Killion was required to obtain an alcohol and drug
assessment, complete any recommended treatment, abstain from alcohol and drugs, and
maintain law abiding behavior. Ms. Killion served one day in jail and satisfied her legal
financial obligations.
As it relates to Ms. Killion’s probation, on September 22, 2003, the probation
department filed a petition for revocation. Thereafter, Ms. Killion sent a letter to the
municipal court asking that her probation be revoked. On October 22, 2003, the
municipal court revoked Ms. Killion’s probation and sentenced her to 10 days in jail.
According to the Yakima Municipal Court docket, the court “Excused/Waived” Ms.
Killion’s probation, along with the requirement she complete an alcohol and drug
assessment and treatment. Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 71. Pursuant to the State of
Washington’s archive destruction rules, on October 14, 2015, Ms. Killion’s case file was
destroyed.
In March 2022, Ms. Killion filed a petition to vacate the record of her conviction.
Without providing a basis for its decision, the municipal court denied Ms. Killion’s
petition. In response, Ms. Killion’s attorney sent an e-mail to the municipal court
inquiring, “Is it safe to assume that Ms. Killion’s motion to vacate was denied because
she was terminated from probation?” CP at 14. The municipal court judge responded
that she “[did] not believe all her conditions were met.” Id.
2 No. 39535-9-III City of Yakima v. Killion
Ms. Killion appealed to the Yakima County Superior Court. The superior court
determined that the municipal court had “legally waived all the remaining sentencing
conditions . . . that had been originally imposed on February 24, 2003 and imposed 10
days in jail which Plaintiff fully completed.” CP at 51. Because the conditions had been
waived, the superior court held that the “conditions were fully satisfied as a matter of
law.” CP at 52. The superior court remanded for “the municipal court to provide specific
reasons why Ms. Killion’s motion to vacate was denied.” Id.
In response, the municipal court judge filed with the superior court a document
entitled, “Remand Reply from Superior Court Providing Specific Reasoning and Rational
as to Denial of Plaintiff’s Motion to Vacate.” CP at 53 (some capitalization omitted). In
it, the municipal court judge speculated that the “‘Excused/Waived’” notation was
merely a “keystroke error” made by the clerk of the court. CP at 56. The municipal court
judge suspected the clerk’s intent was to enter a “T” for “terminated” rather than an “E”
for “[e]xcused.” Id.
On January 6, 2023, the superior court held a second hearing. Later, the superior
court ruled that the record was void of any sworn testimony to support the municipal
court judge’s finding that the “minute entries were ‘simply a key stroke error made by the
clerk.’” CP at 120. The superior court concluded the municipal court had abused its
discretion in finding “that Ms. Killion did not complete, or otherwise be relieved of, all of
3 No. 39535-9-III City of Yakima v. Killion
the conditions of her sentence” and directed the municipal court to grant Ms. Killion’s
petition. Id.
The City timely appeals.
ANALYSIS
On appeal the City argues that the superior court employed an incorrect standard
of review and that the municipal court did not commit any errors of law when it found
Ms. Killion had failed to complete the terms of her sentence.
WHETHER THE SUPERIOR COURT EMPLOYED THE PROPER STANDARD OF REVIEW
The City contends the superior court improperly reviewed the municipal court’s
decision de novo rather than for any errors of law. We disagree.
The Rules for Appeal of Decisions of Courts of Limited Jurisdiction (RALJ)
govern appeals from a municipal court to a superior court. Under RALJ 9.1(a), the
superior court reviews “the decision of the court of limited jurisdiction to determine
whether that court has committed any errors of law.” RALJ 9.1(b) requires the superior
court to “accept those factual determinations supported by substantial evidence in the
record (1) which were expressly made by the court of limited jurisdiction, or (2) that may
reasonably be inferred from the judgment of the court of limited jurisdiction.”
Accordingly, “[i]t is not within the superior court’s scope of review to examine the
evidence de novo.” State v. Basson, 105 Wn.2d 314, 317, 714 P.2d 1188 (1986).
4 No. 39535-9-III City of Yakima v. Killion
“‘Substantial evidence is evidence sufficient to persuade a fair-minded rational
person of the finding’s truth.’” State v. Stewart, 12 Wn. App. 2d 236, 240, 457 P.3d
1213 (2020) (quoting State v. Solomon, 114 Wn. App. 781,789, 60 P.3d 1215 (2002)). If
substantial evidence supports the lower court’s findings then “‘a reviewing court will not
substitute its judgment for that of the trial court even though it may have resolved a
factual dispute differently.’” In re Custody of A.T., 11 Wn. App. 2d 156, 162, 451 P.3d
1132 (2019) (quoting Sunnyside Valley Irrig. Dist. v. Dickie, 149 Wn.2d 873, 879-80, 73
P.3d 369 (2003)). Because the trial court is in a better position to evaluate the evidence,
there exists a presumption in favor of the trial court’s findings. Fisher Props., Inc. v.
Arden-Mayfair, Inc., 115 Wn.2d 364, 369, 798 P.2d 799 (1990).
Here, the superior court did not review the municipal court’s decision de novo.
Rather, the superior court determined that the municipal court’s finding that the terms of
Ms. Killion’s probation was “Excused/Waived” was due to a “keystroke error” was not
supported by substantial evidence. The superior court properly noted that “there [was] no
sworn testimony in this record to support [this] finding[ ].” CP at 120. Accordingly, the
superior court held that the municipal court committed an error of law in finding Ms.
Killion statutorily ineligible to have the record of her conviction vacated. The superior
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FILED MAY 16, 2024 In the Office of the Clerk of Court WA State Court of Appeals Division III
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON DIVISION THREE
CITY OF YAKIMA, ) ) No. 39535-9-III Petitioner, ) ) v. ) ) HEATHER R. KILLION, ) UNPUBLISHED OPINION ) Respondent. )
COONEY, J. — The city of Yakima (City) appeals a superior court order that
directs the Yakima Municipal Court to grant Heather Killion’s petition to vacate the
record of a decades-old conviction. This appeal asks us to decide whether the superior
court applied the correct standard of review and whether, for purposes of RCW
9.96.060(2)(a), Ms. Killion completed the terms of the sentence for the offense.
Answering both questions in the affirmative, we conclude Ms. Killion is statutorily
eligible for vacatur of her conviction and remand for the municipal court to meaningfully
consider her petition.
BACKGROUND
On February 24, 2003, the Yakima Municipal Court found Ms. Killion guilty of
possession of drug paraphernalia. She was sentenced to 90 days in jail, with 89 days
suspended, $615 in legal financial obligations, and two years of probation. Under the No. 39535-9-III City of Yakima v. Killion
terms of her probation, Ms. Killion was required to obtain an alcohol and drug
assessment, complete any recommended treatment, abstain from alcohol and drugs, and
maintain law abiding behavior. Ms. Killion served one day in jail and satisfied her legal
financial obligations.
As it relates to Ms. Killion’s probation, on September 22, 2003, the probation
department filed a petition for revocation. Thereafter, Ms. Killion sent a letter to the
municipal court asking that her probation be revoked. On October 22, 2003, the
municipal court revoked Ms. Killion’s probation and sentenced her to 10 days in jail.
According to the Yakima Municipal Court docket, the court “Excused/Waived” Ms.
Killion’s probation, along with the requirement she complete an alcohol and drug
assessment and treatment. Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 71. Pursuant to the State of
Washington’s archive destruction rules, on October 14, 2015, Ms. Killion’s case file was
destroyed.
In March 2022, Ms. Killion filed a petition to vacate the record of her conviction.
Without providing a basis for its decision, the municipal court denied Ms. Killion’s
petition. In response, Ms. Killion’s attorney sent an e-mail to the municipal court
inquiring, “Is it safe to assume that Ms. Killion’s motion to vacate was denied because
she was terminated from probation?” CP at 14. The municipal court judge responded
that she “[did] not believe all her conditions were met.” Id.
2 No. 39535-9-III City of Yakima v. Killion
Ms. Killion appealed to the Yakima County Superior Court. The superior court
determined that the municipal court had “legally waived all the remaining sentencing
conditions . . . that had been originally imposed on February 24, 2003 and imposed 10
days in jail which Plaintiff fully completed.” CP at 51. Because the conditions had been
waived, the superior court held that the “conditions were fully satisfied as a matter of
law.” CP at 52. The superior court remanded for “the municipal court to provide specific
reasons why Ms. Killion’s motion to vacate was denied.” Id.
In response, the municipal court judge filed with the superior court a document
entitled, “Remand Reply from Superior Court Providing Specific Reasoning and Rational
as to Denial of Plaintiff’s Motion to Vacate.” CP at 53 (some capitalization omitted). In
it, the municipal court judge speculated that the “‘Excused/Waived’” notation was
merely a “keystroke error” made by the clerk of the court. CP at 56. The municipal court
judge suspected the clerk’s intent was to enter a “T” for “terminated” rather than an “E”
for “[e]xcused.” Id.
On January 6, 2023, the superior court held a second hearing. Later, the superior
court ruled that the record was void of any sworn testimony to support the municipal
court judge’s finding that the “minute entries were ‘simply a key stroke error made by the
clerk.’” CP at 120. The superior court concluded the municipal court had abused its
discretion in finding “that Ms. Killion did not complete, or otherwise be relieved of, all of
3 No. 39535-9-III City of Yakima v. Killion
the conditions of her sentence” and directed the municipal court to grant Ms. Killion’s
petition. Id.
The City timely appeals.
ANALYSIS
On appeal the City argues that the superior court employed an incorrect standard
of review and that the municipal court did not commit any errors of law when it found
Ms. Killion had failed to complete the terms of her sentence.
WHETHER THE SUPERIOR COURT EMPLOYED THE PROPER STANDARD OF REVIEW
The City contends the superior court improperly reviewed the municipal court’s
decision de novo rather than for any errors of law. We disagree.
The Rules for Appeal of Decisions of Courts of Limited Jurisdiction (RALJ)
govern appeals from a municipal court to a superior court. Under RALJ 9.1(a), the
superior court reviews “the decision of the court of limited jurisdiction to determine
whether that court has committed any errors of law.” RALJ 9.1(b) requires the superior
court to “accept those factual determinations supported by substantial evidence in the
record (1) which were expressly made by the court of limited jurisdiction, or (2) that may
reasonably be inferred from the judgment of the court of limited jurisdiction.”
Accordingly, “[i]t is not within the superior court’s scope of review to examine the
evidence de novo.” State v. Basson, 105 Wn.2d 314, 317, 714 P.2d 1188 (1986).
4 No. 39535-9-III City of Yakima v. Killion
“‘Substantial evidence is evidence sufficient to persuade a fair-minded rational
person of the finding’s truth.’” State v. Stewart, 12 Wn. App. 2d 236, 240, 457 P.3d
1213 (2020) (quoting State v. Solomon, 114 Wn. App. 781,789, 60 P.3d 1215 (2002)). If
substantial evidence supports the lower court’s findings then “‘a reviewing court will not
substitute its judgment for that of the trial court even though it may have resolved a
factual dispute differently.’” In re Custody of A.T., 11 Wn. App. 2d 156, 162, 451 P.3d
1132 (2019) (quoting Sunnyside Valley Irrig. Dist. v. Dickie, 149 Wn.2d 873, 879-80, 73
P.3d 369 (2003)). Because the trial court is in a better position to evaluate the evidence,
there exists a presumption in favor of the trial court’s findings. Fisher Props., Inc. v.
Arden-Mayfair, Inc., 115 Wn.2d 364, 369, 798 P.2d 799 (1990).
Here, the superior court did not review the municipal court’s decision de novo.
Rather, the superior court determined that the municipal court’s finding that the terms of
Ms. Killion’s probation was “Excused/Waived” was due to a “keystroke error” was not
supported by substantial evidence. The superior court properly noted that “there [was] no
sworn testimony in this record to support [this] finding[ ].” CP at 120. Accordingly, the
superior court held that the municipal court committed an error of law in finding Ms.
Killion statutorily ineligible to have the record of her conviction vacated. The superior
court appropriately reviewed the record for any errors of law.
5 No. 39535-9-III City of Yakima v. Killion
WHETHER MS. KILLION COMPLETED THE TERMS OF HER SENTENCE
The City contends the municipal court did not abuse its discretion in denying the
petition because Ms. Killion had not “completed all of the terms of the sentence for the
offense.” RCW 9.96.060(2)(a). We disagree.
Statutory interpretations are issues of law that we review de novo. Spokane
County v. Dep’t of Fish & Wildlife, 192 Wn.2d 453, 457, 430 P.3d 655 (2018). When we
engage in statutory interpretation “our fundamental objective is to determine and give
effect to the intent of the legislature.” State v. Sweany, 174 Wn.2d 909, 914, 281 P.3d
305 (2012). “When possible, we derive legislative intent solely from the plain language
enacted by the legislature, considering the text of the provision in question, the context of
the statute in which the provision is found, related provisions, and the statutory scheme as
a whole.” State v. Evans, 177 Wn.2d 186, 192, 298 P.3d 724 (2013) (citing State v.
Ervin, 169 Wn.2d 815, 820, 239 P.3d 354 (2010)). “Plain language that is not ambiguous
does not require construction.” Evans, 177 Wn.2d at 192.
Under RCW 9.96.060(2), “[i]f the court finds the applicant meets the requirements
of this subsection, the court may in its discretion vacate the record of conviction.”
(Emphasis added.) Among other limitations, RCW 9.96.060(2)(a) precludes a court from
vacating a conviction if the applicant “has not completed all of the terms of the sentence
for the offense.” However, the statute is silent on what constitutes completion of the
terms of the sentence.
6 No. 39535-9-III City of Yakima v. Killion
The municipal court “Excused/Waived” Ms. Killion’s probation and all of the
terms required therein. CP at 71. The term “waive” is defined as “to relinquish
voluntarily” or “to refrain from pressing or enforcing.” WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2570 (1993). The definition of “complete” is “to bring to
an end often into or as if into a finished or perfected state” and “to make whole, entire, or
perfect : end after satisfying all demands or requirements.” WEBSTER’S, supra, at 465.
When the municipal court waived Ms. Killion’s probation and the required terms,
it inherently found she had satisfied all of her obligations. Upon waiving Ms. Killion’s
probation, the municipal court voluntarily relinquished its ability to enforce the terms of
its sentence. Under the unique facts presented here, for purposes of RCW 9.96.060(2)(a),
Ms. Killion completed all of the terms of her sentence.
Briefing from amici urges us to broadly hold that “complete[ ] all of the terms of
the sentence for the offense” means the moving party has no outstanding legal obligations
related to the offense. Because we conclude that the terms of Ms. Killion’s sentence
were waived rather than terminated, we need not expand the scope of review to decide
the legislative intent of “completed” within the meaning of RCW 9.96.060(2).
The City contends that, under RCW 35.20.255(1), once the municipal court
terminated Ms. Killion’s probation it was thereafter prohibited from waiving any of the
terms of her probation. Although the City is correct, it failed to timely appeal the
municipal court’s order of October 22, 2003, that waived Ms. Killion’s probation.
7 No. 39535-9-III City of Yakima v. Killion
RALJ 2.5(a) requires a notice of appeal to be filed within 30 days after the date of entry
of the final decision. Further, a “court’s failure to operate within a statutory framework
at best render[s] an order voidable, not void.” In re Marriage of Wilson, 117 Wn. App.
40, 49, 68 P.3d 1121 (2003).
WHETHER THE MUNICIPAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT DENIED MS. KILLION’S MOTION
The City contends that even if Ms. Killion completed the terms of her sentence,
the municipal court possessed broad discretion to deny her petition. We agree.
The superior court remanded the petition to the municipal court “to provide
specific reasons why Ms. Killion’s motion to vacate was denied.” CP at 52. The
municipal court responded that “the Plaintiff did not complete all of the terms of her
original sentence as required by RCW 9.96.060 to obtain a vacation.” CP at 56. After a
second hearing, the superior court again remanded to the municipal court, this time
ordering the municipal court to grant Ms. Killion’s petition.
Provided an applicant is not precluded from having their conviction vacated under
RCW 9.96.060(2)(a)-(f), the municipal court may, in its discretion, vacate the record of
conviction. A trial court’s discretionary decision is reversable where it (1) adopts a view
that no reasonable person would take and is thus “manifestly unreasonable,” (2) rests on
facts unsupported in the record and is thus based on “untenable grounds,” or (3) was
reached by applying the wrong legal standard and is thus made “for untenable reasons.”
8 No. 39535-9-III City of Yakima v. Killion
State v. Sisouvanh, 175 Wn.2d 607, 623, 290 P.3d 942 (2012) (internal quotation marks
omitted). Here, the municipal court found Ms. Killion statutorily ineligible for vacatur
and never exercised its discretion.
We remand to the municipal court to exercise its discretion and meaningfully
consider Ms. Killion’s petition to have the record of her conviction vacated.
A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the
Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW
2.06.040.
Cooney, J.
WE CONCUR:
Lawrence-Berrey, C.J.
Pennell, J.