City of Whitefish v. T. Curran

• Court: Montana Supreme Court
• Decided: March 31, 2026
• Docket: DA 24-0054
• Status: Published

Opinion

03/31/2026

DA 24-0054 Case Number: DA 24-0054

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 2026 MT 65

CITY OF WHITEFISH,

Plaintiff and Appellee,

v.

THOMAS G. CURRAN,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Eleventh Judicial District, In and For the County of Flathead, Cause No. DC-2023-288 Honorable Danni Coffman, Presiding Judge COUNSEL OF RECORD:

For Appellant:

Abigail Mathews, Attorney at Law, Great Falls, Montana

For Appellee:

Austin Knudsen, Montana Attorney General, Cori Losing, Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana

Angela Jacobs, Whitefish City Attorney, Renn Fairchild, Deputy City Attorney, Whitefish, Montana

Submitted on Briefs: July 30, 2025

Decided: March 31, 2026

Filed:

__________________________________________ Clerk Justice Beth Baker delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶1 Thomas Curran appeals his 2023 sentence from the City of Whitefish Municipal

Court for Operating a Motor Vehicle with a BAC of .08% or Greater (DUI per se), first

offense. Curran appealed to the Eleventh Judicial District Court, which affirmed the

Municipal Court’s Judgment. On appeal before this Court, Curran argues that the

Municipal Court improperly imposed a $600 suspended fine that he lacked the ability to

pay. We affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 Curran pleaded guilty in August 2020 to first-offense DUI per se under

§ 61-8-406(1)(a), MCA (2019).1 The parties’ plea agreement recommended in part that

the court impose a combined fine and surcharge of $685, with a proviso that “Defendant

requests the court inquire into his ability to pay the fine and suspend the fine and surcharge

in the interests of justice if the court finds that he is unable to pay the fine.” The plea

agreement further recommended that Curran be required to complete the Assessment,

Course, and Treatment Program and to comply with treatment recommendations.

¶3 The Municipal Court held a sentencing hearing and heard testimony from then

73-year-old Curran about his financial and personal circumstances that rendered him

1 This section was repealed effective January 1, 2022, as part of a package to revise and reorganize Montana’s DUI statutes. Curran is subject to the penalties described in § 61-8-722, MCA, in effect at the time of his offense. City of Whitefish v. Curran, 2023 MT 118, ¶ 2 n.1, 412 Mont. 499, 531 P.3d 547 (Curran I). Unless otherwise indicated, all references are to the 2019 version of the Montana Code Annotated. 2 unable to pay the $600 minimum fine required by the applicable sentencing statute,

§ 61-8-722(1), MCA. Curran’s counsel requested that the court suspend the fine entirely

on account of Curran’s inability to pay. Though sympathetic, the Municipal Court did not

believe it had the discretion to do so. It imposed the $600 minimum fine but waived the

$85 statutory surcharge. After the District Court affirmed the sentence, Curran appealed.

¶4 We held in Curran I that the Municipal Court imposed a lawful sentence but abused

its discretion by not considering alternatives to satisfy Curran’s obligation for the $600

fine. Curran I, ¶¶ 20-21, 27. We concluded that under § 46-18-201(2)(a), (3)(b), MCA,

“the Municipal Court had the authority to suspend Curran’s fine or order donation to the

food bank in lieu of monetary payment.” Curran I, ¶ 25 (internal quotations omitted). We

remanded “for consideration of alternative methods authorized by statute for satisfying the

fine.” Curran I, ¶ 30.

¶5 On remand, the Municipal Court held another hearing. Curran, by then 76 years

old, advised the court that his financial situation had not changed in the two years that his

case was pending on appeal. His source of income remained social security, with all of his

income going toward living expenses. Curran explained that he had approximately $100

to $120 for food at the end of the month. Curran uses a walker and relies on supplemental

oxygen. Because of these circumstances, Curran objected to the imposition of any fine or

alternative. The City did not object to suspension of the fine on the condition that Curran

complete the Prime for Life course, which was ordered as part of Curran’s original

sentence. 3 ¶6 The Municipal Court took the view that any of Curran’s available resources should

go toward chemical dependency evaluation and treatment. Based on the information

Curran presented, the court imposed a $600 fine and suspended the fine in its entirety,

subject to Curran completing the remaining conditions of his original sentence, including

that Curran sign up for the Prime for Life course and provide proof of that enrollment to

the court within 30 days. The Municipal Court later stayed its sentence pending resolution

of this appeal.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶7 “Whether a sentence is legal is a question of law that we review de novo to

determine whether the court’s interpretation of the law is correct.” State v. Daricek, 2018

MT 31, ¶ 7, 390 Mont. 273, 412 P.3d 1044 (citation omitted).

DISCUSSION

¶8 Curran argues that he received an illegal sentence when the Whitefish Municipal

Court imposed a suspended $600 fine for DUI per se because the mandatory nature of the

minimum fine renders the sentencing statute facially unconstitutional. Curran points to

§ 46-18-231(3), MCA, which provides that a sentencing judge “may not sentence an

offender to pay a fine unless the offender is or will be able to pay the fine.” He relies on

State v. Gibbons, 2024 MT 63, ¶¶ 51, 66, 416 Mont. 1, 545 P.3d 686, cert. denied, ___

U.S. ___, 145 S. Ct. 355 (2024), in which this Court held that a mandatory fine

unconstitutionally removes the sentencing court’s discretion to consider proportionality

factors such as the nature of the offense and the offender’s ability to pay. The State 4 responds that the plain language of § 61-8-722(1), MCA, supports that if the sentencing

court elects to impose a fine, the $600 mandatory minimum fine is proportional to a

first-offense DUI. The State argues further that Gibbons is manifestly wrong and should

be overruled.

¶9 Curran’s appeal is resolved by our recent decision in State v. Cole, 2026 MT 52,

___ Mont. ___, ___ P.3d ___. We determined there that § 46-18-231(3), MCA, may be

harmonized with other statutory provisions “by requiring the sentencing court to determine

the defendant’s ability to pay the fine and allowing it to suspend all or part of the fine

consistent with that determination.” Cole, ¶ 13 (citation omitted). We noted that the plain

language of § 46-18-231(3), MCA, makes “no exceptions for statutes that establish a

mandatory minimum fine” and that § 46-18-201(2), MCA, grants a sentencing judge

express authority to “suspend execution of [a] sentence,” unless “specifically provided by

statute.” Cole, ¶ 11 (internal quotations and citations omitted). Harmonizing these

provisions, we concluded that a sentencing court must determine the defendant’s ability to

pay a minimum fine in compliance with § 46-18-231(3), MCA, and then must “use its

authority under § 46-18-201(2), MCA (2019), to suspend the mandatory fine to the extent

that the defendant lacks the ability to pay.” Cole, ¶ 14. We overruled Gibbons to the extent

it held that § 61-8-731(3), MCA (2019)—setting a $5,000 mandatory minimum fine for

felony DUIs—was facially unconstitutional. Cole, ¶¶ 22-29. Because Cole’s sentencing

court imposed the minimum statutory fine and suspended all but $100 of it (for which Cole

received credit for a day spent in jail), we upheld the sentence. Cole, ¶¶ 4, 29. 5 ¶10 We reach the same conclusion here. The record makes clear that the Municipal

Court complied with § 46-18-231(3), MCA, by considering Curran’s financial

circumstances, prospects for future income, and ability to pay a fine; complied with

§ 61-8-722(1), MCA, by imposing the $600 minimum fine; and followed § 46-18-201(2),

MCA, when it suspended the fine in its entirety. Curran’s sentence is not illegal.

CONCLUSION

¶11 The District Court’s order affirming the Municipal Court’s sentence and judgment

is affirmed.

/S/ BETH BAKER

We Concur:

/S/ CORY J. SWANSON /S/ JAMES JEREMIAH SHEA /S/ JIM RICE

Justices Ingrid Gustafson, Laurie McKinnon, and Katherine Bidegaray, dissenting.

¶12 We dissent. The statute at issue here, § 61-8-722(1), MCA, requires imposition of

a mandatory minimum fine regardless of a defendant’s ability to pay. In State v. Gibbons,

2024 MT 63, 416 Mont 1, 545 P.3d 686, cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 145 S. Ct. 355 (2024),

this Court determined that § 61-8-731(3), MCA, was unconstitutional as it precluded

sentencing courts from assessing a defendant’s ability to pay and required imposition of a

mandatory minimum fine. Gibbons, fundamentally, concerned the constitutional

6 prohibition of imposing fines on those people uniquely unable to pay them. Since Gibbons

was issued, the State relentlessly crusaded for it to be overturned. In State v. Vaska,

2025 MT 168, 423 Mont. 194, 573 P.3d 327, we declined to overrule Gibbons. We observe

that every state court that has considered the question appears to have aligned itself with

the Court’s reasoning in Gibbons. See City of Seattle v. Long, 493 P.3d 94, 144 (Wash.

2021) (“We pay more than ‘lip service’ to the excessive fines clause and instead hew to its

history. . . . [C]ourts considering whether a fine is constitutionally excessive should also

consider a person’s ability to pay.”); see, e.g. People v. Cowan, 260 Cal. Rptr. 505, 520

(2020) (“It is apparent . . . that California courts, borrowing from a line of federal cases,

have adopted a broad reading of Bajakajian in which ability to pay must be taken into

account as a factor bearing on proportionality. . . . Because ability to pay is an element of

the excessive fines calculus under both the federal and state Constitutions, we conclude

that a sentencing court may not impose court operations or facilities assessments or

restitution fines without giving the defendant, on request, an opportunity to present

evidence and argument why such monetary extractions exceed his ability to pay.”) (citing

United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 312, 118 S. Ct. 2028 (1998)); Oregon v. Goodenow,

282 P.3d 8, 17 (Or. 2012) (citing Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 335-36, 118 S. Ct. at 2037, the

court held that when assessing the severity of a defendant’s fine, courts must consider the

amount of the obligation and the effect of the obligation on the defendant, noting that

“[w]hether an otherwise proportional fine is excessive can depend on, for example, the

financial resources available to a defendant, the other financial obligations of the

7 defendant, and the effect of the fine on the defendant’s ability to be self-sufficient.”); Stuart

v. State Dep’t of Safety, 963 S.W.2d 28, 36 (Tenn. 1998) (“[C]ourts should consider the

monetary value of the property forfeited, particularly in light of the claimant’s financial

resources.”); Colo. Dep’t of Lab. & Emp. v. Dami Hosp., LLC, 2019 CO 47M, ¶ 31,

442 P.3d 94 (Colo. 2019) (“The concept of ‘proportionality’ itself also persuades us that

ability to pay is an appropriate element of the Excessive Fines Clause gross

disproportionality analysis. . . . We thus conclude that courts considering whether a fine is

constitutionally excessive should consider ability to pay in making that assessment.”);

United States v. Levesque, 546 F.3d 78, 83-84 (1st Cir. 2008) (“[T]he notion that a

forfeiture should not be so great as to deprive a wrongdoer of his or her livelihood is deeply

rooted in the history of the Eighth Amendment.”). It is apparent that several modern state

and federal courts have concluded that the history of state and federal excessive fines

clauses suggest that considering ability to pay is constitutionally required.

¶13 Regardless, the State remained undaunted in its crusade. This crusade was

eventually successful in State v. Cole, 2026 MT 52, ____ Mont. ___, ___ P.3d ___. Since

Gibbons, the only change of significance that occurred prior to Cole is the make-up of this

Court. In Cole, under the guise of statutory harmonization, the Opinion ignored the plain

language of § 46-18-231(3), MCA—“The sentencing judge may not sentence an offender

to pay a fine unless the offender is or will be able to pay the fine.” Whether a fine is

suspended after it is imposed is irrelevant to the predicate determination of the defendant’s

ability to pay the minimum prescribed fine. “The sentencing authority of a court exists

8 solely by virtue of a statutory grant of power and therefore cannot be exercised in any

manner not specifically authorized.” State v. Lenihan, 184 Mont. 338, 342, 602 P.2d 997,

1000 (1979) (quoting Oregon v. Braughton, 561 P.2d 1040, 1041 n.2 (Or. App. 1977)).

The initial sentence imposed must be within the limits of punishment authorized by statute.

When an offender has no ability to pay the fine, § 46-18-231(3), MCA, as explained in

Gibbons, prevents a court from imposing the fine, regardless of whether it is suspended.

Permitting a sentencing court to impose a fine on a defendant who lacks the ability to pay

on the theory that the sentencing court suspends the fine after its imposition, in essence,

overturns Gibbons without specifically acknowledging such. The Opinion is at odds with

our holding in Gibbons.

¶14 In her dissent in Cole, Justice Bidegaray appropriately analyzed the issue of whether

suspension of a fine cures the constitutional defect of imposition of a mandatory minimum

fine on a defendant who cannot and will not be able to pay the fine. As summarized in her

dissent, it is the Court’s obligation to apply the law faithfully and to ensure that sentencing

practices comply with constitutional limitations and controlling precedent as they exist,

including the prohibition against excessive fines, not to revise them through strained

statutory construction. Nothing in this record or in intervening law justifies departure from

those principles. As such, we continue to agree with and adopt the dissent analysis in Cole

as if fully set forth here. We would reverse and remand to the District Court to strike the

imposition of the mandatory minimum fine from the Judgment—suspension of an illegal

fine does not cure its illegality.

9 ¶15 Other than a change in the composition of this Court, nothing has changed since our

holding in Gibbons, and the lesson to be gleaned here is that litigants unhappy with a

determination of this Court should relentlessly seek to overturn it as there will inevitably

be future change in this Court’s make-up.

/S/ INGRID GUSTAFSON /S/ LAURIE McKINNON /S/ KATHERINE M. BIDEGARAY