2020 IL App (2d) 170971-U No. 2-17-0971 Order filed March 27, 2020
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). ______________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
SECOND DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________
THE CITY OF WHEATON, ) Appeal from the Circuit Court ) of Du Page County. Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ) v. ) No. 17-DT-1159 ) DENZEL L. CROWLEY, ) Honorable ) Paul A. Marchese, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, Presiding. ______________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE HUTCHINSON delivered the judgment of the court. Justices McLaren and Zenoff concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: The prosecution proved the corpus delicti of DUI by introducing independent evidence to corroborate defendant’s extrajudicial statement that he had driven a vehicle after drinking.
¶2 After a bench trial, defendant, Denzel L. Crowley, was convicted of driving with a breath
alcohol concentration (BAC) of more than 0.08 (DUI) (625 ILCS 5/11-501(a)(1) (West 2016)) and
placed on two years’ supervision. On appeal, he contends that he was not proved guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt, because there was insufficient evidence of the corpus delicti. We affirm.
¶3 I. BACKGROUND 2020 IL App (2d) 170971-U
¶4 At trial, the sole witness, Wheaton police officer Chris Harpling, testified on direct
examination as follows. Late in the evening of May 12, 2017, he and three other officers were
dispatched to the home at 1348 Loughbrough Court. Harpling spoke with the homeowner, then
went outside. Near the house, he saw defendant and David Maines, the homeowner’s son.
¶5 Shortly after midnight, Harpling returned to 1348 Loughbrough Court. He spoke to the
homeowner and Riley McDermott. Another officer located defendant behind the house. Harpling
asked defendant what had happened between Harpling’s first visit and his return. Defendant
replied that he had walked to McDermott’s home on Williamsburg Court because he had been
concerned about McDermott walking home from the Maines residence. Defendant said that he
opened the purse belonging to McDermott’s mother, Cheryl McManus, took the key to her vehicle,
and drove back to the Maines house.
¶6 Harpling testified that, as he spoke to defendant, he saw a gray Honda parked in the
driveway. He did not remember whether any other cars were there. Defendant appeared to be
intoxicated. He admitted drinking vodka between 10 and 11 p.m. Harpling had defendant perform
field-sobriety tests and arrested defendant for DUI. He searched defendant’s clothing and found
the key to a vehicle. Defendant “indicated” that it was the key to the Honda. Harpling testified,
“And it was, I believe, later confirmed that it was the key to the vehicle.”
¶7 Harpling testified that he also recovered a credit card from defendant. Defendant told him
that McManus had given him the credit card. Harpling transported defendant to the police station,
where defendant said that he could not remember whether he had taken McManus’s credit card
out of her purse when he took the key. A test disclosed that defendant’s BAC was 0.19.
¶8 Harpling testified that, when he first went to 1348 Loughbrough Court, McManus was not
there. After he left the second time, another officer transported McManus there to retrieve her car.
-2- 2020 IL App (2d) 170971-U
Asked whether the key that was taken from defendant was given to McManus so that she could
drive away, Harpling testified, “It was returned to her, I don’t know if she used that key to start
the car. I wasn’t there when she got back.”
¶9 Harpling testified on cross-examination that nobody reported having seen defendant
driving the Honda. Harpling did not open the car or see any of defendant’s possessions inside.
¶ 10 Harpling testified on redirect that defendant both admitted that he had driven the car and
told Harpling the specific route that he had taken. Defendant also said at one point that he had
taken the car key from McManus’s purse. Harpling found no other car key on defendant.
¶ 11 The State rested. Defendant put on no evidence. In arguments, the parties disputed whether
the State had proved the corpus delicti of DUI and, more specifically, whether the State had
introduced sufficient evidence, beyond defendant’s admissions, that he had been driving.
¶ 12 The trial court found defendant guilty, holding that the corpus delicti had been proved. The
court explained that defendant was on the same property as the Honda while he possessed a credit
card belonging to McManus and a vehicle key. Defendant said that the key was to the Honda and
that he had retrieved the key from McManus’s purse. He also admitted that he had driven from her
home, and he described the route. However, the court stated, “that’s still not enough.”
¶ 13 The court explained the evidence also proved that, after defendant turned over the key to
the police, they gave it to McManus, who used it to drive the Honda away from the Maines
residence. Thus, the prosecution corroborated defendant’s admission with evidence that
McManus’s residence was within walking distance of the Maines residence; that defendant
possessed the key and McManus’s credit card; and that McManus used the key to drive the Honda
away. The evidence proved the corpus delicti. The court-imposed supervision and denied
defendant’s postjudgment motion. He timely appealed.
-3- 2020 IL App (2d) 170971-U
¶ 14 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 15 On appeal, defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to prove him guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt of DUI. He argues that it did not prove the corpus delicti, because his
admission that he had been driving was insufficiently corroborated.
¶ 16 Although plaintiff, the City of Wheaton, has not filed an appellee’s brief, we may decide
the merits of this appeal. See First Capitol Mortgage Corp. v. Talandis Construction Corp., 63 Ill.
2d 128, 133 (1976).
¶ 17 In evaluating a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we ask only whether, after
viewing all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational fact finder
could have found the elements of the offense proved beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Ward,
154 Ill. 2d 272, 326 (1992). The fact finder is responsible for determining the witnesses’
credibility, weighing their testimony, and deciding on the reasonable inferences to be drawn from
the evidence. People v. Hill, 272 Ill. App. 3d 597, 604 (1995). It is not our function to retry the
defendant. People v. Lamon, 346 Ill. App. 3d 1082, 1089 (2004).
¶ 18 To the foregoing principles must be added the rules that the prosecution must prove beyond
a reasonable doubt that a crime occurred, i.e., the corpus delicti, and the proof of the corpus delicti
may not consist exclusively of the defendant’s extrajudicial admission. People v. Sargent, 239 Ill.
2d 166, 183 (2010); People v. Underwood, 2019 IL App (3d) 170623, ¶ 10. The independent
evidence need not prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt or corroborate every element of the
charged offense. People v. Lara, 2012 IL 112370, ¶¶ 45, 50. It need only tend to show the
commission of a crime. Id. ¶ 45.
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2020 IL App (2d) 170971-U No. 2-17-0971 Order filed March 27, 2020
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). ______________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
SECOND DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________
THE CITY OF WHEATON, ) Appeal from the Circuit Court ) of Du Page County. Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ) v. ) No. 17-DT-1159 ) DENZEL L. CROWLEY, ) Honorable ) Paul A. Marchese, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, Presiding. ______________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE HUTCHINSON delivered the judgment of the court. Justices McLaren and Zenoff concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: The prosecution proved the corpus delicti of DUI by introducing independent evidence to corroborate defendant’s extrajudicial statement that he had driven a vehicle after drinking.
¶2 After a bench trial, defendant, Denzel L. Crowley, was convicted of driving with a breath
alcohol concentration (BAC) of more than 0.08 (DUI) (625 ILCS 5/11-501(a)(1) (West 2016)) and
placed on two years’ supervision. On appeal, he contends that he was not proved guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt, because there was insufficient evidence of the corpus delicti. We affirm.
¶3 I. BACKGROUND 2020 IL App (2d) 170971-U
¶4 At trial, the sole witness, Wheaton police officer Chris Harpling, testified on direct
examination as follows. Late in the evening of May 12, 2017, he and three other officers were
dispatched to the home at 1348 Loughbrough Court. Harpling spoke with the homeowner, then
went outside. Near the house, he saw defendant and David Maines, the homeowner’s son.
¶5 Shortly after midnight, Harpling returned to 1348 Loughbrough Court. He spoke to the
homeowner and Riley McDermott. Another officer located defendant behind the house. Harpling
asked defendant what had happened between Harpling’s first visit and his return. Defendant
replied that he had walked to McDermott’s home on Williamsburg Court because he had been
concerned about McDermott walking home from the Maines residence. Defendant said that he
opened the purse belonging to McDermott’s mother, Cheryl McManus, took the key to her vehicle,
and drove back to the Maines house.
¶6 Harpling testified that, as he spoke to defendant, he saw a gray Honda parked in the
driveway. He did not remember whether any other cars were there. Defendant appeared to be
intoxicated. He admitted drinking vodka between 10 and 11 p.m. Harpling had defendant perform
field-sobriety tests and arrested defendant for DUI. He searched defendant’s clothing and found
the key to a vehicle. Defendant “indicated” that it was the key to the Honda. Harpling testified,
“And it was, I believe, later confirmed that it was the key to the vehicle.”
¶7 Harpling testified that he also recovered a credit card from defendant. Defendant told him
that McManus had given him the credit card. Harpling transported defendant to the police station,
where defendant said that he could not remember whether he had taken McManus’s credit card
out of her purse when he took the key. A test disclosed that defendant’s BAC was 0.19.
¶8 Harpling testified that, when he first went to 1348 Loughbrough Court, McManus was not
there. After he left the second time, another officer transported McManus there to retrieve her car.
-2- 2020 IL App (2d) 170971-U
Asked whether the key that was taken from defendant was given to McManus so that she could
drive away, Harpling testified, “It was returned to her, I don’t know if she used that key to start
the car. I wasn’t there when she got back.”
¶9 Harpling testified on cross-examination that nobody reported having seen defendant
driving the Honda. Harpling did not open the car or see any of defendant’s possessions inside.
¶ 10 Harpling testified on redirect that defendant both admitted that he had driven the car and
told Harpling the specific route that he had taken. Defendant also said at one point that he had
taken the car key from McManus’s purse. Harpling found no other car key on defendant.
¶ 11 The State rested. Defendant put on no evidence. In arguments, the parties disputed whether
the State had proved the corpus delicti of DUI and, more specifically, whether the State had
introduced sufficient evidence, beyond defendant’s admissions, that he had been driving.
¶ 12 The trial court found defendant guilty, holding that the corpus delicti had been proved. The
court explained that defendant was on the same property as the Honda while he possessed a credit
card belonging to McManus and a vehicle key. Defendant said that the key was to the Honda and
that he had retrieved the key from McManus’s purse. He also admitted that he had driven from her
home, and he described the route. However, the court stated, “that’s still not enough.”
¶ 13 The court explained the evidence also proved that, after defendant turned over the key to
the police, they gave it to McManus, who used it to drive the Honda away from the Maines
residence. Thus, the prosecution corroborated defendant’s admission with evidence that
McManus’s residence was within walking distance of the Maines residence; that defendant
possessed the key and McManus’s credit card; and that McManus used the key to drive the Honda
away. The evidence proved the corpus delicti. The court-imposed supervision and denied
defendant’s postjudgment motion. He timely appealed.
-3- 2020 IL App (2d) 170971-U
¶ 14 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 15 On appeal, defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to prove him guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt of DUI. He argues that it did not prove the corpus delicti, because his
admission that he had been driving was insufficiently corroborated.
¶ 16 Although plaintiff, the City of Wheaton, has not filed an appellee’s brief, we may decide
the merits of this appeal. See First Capitol Mortgage Corp. v. Talandis Construction Corp., 63 Ill.
2d 128, 133 (1976).
¶ 17 In evaluating a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we ask only whether, after
viewing all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational fact finder
could have found the elements of the offense proved beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Ward,
154 Ill. 2d 272, 326 (1992). The fact finder is responsible for determining the witnesses’
credibility, weighing their testimony, and deciding on the reasonable inferences to be drawn from
the evidence. People v. Hill, 272 Ill. App. 3d 597, 604 (1995). It is not our function to retry the
defendant. People v. Lamon, 346 Ill. App. 3d 1082, 1089 (2004).
¶ 18 To the foregoing principles must be added the rules that the prosecution must prove beyond
a reasonable doubt that a crime occurred, i.e., the corpus delicti, and the proof of the corpus delicti
may not consist exclusively of the defendant’s extrajudicial admission. People v. Sargent, 239 Ill.
2d 166, 183 (2010); People v. Underwood, 2019 IL App (3d) 170623, ¶ 10. The independent
evidence need not prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt or corroborate every element of the
charged offense. People v. Lara, 2012 IL 112370, ¶¶ 45, 50. It need only tend to show the
commission of a crime. Id. ¶ 45. If there is corroborating evidence that tends to prove the
corpus delicti and corresponds with the confession, both may be considered in determining
whether the corpus delicti has been proved in a given case. Id. ¶ 32.
-4- 2020 IL App (2d) 170971-U
¶ 19 Here, defendant contends that the State did not introduce sufficient proof of the
corpus delicti of DUI. He concedes that the evidence proved that he had been under the influence
of alcohol, but he argues that there was insufficient evidence independent of his admissions to
Harpling that he had been driving. Defendant notes that there was no evidence that anyone saw
him drive the Honda that was parked an undisclosed distance from where Harpling encountered
him.
¶ 20 We conclude that the corpus delicti was proved beyond a reasonable doubt. We recognize
our obligation to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, which includes
deferring to the fact finder’s reasonable inferences. The following summary of the evidence
adheres to these requirements.
¶ 21 Defendant’s admission that he drove McDermott in the Honda to the Maines residence was
corroborated in key respects. At the residence, Harpling saw defendant, McDermott, and the
Honda. Although Harpling could not say exactly how far defendant was from the car, both were
on the Maines property and visible to Harpling. Moreover, defendant possessed exactly one car
key, which he had taken from McManus’s purse, and it was returned to her at the Maines residence,
where the Honda was parked.
¶ 22 We acknowledge that the independent evidence would be insufficient, on its own, to prove
that defendant drove the gray Honda. However, the independent evidence by itself need not prove
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, because the corroborating evidence supported the trial court’s
reasonable inference that he had been driving.
¶ 23 Defendant contends that the evidence here was no stronger than it was in People v. Foster,
138 Ill. App. 3d 441 (1988), in which a DUI conviction was reversed. There, the evidence showed
that an officer reported to the scene of a one-car accident and saw a car off the highway. The
-5- 2020 IL App (2d) 170971-U
defendant was seated on the passenger side and the other occupant was on the driver’s side. Both
appeared to be asleep. Two other officers were called. The defendant said twice that he had been
driving the vehicle. However, after being taken to the police station, the defendant said the he had
not been the driver. He failed a breath-alcohol test. The trial court found him guilty of DUI. Id. at
45-46.
¶ 24 In reversing, the appellate court explained that, other than defendant’s admissions at the
scene, there was no evidence that he had been the driver. Further, he had been seated on the
passenger side, asleep, when the officer approached; there was no evidence who owned the vehicle;
and, at the station, the defendant denied having driven the vehicle. Id. at 46-47.
¶ 25 We disagree with defendant’s application of Foster. There, the independent evidence
contradicted rather than corroborated the defendant’s admission; he was found in the passenger
seat of the car and another person was found in the driver’s seat. The circumstances made it
unlikely that they had gotten into their respective positions after the car came to rest. Further, the
defendant recanted his admission. See People v. Kaufmann, 2019 IL App (2d) 180531-U, ¶ 16.
Here, defendant and the car were on the same property and there was no evidence that anyone else
had driven it. Defendant never recanted his admission. He possessed one car key, which he had
taken from the purse of the individual who was later driven to the scene to retrieve the car.
¶ 26 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 27 For the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Du Page County.
¶ 28 Affirmed.
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