City of Westminster v. Webb CA4/3

Opinion

Filed 9/3/26 City of Westminster v. Webb CA4/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

CITY OF WESTMINSTER,

Plaintiff and Respondent, G065721

v. (Super. Ct. No. 30-2022-01280840)

JASON WEBB, OPINION

Appellant,

RICHARD C. GRISWOLD,

Real Party in Interest and Respondent.

Appeal from orders of the Superior Court of Orange County, Layne H. Melzer and David J. Hesseltine, Judges. Appeal dismissed.

Roger E. Naghash for Appellant. Jones Mayer, Amanda A. Pope, Krista MacNevin Jee and Ryan M. Allen for Plaintiff and Respondent.

Griswold Receivers, Richardson C. Griswold, Neil R. Sheaffer and Jarrod Ready for Real Party in Interest and Respondent.

THE COURT. Appellate courts lack jurisdiction to entertain untimely appeals or appeals from nonappealable orders. (Garg v. Garg (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 1036, 1041; Kirk v. Ratner (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 1052, 1060.) Also, “California courts have the inherent power to dismiss frivolous appeals.” (People ex rel. Lockyer v. Brar (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1318.) “An appeal is objectively frivolous when a reasonable person would ‘agree that the appeal is completely devoid of merit.’” (In re Marriage of Deal (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 71, 80.)

This appeal from three separate orders is untimely as to the first two orders, nonappealable as to the third order, and (even if one assumes the third order is appealable) objectively frivolous. We therefore dismiss the appeal rather than allowing further delay to accrue to the benefit of appellant Jason Webb (Jason) and the prejudice of respondents City of Westminster (the City) and Richard C. Griswold (receiver).

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY We previously issued an opinion rejecting defendant Dianna E.

Webb’s (Dianna) challenge to “two trial court orders entered in the underlying public nuisance abatement action: a May 2023 order appointing a receiver and an October 2023 order granting the receiver’s request for a preliminary injunction.” (City of Westminster v. Webb (Feb. 25, 2025, G063189) [nonpub. opn.] (Webb I).) We concluded that “the appeal from the first order must be dismissed as untimely and the appeal from the second order is without merit.” (Ibid.)



Motoike, P. J., Delaney, J., and Servino, J.

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Dianna owned the residential real property that is the subject of this litigation, but our prior opinion also referenced her adult son, Jason, who resided with Dianna at the property. (Webb I, supra, G063189.) The injunction that was affirmed in our prior opinion enjoined Dianne and Jason from “‘residing at, entering onto, trespassing onto or interfering with receiver’s possession, clean out work, and remediation of the property . . . .’” (Ibid.) The injunction ordered Diana, Jason, “‘and all other occupants of the property to vacate the property by 11:59 p.m. on October 28, 2023, and refrain from entering the property for any reason without the express permission of receiver.’” (Ibid.) However, our opinion also stated that Dianna’s contentions concerning Jason failed “because she lacks standing to assert Jason’s rights” and that “we express no opinion on Jason’s legal interests in this matter.” (Ibid.)

Our prior opinion was filed in February 2025. (Webb I, supra, G063189.) On May 28, 2025, the Supreme Court denied a petition for review and our remittitur issued the next day. On July 3, 2025, Jason filed an ex parte application to vacate the orders that were the subject of Webb I, supra, G063189. On July 7, 2025, the trial court entered a minute order denying Jason’s ex parte application “without prejudice to the moving party filing a noticed motion.” The minute order did not analyze the merits of Jason’s contentions. The ex parte hearing was not reported. The settled statement provides no indication that the court entertained the merits of Jason’s contentions at the hearing, noting only that the “court denied [Jason’s] ex parte motion in its entirety.”

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Rather than filing a noticed motion, Jason immediately filed a notice of appeal purporting to challenge: (1) the May 2023 order appointing a receiver; (2) the October 2023 order granting a preliminary injunction; and (3) the July 7, 2025 minute order denying his ex parte application. The appeal has been delayed for more than a year while counsel for appellant struggled to designate the record and secure a settled statement. Appellant’s appendix and opening brief are presently due on October 7, 2026.

The City moved to dismiss the appeal and this court invited further briefing on whether the appeal should be dismissed on additional grounds. All parties filed briefing on the questions raised by the motion and this court’s briefing order.

DISCUSSION

The appeal, filed in July 2025, is clearly untimely as a direct challenge to orders entered in May and October 2023. “Under California law, if an appeal is untimely, the appellate court has no jurisdiction to consider its merits and the appeal must be dismissed.” (Sanchez v. Strickland (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 758, 762; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.104(b).) The longest possible deadline to file a civil notice of appeal is 180 days after entry of the judgment or appealable order. (In re Marriage of Lin (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 471, 475.) A lack of notice or service of the appealable order does not extend the 180-day outer limit. (See Kimball Avenue v. Franco (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 1224, 1228.) The notice of appeal here was filed more than a year after both orders.

Jason claims he was improperly excluded from proceedings in 2023 to his detriment. His remedy, if any, is to move to vacate those 2023 orders (cf. People ex rel. Reisig v. Broderick Boys (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 1506, 1511 [individuals had standing to attack injunction by motion to vacate]), not to directly appeal the orders entered in 2023, in 2025.

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Construed reasonably, the appeal does seek to challenge the earlier orders through the framework of appellant’s ex parte application to vacate the orders. The appeal is timely as to the July 2025 order denying that ex parte application.

The July 2025 order, however, is not appealable. An order “refusing to . . . dissolve an injunction” is appealable. (Code Civ. Proc., § 904.1, subd. (a)(6).)1 But the court did not actually refuse to dissolve an injunction or vacate the appointment of a receiver. Instead, the court merely ruled that it would not entertain Jason’s request on an ex parte basis, presumably concluding it would be imprudent to consider this relief without allowing time for written opposition from the City and receiver. (See, e.g., People ex rel. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Suh (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 253, 257 [“A court will not grant ex parte relief ‘in any but the plainest and most certain of cases’”].)

An order declining to reach the merits of an ex parte application but instead inviting consideration by noticed motion is not appealable. (Marken v. Santa Monica-Malibu Unified School Dist. (2012) 202 Cal.App.4th 1250, 1277 [application to intervene in action denied “solely because it had been filed on an ex parte basis, rather than by noticed motion, not on the merits of [movant’s] right to intervene in the action. This court does not have jurisdiction to review the denial of that application”].) There is no ruling on the merits for this court to review, and this order is not appealable. (Cf.

1 Appeals are authorized by statute from a prejudgment order

appointing a receiver, not one declining to vacate the prior order. (Code Civ. Proc., § 904.1, subd. (a)(7).) As a general matter, an interlocutory order declining to vacate a prior order appointing a receiver is not appealable. (Raff v. Raff (1964) 61 Cal.2d 514, 518; Title Ins. & Trust Co. v. Calif. etc. Co. (1911) 159 Cal. 484, 486–487.)

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McLellan v. McLellan (1972) 23 Cal.App.3d 343, 357 [a temporary restraining order is appealable, as it grants injunctive relief].)

Even assuming for the sake of argument that the order is appealable, this appeal is objectively frivolous. Our review of an order refusing to dissolve an injunction is for an abuse of discretion. (Salazar v. Eastin (1995) 9 Cal.4th 836, 850.) Likewise, trial courts have broad discretion in their decisions regarding the appointment of receivers. (Gold v. Gold (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 791, 808.) Here, the trial court has not yet made a substantive ruling on Jason’s application. The standard of review cannot be applied. The most that a theoretical reversal would accomplish is a command to the court to rule on the merits in the first instance. Jason could have achieved that outcome a year ago by promptly filing a noticed motion. In addition, the notion that the trial court should have vacated its prior orders appointing a receiver and entering an injunction (an injunction affirmed on the merits in Webb I, supra, G063189) via ex parte application, without the opportunity for opposition by respondents, is preposterous.

Jason’s briefing does nothing to demonstrate otherwise. Instead, Jason emphasizes supposed irreparable harm. The appeal in Webb I, supra, G063189 stayed the injunction for approximately 20 months. Once the affirmance of the injunction was final, Jason filed an ex parte application (more than a month after issuance of the remittitur) in the hope of again stopping imminent enforcement of the injunction. Jason explains his subsequent tactical choice to file an appeal rather than proceeding to a noticed motion: “On July 7, 2025, the jurisdiction was transferred to the [C]ourt of [A]ppeal, and automatic ‘stay’ of execution of injunction order was in place by operation of law.” According to the City’s responsive brief, the

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trial court accepted Jason’s contention that its 2023 preliminary injunction was stayed by the instant appeal.

But a notice of appeal does not stay trial court proceedings or orders pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 916, subdivision (a), when it is obviously untimely or taken from a nonappealable order. (Hearn Pacific Corp. v. Second Generation Roofing, Inc. (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 117, 146 [“Since [plaintiff’s] appeal was invalid, it did not affect the trial court’s jurisdiction to proceed”].) We emphasize that any additional appeals from orders denying relief to Jason from these 2023 orders (whether via ex parte application or noticed motion) will not automatically stay the underlying orders or any trial court proceedings to implement the receivership and injunction.

DISPOSITION

The City’s motion to dismiss is granted in part, solely as to contentions about the timeliness of this appeal.2 The appeal is dismissed as untimely with regard to the 2023 orders appointing a receiver and entering a preliminary injunction. On the court’s own motion, the remainder of the appeal is dismissed as one taken from a nonappealable order denying an ex parte application and one that is frivolous even if it is assumed that the order denying an ex parte application is appealable. Respondents shall recover costs incurred on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(2).)

2 The City, contending that claim preclusion and/or issue

preclusion bar Jason’s attempts to undo the 2023 orders, urges the court to say more about the merits of Jason’s application. We decline to do so.

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Statements made by appellant’s attorney, Roger E. Naghash, in filings in this matter represent reportable misconduct. (See Bus. & Prof. Code, § 6068, subd. (b); Rules Prof. Conduct, rule 8.2(a).) The clerk of this court is directed to send copies to the State Bar of California of: (1) this opinion; (2) appellant’s brief filed on July 27, 2026; and (3) appellant’s motion filed on December 15, 2025.