City of Warwick v. Adams

772 A.2d 476, 2001 R.I. LEXIS 139, 2001 WL 514468
CourtSupreme Court of Rhode Island
DecidedMay 11, 2001
Docket2000-328-M.P
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 772 A.2d 476 (City of Warwick v. Adams) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Rhode Island primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
City of Warwick v. Adams, 772 A.2d 476, 2001 R.I. LEXIS 139, 2001 WL 514468 (R.I. 2001).

Opinion

OPINION

PER CURIAM.

This case concerns the propriety of a District Court judge’s refusal to allow a person accused of a misdemeanor to withdraw the jury-trial waiver that the accused had executed during an initial appearance before a justice of the peace authorized to set and take bail under G.L.1956 § 12-10-2 (bail commissioner). The petitioner, Mark T. Adams (petitioner or Adams), sought a writ of certiorari from this Court to review a District Court judge’s refusal to permit him to withdraw his previous jury-trial waiver. The respondent City of Warwick (city) did not object to the petition. The parties met with a single justice of this Court, who vacated the District Court’s decision and transferred the case to the Superior Court. Thereafter, this Court issued the requested writ and assigned this case to the show cause calendar, ruling that the issue raised by the petition was “capable of repetition, but may evade review.” We then ordered counsel for the petitioner to file a supplemental memorandum and invited counsel for the city and the Attorney General to file responsive memoranda. 1 We specifically invited the Attorney General to discuss “the current practice in the District Court relative to Dist. R.Crim. P. 23 which may be relevant to our determination in this case.” 2

The facts are not in dispute. As previously noted, Adams waived his right to a jury trial during a preliminary hearing at the Warwick police station, where he was charged with the crime of assault. Within ten days of this hearing, after consulting with counsel, Adams attempted to revoke his waiver of a jury trial in District Court, but he was not permitted to do so. Adams *478 then filed the present petition with this Court.

The parties agree, as was stated in the previous order, that a jury-trial waiver may be withdrawn if the defendant does so within ten days of his or her initial appearance before a bail commissioner without the necessity of showing good cause. However, we hold that when good cause becomes a prerequisite for withdrawing a waiver, the fact that the defendant has decided to waive a jury trial at an initial hearing without the benefit of counsel constitutes good cause for allowing the withdrawal.

In explaining current District Court practice, the Attorney General indicates that defendants charged with misdemeanors usually are given an opportunity to waive their right to a jury trial when they appear before a bail commissioner. The state suggests that most District Court judges are “reasonable” about allowing a defendant to withdraw a waiver of his or her right to a jury trial, either before or after the passage of ten days following the defendant’s initial court appearance. According to the state, the District Court judge’s denial in this case of petitioner’s request to withdraw his jury trial waiver was an anomaly.

The powers of bail commissioners are enumerated in § 12-10-2. Under § 12-10-2(a), they are authorized “to set and take bail in all complaints bailable” and “to commit to the adult correctional institutions all respondents arrested on such complaints.” They also “issue warrants, and complaints,” but may not issue search warrants. Id. In addition, in misdemean- or cases, they “may accept pleas of not guilty,” and then “schedule a pretrial conference date before a judge of the district court.” Section 12 — 10—2(b). Finally, in non-capital felony cases, they “may also schedule felony screening dates.” Section 12-10-2(c).

An administrative order issued by the chief judge of the District Court specifies the procedures to be followed by bail commissioners “when conducting arraignments in misdemeanor cases and initial appearances in felony cases.” District Court Administrative Order 88-18 at 1 (effective November 22, 1988) (Appendix A). The petitioner argues that a bail commissioner may not conduct such arraignments and that the administrative order that grants bail commissioners “full-fledged power to arraign” is ultra vires.

As we construe the administrative order, however, it does not extend the powers of bail commissioners beyond those which are provided by § 12-10-2. In misdemeanor cases, the bail commissioner may only accept a plea of not guilty. See District Court Administrative Order 88-18 at 1 (Order 88-18). Although the administrative order refers to this process as a “special arraignment,” it does not constitute an arraignment as that term is used in the District Court’s Rules of Criminal Procedure because it does not occur “in open court.” Dist. R.Crim. P. 10; see also Dist. R.Crim. P. 11. If the defendant wishes to enter a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, the case must be reassigned for arraignment before a judge of the District Court. See Order 88-18 at 1. In felony cases, the bail commissioner must explain to the defendant that because the charge is beyond the jurisdiction of the District Court, no plea may be entered. See id. at 3. The bail commissioner must also inform the misdemeanor defendant that he has a right to a trial by jury and that he may waive that right and stand trial in District Court. See id. at 2. If the defendant wishes to waive his right to a jury trial, the bail commissioner must have the defendant execute a waiver of rights form, which is *479 returned to the court the following day. See id. at 2, 5.

The petitioner contends that these initial proceedings before bail commissioners, at which they may accept a not-guilty plea to a misdemeanor, should not be considered arraignments as that term is used in the District Court Rules of Criminal Procedure because, by definition, an arraignment “shall be conducted in open court” and the defendant must be allowed to plead as he chooses. Dist. R.Crim. P. 10; see also Dist. R.Crim. P. 11. The petitioner argues that the District Court Rules refer to “hearings” before a bail commissioner, but when discussing arraignments, the rules refer to the court. Dist. R.Crim. P. 6(e), 9, 10; see also Dist. R.Crim. P. 16(f), 23. As a matter of public policy, petitioner argues, a defendant should not be allowed to waive important rights, such as the right to trial by jury, outside of court. The petitioner asks this Court to hold that arraignments may occur only in open court and that a defendant may waive his right to a jury trial only in open court.

The state contends that the use of the term “court” in the District Court Rules includes bail commissioners for some purposes. Although the District Court Rules do not specifically recognize the power of a bail commissioner to accept a plea of not guilty, the state explains that the rules have not yet been revised to comport with the 1988 amendment to § 12-10-2, which established this authority. The state indicates that bail commissioners serve an important function in controlling the District Court’s caseload by accepting pleas as authorized by § 12-10-2 outside of the normal court day. The state suggests that the District Court Rules may have to be amended to account for bail commissioners’ authority to conduct the proceedings authorized by § 12-10-2.

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Related

State v. Dearmas
841 A.2d 659 (Supreme Court of Rhode Island, 2004)
State v. Brunson
625 A.2d 1085 (Supreme Court of New Jersey, 1993)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
772 A.2d 476, 2001 R.I. LEXIS 139, 2001 WL 514468, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/city-of-warwick-v-adams-ri-2001.