City of Venice v. Lawrence

141 P. 406, 24 Cal. App. 350, 1914 Cal. App. LEXIS 88
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeal
DecidedApril 17, 1914
DocketCiv. No. 1493.
StatusPublished
Cited by12 cases

This text of 141 P. 406 (City of Venice v. Lawrence) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering California Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
City of Venice v. Lawrence, 141 P. 406, 24 Cal. App. 350, 1914 Cal. App. LEXIS 88 (Cal. Ct. App. 1914).

Opinion

SHAW, J.

Original application for a writ of mandate to be directed- to the respondent requiring him, as treasurer of the city of Venice, to sign a certain municipal bond in the sum of five hundred dollars, it being one of forty bonds of like denomination voted by the electors of said city for the purpose of constructing an outfall sewer.

It appears from the petition, all the allegations of which are admitted by a general demurrer interposed thereto, that on January 22,1912, the hoard of trustees of the city of Venice duly adopted a resolution, approved by its president, whereby it determined that public interest and necessity demanded the acquisition and construction of a garbage incinerating plant, the cost of which was twenty three thousand dollars, and the construction of an extension to the sewer outfall pipe, the cost of which was twenty thousand dollars, the cost of which improvements it was declared would be “too' great to be paid out of the annual income and revenue of the city of Venice.” The resolution contained thé following: “The proceedings for the incurring of said indebtedness and the issuance and sale of bonds thereunder, be conducted in accordance with the provisions of an act of the legislature of the state of California, entitled, ‘An act authorizing the incurring of indebtedness by cities, towns and municipal corporations for municipal purposes, and regulating the acquisition, the construction and completion thereof,’ (which act became a law under constitutional provisions without the governor’s approval, February 25, 1901), and in accordance with the provisions of section 866 of an act of the legislature of the state of California entitled, ‘An act to provide for the organization, incorporation and government of Municipal Corporations,’ approved March 13th, 1883, and all acts in addition thereto and amendatory thereof.” On February 19, 1912, an ordinance was duly adopted calling a special election to be held on April 4, 1912, for the purpose of submitting to the qualified electors of said city the proposition of issuing the bonds and reciting the purposes so embodied in the resolution, for which the indebtedness evidenced by the bonds was *352 to be incurred; and providing as to the outfall sewer bonds here involved, that they should be of the denomination of five hundred dollars each and bear five per cent interest, one of said bonds to be made payable on the first day of February of each year after the date of their issue. The election was duly and regularly held, and more than two-thirds of the electors voting at the election voted in favor of the proposition.

The only grounds upon which respondent seeks to justify his action in refusing to sign the bond presented for his signature as city treasurer, are: 1. That it was stated in the resolution and ordinance that the proceedings for the issuance of the bonds would be conducted in accordance with two separate acts providing for cities incurring indebtedness in the-making of public improvements, the provisions of which acts are inconsistent each with the other, in that, among other things, one authorizes the incurring of an indebtedness only when the estimated cost of the improvements exceeds the ordinary annual income and revenue of the municipality, while the other authorizes the incurring of such indebtedness only in case the amount is in excess of the money in the treasury applicable to the payment thereof; in one the payment of the bonds may extend over a period of forty years, while in the other the time is restricted to twenty years; 2. That the proposed issuance of the bonds is unauthorized in that the board of trustees did not, as required, determine the cost of Constructing the improvement to be “too great to be paid out of the ordinary annual income and revenue of the municipality.” This claim is based upon the fact that the resolution included not only the construction of an outfall sewer at a cost of twenty thousand dollars, but the acquisition of a garbage incinerating plant at a cost of twenty-three thousand dollars; and the determination was not as to each improvement separately, but declared that the combined cost of the two improvements was “too great to be paid out of the annual income and revenue of the city,” omitting the word “ordinary”; 3. The omission of a sufficient statement in the ordinance as to the amount of the indebtedness which it was proposed to incur in the construction of the improvement; 4. That no authority exists for antedating the bonds. The ordinance passed by the board of trustees, pursuant to the authority given, provided that the bonds should be dated *353 as of February 1, 1912, and bear interest at the rate of five per cent per annum; and, 5. Under the terms of the ordinance the bonds are to extend over a period of more than forty years from their date.

The existence of irregularities in the proceedings inaugurated for conferring authority upon the" board to issue the bonds, may be conceded. Whether of sufficient import to render the proceedings invalid by reason of noncompliance with the statutory provisions under and pursuant to which they were conducted, is immaterial, for the reason that, in our opinion, such defects, in so far as material, were cured by an act of the legislature entitled, “An act to validate municipal bonds, and to provide for the levy and collection of taxes to pay the principal and interest on such bonds,” approved April 4, 1913 (Stats. 1913, p. 14). Section 1 of this act provides: “Where in any municipal corporation, proceedings have been taken for the purpose of issuing and selling bonds of such municipal corporation, ... all such acts and proceedings leading up to and including the issuance of such bonds, if they have heretofore been sold, and all such acts and proceedings heretofore had, although the bonds are not yet sold, are hereby legalized, ratified, confirmed and declared validated to all intents and purposes, and the power of said municipal corporation and of the legislative body thereof, to issue such bonds, is hereby ratified, confirmed and declared, . . . and the bonds hereafter sold shall be the legal and binding obligation of and against the municipal corporation, ...” Section 3 of the act provides: “This act shall not operate to legalize any bonds which have been sold for less than par, nor to legalize any bonds the issuance of which has not received the assent of two-thirds of the qualified electors of such municipal corporation, voting at an election held for the purpose of determining whether such indebtedness should be incurred, nor to legalize any bonds which mature at a date more than forty years from the time of their issuance.” It has been repeatedly held that the legislature may validate past transactions when it could in advance, without contravening constitutional provisions, have authorized the proceedings taken as a precedent condition to the exercise of municipal power in issuing bonds. In other

*354 words, as to all steps which the legislature could, in the first instance, have dispensed with, it may by retroactive statute declare the taking thereof unnecessary. (See Dillon on Municipal Corporations, 5th ed., vol. 2, sec. 948; City of Redlands v. Brook, 151 Cal. 474, [91 Pac.

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Bluebook (online)
141 P. 406, 24 Cal. App. 350, 1914 Cal. App. LEXIS 88, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/city-of-venice-v-lawrence-calctapp-1914.