City of Tampa v. Colgan

149 So. 587, 111 Fla. 538, 1933 Fla. LEXIS 2027
CourtSupreme Court of Florida
DecidedJuly 22, 1933
StatusPublished
Cited by9 cases

This text of 149 So. 587 (City of Tampa v. Colgan) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
City of Tampa v. Colgan, 149 So. 587, 111 Fla. 538, 1933 Fla. LEXIS 2027 (Fla. 1933).

Opinion

Buford, J.

The appeal in this case is from an order overruling motion to strike certain paragraphs of defendant’s answer filed in defense of the allegations of a bill of complaint exhibited by the City of Tampa to foreclose a tax-sale certificate issued on sale of real property to enforce the payment of delinquent municipal taxes.

Rights of no third parties had intervened.

The motion was addressed to the 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, and 11th paragraphs of the answer which were, respectively, in the following language:

“Further answering said bill of complaint, this defendant avers that under the Charter of the City of Tampa the tax assessor for said City for the years 1929, 1930 and 1931, was required to assess all property, both real and personal, at a uniform and equal rate at its full cash value. That *539 Section 14-A of Ordinance number 213-A of the City of Tampa defines the full cash value of property to be 50% of its fair market value, and requires that the assessor shall ascertain such valuation for city taxation by first finding the fair market value of all taxable property, and thereupon by dividing the valuation by two, the quotient to be the full cash value, as will more fully appear by a certified copy of said Ordinance, which is hereto attached marked Defendant’s Exhibit “A” and is hereby made a part hereof as if fully set out herein. That notwithstanding it was the duty of said tax assessor to assess the property described in complainant’s bill of complaint in accordance with said Charter provision of said Ordinance for said years, 1929, 1930, and 1931, the said tax assessor systematically, willfully, deliberately and intentionally discriminated against said property, as compared with similar property liable to assessments owned by other tax payers similarly situated, in that this Defendant’s property was assessed for each of said years at $210,000.00, as shown by copy of assessment roll attached to complainant’s bill of complaint, which sum was grossly, obviously and flagrantly excessive, and was more than four times the full cash value, as defined by said Ordinance hereinabove referred to, and amounts to a confiscation of its property, and denies to this defendant due process of law and the equal protection of the law. This defendant further answering alleges that its property was listed for sale with leading real estate firms of the City of Tampa for the years 1929, 1930 and 1931 for the sum of $100,000.00, and advertised through newspapers, both in and outside of the City of Tampa, Florida, during said years, for said sum, but no sale of said property could be consummated. That the improvements on said property is known as the “Mirasol Hotel” and for two of said years, to-wit, 1930 and 1931, the said hotel was not operated as *540 a going concern, but remained for said years closed and unoccupied by reason of the fact that said hotel could not be operated except at a heavy loss and at no time during said years 1929, 1930 and 1931 could anyone be found who was able and willing to pay an annual rental for said premises sufficient to pay the taxes levied and assessed annually against the same.
“Further answering said bill of complaint this defendant avers that the tax assessor of the City of Tampa for the years 1929, 1930 and 1931, perpetrated a fraud upon this defendant in assessing its only specie of property," to-wit, real estate, at more than double its full cash value, while personal property consisting of stocks of merchandise located within the City of Tampa, and taxable therein, worth many millions of dollars, were for said years systematically, intentionally and arbitrarily assessed by said tax assessor at less than 25% of its full cash value.
“This defendant, as an illustration of the deliberate, intentional, systematic and willful discrimination practiced against the only specie of property owned by this defendant, to-wit, real estate, and practiced in favor of larger and influential owners of other specie of property, to-wit, personal property located within the City of Tampa, Florida, and subject to taxation therein, sets forth and shows the following instance, among many, but which does not show the full extent of the discrimination, deliberate, intentional and willful, practiced against this defendant.
“Sears, Roebuck & Company, mercantile establishment, assessed for said years 1929, 1930 and 1931 at $4820.00 and $8000.00 and $9560.00 respectively, although its stock of merchandise on January the first of each of said years exceeded $100,000.00.
“Maas Bros., Inc., a mercantile establishment was assessed for said years at an average of less than $50,000.00 *541 a year for each of said years, although its stock of- merchandise on January the first of each of said years exceeded $200,000.00.
' “That Firestone Tire & Rubber Company, Inc., a retail tire store, was assessed for each of said years at .less than $3000.00 although its stock of merchandise on January the first of each of said 'years exceeded $25,000.00.
“That Grants, Inc., a department store, was assessed for the years 1929, 1930 and 1931 at $20,000.00, $15,395.00 and $23,914.00 respectively, although its stock of merchandise on the first day of January of each of said years exceeded the sum of $80,000.00.
“That said illegal, arbitrary, discriminating and systematic action on the part of said Tax Assessor in assessing defendants only specie of property, to-wit, real estate, at double its full cash value for said years, while under-valuing millions of dollars of personal property of the class herein referred to, had the direct and necessary result of increasing the amount of taxes unconstitutionally and illegally imposed against the property of this defendant and rendered said assessment against the premises described in the bill of complaint null and void, and of no effect.
“This defendant avers that under the constitution of the State of Florida, the Statutes enacted by the legislature in conformity therewith, and the charter of the City of Tampa, the Tax Assessor of the City of Tampa is charged with the duty of ascertaining by diligent search and inquiry the names of all taxable persons in said City, ahd also all taxable real estate and personal property therein, and is directed to make an assessment roll of all such taxable property assessing all. of said property at a uniform and equal rate. That notwithstanding it was the duty of said tax assessor to assess all property, both real and personal, belonging to *542 the residents of the City of Tampa, and situated within, the city limits of said city, for the years 1929, 1930 and 1931, that said Tax Assessor deliberately, willfully and intentionally, systematically, knowingly and arbitrarily refused, neglected and omitted to assess any mortgages standing of record in the office of the Clerk of the Circuit Court, Hillsborough County, Florida, and owned by citizens of the City of Tampa, as of January 1st, 1929, 1930 and 1931, respectively, whatsoever, although same were subject to taxation and amounted to several million dollars.

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Bluebook (online)
149 So. 587, 111 Fla. 538, 1933 Fla. LEXIS 2027, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/city-of-tampa-v-colgan-fla-1933.