City of Stillwater v. Cundiff

1939 OK 118, 87 P.2d 947, 184 Okla. 375, 1939 Okla. LEXIS 62
CourtSupreme Court of Oklahoma
DecidedFebruary 28, 1939
DocketNo. 28787.
StatusPublished
Cited by11 cases

This text of 1939 OK 118 (City of Stillwater v. Cundiff) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Oklahoma primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
City of Stillwater v. Cundiff, 1939 OK 118, 87 P.2d 947, 184 Okla. 375, 1939 Okla. LEXIS 62 (Okla. 1939).

Opinion

PER CURIAM.

The parties will be referred to as they appeared in the trial court. Plaintiff is the owner of the west half of the northeast quarter of a section of land in Payne county, ' Okla. The defendant has drilled a series of six wells on the southeast quarter of the quarter section so that the six wells are on the 40 acres of land just east of the 80 acres owned by the plaintiff and just across from the south 40 acres of the plaintiff’s land. From these wells the city of Still-water obtained its water supply which was being sold for the consumption of its citizens.

Plaintiff first filed a petition for injunc-tive relief. After the defendant filed an answer admitting the drilling of the wells and the use of the water as alleged, plaintiff amended his petition and therein alleged that prior to the drilling of the wells the land was worth $10,000; that the drilling of the wells rendered the land dry and barren and absolutely of no value and prayed permanent damages of $10,000. Defendant answered that it was not responsible for the failure of the water suuplv on plaintiff’s land, and pleaded specially *376 that if the plaintiff had developed his land for water by drilling the wells deeper, plaintiff would have a sufficient water supply.

Commissioners were appointed who qualified and made their report fixing the damage to the plaintiff at $500. Neither the plaintiff nor the defendant being satisfied with the report of commissioners, a jury was called and after a verdict for $1,250 judgment was entered for the plaintiff in this amount.

Defendant first alleged that there is no competent evidence of permanent injury. It will be noted that the allegations of the amended petition are that the value of tlxa 80 acres had been completely destroyed. The plaintiff testified that except for the improvements of approximately $3,000 in value the land was worthless. Several witnesses for the plaintiff testified that before the wells were drilled the land was worth $10,000 and that after the wells were drilled the land was not worth over $2,500.

There were two wells at the house that were used for the house and the surrounding premises. One was a pitcher pump well 24 feet deep. The other was about 75 feet from the house and was 26 feet deep. Plaintiff -testified that these were almost totally dried up; that only three gallons of water could be secured by pumping the well at the house and only six gallons could be obtained from pumping the one in the yard; that the creek had always been fed by springs that boiled up from the surface and two of these springs were especially large. This creek is referred to as Golden creek; that both of these large spring!had dried up. The garden had burned up because of lack of moisture and some of the trees had died. He, when questioned, declined to estimate the number of deajl trees, stating that he had not counted them. Other witnesses corroborated the testimony of plaintiff. One witness, who was a well driller, stated that he had been in the neighborhood since 1889 and had crossed the creek and camped on the bank in 1882 and that up until 1937 Golden creek had always been a running creek. He described it in 1937 as “dry as a powder horn.” He had dug a number of wells all up and down the creek in this area and classified the water ns sheet or percolating water. He detailed how he, once at the instance of the city authorities, deepened one of the neighborhood wells after the wells of the city of Stillwater were drilled. He said it was impractical to deepen the wells because of 40 to 50 foot red layer commonly referred to as “red bed” and stated that no water had been found in these red beds or below them by him in all of his experience of digging wells in this neighborhood.

Plaintiff did not attempt to estimate the damage to the trees or garden, or the wells as separate items of damages, but relied upon the permanent damages to the premises by reason of the drilling of these wells. The city engineer testified that there were five pumping wells drilled and one well that was not pumped. These wells were somewhat below the level of Golden creek and the two wells referred to above. An engineering instructor and dean of the college at A. and M., called on behalf of the defendant, admitted that if the water in the creek and in plaintiff’s wells was percolating or sheet water in the same area as the wells of defendant city, then the pumping of the wells by the defendant would lower the water level of plaintiff’s wells and the creek. He further stated that if the water level in the defendant’s wells was pumped until it was lowered below the level of the creek, it would dry up the creek.

We hold that there is competent evidence' of permanent injury. Where a municipality drills wells on land adjacent to another property owner and proceeds to pump the water for sale to its citizens and, in so doing-, causes the wells or water supply of the adjacent land to dry up or fail, the resulting damage is permanent. Canada v. City of Shawnee, 179 Okla. 53, 64 P.2d 694; Clinchfield Coal Co. v. Compton, 148 Va. 437, 139 S. E. 308; Rouse v. City of Kinston, 188 N. C. 1, 123 S. E. 482.

The rule especially applicable to a person or corporation engaged in the production of water from adjacent premises for commercial purposes is discussed exhaustively in Canada v. City of Shawnee, supra. There we were considering the result of the digging of a number of wells as in the case at bar. Therein we said:

“The English or common-law rule concerning rights in percolating waters was first announced in the case of Acton v. Blundell (1843), 12 Mees & W. 324, 152 Eng. Reprint 1223, 15 Mor. Min. Rep. 168. It is in effect in probably the majority of American states today. The rule is that rights in percolating waters are regarded as belonging to the owner of the freehold, like the rocks, soil, and mineral found there, and that such owner may, in the absence of malice, intercept, impede, and appropriate such waters while they are upon or beneath his premises, and make whatever use of them he pleases, regard *377 less of the fact that his use cuts off the flow of such waters to adjoining land and deprives the adjoining landowner of their use.
“At an early day, however, the courts expressed dissatisfaction with the common-law or English rule, and began applying what they called, variously, the rule of ‘reasonable use’ or rule of ‘correlative rights,’ or the American rule * * *
“Stated generally, the rule of reasonable use is that each landowner is restricted to a reasonable exercise of his own rights and a reasonable use of his own property, in view of the similar rights of others.”

After discussing the applicability of the facts involved, we said:

“It clearly appears from the cases that the American rule is used merely as a check upon the unreasonable use of the English rule: that few if any cases can be found where American courts have deni.ed a landowner the right to draw as much percolating water from under his land as he needs, even though it hurts his neighbor, so long as the use to which he puts it bears some reasonable relationship to the natural use of his land, and even though such use of the land be industrial and not agricultural. But the majority of recent decisions stop short at and forbid the harmful extraction of percolating water for sale at a distance.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Clay v. Independent School District No. 1 of Tulsa County
1997 OK 13 (Supreme Court of Oklahoma, 1997)
Schneberger v. Apache Corp.
1994 OK 117 (Supreme Court of Oklahoma, 1994)
Keck v. Bruster
1962 OK 35 (Supreme Court of Oklahoma, 1962)
ABC Construction Co. of Oklahoma v. Thomas
1959 OK 231 (Supreme Court of Oklahoma, 1959)
George v. Greer
1952 OK 433 (Supreme Court of Oklahoma, 1952)
Bowles v. City of Enid
1952 OK 215 (Supreme Court of Oklahoma, 1952)
Klein v. Garrison
108 N.E.2d 381 (Ohio Court of Appeals, 1951)
Douglas Aircraft Co. v. Kerns
164 F.2d 1007 (Tenth Circuit, 1947)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
1939 OK 118, 87 P.2d 947, 184 Okla. 375, 1939 Okla. LEXIS 62, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/city-of-stillwater-v-cundiff-okla-1939.