In the Missouri Court of Appeals Eastern District DIVISION ONE
CITY OF ST. PETERS, ) No. ED110353 ) Appellant, ) Appeal from the Circuit Court ) of St. Charles County vs. ) 2111-MU00224 ) COLLENE VELMA LIENEMANN, ) Honorable Rebeca M. Navarro-McKelvey ) Respondent. ) FILED: October 25, 2022
Introduction
The City of St. Peters (the City) appeals from the decision of the trial court dismissing
citations against Collene Velma Lienemann (Lienemann) for 31 violations of the City’s
municipal ordinances governing property maintenance and nuisances. We reverse and remand.
Factual and Procedural Background
This appeal arises from the dismissal of municipal citations issued by the City to
Lienemann in connection with property located at 3401 North St. Peters Parkway in St. Peters,
Missouri (the Property). Between December 2020 and June 2021, the City issued 31 citations to
Lienemann for violations of the City of St. Peters Municipal Code (City Code) relating to
property maintenance and weeds. 1
1 All ordinance references are to the City of St. Peters Municipal Code as effective in 2020, and will be cited as
City Code section __. The municipal division of the St. Charles County Circuit Court found Lienemann guilty
of all ordinance violations and sentenced her to pay fines and court costs totaling over $10,000.
Lienemann timely filed an application for trial de novo in the circuit court pursuant to Rule
31.71. She subsequently filed a motion to dismiss the citations against her, arguing that, because
she was not the owner or resident of the Property, she was not the proper party to be cited for the
relevant ordinance violations. Lienemann attached two deeds to the memorandum in support of
her motion to dismiss showing ownership of the Property by the Norman F. Lienemann Family
Limited Partnership and the Virginia L. Lienemann Family Limited Partnership (collectively, the
Family Partnerships). 2 The City filed a memorandum in opposition to the motion to dismiss, in
which it argued that Lienemann was the proper defendant because she was the sole member of
Harvester Farms, LLC—which is the general partner of each Family Partnership—and was the
registered agent for the Family Partnerships. After a hearing, the trial court granted Lienemann’s
motion to dismiss all 31 citations against her.
The City filed a motion to reconsider or to vacate, to which it attached: records of
previous municipal proceedings in which Lienemann has been found guilty of and paid fines for
property maintenance code and nuisance violations allegedly occurring on the Property; an order
denying Lienemann’s motion to dismiss filed in a previous St. Charles Circuit Court proceeding
from consolidated municipal violations, which was allegedly premised on similar arguments as
those in this case; and an order removing that consolidated proceeding to the municipal division
after Lienemann’s withdrawal of her request for a trial de novo. After a hearing, the trial court
denied the City’s motion to reconsider or to vacate on February 15, 2022. The City filed its
notices of appeal on February 25, 2022.
2 The parties do not contest that the legal description included in the deeds is that of the Property.
2 Timeliness of Notices of Appeal
Lienemann challenges the timeliness of the City’s notices of appeal and argues this Court
must dismiss the appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction. We disagree for the following reasons
and conclude we have authority to address the merits of this appeal.
The City appeals from the trial court’s January 19, 2022 dismissal of all 31 citations
against Lienemann in her trial de novo from prior municipal court proceedings. The City filed a
motion to reconsider or to vacate, which the trial court denied on February 15, 2022. The City
filed it notices of appeal on February 25, 2022.
Proceedings arising from an ordinance violation “in all courts of this state” are governed
by Rule 37. Rule 37.01. 3 “If no procedure is specially provided by this Rule 37,” courts are
governed by the Missouri Rules of Criminal Procedure, see Rules 19 through 36, “to the extent
not inconsistent with” Rule 37. Rule 37.08. 4 Under Rule 30.01, “[a]fter rendition of final
judgment in a criminal case, every party shall be entitled to any appeal permitted by law.
Appeals may be taken as provided in Rule 81.04 and Rule 81.08.” Rule 30.01(a). Rule 81.04 in
turn provides that no appeal “shall be effective unless the notice of appeal shall be filed not later
than ten days after the judgment, decree, or order appealed from becomes final.” Rule 81.04(a).
Lienemann argues that the dismissal of the citations constituted a final judgment the day
it was entered, on January 19, 2022, citing State v. Cooper, 599 S.W.3d 205, 206 (Mo. App.
W.D. 2020) (“a judgment is final when the trial court enters an order of dismissal or discharge of
the defendant prior to trial which has the effect of foreclosing any further prosecution of the
defendant on a particular charge” (quoting State v. Burns, 994 S.W.2d 941, 942 (Mo. banc
3 All rule references are to the Missouri Supreme Court Rules (2020). 4 Given the specific guidance of Rule 37.08, which has been in effect in substantially the same form since
2000, we do not agree with the City’s argument that the Missouri Rules of Civil Procedure govern the case at issue here.
3 1999))). The City, on the contrary, argues that the dismissal became a final judgment on
February 18, 2022, given that Rule 81.05 provides that “[a] judgment becomes final at the
expiration of thirty days after its entry ….” Rule 81.05(a)(1). We agree with Lienemann.
Contrary to the City’s argument, Rule 81.05 does not apply to the dismissal here because
that Missouri Rule of Civil Procedure does not expressly govern municipal ordinance violation
proceedings. Proceedings arising from an ordinance violation “in all courts of this state” are
governed by Rule 37, see Rule 37.01, which requires we follow the Missouri Rules of Criminal
Procedure 19 to 36 “[i]f no procedure is specially provided by this Rule 37,” see Rule 37.08.
Those Rules in turn provide that an appeal “may be taken as provided in Rule 81.04 and Rule
81.08.” Rule 30.01(a). No applicable rule directs us to Rule 81.05—as such, we cannot apply it
as the City suggests. See City of Florissant v. Moore, 5 S.W.3d 598, 599 (Mo. App. E.D. 1999).
Instead, following the standard rules for criminal proceedings, “a judgment is final when the trial
court enters an order of dismissal or discharge of the defendant prior to trial which has the effect
of foreclosing any further prosecution of the defendant on a particular charge[.]” Cooper, 599
S.W.3d at 206 (quoting Burns, 994 S.W.2d at 942).
The dismissal of the citations against Lienemann constituted a final judgment on the day
it was entered: January 19, 2022. The City was required to file its notices of appeal not later than
ten days after this date. See Rule 33.01(a); Rule 81.04(a); see also City of St. Louis v. Addison,
461 S.W.3d 440, 443 (Mo. App. E.D. 2015); St. Louis Cnty. v. Sparks, 267 S.W.3d 699, 699–
700 (Mo. App. E.D. 2008). As such, any notice of appeal was due on or before January 31,
2022. 5 See Rule 33.01(a); Rule 81.04(a); Rule 20.01(a). But the City did not file its notices of
5 January 29, 2022, is exactly 10 days from the date the dismissal judgment was entered on January 19, 2022.
January 29 fell on a Saturday, and therefore the notices of appeal were due the following Monday, on January 31. See Rule 20.01(a) (“In computing any period of time prescribed or allowed by these Rules, by order of court, or by any applicable statute, … [t]he last day of the period so computed is to be included, unless it is a
4 appeal until 37 days after January 19, 2022, rendering them untimely. This conclusion, however,
does not end our inquiry because Rule 30.03 allows this Court to permit a party to file a late
notice of appeal, in our discretion, for good cause shown. That Rule states:
Where the defendant or the state has the right of appeal … but notice of appeal is not filed with the clerk of the trial court within ten days after the judgment becomes final, the defendant or the state may file a notice of appeal in the trial court if, within twelve months after the judgment becomes final, a motion for leave to file such notice is filed in the appropriate appellate court and it thereafter sustains the motion and grants such leave. Such special order may be made by the appellate court, in its discretion, for good cause shown. The order shall specify the time within which the notice of appeal is to be filed in the trial court.
Rule 30.03. 6
On July 29, 2022, the City filed with this Court a motion for leave to file its appeal out of
time pursuant to Rule 30.03. 7 The City filed this motion as an alternative to its argument that its
notices of appeal were timely filed. In support of this motion, the City argued it had good cause
for its late filing, highlighting “the ambiguity regarding the interplay between Rule 30.01,
81.04(a), and 81.05(a) when seeking an appeal in an ordinance prosecution matter” and “a lack
of clear decisional law addressing when an order granting a motion to dismiss in an ordinance
violation proceeding is considered final for the purposes of starting the 10-day window within
which the aggrieved party is required to file a notice of appeal.” The City further noted the
Saturday, Sunday, or a legal holiday, in which event the period runs until the end of the next day which is neither a Saturday, Sunday nor a legal holiday.”). 6 Lienemann argues that Rule 30.03 is inapplicable to appeals from municipal ordinance violation proceedings,
citing St. Louis Cnty. v. Glore, 715 S.W.2d 565 (Mo. App. E.D. 1986). Glore generally explained that municipal ordinance violation proceedings should be governed by the rules of criminal procedure except as to the right of appeal, which fell under the general civil appeals statute. Id. at 566–68. Glore does not aid Lienemann, however, because it was decided prior to the enactment of Rule 37.08 in 1998 (effective January 1, 2000), which established that cases arising from municipal ordinance violations are to be governed by the Missouri Rules of Criminal Procedure 19 to 36. Rule 37.08 (“If no procedure is specially provided by this Rule 37, the court shall be governed by Rules 19 to 36, inclusive, to the extent not inconsistent with this Rule 37.”). 7 The City also filed this motion pursuant to Rule 81.07, which governs civil cases and is therefore
inapplicable.
5 importance and likely reoccurring nature of the legal issues presented in this appeal. Lienemann
opposed this motion.
This Court issued a special order provisionally granting the City’s motion under Rule
33.03 and allowing new notices of appeal for these cases to be filed within 15 days. The City
complied with this order and filed a new notice of appeal in each ordinance violation case, which
were filed within twelve months after the January 19 dismissal became final. See Rule 33.03.
Our special order allowing the City to file these notices of appeal was a proper exercise of
discretion under Rule 33.03. We therefore proceed to address the merits of this appeal.
Motion to Strike Portions of the Legal File
Lienemann has filed a motion to strike portions of the City’s system-generated legal file.
Specifically, Lienemann seeks to strike documents numbered 660 through 663, which
Lienemann argues were submitted without the trial court’s permission after it had entered final
judgment fully disposing of the case now before us. This Court ordered the motion taken with
the case. We now deny Lienemann’s motion to strike for the following reasons.
On January 19, 2022, the trial court entered final judgment in this case dismissing the
ordinance violation citations against Lienemann. The City proceeded to file a motion to
reconsider or to vacate the judgment, which the trial court denied on February 15, 2022. Three
days later, on February 18, the City submitted certified copies of three City Code provisions:
section 100.020; section 215.010; and Chapter 525, including the 2015 International Property
Maintenance Code (IPMC). Those documents were included in the legal file of this appeal and
are the ones that Lienemann seeks to have stricken therefrom.
Although typically we do not consider documents that were not before the trial court
when it entered the appealed-from decision, see Greene v. Pinetree/Westbrooke Apartments,
6 LLC, 480 S.W.3d 434, 436 n.1 (Mo. App. E.D. 2016), we decline to strike these documents from
the record in this case for two reasons. First, two of the three documents at issue were merely
copies of documents that were already in the record before the trial court when it ruled on
Lienemann’s motion to dismiss. Lienemann herself attached an uncertified copy of City Code
section 100.020 in support of her motion to dismiss. And the City had previously attached a
certified copy of City Code Chapter 525—albeit without including the 2015 IPMC it
references—in support of its opposition to Lienemann’s motion to dismiss. Second, both parties
extensively referenced and cited to these ordinances in their briefing before the trial court and
this Court, and the language of the ordinances are central to all parties’ arguments both before
the trial court and on appeal. As such, we believe there are no equitable arguments for striking
these documents. See Kansas City v. Scanland, 506 S.W.2d 18, 21 (Mo. App. K.C. 1974); City
of Kansas City v. Narron, 493 S.W.2d 394, 401 (Mo. App. K.C. 1973).
While we are mindful of the general rule regarding ordinance submission into the record,
see City of Univ. City v. MAJ Inv. Corp., 884 S.W.2d 306, 308 (Mo. App. E.D. 1994), 8 we
conclude that the ordinances at issue were sufficiently in the record before the trial court such
that we will not strike the certified copies from the legal file on appeal.
Lienemann’s motion to strike is denied.
Standard of review
Appellate courts review de novo the grant of a motion to dismiss an information charging
an ordinance violation where the dismissal is based solely on questions of law. City of Moline
8 Courts, including this one, may not take judicial notice of a municipal ordinance that is not properly
introduced into evidence in the record. See City of Univ. City v. MAJ Inv. Corp., 884 S.W.2d 306, 307 (Mo. App. E.D. 1994).
7 Acres v. Brennan, 470 S.W.3d 367, 371 (Mo. banc 2015); City of Raymore v. O’Malley, 527
S.W.3d 857, 861 (Mo. App. W.D. 2017).
Our review of a circuit court’s interpretation of a city ordinance is a question of law
which we likewise review de novo. DMK Holdings, LLC v. City of Ballwin, 646 S.W.3d 708,
712 (Mo. App. E.D. 2022). When interpreting an ordinance, courts apply the same rules as those
for statutory interpretation. City of St. Peters v. Roeder, 466 S.W.3d 538, 543 (Mo. banc 2015)
(citing State ex rel. Teefey v. Bd. of Zoning Adjustment of Kansas City, 24 S.W.3d 681, 684
(Mo. banc 2000)). Accordingly, we seek to “ascertain the intent of the municipality, give effect
to that intent, if possible, and consider the plain and ordinary meaning of the language used.”
See id. (citing Teefey, 24 S.W.3d at 684).
Discussion
In three points on appeal, the City challenges the trial court’s dismissal of the municipal
citations against Lienemann for various property maintenance and nuisance violations. 9 We find
merit in the City’s second point on appeal and reverse and remand for further proceedings.
Because our disposition of Point II resolves this appeal, we do not address the allegation of error
raised in Point I. See Emerson v. Garvin Group, LLC, 399 S.W.3d 42, 47 (Mo. App. E.D. 2013).
We do discuss the arguments raised in Point III, however, given that those issues are likely to
arise upon remand. See Watson v. City of St. Peters, 599 S.W.3d 479, 488 (Mo. App. E.D.
2020).
9 Although the trial court’s dismissal was without prejudice, it constituted an appealable final judgment
because it had “the practical effect of terminating the litigation.” City of Chesterfield v. DeShetler Homes, Inc., 938 S.W.2d 671, 673 (Mo. App. E.D. 1997) (citing Skaggs v. Skaggs, 938 S.W.2d 302, 302–03 (Mo. App. E.D. 1997)); see also State v. Metzinger, 456 S.W.3d 84, 98 (Mo. App. E.D. 2015). This dismissal is a determination from which the City has the right to appeal. See Metzinger, 456 S.W.3d at 90.
8 Lienemann as Proper Defendant (Point II)
In its second point on appeal, the City contends the trial court erred in granting
Lienemann’s motion to dismiss because Lienemann is the proper defendant liable for these
municipal violations, in that she is the person in control of the corporate entities that own the
Property. We agree that the trial court erred in dismissing the citations against Lienemann.
The parties do not dispute the underlying facts: that the Property is owned by the Family
Partnerships, that the general partner of each Family Partnership is Harvester Farms, LLC, and
that Lienemann is the registered agent for each Family Partnership and is the sole member of
Harvester Farms, LLC. The parties’ sole dispute is whether these facts are sufficient to cause
Lienemann to be cited for violations at the Property of the City’s property maintenance and
nuisance ordinances.
Here, Lienemann was cited for violations of the City’s property maintenance code, see
Chapter 525, and for violations of the City’s Code covering nuisances, see Chapter 215. For its
property maintenance code, the City has adopted the 2015 International Property Maintenance
Code (IPMC). 10 See City Code section 525.010. The relevant IPMC section, adopted as the
City Code, provides: “Responsibility. The owner of the premises shall maintain the structures
and exterior property in compliance with these requirements, except as otherwise provided for in
this code.” IMPC 301.2. The nuisance ordinance provisions are found in City Code Chapter
215, which provides that “it shall be unlawful for any person, including the owner or occupant of
any premises within the boundaries of the City … to maintain or permit to be maintained such
public nuisance.” City Code section 215.010(C). Such public nuisance includes “weeds … or
grass of any type” above a proscribed height. See City Code section 215.010(H).
10 All references to the International Property Maintenance Code are to IPMC 2015.
9 Under the language of the City ordinances, a “person,” including an “owner,” may be
held liable for and be charged with a violation of the weed nuisance ordinances, and an “owner”
may be held liable for and be charged with a violation of the property maintenance code. The
parties disagree over whether the general City Code definitions or the IPMC definitions apply to
the violations at issue here: failures to maintain property and to cut weeds. For the following
reasons, we conclude the IPMC definitions apply to the City’s property maintenance code, but
the City Code’s general definitions apply to the weed nuisance ordinances.
City property maintenance code The City’s property maintenance code is found in Chapter 525. City Code section
525.010 provides that:
The 2015 International Property Maintenance Code, as published by the International Code Council, Inc., as amended, along with Appendix A, as amended, is hereby adopted as the Property Maintenance Code of the City; and all of the regulations, provisions, penalties, conditions, and terms of the 2015 International Property Maintenance Code are hereby referred to, adopted and made part thereof, as if fully set forth in this Chapter, with additions, insertions, deletions, and changes prescribed in this Chapter.
City Code section 525.010. City Code section 525.040 then lists provisions of the IMPC with
the additions, insertions, deletions, and changes prescribed. Some of these changes delete entire
provisions of the IMPC, 11 some replace provisions in the IPMC, 12 and some provide for specific
definitions to be used. 13 No changes are listed that affect IPMC 201.1 or 202, which provide the
scope and the definitions for the IPMC. See IPMC 201.1 (“Unless otherwise expressly stated,
11 For example: “103.1 Delete.” City Code section 525.040(A)(2). In the City Property Maintenance Code, IPMC 103.1 is therefore deleted. 12 For example: “109.4 Emergency Repairs. For the purposes of this Section, the Code Official shall employ
the necessary labor and materials to perform the required work as expeditiously as possible.” City Code section 525.040(A)(8). In the City Property Maintenance Code, IPMC 109.4 is therefore replaced by this language. 13 For example: “109.7.2 Definitions as used in Section 109.7 through 109.7.8,” and providing specific
definitions. City Code section 525.040(A)(13). In the City Property Maintenance Code, the definitions provided are therefore employed in relation to IPMC 109.7 through 109.7.8.
10 the following terms shall, for the purposes of this code, have the meanings shown in this
chapter.”); IPMC 202. Given this, we believe the City intended the IPMC definitions to apply to
the property maintenance code unless specifically provided for in City Code section 525.040
governing IPMC amendments. 14
As discussed above, the City property maintenance code provides that an “owner” may
be held liable for a violation of that code. IMPC 301.2. An “owner” is defined as:
Any person, agent, operator, firm or corporation having legal or equitable interest in the property; or recorded in the official records of the state, county or municipality as holding title to the property; or otherwise having control of the property, including the guardian of the estate of any such person, and the executor or administrator of the estate of such person if ordered to take possession of real property by a court.
IPMC 202. A “person” is in turn defined as “An individual, corporation, partnership or any
other group acting as a unit.” IPMC 202.
The Family Partnerships, who hold legal title to the Property, clearly fall within the
definition of who may be held liable for and be charged with a violation. It is a more complex
question whether Lienemann may be cited and held liable for a violation of the property
maintenance code.
The only portion of the definition of “owner” within which Lienemann may fall is: “Any
person … otherwise having control of the property.” See IPMC 202. This Court has previously
held, under the same definition of owner applicable here, that an individual who did not hold title
14 We note that the City Code’s general definitions and rules of construction provide:
In the construction of this Code and of all other ordinances of the City, the following definitions and rules of construction shall be observed, unless it shall be otherwise expressly provided in any Section or ordinance, or unless inconsistent with the manifest intent of the Board of Aldermen, or unless the context clearly requires otherwise. City Code section 100.020(A). We believe that the City Code’s statement that “all of the … terms of the 2015 International Property Maintenance Code are hereby referred to, adopted and made part thereof, as if fully set forth in this Chapter,” and the fact that there are no changes to the scope or definitions provisions of the IPMC, express the City’s intent to use the IPMC definitions and, further, that the context of the property maintenance code clearly requires use of the IPMC definitions.
11 to an apartment complex could be found guilty of a municipal property maintenance violation
where the municipality “presented evidence at trial that [the individual] maintained control over
the subject property,” which in that case included stating to the code official that he “would hire
a crew to make necessary repairs” and presenting the official “with a work scope” detailing the
repairs. St. Louis Cnty. v. Heiman, 441 S.W.3d 160, 163–64 (Mo. App. E.D. 2014).
Importantly, that individual also “never referred [the code official] to a different party to discuss
Code violations on the property, nor did he ever indicate that anyone other than he would be
needed to approve repairs at the property.” Id.
In the instant case, however, no such evidence regarding “control” has been adduced.
The City contends Lienemann fully controls the Family Partnerships and the Property;
Lienemann contends she is merely an agent of the Family Partnerships who has no other control
over the Property. Without sufficient facts before us regarding Lienemann’s “control” over the
Property, we are unable to determine if she may properly be held liable for the property
maintenance violations. See City of St. Louis v. Londoff, 518 S.W.2d 312, 313–14 (Mo. App.
St.L. 1975) (individual properly charged with violation of property maintenance ordinances
where individual stipulated to being president of corporation that was owner of record of
property at issue); but see City of St. Louis v. Boos, 503 S.W.2d 133, 134–35 (Mo. App. St.L.
1973) (discharge of defendant proper where evidence failed to establish individual’s
responsibility as an officer, agent, or member of owner corporation for property maintenance
violations, where individual testified to his distance from and lack of knowledge of corporation).
We conclude the trial court erred in dismissing Lienemann as a defendant at this early
stage, where further factual determinations were required to determine her potential liability. We
must reverse and remand for further consistent proceedings.
12 City weed nuisance ordinances City Code section 525.040 provides that ordinances covering weeds are found in
“Chapter 215, Section 215.020(H) of the Municipal Code of the City of St. Peters,” as opposed
to adopting the language of the “Weeds” provision of the IPMC, see IPMC 302.4. City Code
section 525.040(A)(53). Because this amendment refers outside the IPMC and back to another
chapter of the City Code, we believe that context requires application of the City Code’s general
definitions as found in City Code section 100.020, rather than the definitions found in and
applicable to the IPMC and City property maintenance code.
The City nuisance ordinance provides that a “person,” including an “owner,” may be held
liable for a violation of that ordinance. City Code section 215.010(C). The general definitions
of the City Code provide that an “owner” as “[a]pplied to a building, land, or personal property,
shall include any part owner, joint owner, tenant in common, joint tenant or tenant by the
entirety, of the whole or a part of such building, land or personal property.” City Code section
100.020(A). A “person” under that section is defined to include:
a natural person and shall extend and be applied to bodies politic and corporate, and to other similar entities, partnerships, and unincorporated associations. … Whenever the word “person” is used in any Section of this Code as to partnerships or associations, the word shall include the partners or members thereof, and as to corporations, shall include the officers, agents or members thereof who are responsible for any violation of such Section.
City Code section 100.020(A).
The Family Partnerships, who are the Property’s owners, clearly fall within the definition
of who may be held liable for and charged with a violation. Under the definitions applicable, the
Family Partnerships are the “persons” liable as the owners. 15 And under the definition of
15 Because this ordinance holds the owner of property liable, we reject Lienemann’s argument that it is in
conflict with state nuisance law. See Fred Kemp Co., LLC v. Braselman, 619 S.W.3d 477, 482–83 (Mo. App. E.D. 2021) (citing RSMo. Section 71.780).
13 “person,” this includes responsible “partners or members” of the Family Partnerships. See City
Code section 100.020(A). As the general partner, Harvester Farms, LLC therefore meets the
definition of a liable “person.” In turn, because the statute provides that such corporate entities 16
“include the officers, agents or members thereof who are responsible for any violation,”
Lienemann could also be a liable “person.” This definition, however, turns on a factual
determination of Lienemann’s level of responsibility for the violation, for the Property, and
within the Family Partnerships and Harvester Farms, LLC. See City Code section 100.020(A)
(corporate entities liable for violations as property owners include their partners, members,
officers, and agents “who are responsible for any violation”) (emphasis added). As stated
above, no sufficient evidence regarding Lienemann’s level of responsibility has been adduced.
Therefore, we conclude the trial court erred in dismissing Lienemann as a defendant at
this early stage, where further factual determinations were required to determine her potential
liability. We must reverse and remand for further consistent proceedings.
Dismissing the citations against Lienemann was improper because further factual determinations are needed As explained above, the ordinance provisions defining who may be liable for property
maintenance and nuisance violations could cover Lienemann depending on her level of “control”
or “responsibility” for the Property and the violations thereon. Answering the question of
Lienemann’s possible liability for the violations demands further factual inquiry. Accordingly, it
was improper for the trial court to grant Lienemann’s motion to dismiss the citations against her
16 The ordinance specifically provides that “corporations” includes “the officers, agents or members thereof.”
City Code section 100.020(A). We conclude, relying on the plain and ordinary meaning of that term, that “corporation” as used in the ordinance includes limited liability companies such as Harvester Farms, LLC. Accord Corporation, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 429, 431 (11th ed. 2019) (including nested term “limited- liability corporation” and cross-referencing “limited-liability company”); Company, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 350, 351 (11th ed. 2019) (defined primarily as “[a] corporation” and including nested term “limited-liability company,” which is noted as being “also termed limited-liability corporation”).
14 at this early stage in the proceedings. See O’Malley, 527 S.W.3d at 862–63. Upon remand, the
City bears the burden to prove all elements of the alleged ordinance violations beyond a
reasonable doubt—including Lienemann’s liability therefor. See id. at 863 (citing City of
Kansas City v. Johnney, 760 S.W.2d 930, 931 (Mo. App. W.D. 1988)); Tupper v. City of St.
Louis, 468 S.W.3d 360, 372–73 (Mo. banc 2015).
Point II is granted.
Collateral Estoppel (Point III)
In its third and final point on appeal, the City claims the trial court erred in granting
Lienemann’s motion to dismiss because Lienemann is collaterally estopped from arguing that
she is not the proper defendant for the municipal violations at issue. Specifically, the City asserts
that Lienemann is collaterally estopped from raising this argument because she was previously
found guilty of violations of the same ordinances involving the Property, she withdrew her
application for trial de novo of those convictions, and she paid the fines assessed against her.
We address the City’s point on appeal because it presents an issue that is likely to arise upon
remand. See Watson, 599 S.W.3d at 488.
“Collateral estoppel ‘means simply that when an issue of ultimate fact has been
determined by a valid final judgment, that issue cannot again be litigated between the same
parties in any future lawsuit.’” State v. Dowell, 311 S.W.3d 832, 837 (Mo. App. E.D. 2010)
(quoting State v. Coleman, 773 S.W.2d 199, 201 (Mo. App. E.D. 1989)). The principle of
collateral estoppel is embodied in the 5th Amendment guarantee against double jeopardy. Id.
(citing supporting cases, including Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 445 (1970)). One
fundamental aspect of the doctrine of collateral estoppel is that it is only available for use by a
defendant in a criminal proceeding—not the State. See id. at 837–38; State v. Cusumano, 399
15 S.W.3d 909, 914-15 (Mo. App. E.D. 2013). And although municipal proceedings are civil in
nature, courts generally apply fundamental criminal law principles to prosecutions of municipal
ordinance violations because of their quasi-criminal aspects. See Tupper, 468 S.W.3d at 372-73.
Accordingly, the doctrine of collateral estoppel is not available to the City in its prosecution of
the ordinance violations against Lienemann. The trial court did not err in failing to apply
collateral estoppel to preclude Lienemann from asserting that she cannot be named as the
defendant party for these municipal ordinance violations.
Point III is denied.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion.
SHERRI B. SULLIVAN, J.
Angela T. Quigless, P.J., and Robert M. Clayton III, J., concur.