City of St. Charles v. De Sherlia

308 S.W.2d 456, 1957 Mo. App. LEXIS 581
CourtMissouri Court of Appeals
DecidedOctober 1, 1957
Docket29912
StatusPublished
Cited by19 cases

This text of 308 S.W.2d 456 (City of St. Charles v. De Sherlia) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Missouri Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
City of St. Charles v. De Sherlia, 308 S.W.2d 456, 1957 Mo. App. LEXIS 581 (Mo. Ct. App. 1957).

Opinion

ANDERSON, Judge.

This is an action in ejectment which was .brought by the City of St. Charles to recover possession of a certain strip of land alleged to be part of a public street in said ,city. The defendants are Harold DeSherlia and Gertrude DeSherlia, husband and wife, owners of land abutting on the alleged street.

The petition alleged that in 1910 Annie Dallmeyer conveyed a tract of land to William Bredenbeck and Amanda Bredenbeck, and by said deed also dedicated to the public for use as a street a strip of land 25 feet in width and 350 feet in length located in the ’City of St. Charles; that said.street hard for many years past been opened and traveled by the public; that the owners of real estate abutting upon said street and'their predecessors in title have, ever since the 29th day rof December, 1910, acknowledged and recognized the right of plaintiff and the public to use said strip for street purposes; that title thereto became vested in plaintiff for the use of the public for street purposes, and that plaintiff was entitled to the possession thereof; that defendants entered into possession of said strip of ground and obstructed same and prevented its use as a public street by placing thereon concrete building blocks and motor vehicles parked crosswise on said street; and that although demand was made on defendants to cease said practice they have continued to obstruct said street. The petition prayed judgment for possession, and for costs.

By their answer, defendants admitted the execution of the deed by Annie Dallmeyer, but denied that thereby said street was opened, dedicated or created. It was denied that said street had for many years been opened and used for street purposes by the public, and that the abutting property owners had, since the 29th day of December, 1910, acknowledged and recognized the right of plaintiff and the public to use said strip of ground for street purposes. It was denied that title to said ground became vest-edin plaintiff upon execution of said deed and use by the public. Further answering, defendants admitted that they, their servants and agents, were using said land so as to obstruct the use thereof by others. It was then alleged that they entered upon said strip “more than ten years ago and have been in open, notorious, hostile, adverse, continuous and exclusive possession of said strip ever since said time.” The prayer of said answer was that, defendants be dismissed with their costs.

Defendants also filed a counterclaim in which they alleged that they entered upon said strip of land in question on March 15, 1941, and since said time have been in continuous adverse possession thereof. Said pleading- then, after, alleging that plaintiff *459 was making some claim of interest in said land adverse to defendants’ ownership', prayed that the court try and determine the title to said strip of land and for decree that defendants are the rightful legal owners of said strip of land. Plaintiff, by its reply to the counterclaim, denied defendants acquired the title by adverse possession, and again asked for the relief as prayed in its petition.

The trial of the ejectment suit was to a jury, and the hearing on the counterclaim was to the court. There was a verdict for defendants on plaintiff’s cause of action, and a finding by the court against defendants on their counterclaim. Judgment was entered accordingly.

Defendants filed no after trial motion, and took no appeal. Plaintiff filed a motion to set aside the verdict in the ejectment suit and to enter judgment in its favor or, in the alternative, for a new trial. The trial court sustained the alternative motion for new trial and assigned as reasons therefor that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence and that instructions A and B, given at the request of defendants, were erroneous. Defendants thereupon appealed to the Supreme Court from the judgment and order granting a new trial. The Supreme Court transferred the cause to this court on the ground that it was without jurisdiction of the appeal. City of St. Charles, Missouri, v. DeSherlia, Mo.Sup., 303 S.W.2d 32.

Defendants’ principal contention on this appeal is that plaintiff was not, under its petition and under the evidence adduced, entitled to a judgment in its favor, and for that reason the court erred in sustaining plaintiff’s motion for new trial.

It is within the trial court’s discretion to grant one new trial upon the ground that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence. Section 510.330 RSMo 1949, V.A.M.S. Such an order will not be interfered with absent an abuse of discretion. Woods v. Ogden, Mo.Sup., 102 S.W.2d 648; Lindsey v. Vance, 337 Mo. 1111, 88 S.W.2d 150; Stegner v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas R. Co., 333 Mo. 1182, 64 S.W.2d 691; Westinghouse Electric Supply Co. v. Binger, Mo.App., 212 S.W.2d 445. There is no abuse of discretion where it appears that substantial evidence was introduced upon which a jury could have reasonably arrived at a verdict contrary to the one returned. Westinghouse Electric Supply Co. v. Binger, Mo.App., 212 S.W.2d 445; Geiger v. City of St. Joseph, Mo.App., 198 S.W. 78; Leavel v. Johnston, 209 Mo.App. 197, 232 S.W. 1064. If plaintiff in the case at bar made a submissible case we cannot disturb the action of the trial court in granting a new trial on the ground that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence. Lindsey v. Vance, 337 Mo. 1111, 88 S.W.2d 150. But if plaintiff, under its petition and the evidence adduced, was not entitled to go to the jury, then the order of the trial court setting aside the verdict for defendants cannot be permitted to stand. Thompson v. Granite Bituminous Paving Co., 199 Mo.App. 356, 203 S.W. 496.

We shall state the evidence favorable to plaintiff and disregard defendants’ evidence unless it aids the plaintiff’s case, for the reason that in passing on the issue presented the plaintiff is entitled to all the evidence in its favor and all the favorable inferences therefrom. Wattels v. Marre, Mo.Sup., 303 S.W.2d 9.

On December 28, 1910, William Breden-beck purchased a lot from Annie Dallmeyer. The land was conveyed by warranty deed which described said property as being “A Lot of ground in the City of St. Charles, being part of the Prairie Haute Common Fields, fronting seventy-five feet (75') on the northwest side of Lindenwood Avenue (formerly called Orchard Street) and ex-' tending back at right angles to said Linden-wood Avenue a depth of One Hundred and Sixty feet (160') to an alley thirty feet (3CK) wide * *

In said deed also appears the following agreement: “And said party of the first part does further promise and agree to open- *460

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

State Ex Rel. Stone County Special v. Day
929 S.W.2d 286 (Missouri Court of Appeals, 1996)
Coffey v. State Ex Rel. County of Stone Ex Rel. Hamilton
893 S.W.2d 843 (Missouri Court of Appeals, 1995)
Gilbert v. K.T.I., Inc.
765 S.W.2d 289 (Missouri Court of Appeals, 1988)
Niccoli v. Thompson
713 S.W.2d 579 (Missouri Court of Appeals, 1986)
Village of Climax Springs v. Camp
681 S.W.2d 529 (Missouri Court of Appeals, 1984)
Pullin v. Victor
655 P.2d 86 (Idaho Court of Appeals, 1982)
Arrington v. Loehr
619 S.W.2d 888 (Missouri Court of Appeals, 1981)
Gee v. Gee
605 S.W.2d 815 (Missouri Court of Appeals, 1980)
Wendy's of Mid-Missouri, Inc. v. West
606 S.W.2d 215 (Missouri Court of Appeals, 1980)
Nowotny v. Ryan
534 S.W.2d 559 (Missouri Court of Appeals, 1976)
Hoechst v. Bangert
440 S.W.2d 476 (Supreme Court of Missouri, 1969)
Smith v. McClard
439 S.W.2d 246 (Missouri Court of Appeals, 1969)
State ex rel. State Highway Commission v. Klipsch
414 S.W.2d 777 (Supreme Court of Missouri, 1967)
State v. Klipsch
414 S.W.2d 783 (Supreme Court of Missouri, 1967)
Chappell v. City of Springfield
388 S.W.2d 886 (Supreme Court of Missouri, 1965)
Whalen v. St. Louis Public Service Co.
351 S.W.2d 788 (Missouri Court of Appeals, 1961)
Ginter v. City of Webster Groves
349 S.W.2d 895 (Supreme Court of Missouri, 1961)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
308 S.W.2d 456, 1957 Mo. App. LEXIS 581, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/city-of-st-charles-v-de-sherlia-moctapp-1957.