City of Spokane v. McGoldrick
Opinion
— Robert D. McGoldrick appeals convictions for driving without a driver's license and operating a motor vehicle with improper license plates. We affirm in part and reverse in part.
On October 17, 1975, appellant attempted to renew his driver's license. When queried by an examiner as to hospitalizations within the preceding year, the appellant stated he had been hospitalized for hypertension. The examiner then informed appellant that before his license would be renewed, he must undergo a physical examination and obtain a doctor's written authorization to continue driving. (See RCW 46.20.305.) Apparently the officer did not believe that appellant's medical problem mandated immediate refusal of renewal,1 because he gave the appellant a 30-day temporary driver's permit. The appellant made an appointment with his doctor the following week; explained the reason for his visit; was examined; and left forms to be completed which had been given him by the examiner. [257]*257Approximately a week later, appellant returned to the doctor's office and was assured that the necessary paper work had been forwarded to the Department of Motor Vehicles (Department). Subsequently, the appellant made two inquiries of the Department relative to the status of his license. In the meantime, on January 13, 1977, while test driving an automobile dealer's vehicle, the appellant was stopped by a Spokane City Policeman and cited for the two offenses involved in this appeal. Finally, in March 1977, appellant received a renewal authorization.
The first issue is whether appellant was operating the vehicle without a valid permit. We answer in the negative. RCW 46.20.305 provides, in part:
The department, having good cause to believe that a licensed driver is incompetent or otherwise not qualified to be licensed may upon notice require him to submit to an examination. The department may in addition require such person to obtain a certificate showing his condition signed by a licensed physician or other proper authority designated by the department. Upon the conclusion of such examination the department shall take driver improvement action as may be appropriate . . .
(Italics ours.)
RCW 46.20.322(1) provides, in part:
(1) Whenever the department . . . proposes to refuse to renew a driver's license, notice and an opportunity for a driver improvement interview shall be given before taking such action, except as provided in RCW 46.20.324 and 46.20.325.
RCW 46.20.3242 became inoperative when the examining officer chose not to exercise the authority accorded the Department in RCW 46.20.031 and issued the temporary [258]*258permit. Obviously, the Department did not invoke RCW 46.20.3253 since it had not disposed of appellant's renewal application. Hence, could the Department deprive appellant of his driving privilege by failing to act on his application within the duration of his temporary permit? No. Although such a permit may not exceed 60 days in duration, RCW 46.20.055(3), there is no statutory prohibition against the Department reissuing a temporary license pending its decision on a renewal application. If we permitted gross inactivity by the Department to convert a person's legal operation of á motor vehicle into a criminal operation, we would condone the Department doing by inaction that which it could not do by affirmative action. Because such a result would be anathema to justice, we hold the appellant's driver's permit was automatically renewed every 60 days, commencing November 17, 1975, until the expiration of the March 1977 renewal authorization.
The second issue, whether a motorist who is test driving a dealer's vehicle can be held criminally liable for operation of an improperly licensed vehicle, is without merit. Although the primary responsibility for obtaining a valid motor vehicle license is with the owner of a vehicle, RCW 46.16.500,4 Spokane city ordinance C 22-259, § 46.16-.010, as well as RCW 46.16.0105 specifically prohibit the operation of an improperly licensed vehicle. The fact that [259]*259the record is silent as to whether the appellant knew or was aware that the vehicle was unlicensed at the time of operation is immaterial since traffic offenses are mala prohibita. State v. Turner, 78 Wn.2d 276, 474 P.2d 91, 41 A.L.R.3d 493 (1970).
The judgment as to the driver's license is reversed and that charge is dismissed; however, the judgment as to the unlicensed vehicle is affirmed.
Farris, C.J., and Roe, J., concur.
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584 P.2d 471 (City of Spokane v. McGoldrick) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.