City of Shreveport v. Belk

258 So. 2d 79, 260 La. 1041, 1972 La. LEXIS 5619
CourtSupreme Court of Louisiana
DecidedFebruary 3, 1972
DocketNo. 51984
StatusPublished
Cited by14 cases

This text of 258 So. 2d 79 (City of Shreveport v. Belk) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Louisiana primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
City of Shreveport v. Belk, 258 So. 2d 79, 260 La. 1041, 1972 La. LEXIS 5619 (La. 1972).

Opinion

PER CURIAM.

The defendant, Joe Frank Belk, was charged in the City Court of the City of Shreveport with selling beer on Sunday, in violation of Sec. 3-26 of the City Code of the City of Shreveport. He was convicted and sentenced to pay a fine of $100.00.

Defendant appealed to the First Judicial District Court, Parish of Caddo, where, sustaining defendant’s Motion to Quash, the court held Sec. 3-26 1 unconstitutional as being violative of La.Const. Art. 14, Sec. 40(d) 2, in that the Shreveport City ordinance and the state statute3 on the same subject are in conflict, insofar as the city ordinance prohibits the selling of beer on Sunday. From this adverse ruling, the City of Shreveport appeals.

[1045]*1045There is no question but that the city ordinance under attack is broader than the State Sunday Closing Law. The city ordinance prohibits the sale of all alcoholic beverages on Sunday, including beer, while the State statute only prohibits the sale of intoxicating liquor on Sunday. In State v. Guimbellot, 232 La. 1043, 95 So.2d 650 (1957) we held that the State Sunday Closing Law does not prohibit' the sale of beer on Sunday in places which are otherwise exempted from the operation of said law. However, for the reasons hereinafter set forth, it is unnecessary to reach this issue.

There is a specific grant of legislative authority, which was not called to the attention of the district judge by the litigants, conferring on the various political subdivisions of the state the authority to regulate the sale of alcoholic beverages.4 This authority is contained in R.S. 26:494:

“Except as limited by the provisions of this Chapter the various subdivisions of the state may regulate but not prohibit, except by referendum vote as provided by Chapter 3, this Title or by legally authorized zoning laws of municipalities, the business of wholesaling, retailing, and dealing in alcoholic beverages. * *

In City of Lafayette v. Elias, 232 La. 700, 95 So.2d 281 (1957) this Court held that R.S. 26:494 is a broad grant of authority to municipalities allowing them wide discretion in the control of the sale of alcoholic beverages. This grant of authority is in addition to any authority which the city may have to provide for a day of rest. .

The Shreveport City Ordinance herein assailed reasonably regulates the sale of alcoholic beverages, and, as such, is a valid exercise of authority. The fact that such regulation may be to prohibit the sale of such beverages on Sunday does not invalidate an otherwise valid ordinance.

Defendant contends that the city ordinance is a prohibition, rather than a regulation, of alcoholic beverages, and, therefore not within the ambit of R.S. 26:494, the quoted statute authorizing political subdivisions to “regulate but not prohibit” the sale thereof.

The line between prohibition and regulation is sometimes a fine one. Most regulation of activity involves the prohibition of certain types of activity. For example, the regulation of automobiles and highways may involve the prohibition of driving while intoxicated, or of driving over a certain speed.

In City of Lafayette v. Elias, 232 La. 700, 95 So.2d 281 (1957), we held that a municipal ordinance which prohibited the sale of beer to persons under the age of 21 [1047]*1047was a reasonable regulation of the sale of alcoholic beverages within the authority-granted to municipalities.

The Shreveport City Ordinance herein assailed is a reasonable regulation, rather than a prohibition within the meaning of R.S. 26:494, of the sale of alcoholic beverages.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is reversed, and the case is remanded to the district court for further proceedings in accordance with law.

Reversed and remanded.

SUMMERS and DIXON, JJ., dissent.

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Bluebook (online)
258 So. 2d 79, 260 La. 1041, 1972 La. LEXIS 5619, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/city-of-shreveport-v-belk-la-1972.