City of Seymour v. Cummins

5 L.R.A. 126, 21 N.E. 549, 119 Ind. 148, 1889 Ind. LEXIS 253
CourtIndiana Supreme Court
DecidedMay 27, 1889
DocketNo. 13,520
StatusPublished
Cited by13 cases

This text of 5 L.R.A. 126 (City of Seymour v. Cummins) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Indiana Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
City of Seymour v. Cummins, 5 L.R.A. 126, 21 N.E. 549, 119 Ind. 148, 1889 Ind. LEXIS 253 (Ind. 1889).

Opinion

Olds, J. —

This action was commenced by John J. Cum[149]*149mins, in his lifetime, and he died during the pendency of the action in the court below. His death was suggested, and Mary J. Cummins, administratrix of his estate, was substituted as plaintiff. It is an action for damages for the construction of an open ditch on the ways or streets on two sides of a residence property owned by the decedent within the city of Seymour. The complaint alleges the manner in which the ditch was constructed, by which the decedent’s real estate was depreciated in value, rendered uninhabitable, and the means of ingress and egress to and from the said real estate were obstructed.

There was a demurrer to the complaint, by the appellant, which was overruled and exceptions reserved.

The first error assigned and discussed is the overruling of the demurrer to the complaint. One of the objections urged to the complaint is, that the heirs of the decedent are the proper parties plaintiff, instead of the administratrix. This objection is not well taken. The cause of action accrued during the lifetime of the decedent, and it survived, and his administratrix is the proper party to prosecute the action for damages. R. S. 1881, sections 281, 282 and 283.

There is a further objection urged to the complaint: That the complaint does not show any specific private interest the decedent had in the streets or ways, along which the ditch is constructed, differing from that of the general public. In this counsel for appellant are in error. The complaint clearly states and shows that the ditch was ten feet wide and three feet deep; that the decedent had sustained specific injuries by the obstruction of all means of ingress and egress to and from his said premises, on which he had erected a valuable dwelling-house ; that the ditch was dug so near to the line of his lot that the soil of his lot from time to time falls into the ditch; that the corrupt, filthy and poisonous water from the swamp and other surface water and sewerage from the woollen mills are turned into the ditch; that the fall is insufficient to carry it off, and it remains in said ditch [150]*150as stagnant water, and poisonous and unwholesome vapors and smells permeate and render impure the air over his lot and within his residence property, and malaria and disease are generated thereby, whereby said house and' premises are rendered untenantable; and that said ditch was constructed in 1877, and has ever since been maintained by said city in the same condition, and said ditch is a permanent one, and it was not the natural outlet for such drainage, and said drainage should have been by underground sewerage and not by an open drain.

The complaint was sufficient, and there was no error in overruling the demurrer.

The next error assigned is the overruling of appellant’s motion to separate the causes of action stated in the complaint. This question is not presented by the record. It can only be presented by a bill of exceptions, or by proper record made at the time. No bill of exceptions was filed at the time of the ruling, and no time was given to file any, as appears of record. If, however, the question were properly presented by the record, there was no error in the ruling, as there was but one cause of action stated in the complaint.

Appellant filed a motion to make the complaint more specific, and to strike out parts of the complaint, which motions were overruled and exceptions reserved, and the rulings on the motions are assigned as error. There were no bills of exceptions presented at the time of the rulings, nor was time given to present and file the same, and there is no question presented as to such rulings by the record. Rhine v. Morris, 96 Ind. 81; Manhattan L. Ins. Co. v. Doll, 80 Ind. 113; McIlvain v. Emery, 88 Ind. 298.

Demurrers were filed by appellee, and sustained to the fourth and fifth paragraphs of appellant’s answer, and the rulings are assigned as error.

The fourth paragraph alleges that the land of the decedent was wet and unfit for cultivation, and that it was improved and benefited by the drain, instead of being injured and [151]*151damaged, as alleged in the complaint. There was no error in sustaining the demurrer to this paragraph. The general denial was pleaded, and the same evidence was admissible under the general denial as was admissible under this paragraph.

The fifth paragraph of answer alleged that all and every act and thing alleged to have been done by defendant in said complaint were done, if at all, by reliable contractors, and the defendant did not, nor did her officers, or agents and employees take, have or exercise any control in regard thereto, but all was done, controlled, managed and directed by Leonard W. Bartlett, who was the contractor for all work in and to the excavating, digging and constructing the said ditch mentioned and described in said complaint, and the defendant had no control over the same in any manner whatever.

The complaint charges the defendant with having caused the line of a ditch to be surveyed, marked and staked by her city engineer, and by her officers, servants and employees, in September and October, 1877, dug and caused to be dug on the line so surveyed an open ditch, ten feet wide and three feet deep, along the streets and ways on the north and west sides of said plaintiff’s lot, and on one side of said plaintiff’s lot it was constructed on the line of the lot, so that the soil of the lot from time to time caves and falls into said ditch; that the dirt excavated from said ditch was placed in piles and destroyed the grade of the street; that said ditch obstructed and deprived the plaintiff of all means of access to said lot, depriving plaintiff of all means of ingress and egress to and from said premises; that it was dug and constructed for the purpose of draining a pond and other surface waters from a portion of the city; that the defendant turned the sewerage from a woollen mill into the ditch, and other sewerage and corrupt waters into the ditch, and that it remained stagnant therein, and poisonous and offensive odors and vapors arose therefrom, and made the air over the real estate of the plaintiff, and passing in and through [152]*152the house and residence of the plaintiff situate thereon, impure and unwholesome, rendering the premises and dwelling-house untenantable ; and such corrupt, poisonous and filthy waters, so remaining stagnant in said ditch, generated malaria and disease; and that said ditch was permanently constructed in such manner by said city, and so remained and was kept by said city as it was originally constructed; and additional sewerage and corrupt and filthy waters were from time to time turned into the same by said city, up to the time of the commencement of this suit, in 1882; that one of the ways along which it was constructed, adjacent to the plaintiff’s premises, was a private way of the plaintiff, and that it constituted a nuisance; that the natural outlet for such drainage was in another direction, and it could not be obtained in the course in which the ditch in question was constructed.

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Bluebook (online)
5 L.R.A. 126, 21 N.E. 549, 119 Ind. 148, 1889 Ind. LEXIS 253, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/city-of-seymour-v-cummins-ind-1889.