IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
CITY OF SEATTLE, No. 72667-6-1 Respondent, C~i
DIVISION ONE v. PO
JANET NORMAN, UNPUBLISHED OPINION c
Appellant. FILED: February 16, 2016
Becker, J. — A dog bit his owner's neighbor. The dog's owner was
convicted of owning a dangerous animal in violation of the Seattle Municipal
Code, a crime for which death of the animal is a mandatory sentence. The dog
owner appeals. We conclude that the animal control officer's testimony
constituted improper opinion evidence on whether the dog bite was unprovoked.
For this reason, we reverse.
FACTS
Appellant Janet Norman, a 79-year-old Seattle resident, owns a German
Shepherd dog named Duncan. Melania Grant, approximately 30 years old, lived
across the street from Norman on September 22, 2012. That day, Grant
approached the front door of Norman's house, wanting to borrow tools to fix her
car. When Norman opened her front door, Duncan shot past her and bit Grant's
arm. Grant's mother immediately drove her to the hospital, where the doctors No. 72667-6-1/2
mended the wound with approximately 50 stitches. The record contains no
evidence that Duncan had ever bit anyone before this incident occurred. Animal
Control Officer James Jackson investigated the incident and concluded the
attack was unprovoked. Later, a different animal control officer went to Norman's
home twice and told her she might face a criminal charge unless she removed
the dog from within the city limits. Norman decided to keep Duncan with her in
Seattle. As a result, the city decided to bring a criminal charge.
Norman was charged with the crime of owning a dangerous animal in
violation of Seattle Municipal Code 9.25.083(A). If an animal owner is found
guilty of this offense, the animal "shall" be euthanized. SMC 9.25.083(C).
Norman's trial occurred in Seattle Municipal Court in January 2014. Grant
was not present at trial. Norman did not testify. No one who testified at trial had
seen Duncan attack Grant. A jury found Norman guilty of owning a dangerous
animal. The court ordered Norman to surrender Duncan, and he is currently
detained at a kennel pending the outcome of these proceedings.
Norman appealed her conviction to superior court, and the court upheld
the conviction. Norman then obtained a grant of review from this court.
INTERPRETATION OF THE SEATTLE MUNICIPAL CODE
Seattle's municipal code contains an administrative process by which an
authorized city representative may declare an animal dangerous. SMC 9.25.035-
36. The administrative process contains various procedural safeguards, such as
written notice, an opportunity to respond at a meeting, a written decision, and an
appeal. The same chapter of the code also defines the crime of owning a No. 72667-6-1/3
dangerous animal. SMC 9.25.083. Norman contends that the ordinance
requires the city to declare her dog dangerous in accordance with the
administrative process of SMC 9.25.035 before it can charge her with owning a
dangerous animal under SMC 9.25.083.
Our paramount duty in construing this ordinance is to ascertain and give
effect to the intent of the city council. See, e.g., Hiqqins v. King County, 89 Wn.
App. 335, 948 P.2d 879 (1997). We are to interpret each section of a statute in
connection with every other section in order to harmonize the statute as a whole.
Belleau Woods II, LLC v. City of Bellingham, 150 Wn. App. 228, 242-43, 208 P.3d
5, review denied, 167Wn.2d 1014(2009).
An animal owner may be convicted of owning a dangerous animal under
either prong A or B of SMC 9.25.083:
A. It is unlawful to own a dangerous animal (other than a licensed guard or attack dog) with knowledge that the animal is dangerous, or with reckless disregard of the fact that the animal is dangerous. B. It is unlawful to possess within the City of Seattle any animal that has been ordered removed from the City of Seattle pursuant to SMC 9.25.035.
For the purposes of the charge against Norman, "dangerous animal" was defined
for the jury as any animal that "when unprovoked, inflicts severe injury on or kills
a human being or domestic animal on public or private property." SMC
9.25.020(G)(1).
Norman was charged and convicted under prong A. The plain language of
prong A does not require that the animal was previously declared dangerous
under the administrative process at SMC 9.25.035. In contrast, the plain No. 72667-6-1/4
language of prong B requires that the animal was previously ordered removed
from Seattle pursuant to SMC 9.25.035. Under that section, removal can be
ordered only after the animal has been declared dangerous in an administrative
process. SMC 9.25.035(A). In other words, a conviction for owning a dangerous
animal under prong B by definition requires a prior administrative declaration that
the animal is dangerous. The contrast between prongs A and B demonstrates
that the Seattle City Council knew how to make an administrative determination
of dangerousness a prerequisite for convicting a person of owning a dangerous
animal. The fact that the city council did not include such a prerequisite in the
plain language of prong A shows that they did not intend such a requirement.
Interpreting the Seattle ordinance in another case, the Washington
Supreme Court recognized that a finding of viciousness (now called
dangerousness) under the city code may be made by the director
administratively pursuant to SMC 9.25.035 or necessarily made by the jury in
finding him guilty of owning a vicious animal. Rabon v. City of Seattle, 135
Wn.2d 278, 295, 957 P.2d 621 (1998). The court's interpretation confirms the
plain language of the statute—that an animal may be declared dangerous either
by the administrative process at SMC 9.25.035 or by a jury at a criminal trial.
For her argument that a charge of owning a dangerous animal must be
dismissed where it is not preceded by an administrative declaration of
dangerousness, Norman cites State v. Bash, 130 Wn.2d 594, 925 P.2d 978
(1996). In Bash, the statute provided that "'the owner of any dog that
aggressively attacks and causes severe injury or death of any human, whether No. 72667-6-1/5
the dog has previously been declared potentially dangerous or dangerous, shall
be guilty'" of a felony. Bash, 130 Wn.2d at 600 (emphasis added), quoting former
RCW 16.08.100(3) (1987). The court interpreted this statute to require a
previous declaration of either dangerousness or potential dangerousness. Bash,
130 Wn.2d at 603. Norman cites to Chief Justice Durham's concurring opinion
that dismissal was required because there was no allegation that a previous
declaration of dangerousness or potential dangerousness had been made.
Bash, 130 Wn.2d at 613. The statute in Bash is not the same as the ordinance
at issue here. Prong A does not require a previous declaration that the animal
was potentially dangerous or dangerous. For this reason, Bash does not support
Norman's argument that she could not be charged with owning a dangerous
animal absent a previous administrative declaration of dangerousness.
We conclude that the Seattle Municipal Code does not require the city to
administratively declare an animal dangerous before charging the owner with
owning a dangerous animal.
DUE PROCESS
Norman was convicted after a jury trial in Seattle Municipal Court—"a
criminal proceeding with maximum due process protection." Rabon v. City of
Seattle, 107 Wn. App. 734, 744, 34 P.3d 821 (2001). At Norman's trial, the city
had the burden of proof and the jury was properly instructed regarding this
burden. Norman does not claim that any due process violations occurred during
her trial. No. 72667-6-1/6
Instead, Norman claims that it was a denial of due process for the city to
charge her with owning a dangerous animal without first administratively
declaring Duncan dangerous pursuant to SMC 9.25.035. A municipal ordinance
is presumed to be constitutional, and the party challenging it has the burden of
proving its unconstitutionality beyond a reasonable doubt. City of Seattle v.
Montana, 129 Wn.2d 583, 589, 919 P.2d 1218(1996).
Norman cites to an Ohio case for the proposition that a defendant's due
process rights are violated when there is no administrative hearing before
criminal charges are filed. State v. Cowan, 103 Ohio St. 3d 144, 2004-Ohio-
4777, 814 N.Ed.2d 846. In Cowan, the deputy dog warden made a unilateral,
unreviewable determination that the owner's dogs were vicious. The State then
criminally prosecuted the dog owner for failing to confine a vicious dog. At the
criminal trial, the State repeatedly told the jury the dog warden had already
determined that the dogs were dangerous and it was not the jury's job to decide
whether it was fair for the dog warden to make this determination. The Ohio
Supreme Court found that the "vicious" element of the crime was removed from
the jury's consideration and thus the dog owner was unconstitutionally deprived
of her due process right. Cowan, 103 Ohio St. 3d at 148-49. In contrast, in this
case, the jury did determine on its own that Duncan was dangerous, so the
problem that existed in Cowan does not exist here.
Norman's case is more analogous to another Ohio case she cites,
Younostown v. Travlor. 123 Ohio St. 3d 132, 2009-Ohio-4184, 914 N.E.2d 1026.
The Ohio Supreme Court held that a vicious dog ordinance did not violate the No. 72667-6-1/7
dog owner's procedural due process rights where the dogs' viciousness was an
element of the crime that the State had the burden of proving. Travlor, 123 Ohio
St. 3d at 136. The dogs were alleged to be vicious in the criminal complaint, and
the dog owner was given an opportunity for meaningful review in front of the trial
court. Travlor, 123 Ohio St. 3d at 137. Similarly, Duncan's dangerousness was
an element of the crime that the city had the burden of proving at trial. Duncan's
dangerousness was alleged in the criminal complaint, and Norman had a criminal
trial affording her maximum procedural due process. Norman has not met her
burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the ordinance under which she
was convicted had to include a preliminary administrative determination of
dangerousness in order to comport with due process.
EQUAL PROTECTION AND PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES
If an animal is administratively declared dangerous in Seattle, the animal
may be sent to a secure animal shelter, removed from the city, or euthanized.
SMC 9.25.035(A). But if an animal owner is convicted of owning a dangerous
animal, as Norman was, the animal shall be euthanized. SMC 9.25.083(C). The
heart of Norman's complaint is that the city, on Duncan's first offense, proceeded
directly to criminal charges which mandate death as a penalty rather than
administratively declaring him dangerous and retaining the option to spare his
life. Norman challenges the city for creating disparate penalties for the same
conduct and for choosing to prosecute Norman under the harsher ordinance.
Norman argues that the penalty disparity violates her rights both under the equal
protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and under the privileges and No. 72667-6-1/8
immunities clause of the Washington State Constitution. Again, a municipal
ordinance is presumed to be constitutional, and the party challenging it has the
burden of proving its unconstitutionality beyond a reasonable doubt. Montana,
129Wn.2dat589.
Norman refers to a violation of the equal protection clause in passing, but
does not brief the issue. Indeed, she acknowledges that the case she would like
to rely on for such a claim, State v. Zornes, 78 Wn.2d 9, 475 P.2d 109 (1970), is
no longer good law. Zornes held that acts defining the same offense for the
same conduct but prescribing different punishments violate an individual's right to
equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. Zornes, 78 Wn.2d at 21, 24-
25. But the equal protection analysis in Zornes was later overruled by the
Supreme Court in United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 125, 99 S. Ct. 2198,
60 L. Ed. 2d 755 (1979), where the Court held that the prosecutor's ability to
choose to proceed under identical criminal statutes prescribing different
penalties, standing alone, does not give rise to an equal protection violation. See
City of Kennewick v. Fountain, 116 Wn.2d 189, 802 P.2d 1371 (1991)
(recognizing that Batchelder overruled Zornes as to equal protection analysis
under the Fourteenth Amendment). Norman cites no authority to support her
equal protection argument. "Where no authorities are cited in support of a
proposition, the court is not required to search out authorities, but may assume
that counsel, after diligent search, has found none." DeHeer v. Seattle Post-
Intelligencer, 60 Wn.2d 122, 126, 372 P.2d 193 (1962). Norman's Fourteenth
Amendment equal protection claim fails for lack of authority.
8 No. 72667-6-1/9
To establish a violation of the privileges and immunities clause of the state
constitution, the challenger must show that the law, or its application, confers a
privilege to a class of citizens. Grant County Fire Prot. Dist. No. 5 v. City of
Moses Lake, 150 Wn.2d 791, 812, 83 P.3d 419 (2004). The first step of the
analysis is to determine whether the law in question involves a privilege or
immunity; if not, the privileges and immunities clause is not implicated. Grant
County, 150Wn.2dat812.
The term "privileges and immunities" is limited to "'those fundamental
rights which belong to the citizens of the state by reason of such citizenship.'"
Grant County, 150 Wn.2d at 812-13, quoting State v. Vance, 29 Wash. 435, 458,
70 P. 34 (1902). Included are the right to carry on business; the right to acquire
property and protect it under the law; the right to usual remedies to collect debts
and enforce other personal rights; and the right to be exempt, in property or
persons, from taxes or burdens which citizens of other states are exempt from.
Grant County, 150 Wn.2d at 813. The statutory authorization allowing
landowners to petition for annexation is not included because it does not involve
a fundamental attribute of an individual's state or national citizenship. Grant
County, 150 Wn.2d at 812-13. A person's property interest in dogs is imperfect
or qualified rather than absolute. Am. Dog Owners Ass'n v. City ofYakima, 113 Wn.2d213, 777 P.2d 1046 (1989); Rabon, 107 Wn. App. at 743. That is, the
State may use its police power to regulate and destroy dogs in order to protect
human citizens. Rabon, 107 Wn. App. at 743. Because a person has no
fundamental right as a citizen to own a dog, the Seattle ordinance in question No. 72667-6-1/10
does not involve a privilege or an immunity. Norman's claim under the
Washington Constitution privileges and immunities clause also fails.
OFFICER JACKSON'S TESTIMONY
At Norman's trial in January 2014, the city was confronted with a problem.
None of the witnesses had seen Duncan attack Grant. Grant was unavailable as
a witness because she had moved out of state and Norman did not testify. A
dangerous animal is defined as one that inflicts severe injury or kills "when
unprovoked." SMC 9.25.020(G)(1). To convict Norman of owning a dangerous
animal, the city had to prove without an eyewitness that Duncan's bite was
unprovoked. The city tried to solve this problem by having Officer Jackson testify
about his investigation of the dog bite. Norman assigns two errors to the
admission of Officer Jackson's testimony.
The first issue concerns the admission of Grant's out-of-court description
of the incident in her interview with Officer Jackson. Norman raised a preliminary
objection to the city's plan to have Officer Jackson testify about Grant's
statement, arguing that it was inadmissible hearsay and violated the
confrontation clause. The city countered that Grant's statement would not be
offered for the truth of the matter asserted but rather to show how Norman
reacted when Officer Jackson repeated it to her. Norman's reaction could then
be admitted as an admission of a party opponent. The trial court agreed with the
city and ruled that Officer Jackson would be allowed to testify as to what he told
Norman that Grant told him.
10 No. 72667-6-1/11
At trial, the prosecutor asked Officer Jackson what he told Norman about
his interview with Grant:
Q. [Prosecutor:] What did you tell the defendant Ms. Grant had told you? A. [Officer Jackson:] Urn, I told her that the—Ms. Grant said she came over to the house to borrow something, and that when she knocked on the door, urn, the defendant opened up the door and that the dog came out, immediately charged past her and began lunging and snapping and then finally biting her.
The prosecutor then asked about Norman's response:
Q. [Prosecutor]: . . . Officer Jackson, when you told the defendant what Ms. Grant had told you, how did she react? A. [Officer Jackson]: Urn, the defendant acknowledged that incident occurred. She said that Duncan had got—got past her when she opened up the door, urn, and—and bit the—her neighbor. She also said that the reason why she opened the door—normally she'll put the dog up, but because Duncan didn't show any type of aggressive behavior when . . . Ms. Grant knocked on the door, Duncan didn't show any type of aggressive behavior, so she thought it was okay, and she opened up the door and didn't—Duncan shot past her.
Norman contends that the admission of Officer Jackson's testimony about
Grant's out-of-court statement violated the confrontation clause of the Sixth
Amendment. Our review is de novo. State v. Koslowski, 166 Wn.2d 409, 417,
209 P.3d 479 (2009). The confrontation clause "does not bar the use of
testimonial statements for purposes other than establishing the truth of the matter
asserted." Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 59-60 n.9, 124 S. Ct. 1354, 158
L. Ed. 2d 177(2004).
Norman confirmed the facts contained in Grant's statement: as Norman
opened the door, Duncan got past her and bit Grant. Norman's statement was
admissible as a statement of a party opponent. ER 801(d)(2). With Norman's
11 No. 72667-6-1/12
statement having been ruled admissible, the city did not need all the details in
Grant's statement. If the idea was to set the stage for Officer Jackson's
testimony quoting Norman's reaction to Grant's account, the prosecutor could
have simply asked Officer Jackson what Norman said about the incident in
reaction to hearing him report Grant's account of it. Because the set-up for
Norman's statement could have been done without having Officer Jackson repeat
Grant's out-of-court statement, the city's explanation that Grant's statement was
offered solely to show Norman's reaction is not entirely convincing. But even if
Grant's statement to the officer was not properly admitted, the error was probably
harmless, given that Grant's and Norman's statements were much the same.
This brings us to Norman's second evidentiary issue: that Officer Jackson
was allowed to say that Duncan's bite was unprovoked. We agree with Norman
that this statement was improper opinion testimony and the error was prejudicial.
Norman asked that Officer Jackson be instructed not to testify that
Duncan's bite was unprovoked, arguing that it was an improper legal opinion.
The trial court agreed and ruled that Officer Jackson could testify "why he did
what he did" without drawing the legal conclusion that the bite was unprovoked.
Nevertheless, Officer Jackson testified that he told Norman the bite was
unprovoked:
Q. [Prosecutor:] Can you please explain to the jury what you explained to the defendant that day. A. [Officer Jackson:] I explained that a unprovoked bite—well, first I started a provoked bite. A provoked bite—I explained the unprovoked bite first. I explained that the unprovoked bite is when a person, urn, is walking down the street and your dog leaves the premises and bites the individual without any provocations. Urn, and then I went into the provoked
12 No. 72667-6-1/13
bite, the dog is provoked ifthe dog is teased, tantalized, urn, protecting property or protecting the owner. Q. [Prosecutor:] And what did you tell the defendant about this bite? A. [Officer Jackson:] And I told the defendant that this bite is a unprovoked bite because— MS. BERNHEIM: Objection, your Honor. This was addressed earlier. THE COURT: Ask a different question. MS. LONGANECKER: Your Honor, may I have a side bar? THE COURT: Actually, I'm going to allow the—I'm going to allow the statement. MS. LONGANECKER: Thank you. THE COURT: You can ask it again. Q. [Prosecutor:] What did you tell the defendant about this bite? A. [Officer Jackson:] I told her this bite was an unprovoked bite. Q. [Prosecutor]: And how did she react when you told her that? A. [Officer Jackson] She said, after explaining it, she said she understood, and I told her that I was going to issue her a citation for that bite.
Atrial court's ruling on the admissibility of opinion evidence is reviewed for
abuse of discretion. State v. Demerv. 144 Wn.2d 753, 758, 30 P.3d 1278 (2001).
Generally, no witness may testify to an opinion regarding the guilt of the
defendant, whether by direct statement or inference. State v. Black, 109 Wn.2d
336, 348, 745 P.2d 12 (1987). Such testimony is unfairly prejudicial because it
invades the exclusive province of the fact finder. Black, 109 Wn.2d at 348. In
deciding whether statements are impermissible opinion testimony, we consider
the entire circumstances of the case, including the following factors: the nature of
the charges, the type of defense, the type of witness involved, the specific nature
of the testimony, and the other evidence before the trier of fact. City of Seattle v.
Heatlev, 70 Wn. App. 573, 579, 854 P.2d 658 (1993), review denied, 123 Wn.2d
1011 (1994).
13 No. 72667-6-1/14
Norman's defense was that the city had not carried its burden of proving
the bite was unprovoked. Provocation was the only disputed fact for the jury.
The fact that Officer Jackson's opinion went to the core disputed issue made it
more likely to constitute improper opinion testimony. See, e.g., State v.
Montgomery. 163 Wn.2d 577, 594, 183 P.3d 267 (2008) (opinion testimony that
went to defendant's intent, the core issue and only disputed element, was
improper); State v. Farr-Lenzini. 93 Wn. App. 453, 462-63, 970 P.2d 313 (1999)
(in prosecution for attempting to elude, officer's testimony that defendant was
attempting to get away went to a core contested issue and was improper).
The specific nature of Officer Jackson's testimony was a legal conclusion.
Under ER 704, a witness may testify as to matters of law but may not give legal
conclusions. Hyatt v. Sellen Constr. Co., Inc., 40 Wn. App. 893, 899, 700 P.2d
1164 (1985). Improper legal conclusions include testimony that a particular law
applies to the case or that the defendant's conduct violated a particular law.
Hyatt. 40 Wn. App. at 899. For example, it was improper for a law enforcement
officer to testify that he had been trained in the elements of reckless driving, that
the defendant's actions fit within those elements, and that he issued the
defendant a citation. State v. King, 167 Wn.2d 324, 331-32, 219 P.3d 642 (2009).
In another case, the witness testified that the propane tanks in question were not
approved by the Department of Transportation. State v. Qlmedo, 112 Wn. App.
525, 532-33, 49 P.3d 960 (2002), review denied, 148 Wn.2d 1019 (2003). The
testimony constituted an improper legal conclusion because it required applying
14 No. 72667-6-1/15
the law defining an approved propane tank to the facts of the defendant's case.
Olmedo, 112 Wn. App. at 532.
Officer Jackson said he first explained to Norman how the law
distinguishes a provoked bite from an unprovoked bite. He then applied the legal
definitions to the facts of Duncan's bite and told her his conclusion that it was an
unprovoked bite. He told Norman he was going to issue her a citation for the
bite, a finding of guilt. He essentially stated the legal definition, applied it, and
found Norman guilty. Under ER 704, King, and Olmedo, this was improper legal
opinion testimony.
The city's other evidence on the issue of provocation was not particularly
strong. Officer Jackson formed his opinion that the bite was unprovoked based
on his post-bite interviews, not on a personal observation of the incident. By
contrast, in Heatley. the officer's opinion that the driver was intoxicated was
based on detailed testimony about his personal observations of the driver's
physical condition and performance on the field sobriety tests. The jury was
therefore in a position to independently assess the opinion in light of the
foundation evidence. Heatley, 70 Wn. App. at 581-82.
When a law enforcement officer gives opinion testimony, the jury is
especially likely to be influenced by that testimony. State v. Carlin, 40 Wn. App.
698, 703, 700 P.2d 323 (1985). A law enforcement officer's live testimony during
trial will often carry an aura of special reliability and trustworthiness. Demery.
144 Wn.2d at 763. Because Officer Jackson is a law enforcement officer, his
improper opinion testimony was especially prejudicial. In sum, all the Heatley
15 No. 72667-6-1/16
factors indicate that Officer Jackson's opinion testimony improperly usurped the
role of the jury.
The city argues that Officer Jackson's testimony was a fair opinion as to
the significance of the circumstances surrounding the dog bite and that it was
then up to the jury to decide whether Duncan was dangerous. The city cites
State v. Nelson, 152 Wn. App. 755, 763-64, 219 P.3d 100 (2009), review denied,
168 Wn.2d 1028 (2010). However, Nelson involved an expert witness, an
investigator who specialized in infiltrating animal fighting rings. He testified about
evidence found at the property of defendants charged with animal fighting and
concluded that that it was a dog fighting operation and that the dogs were
possessed with the intent that they be engaged in dogfighting. Nelson, 152 Wn.
App. at 763-64. The appellate court found that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in allowing this testimony because it was a classic expert opinion,
pulling disparate pieces of evidence into a coherent picture for jurors who would
not be familiar with the world of dogfighting. Nelson, 152 Wn. App. at 765-69.
The jury could accept or reject the expert's characterization of the evidence.
Nelson, 152 Wn. App. at 765-69. In contrast, here Officer Jackson was not
attempting to explain the significance of evidence but rather was allowed to
repeat his personal legal conclusion that the bite was unprovoked, when that
element was strictly a question for the jury to decide. For this reason, Nelson
does not demonstrate that Officer Jackson's opinion testimony was proper.
16 No. 72667-6-1/17
We conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing Officer
Jackson's improper opinion testimony and that the error was not harmless in light
of the scarcity of other evidence that the bite was unprovoked.
Reversed.
(f WE CONCUR:
/