City of Sarasota v. Burch
This text of 192 So. 2d 9 (City of Sarasota v. Burch) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court of Appeal of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
^ This is an appeal taken by the condemnor, City of Sarasota, in an eminent domain proceeding pursuant to Chaps. 73 and 74 F.S., from a final order denying the City’s petition to require the Circuit Clerk for Sarasota County to pay the condemnor the funds then remaining in his registry, after paying out the required amounts to the landowners-defendants at the conclusion of the proceedings, and without deducting from the remaining funds any clerk’s fees on the sums of money paid out.
The Clerk had already paid to the various landowners those sums to which they were found entitled by virtue of the merits of the eminent domain proceeding. Out of the remaining fund, the lower Court found the Clerk to be entitled to a fee, pursuant to Section 28.24, Florida Statutes, 1963, F.S. A., on those sums paid to meet the award fixed by the jury and judgment of the Court, but not on the excess in the registry, since such balance was held not to be a “pay-out”, but merely a return of the con-demnor’s money.
The appellant has assigned various errors, the crux of them being that the court erred in finding Section 28.24 applicable to the sums deposited in the Court’s registry in the instant case.
We agree with appellant.
Sections 74.05,1 74.06,2 and 74.11,3 F.S., provide for the monies paid into the registry of the Court pursuant to the statutory [11]*11•proceedings supplemental to eminent domain, initiated with the declaration of taking, to be free of commissions or “poundage”, and further that those sums not necessary to satisfy the judgment in favor of the landowners be returned to the condemning authority.
F.S. Sec. 28.24, F.S.A. provides for clerk’s fees on monies paid out of the registry unless otherwise provided.
The various sections of Chapter 74 before cited, seem to clearly provide for no commissions on the sums deposited and for the return to the condemnor of the entire amount over and above that distributed to the landowners pursuant to the award and judgment. This does not allow the construction calling for a deduction for clerk’s fees. The legislature provided for clerk’s fees in Section 28.24 only where there was no contrary provision in another statute. Chapter 74 is clearly contrary. Where there is no ambiguity in a statute, there is no authority for the court to construe the same, State ex rel. Green v. City of Pensacola, Fla.1961, 126 So.2d 566, and its plain meaning will not be disturbed, Hooper v. State Road Dept., Fla.App.1958, 105 So.2d 515; Vocelle v. Knight Bros. Paper Co., Fla.App.1960, 118 So.2d 664. The legislative intent is made manifest in the clear language used and therefore the need for construction is not activated. Platt v. Lanier, Fla.App.1961, 127 So.2d 912.
For the reasons above given the order appealed is hereby reversed.
Reversed.
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192 So. 2d 9, 1966 Fla. App. LEXIS 4571, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/city-of-sarasota-v-burch-fladistctapp-1966.