City of Rosenberg v. State

Opinion

ACCEPTED 14-15-00745-CV FOURTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS HOUSTON, TEXAS 10/28/2015 5:19:30 PM CHRISTOPHER PRINE CLERK

NO. 14-15-00745-CV

*** FILED IN IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 14th COURT OF APPEALS HOUSTON, TEXAS FOURTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT 10/28/2015 5:19:30 PM HOUSTON, TEXAS CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE Clerk *** CITY OF ROSENBERG, Appellant/Defendant

v. THE STATE OF TEXAS Appellee/Plaintiff

On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 2 Of Fort Bend County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. l 5-CCV-055144 Honorable Jeffrey A. McMeans, Presiding Judge

APPELLANT'S OPPOSED MOTION FOR EN BANC RECONSIDERATION

DENTON NAVARRO ROCHA BERNAL HYDE & ZECH, P.C. 2500 W. William Cannon Drive, Suite 609 Austin, Texas 78745 ( 512) 279-643 l Phone (512) 279-6438 Facsimile

George E. Hyde State Bar No. 45006157 SCOTT M. TSCHIRHART State Bar No. 24013655

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT CITY OF ROSENBERG MAY IT PLEASE THE COURT:

NOW COMES APPELLANT, the CITY OF ROSENBERG, (hereinafter

"Appellant" and/or "the City") and files this Appellant's Opposed Motion for En

Banc Reconsideration in accordance with the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure

("TRAP").

INTRODUCTION

By this motion for reconsideration en bane filed under Texas Rules of

Appellate Procedure 49.1 and 49. 7, Appellant asks this Court to reconsider its

decision to grant the Motion of the State of Texas to Dismiss Appeal for Want of

Jurisdiction. See Opinion filed October 13, 2015.

Reconsideration en bane is appropriate in this case because, although the

Court correctly identified this to be an issue of first impression in Texas

Jurisprudence, the Court's ruling mistakenly concludes that the 2011 Legislative

amendments to the Texas Property Code do not make the requirement that the State

make a bona fide offer prior to commencement of condemnation proceedings

jurisdictional. In fact, the Court incorrectly extended the Hubenak decision

(Hubenak v. San Jacinto Gas Transmission Co., 141 S.W.3d 172 (Tex. 2004)) by

applying it to statutory language that did not exist when Hubenak was decided. The

City contends that the Texas Legislature intended to completely overhaul the

condemnation practices in Texas and to make condemning entities follow the

2 prerequisites set forth in the Texas Property Code prior to initiating a condemnation

lawsuit. The Court incorrectly concluded that the abatement remedy set forth in

Texas Property Code section 21.047(d) is the sole remedy for the failure of the State

to follow the mandatory prerequisites of the condemnation procedure. Moreover,

the Court dismissed the City's appeal without giving the parties the opportunity to

brief the issues. The City's briefing will establish that the Legislature was, in a

string of bills dating back to the Hubenak decision, reacting directly to that decision.

The City should at the very least be afforded the opportunity to brief issues that the

Court correctly indicates are issues of first impression under Texas jurisprudence.

Finally, the granting of Appellee's Motion to Dismiss for Want of Jurisdiction

effectively deprives the City of its procedural due process rights and makes the 2011

amendments of the Texas Legislature a nullity.

For these reasons, Appellant urges the panel to reconsider its ruling based on

the following arguments.

STATEMENT OF RECONSIDERATION POINTS

Appellant requests reconsideration of the Court's ruling based on the

following:

A. The Court incorrectly concluded that the mandatory language used by the Legislature in the 2011 amendments to Chapter 21 of the Texas Property Code were not intended to be jurisdictional and abrogate the Hubenack decision.

3 B. The Court incorrectly extended Hubenack to apply to statutory language that the Legislature adopted to change the legislative scheme for condemnation set forth in Hubenack.

C. The Court incorrectly concluded that the abatement remedy set forth in Texas Property Code section 2 l.047(d) is the sole remedy for the failure of the State to follow the mandatory requisites of the condemnation procedure.

D. By granting Appellee's Motion to Dismiss for Want of Jurisdiction, without allowing briefing on the subject, the Court deprives the City of certain procedural due process rights that were intended by the Texas Legislature.

ARGUMENTS & AUTHORITIES

A. The Court incorrectly concluded that the mandatory language used by the Legislature in the 2011 amendments to Chapter 21 of the Texas Property Code were not intended to be jurisdictional.

Page 3-4 of the Court's Opinion contains the conclusion that the 2011

amendments to Chapter 21 of the Texas Property Code were not intended to

undermine the Hubenak analysis. As a result, the Court extended Hubenak to the

Legislature's bona-fide-offer requirement. However, the plain language of the

statute indicates that the Legislature wanted to change the way condemnations were

conducted in Texas and the legislative history supports the argument that these

amendments came about as a reaction to the Hubenak decision.

The Legislature used mandatory language to require a condemning entity to

take certain steps prior to condemning property. The 2011 amendments from Senate

Bill 18 included a new Section 21.0113:

Sec. 21.0113. BONA FIDE OFFER REQUIRED. (a) An entity with eminent domain authority that wants to acquire real property for a public use must make 4 a bona fide offer to acquire the property from the property owner voluntarily. (b) An entity with eminent domain authority has made a bona fide offer if: ( l) an initial offer is made in writing to a property owner; (2) a final offer is made in writing to the property owner; (3) the final offer is made on or after the 30th day after the date on which the entity makes a written initial offer to the property owner; (4) before making a final offer, the entity obtains a written appraisal from a certified appraiser of the value of the property being acquired and the damages, if any, to any of the property owner's remaining property; (5) the final offer is equal to or greater than the amount of the written appraisal obtained by the entity; (6) the following items are included with the final offer or have been previously provided to the owner by the entity: (A) a copy of the written appraisal; (B) a copy of the deed, easement, or other instrument conveying the property sought to be acquired; and (C) the landowner's bill of rights statement prescribed by Section 21.0112; and (7) the entity provides the property owner with at least 14 days to respond to the final offer and the property owner does not agree to the terms of the final offer within that period.

Added by Acts 2011, 82nd Leg., R.S., Ch. 81 (S.B. 18.), Sec. 8, eff. September 1, 2011. (emphasis added)

The Court was correct in its conclusion that this is a case of first impression under

Texas jurisprudence as it does not appear that any other court has considered whether

these provisions are jurisdictional. However, when considering the changes to

Section 21.012, it is clear that the Legislature intended these provisions to be

jurisdictional:

5 Sec. 21.012. CONDEMNATION PETITION. (a) If an entity with eminent domain authority wants to acquire real property for public use but is unable to agree with the owner of the property on the amount of damages, the entity may begin a condemnation proceeding by filing a petition in the proper court. (b) The petition must: ( 1) describe the property to be condemned; (2) state with specificity the public use for which the entity intends to acquire the property; (3) state the name of the owner of the property if the owner is known; (4) state that the entity and the property owner are unable to agree on the damages; (5) if applicable, state that the entity provided the property owner with the landowner's bill of rights statement in accordance with Section 21 .0 l l 2; and (6) state that the entity made a bona fide offer to acquire the property from the property owner voluntarily as provided by Section 21.0113. (c) An entity that files a petition under this section must provide a copy of the petition to the property owner by certified mail, return receipt requested.

Acts 1983, 68th Leg., p. 3498, Ch. 576, Sec. 1, eff. Jan. l, 1984. Amended by: Acts 2007, 80th Leg., R.S ., Ch. 1201 (H.B. 1495), Sec. 4, eff. February 1, 2008. Acts 2011, 82nd Leg., R.S., Ch. 81 (S.B. 18), Sec. 9, eff. September 1, 2011.

The Texas Legislature intended the bona fide offer requirements of Sec. 21.0113 to

provide a clear set of rules that a condemning entity must follow in order to

determine whether the parties are unable to agree and those mandatory provisions

must be complied with prior to filing suit. Otherwise the Legislature's actions in

passing Senate Bill 18 had no effect on the condemnation process.

6 The requirement in Sec. 21.0 l 2(b )(6), that the condemning entity ''state that

the entity made a bona fide offer to acquire the property from the property owner

voluntarily as provided by Section 21.0113" is also instructive of the clear

Legislative intent that the condemning entity could not bring an action without first

complying with Section 21.0113. For example, it would be a violation of Texas

Rule of Civil Procedure 13 to include a Sec. 21.0 l 2(b )(6) statement in a

condemnation petition without actually having previously made the bona fide offer

as mandated by Sec. 21.0113. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 13 ("Attorneys.. .who shall make

statements in pleadings which they know to be groundless or false ... shall be guilty

of contempt."). Moreover Rule 303 of the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional

Conduct states in relevant part "A lawyer shall not knowingly . ..make a false

statement of material fact or law to a tribunal." The Texas Legislature clearly

intended that the Sec. 21.0 l 2(b)(6) be included in the condemnation, but that the

lawyer who signed the pleading would be bound by both the Texas Rules of Civil

Procedure and the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct to make certain

that the bona fide offer was made prior to the institution of condemnation

proceedings. The Texas Legislature would not have intended that attorneys who

sign condemnation petitions would do so in violation of these rules.

The legislative history relating to Senate Bill 18 indicates that the Texas

Legislature was reacting directly to the Hubenak decision in a series of enactments

7 culminating in Senate Bill 18. The House Research Organization, Interim News

(May 17, 2010), a true and correct copy of which is attached as Exhibit "A" directly

discusses Hubenak and the Legislature's reaction:

Concerns about entities exercising the power of eminent domain providing fair initial offers for condemned property have led to recent attempts to require these entities to make "good-faith offers" at the beginning of the condemnation process and to establish meaningful sanctions when they do not. Supporters of a good-faith offer requirement point to the 2004 Texas Supreme Court decision in Hubenak v. San Jacinto Gas Transportation Company, 141S.W.3d172, claiming that case diminished the incentive for condemning entities to negotiate in good faith. That opinion resulted from a number of cases in which property owners claimed that condemning entities did not satisfy the requirement, under Property Code 21 .012, that the authorities were "unable" to agree with the owners on the amount of damages before beginning condemnation proceedings. Property owners argued that the requirement could not be met unless the condemning authorities established that they had engaged in "good- faith" negotiations with the owners before filing suit. The court found that the entities in Hubenak each had made a formal offer to purchase the properties and that this was sufficient to meet legal requirements to make an offer before filing suit. Supporters of raising the standards for what constitutes a good- faith offer say that the current court interpretation of the law allows condemning entities to make low offers knowingly without facing the penalty of paying attorney' s fees and having to re-file a case as a consequence.....

The article then describes past legislative efforts, which included the bona-fide offer

requirement that resulted in Section 21.0113:

Past legislative efforts. Two previous bills that failed to be enacted would have established requirements for good-faith offers. HB 2006 in 2007 would have require an entity attempting to take a property to make a bona fide offer, defined as an offer that was based on a reasonably thorough investigation and an honest assessment of the 8 amount of just compensation due to the landowner. It would have allowed a court that found a condemning entity did not make a bona fide offer to dismiss a condemnation suit and require the entity to make such an offer. SB 18 in 2009 would have required a condemning entity to make a bona fide offer meeting several criteria, including obtaining a certified appraisal no higher than the offer made....

See id. These provisions made it into Senate Bill 18 and the Legislature clearly

intended to abrogate the Hubenack decision and put in place a more rigid procedure

the condemnor must comply with before filing suit.

The City respectfully requests that the Court rehear and reconsider its decision

to grant the State's Motion to Dismiss and allow briefing on these issues of first

impression under Texas jurisprudence.

B. The Court's incorrectly extended Hubenack to apply to statutory language that the Legislature adopted to change the legislative scheme for condemnation set forth in Hubenack.

On page 4 of the Opinion, the Court correctly noted that the Hubenack court

did not address whether the requirement of a bona fide offer is jurisdictional, and

that the issue appears to be an issue of first impression in Texas jurisprudence. Then

the Court, without additional discussion, concludes that the 2011 amendments to the

Texas Property Code do not appear to have undermined the Hubenak analysis.

However, the Court reads too much into the Hubenak decision. It's true that

Hubenak stands for the proposition that the requirements under the previous version

of Texas Property Code§ 21.012 are mandatory but not jurisdictional. See Hubenak

v. San Jacinto Gas Transmission Co., 141 S. W.3d 172, 183~84 (Tex. 2004 ).

9 However, it is also clear that under Hubenak, a landowner can waive its right to

challenge whether the condemnor negotiated in good faith prior to filing the

condemnation petition. See id. The Court seemed to indicate that all pre-suit

requirements of condemnation actions could be waived by the landowner's failure

to timely raise a challenge. See id.

In the present case, the City did timely raise a challenge to the State's failure

to comply with the pre-suit requirements. The City objected in writing to the State

prior to the commencement of the suit and raised the issue in a plea to the jurisdiction

after the suit was filed. A plea to the jurisdiction is the only appropriate procedural

vehicle for the City to use to challenge the State's failure.

Moreover, as previously demonstrated, the Legislature clearly intended to

address the perceived abuses under the Hubenack decision.

The City respectfully requests that the Court rehear and reconsider its decision

to grant the State's Motion to Dismiss and allow briefing on these issues in light of

the legislative history and the Hubenack court's indication that a landowner could

waive all pre-suit requirements by failing to raise a timely challenge.

C. The Court incorrectly concluded that the abatement remedy set forth in Texas Property Code section 21.047(d) is the sole remedy for the failure of the State to follow the mandatory requisites of the condemnation procedure.

On Page 4 of the Opinion, the Court concluded that the Legislature provided

an abatement remedy under Property Code Section 2 l .047(d) shows that the defect 10 (the failure of the State to make a bona fide offer prior to commencing suit) is not

jurisdictional. However, nothing in Chapter 21 of the Texas Property Code indicates

that abatement is the sole remedy available to a landowner. The present case is in a

different procedural posture than the Court considered in Hubenack. In Hubenack,

the condemnation petitions were filed, the Special Commissioners had made their

awards and the landowners timely appealed the awards, and there were opposing

motions for summary judgment. See Hubenack, 141 S.W.3d at 176-177. The Court

noted that there was no language in the previous Sec. 21.012 that made the "unable

to agree" requirement jurisdictional. See id. at 180.

However, the 2011 amendments to Texas Property Code Sec. 21 .0113 and

21 .012 were changed to add specific mandatory requirements that a condemning

entity must follow prior to filing suit. This was a major departure from the previous

version of21.012(b)(4) that simply stated that the condemnation petition must "state

that the entity and the property owner are unable to agree on the damages." When

these prerequisites are not met, the entity cannot maintain an action and a plea to the

jurisdiction is the proper procedural vehicle to challenge the lawsuit.

The City respectfully requests that the Court rehear and reconsider its decision

to grant the State's Motion to Dismiss and allow briefing on these issues in light of

the specific changes the Legislative made to Texas Property Code Sec. 21 .0113 and

21 .012 which added specific mandatory requirements that a condemning entity must

11 follow prior to filing suit and because the Legislature did not provide any changes

to Chapter 21 of the Texas Property Code that evidence a legislative intent that

abatement is the sole remedy available to a landowner.

D. By granting Appellee's Motion to Dismiss for Want of Jurisdiction, without allowing briefing on the subject, the Court deprives the City of certain procedural due process rights that were intended by the Texas Legislature.

The Texas Legislature clearly intended that the 2011 amendments to

Sections 21.0113 and 21.012 of the Texas Property Code would provide

procedural due process rights to landowners. The Legislature changed the

requirements under fonner Sec. 21.012(b)(4) that simply required the

condemnation petition to state that "the entity and the property owner are unable

to agree on the damages." To specific actions that must be taken before the

condemnation petition can be filed and a certification under Texas Rule of Civil

Procedure 13 that the provisions contained in Sec. 21.0113 have been met. When

the State failed to comply with Sec. 21.0113, a plea to the jurisdiction is the

appropriate vehicle to test the jurisdiction of the trial court.

"The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard

at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner." Mathews v. Eldridge, 424

U.S. 319, 333, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976). "Procedural due process

considers not the justice of a deprivation, but only the means by which the

deprivation was effected." Caine v. Hardy, 943 F.2d 1406, 1411 (5 1h Cir. 1991).

12 The injury that stems from a denial of due process is not the liberty or property

that was taken from the litigant, but the fact that it was taken without sufficient

process. See Nasierowski Bros. Inv. Co. v. City of Sterling Heights, 949 F.2d

890, 894 (61h Cir. 1991 ). A due process injury is complete when process is denied.

Zinermon v. Burch, 498 U.S. 113, 125, 110 S.Ct. 975, l 08 L.Ed.2d l 00 (1990).

If a landowner cannot challenge whether the State has complied with the

mandatory pre-suit provisions of Sect. 21.0113 and 21.012 immediately after suit

is filed, the landowner is deprived of its ability to effectively challenge the State

at all. The State will be able to ignore all of the mandatory pre-suit provisions

contained in Sec. 21.0113 and 21.012 with impunity. The State's lawyers will

be allowed to sign condemnation petitions in direct violation of Texas Rule of

Civil Procedure 13 with no meaningful consequences. Moreover, the courts of

the State of Texas will be able to ignore the directives of the Texas Legislature

set forth in Senate Bill 18.

The City respectfully requests that the Court rehear and reconsider its decision

to grant the State's Motion to Dismiss and allow briefing on these issues in order to

give effect to the Texas Legislature's 2011 amendments to the Texas Property Code

and in order to preserve the procedural due process rights of Texas landowners.

13 CONCLUSION

The City of Rosenberg respectfully requests that the Court rehear and

reconsider its decision to grant the State's Motion to Dismiss and allow the appeal

of the City's Plea to the Jurisdiction to proceed. Accordingly, Appellant asks this

Court to reconsider its decision to grant the Motion ofthe State of Texas to Dismiss

Appealfor Want ofJurisdiction, see Opinion filed October 13, 2015, and reverse the

decision to grant the State's Motion.

PRAYER

WHEREFORE PREMISES CONSIDERED, Appellant prays that this Court

reconsider en bane its decision to grant the Motion of the State of Texas to Dismiss

Appeal for Want of Jurisdiction and, after filings of briefs and oral arguments, hold

that Appellant is entitled to dismissal of the condemnation lawsuit in the trial court,

and for such other relief to which Appellant may show itself to be entitled.

SIGNED this 281h day of October, 2015.

t4 Respectfully submitted,

DENTON NAVARRO ROCHA BERNAL HYDE & ZECH, P.C. 2500 W. William Cannon Drive, Suite 609 Austin, Texas 78745 512/279-6431 512/279-6438 (Facsimile) george.hyde@rampage-aus.com scott.tschirhait@rampage-aus.com

By:

State Bar No. 45006157 SCOTT M. TSCHIRHART State Bar No. 24013655

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT CITY OF ROSENBERG

CERTIFICATE OF CONFERENCE

Pursuant to Rule I 0. I (a)(5) of the Rules of Appellate Procedure, the undersigned certifies that attempts to confer with counsel for Appellee The State of Texas was made on Octoz pellant is filing this motion as opposed.

GEORGE E. HYDE SCOTT M. TSCHIRHART

15 CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

In compliance with Tex. R. App. P. 9.4(i)(3), this is to certify that the Appellants' Motion for En Banc Reconsideration contains 3,320 words, which does not include the caption, signature, proof o ) service, certificate of conference, and certificate of compliance.

GEORGE .HYDE SCOTT M. TSCHIRHART

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

This is to certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing instrument has been served upon the below named individuals as indicated, and according to the Texas Rules of Appellant Procedure and/or via electronic notification on this the 281h day of October, 2015:

Glorieni Azeredo via electronic notification Susan Demaraisa Bonnen Assistant Attorney General Office of the Attorney General of Texas Transportation Division P.O. Box 12548 Austin, Texas 78711-2548

16 HOUSE RESEARCH ORGANIZATION Texas House of Representatives Interim News Number81-4 May 17, 2010

Legislature may revisit eminent domain issues in next regular session The Tc:rcvious discussions of oppose furthcr revisions s;1y recent a rangi: or prnpo~cd re\'isions tu cmim:nt domain in Texas centered dmnges in the l;1w have cffc:ctivcly un whether current luw adequately (See eminent domain, page 2) protects property owners from unfair and unnecessary takings.

Property Coe.le. ch. 21 govcms Veterans mental health courts eminent domain (condemnation) proceedings antlth and drug treatment for court or county court-ai~law in the certain mililary veter.ins with the processing of crnninal cases in whkh the county where the propcny is lm:atcd. veterans arc dc!Cn

Exhibit A ·page 2 Interim News

Eminent domain. from page 1 aJctiuatcly dl'linc ·'public nsc" nr sullkk111ly hmtl the use ol"cmincnl domain in slum and blighted areas. the c:xcrcisc of eminent domain in Texas. In '.!007, Under the Texas Conslitution, eminent domain authonty the governur vetoed one bill, HB 2000 by Woolley. may he excn.:1scd only whi:n lanJ is bdng ta~cn for a that would ha,·c made .1 number of cha11gcs lo 1he puhlic use. but the definition of ·'public use:"' has hc:cn use of i:mincnt domain. i11d11di11g dclined lnrgcly by the co1111s. narrowint; the uses for which land may (Jc 1akcn and 1cv1sing 1hc In Novcmhi:r 2001J, Vlllcrs prOl:csscs that guvcm the taking of Two laws <.'mu.:ted rece11t~v lwi:I! .wught tu re.i;tricl thc :ippro\'cd Proposition 11 (I IJR 14 privalc properly. Anothl!r bill. SB by Co11c:). amending the: Tcx<1s 18 by Estes. whidt included similar permissihle uses '?I emi11e11t dnmai11 a111ltority. Constitulion h> rcs1ric1 the use provisions, was appnn-ctl hy the ur eminent domain aulhority Scnmc but died in 1hc I lou:;c lluring lo a l<1king or other dmm.1gc the rc~ulor session in 2009. Voters tu a property rrimarily for the approved a constimLional amendment 111 .!009 that O\\llCl'ship, usc, and enjoyment hy ce11ain entities. Those m1rrowcll the purposes for wluch propc11y may be taken. cmitics im:ludc the stale. a local government. an entity with condcrmmtion authority under slate l:1w. or !he public al k1rgc. The amendment disallowed the laking Restricting uses of eminent domain of property for tmnsfor to n a p.1rticular privotc parry: 01· term~ mu.I n:spoml to putcnti;1I court interpretations of • is for economic development purpoc;cs, unless language! in the Constitution . th.: llc\.clopmcnl is a 'iccoudary purpose rcsulling from urban renewal aclivitics lo Slum and blight eliminate ;11lirm.1tivc ham1s from slums or hlighlcd areas. The a111hority to acquire property for economic dcvclupmcnt, including the removal ur slum mid blight. The LcgislJturc cnadc LOllld rcs1rk1 such constitutional amendment adopted in 2009. :11lows :1 aulhorily. taking of property 10 eliminate hligh1 on a partkular pa1ccl only, rather than a lar~er area tlcsignntcd as Public use ·'slum·· or ·'hlightet.I.'"

AJvocatcs of reigning in eminent Jom:un powl·r The Texas Urban Renewal Law, cnach!ll in 1%7. said SR 7, whik :1 marked imprnvcmenl. did not ;illows local authorities lo exercise cmincnl domain 111 May 17, 2010 page 3

acquire pro(lcrty within an urhan renewal plan :1re;1 1ha1 residents and businesses for enterprises th;u gener;11c a munit:ijlalily d.:signatcs as a shun or hligh11.:d. Propc11y more tax revenue. may he condemned 111 a section of a dcsigm11cd urban rcncwal area when: the municipality has dctcrminctl lhat Opponents of 1cstric1ing the use of cmine111 domain al lc;ist 50 pcn:enl of stn11.:l11rcs arc Jilapid;1tcd mul show for slum and blighl say proposed limit-; woulJ crcah: other ch:1rac1cristics urhlight. ubstadcs thal cffcclivcly climinall! a municipality's aulhority to who need lhc mos! assistance. s1a1utu1y revisions hccame l;1w. HB 3057 by C1llcgari in 2007 :mtl SB 18 by C!sles in 1009 would ha\'c prohihill:d a municipality li'otn c~ercising powers under Rights of property owners the Urbm1 Renewal L:1w unless its govcmini; hndy dctcnnincd that c;1ch unil or prnperiy in an area met lhe Artother is.,uc centers on the rights of property definition of "hligh1:· Both bills would have rcquircJ owners whose l:mtl is t:1kcn umlcr eminent domain wrillen notice to pmpc11y owners before :1 blighted area authority. was designated and would have allowed a property In b~ dcsignaccd as hligh1cd only if the owner took no MB 2006. which Go\'. P!!ny v..:10..:tl in :!OU?, ant.I SB reasonable measures to remedy haianlous condit10ns. 1R. which was approved by the Senate but died in the A municipalily wishing 10 exercise eminent domain I louse in 2009, would h:l\'c e~pandcd compcnsa1ion authority in an urban renewal area nol only would have for property uwncrs, rcl1uin:d condemning l!ntitics to had to determine that each property in the area met the nqmtialc in ··gootl faith," and allowed properly owners dclini1ion of blighted - also a provision of Prnposition lu rc:purchasc 1akl!n properly 1ha1 had not been put lo a 11 . the ronstitutional amendment approved by voters puhlic U!>C within I0 years. in 1009 - but also woulJ have had lo n:afiinn the designation on "" ongoing hasii;. Compensation for access to transportation

UnJi:.- Prupu~it1011 11, cunJcmnation for u public Th!! fa.:tors thal may be cunsidcrcd in awarlin filed for additional page4 Interim News

d.1111.1g.cs as J rl!sult of a St.lie Mighw.1y 183 con-.1ruct1on l11ghway from thc rcmainini:t rrorerty due 10" :-.talc pruJCCt th:1t lllVOIVCU dcvat111g lane.; Jm) t.1kmg 'il!VCtl highway rrnicct. lo the extent 1ha1 it alfoth!d chc li:ct or their pmpe1ty for right or way. The court found propcny's market 'aluc. The bill abo would have that the l of parking spaces due Ill cmincnt domain \\oul

Right lo repurchase landowner lo rcl·civc any appri:caalion m v.1lm: •u:crucd between the time the property was comkmncd and \\hen Properly o\\ ncrs ha\'e sought autho1·ity to rcpurcli.1sc it w:is rcpun.:hascJ by the l;mdowner. prnpcity .111he unginal piicc lhcy were paiJ by a condemning uuthority when their funner 1m1pcrty is 1101 Suppol1er.; of allowing propc1 ly owner' In uscJ ;1flcr a ccnain pcrioJ for the public use for which rcpurdmse thdr properly m 1he llnginal price s;1id it it wui. taken. Current law allows a properly owner lo would crc:1tl! a disincenlivc again~t lhc !>peculativ~ rcpun:has~ land wkcn through eminent domain for a exercise of eminent domain ;1uthority by condemning public use thal 1s cancdcJ bdun: the IOth anniversary entities Comknming cntilks would he strongly of the dale the rrorcrty \\'JS at:ljlllrcJ. The rosSCS!>ing discouraged from acquiring land through eminent governmental cnlily mu:;t oiler 10 sell the prnpcrty lo lhc is dcpmc value of the 1>mpc11y al the lime the public use was owners of the l'uturc valm: of the prnpcrty. and the canceled, nut ;U the original price paiu by the cntuy. option to rcpurch;isc at the original pnce woulJ help rcctily this grievance. To cst:tbli~h the constitutional authority for the 1ight of repurclmsc ;11 the original price paiJ. voters approved Opponents of allowmg property owners to Prupo.;irion 7 in 2007 (MJR 30 by Jackson), authorizing n:pun.:hasc !heir property at the original price govcrnmcnt;il entities lo sell land t:1ken through eminent said it would allow '·double recovery" for digiblc domain back to the t<.mncr ll\Vncr, the owncr·s heirs. rropcrly owners who had undcrgoni: cmincnl dom<1in or olhcr succL'SS~lrs, m 1hc prit:c the cntuy paid when proceedings. This would confer a wimlfrill on property acquiring the property if: owners who were compensatccJ adcquatdy fur lhe original taking. lhcy -.a1J. An own..:r wh\l was cliy1blc tu • the public use for which the property was rcpurdrni;e at the price originally paid could accrue all acquired has been canceled: lhl! l!lJUity from appreciation of the value of the prop\!11y • no actuul pmgrc~s has h~cn made tow;irJ the .;mcc the lime of the original laking without having to public use during :i prcscrib.:

A cons11tu11onal :11ncndmcnt was rc~1uiret.I 10 m·emdc Good-faith offers the prohibition ;1g.1ins1 a governmental cnllty granting anything uf vi\h11: 10 an indh·idual or corporntiun unless Concerns about cnlitic-; C"mperly owner a gunJ-faith offer 1cquircmcnt roi111 to the 2004 Tc~as whose lanJ was acquircll for a public use that has since Supn.•mc Courl 1lcc1s1on in / lulll'1111k 1 Sa11 .Im i11to Uo.; been cancelled or failed lo pwgress to rcpun:hasc their Trmr.wri.\'.\"Ulll Cv111pm11. 141 S W.3d 172. c..la1ming that property at the original price the conc.kmning entity cusc d1mmislml the 111ccnti\ c ltw w11Jcm11111g cn111ic~ paid. Only lhc origin:ll owners and their heirs could lo negotiate 111 good foith. Thal opinion rc,ulh:d from a have repurchased the property. The right ol repurchase number ol 1. 1);c-; 111 \\ hil:h property own\!1·s claim~d that wnulcJ have ~·r1llicd if'lhc rublic u.;c for lhe properly contlcmnmg entitles did not satisfy the rcquir~menl, were cancdcd or the governmental entity failed to begin unJcr Prnpl!t'lY Code 21 012. th.it lhc authorllh!s operation or ~onslruction t'I' the proJCl.I within IO yc;m;. were "1111ahk" lo :igr\!c wi1h owner-. on 1h1.· mnounl or If such legislation \\ere cn11cteJ. 1t would ;1llow the damage' bcfon.· bcginmng condcrm1;11ion prrn:c1:d111g-. page 6 Interim News

Prupl!rty owners ;irg.ucd 1he rcquirl!mcnt could no1 Some h,1, c propo~ed mca~uring the inilial he met unkss contlcmnmg autlmntcs cswbHshcd that olfor ag;unst lhc linal award dctcnnncd by spcd;il chey had cng;igctl in "good-la1th'. ncgotiationi; wi1h comnusswncrs ;iftcr court pmcccding'\. They -;ay the the owners hcfon: tiling q11t. rhc mun ltllllhl lhat the mere c:dstcncc of an apprnisal docs not ensure a fair entities 111 I luhcnak i:;1ch h..iJ m.1dc a formal offer to offer. as apprnisals may \'ary widely bascJ on th<.: factors purcha~c the propi:11ics and 1h.1t 1h1s was sullicicnl to includctl in dt:tenmmng market \'alui.: Supporters ol' .1 mct:t lcg:•I ri:t1uirc1m:nb lo make an olfor llt.!fore filing a provision to measure 1hi: ini1iul oiler against the final .;uit. aw;1rd 'ay Che final offer should not \,try hy more than ;1 certain percent from the initial oiler. perha1ls 15 OI' 20 Suppmicrs of raising 1hi.: ~t.mdards for what p!!rccnt. Initial otli:rs murl! than 15 ur 20 rcrccnt lower coit..;1i1u1cs a )J.lKld-foith offer say that 1he current court limn a lim1I judgment should be primu /itch: evidence of in11.·rrm:1a1i0n of tl\c law allow-; comkmmng cnli11cs Lo ba an Lawmakcrs lm\'e llcbatcJ several revisions to the dismi's .1 L'undcmncilton suit and require the entity lo process for exercising eminent domain aulhorily in m:tl-.:c such an offer. SA 18 111 ~OO•> wuulri1y anti intention Co take a properly. wh-:ther to scvcrnl cri1c1 ia. including obtaining a certified appraisal require conucmning nu1hori1ics 10 provide relocation no higher than the offer m.1dc. A courl finding that .1ssist;im:c to Ji~pl:1ceJ property owners, nnjfe r.f. Recent Jchatc on good-failh oilers h:ts centered on how 10 discinguish Disclosure of intent good-faith oll\!rs from those aimed :'It coercing property owners mto settling on :111 unfair r rkc to avoid lcg;il Recent lcgisltlliun lws inn>lvcd changes to notice :111J tees and hassles. thc Jisdosul'c llf mtcnt re11uircmcnls for toking properly.

HOUSE RESEARCH ORGANIZATION Exhibit A May 17, 2010 page 7

r IB 14CJ5 by Callegari. enacted in 2007. rcqu1rcc; pnwisi(ln tn an offer or agrcemen1 h> possi:ss propclly. .m cn111y w11h eminent Jom.iin authot ity 10 prO\· Ilk ,1 The.: 1111\:nl wa.; to rrcv-.:nt such entiries from keeping ki:y landowner's bill of righ1s to a properly ownc:r bc:forc mformation. such :1s ~m ;ippraisal. from pmpcny owners initial ncgollallons lo aClfuirc property. ;\c. required and other mtcrc'itcd part ks. ·nic.:y also woul1I havi.: by 1hc law. lhc: Allorncy Gcnc:r:1rs Ollicc draftc:tl 1hc n:<1uircd an i:ntily lhat was not subject lo upc.:n records l111ulowncr·s lull of rights tu noltly properly owner~ law.; bur w.1s m11hurizctl to c.

HB 2006 m 2007 and SB IX in 2009. which wen: Tht: Lcgi,l.tturc ;iJso has considered proposals to 1101 c11;11.:tcd. \\ uulc.J ha\ c pmhibtlcd an entity 'ic:ckmg rc.:quirc :1s,.1s1ancc for pc.:oplc tlisplaccJ hy a taking of lo ac4uin: property from including a conlidl!ntmlily propc.:ny. The li!dcral Uni form Relocation 1\ssistancc

Groundwater raises regulatory takings issues The Texas Supreme Cuun is now con'iidc.:ring a case that adllrcsscs how regulations affect prnpi:rty owners' rights in groundwater beneath their propc11y and what may constiCutc ;1 "regulatory taking" of property, meaning a regulation that res1nc1o; use nf pmpc11y to such <1n ex lent that il amounts In a taking of value that must be: compcns

f n Edwcmls Aquifer A111lmritv ·~ Dm·, propcny owncri; daim that the Edwt1rds Aquifer A11thori1y cffoctivcly abridged their property 1ights without compensation by pcn11itting them 10 pump only 14 acre-feet of water from the Edwards Aquifor hcncalh their property. The case i;aincd prominence when, ovcm11ing a district court, the fourth Cuui l of Appeals in S,m Antonio ruh:d lhal groundwater was a vested right that conveys to the rropcrty owner. The Texas Supreme Courl heard oral :1rgu111cnts m the case in February.

The case has gcnc111tcd substantial inlc.:rcst among both .mthontks that n:gulatc groundwater and landowner organizations. Dcha1c on &he takings issue in the CilSC has ccnlcrcd on whether owners· intcrcsl in groundwater beneath their pmpcrty ii. a 'cs1cd properly right protected under the Texas Consti1u1io11 's prohibition against lilkmg propcny for a public use without atkqumc compcns:llion (/\rt. I. sec. 17)

La11Jowni:r orgnnizations say an interest in y.rmmdwatcr 1s a h:-;tcd. constitu1iunully prntcdcd right and that this has been alflrmc.:cl historically by the com1.,, anorncy general orinions. anJ in slaluh:. Grnundwatcr conservation distm:ls say 1hat while landowners pos!.css some rights in grou11dwa1cr hcncalh their property, it doc:s not amount lo a co11s111utioiwlly prnll!ctcd. \. cstcd right ;rncl is 1hcrcforc subject lo regulalOf)' limitalion withou1 compcns.niun pageB Interim News

Act {UR1\,\ l h!llUircs support for property ownc1·.'• Propo-;111011 11, the cons1i1utional amendment cli.,placcd a'\ p.1rl of projects thal rccl!i\'c l~dl.'ral adoplctl in :!009, r.1iscd the bar on grant in~ the pO\\Cr .l'>s1!>l;1ncc, but 1Jus Jocs not C1'1cnJ to takings when: no of ellllllCl\t UOlll:llll lo new entities hy increasing such hmds arc invol\'cd. Current law in Texas pcnnlls chc numbcr of voles m l!ach house of 1he lcg1sln1urc a gowmmcnlal cntity lo provitlc J rclm:ation '>cn·kc necessary to ~rant the power of ..:mincnt domain .md issue rclm:atiou pi!}'mcnts in kci:ping with IC

Veterans courts, from page 1 Color .uh Nc\'itda. Illinois, Califomrn. Okluhoma. •md Aht!>ka ;all h.1vc some kind of prohlcm-s<1l\ mg l.llllll for hcndils, hcalt h saviccs. mid other hc:lp o lli:n:d by tlu: dch:mlants who arc \'Clcrans. according to the Na11onal lc

Under SU I ')40, two or more Texas ct•11111ks 1m1y The tirst Ycternns court in the United Slates. 1.:rc••1ed cswhl ish a regional velcrans ment;i) hca II h com t to in Buffalo, New York in January 200~. was mo w11hin a court nf progr;uns. while Ue.xar. Dcntun. Fannin. l lidalgo. and general jurisdictio11 or a criminal coun (For mon rm Orange countii:s arc activdy planning 1hem. New York, pmblt•111-:wfri11g cow·r.~ ;,, Tera.,·. sec: hclm1· )

r

Other problem-solving courts in Texas Texas lws a '';1ridy or prnMcm-snlving couns. the must common bdng drug courts. Drng. wm1s arc progrJms, usually opernting within a district court or a county co1111 al law, that divert from incilrccr.11ion into treatment cct1ain defon

In 1001, thc 77th Texas Lq!islaturc enacted HB 12X7 hy Thompson. which required the large mh•m t:Ollllti\!S of (k'l(ar, Dallas, rt Paso. I J:ims, Jfalalgo. Tarrant ••md Travis Ill establish

Veteran-; mental hcahh com Is arc the newest kind they ~ay. 111 aJJ1tion. under SA 1940. ;1 \'Ch.'r\111s of prnhh:m suh ing court. They urc intended to alldrcs'i mc111:tl-hc;11lll court judge may expunge a deJC:nr cks1roy all r.:co1ds of the criminal beha\'1or. m December ~009 and currently oversees 20 tlcfcndants. The second. in Tarrant County. opened in April of this Supporters of pmblcm·'>olring cm111s say they yl·;u· ;mu oversees 40 1.kfomla11ts. The 1hird, in Dalhis reduce lhc n:d percent for all those criminal conduct tlwr is al is::.uc. who participated, :md 41 pcrccnt for comparable tlmg offi:ndcrs who did not pai1icipa1c. TI1c GAO found SB 1940 grants judges in veterans mental health sirnilur rl·sults iu studies of dmg i:uurts in other states. courts wide c.JiscrcCion to con~1 program hut may 11artkipatc only if lhc prosccu11on closely supervise defi:n:ilc. These courts h:l\'e enlmnced .;raff levels, dd'cndant will be proc.:ss.:d through normal 1.:rimin;1I inclucling aduitional social workers. highly trained proc.:cdings. eourl managers, and ai:i:ess to expcnenccc.J treatment professionals anti probation officers. Crita:s of probli.:m- Jurisdiction solving courls say it would be helter Ill u.:vote such 1esources to all c~isting courts than to i:1·catl! "boutique SB J940 allows cvunlics lo create \'cti:rans mental courts'" for ccrt.iin groups . Some victim protccuon h.:alth courts to hc;1r all fclonic.; and misckml!anors. groups believe that these courcs may lake altention although few granl such wide jurisd1~·1wn . 11.uris •1w;1y from protecting. \·ktims. Incarceration prutccti; County"s vcti:r;ms ..:ourt prngrJm. lhc lirsl in Tc·rn~. !-ucicty from furl her hann. aml diversion progr.ims 1s .1dmimstl!1cd by a .:rimmal dii-1m:1 -.:ourt !"he mi~ht rc.:lcnsc dangerous indivilluals back inlo society. jurisdiction of th.: veterans court includes both folonies May 17, 2010 page 11

an(l 1111stkmeanors .md cnn mcludl! violent ofli:nsco;, .'\t the frdctill kvcl. in spring. 2009. bills were although noc scxuill offenses or most 3(g) aggrav,11cJ 1n1rnducc

Texas counties cslahli,hin.!,! lhcsc courts .ire expected It>follow the models for dmg comts, in whu.:h :1 county Debate on veterans courts in Texas that plans lo allow holh !\:Ionics and misdemeanors lo be heard places the prnyram m " Jistnct court '' ilh Supporh.•rs of \'ercnin~ courts in Texas argue lhat gcner.il or criminal jurisdiction. Ir a county plans 10 crc.lling veterans mental hcallh courts allmvs lhCSl' allow only misdemeanors, it may alsu pl:1cc the program courts 10 develop c:q1cr1isc in mcn1al health illlcl

Vclcrans ad\ ocatcs and 1rca1111~111 prO\·idcrs. such Suppot1crs say the Texas law 1a1lors cligibil1ly for as the VA, say \·ctcrnns court-; shoultalus but l!> Jctcm1incJ on u case-by cao;c has1c; solving court c;111 provide. No veteran is automatically

Funding mechanisms Sup1>orlcrs say veterans mental health courts arc needed becausl" velcrans make up a s1gmflc:m1 portion SB 19.tO allows velcrans mental health courts lo of county jail rorulations in Te.~ms. Acc:ording 10 a 2007 collect a !Cc of up to S 1,000 from the Jc fondant as ~tuJy by the fcdaal Bureau of Justice Statistics. 10 wdl as additio11:1l 1Ccs to cover testing. cnu1lscling. percent of those mcarccr.itcd in slate prison-; :mJ jails in and trc;umcnt c~pcnscs. The Ices 1m1r;1 be b:1sed on the United S1:1lcs arc veterans. Even if vctc1;111s c:ourts the vclcr,111 's ability lo p;iy unJ may be used only for cannot treat :111 specific lo the veterans mental hciilth court. problems. they will open up space in cx1~1ing local trcalmcnl program!' by transferring eligible \ ctcrnns The crim111:1I juslke division of the Governor's 111 progrJms run by the VA. A maJor hcndit of Ollicc offers seed grants lo hdp Tc: l11s1oric:.lly ha' I! had d11lkully in gr;ints to Tan ;int County's vct.,;r;ms menial health court establishing problem-solving courts because ol lhc high program :mSing, other ;1pplh:ations. ~O!>l of 11·c;1tmcn1. page 12 Interim News

Opponl'nls of \'l'll•r:ms courts in Tl'x:is •my these The Amcncan Ch ii Libs:rtic'i Union h.1o; ... poki:n tlllt courts arc not ncccs'i:iry hccau-;c ex isling courts c.in .1g.1inst the \ cte1·,rns court progrmns Ill ( olorado and handk any special needs a \Ctcran might ha\C. Under Nevada. saying they gr•utt vch:rnn'i cerlnin cnmmnl the U.S and stale constilutions. Tc~:is prosccutors defense rights that other t.lcfondants do not ha\c. already have Wilk lliscrctiun 111 whether ;inJ how to Veterans courts th:it cover only combat veterans c:\.dutk prosecute a crime. They consider ;i \'Ctcr.m 's prior both other veter.ms :iml non-vctcr;ms who h;I\ c -.1milar scrvic~ and, where appmrriatc. use prt!-trial tf j\ cr'iion mcnt::tl illnc'iscs, they .-:ay. For cxainpk. a police nllkcr aml other llrogrnms to get vctc1ans hack on their feet might al-.o sulli:r from work-rcl

-by Tom Howe

HOUSE RESEARCH ORGANIZATION

John H. Reagan Building Steering Committee: Room 420 P.O. Box 2910 David Farabee, Chairman Austin. Texas 78768-2910 Bill Callegari, Vice Chairman Drew Darby (512) 463-0752 Harold Dutton Dan Gattis www.hro.house.state.tx.us Yvonne Gonzalez Toureilles Carl Isett Susan King Staff: Jim McReynolds Jose Menendez Tom Whalley, Director: Geanie Morrison Laura Hendrickson, Editor: Elliott Naishtat Rita Barr, Office Manager/Analyst: Rob Orr Catherine Dilger, Kellie Dworaczyk. Joe Pickett Tom Howe. Andrei Lubomudrov, Todd Smith Carisa Magee, Blaire Parker. Research Analysts

HOUSE RESEARCH ORGANIZATION Exhibit A