City of Quincy v. MA Dept. of Envir. Protection

21 F.4th 8
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit·Decided December 17, 2021·No. 21-1131P·Published

Opinion

United States Court of Appeals For the First Circuit

No. 21-1131

CITY OF QUINCY, MASSACHUSETTS; TOWN OF HINGHAM, MASSACHUSETTS; TOWN OF BRAINTREE, MASSACHUSETTS; DOROTHY ANDERSON; ALICE ARENA;

MARGARET BELLAFIORE; WENDY CULLIVAN; SUSAN GREENE; ANDREA HONORE; MICHAEL LANG; CURTIS NORDGAARD, M.D.; THOMAS PENDERGAST;

JUDY ROBERTS; BETSY SOWERS; BERNADETTE WILSON; KENNETH J.

DIFAZIO; JANE HACKETT, Councilor at Large; ED HARRINGTON, District Five Councilor; REBECCA HAUGH; GEORGE LORING; ARTHUR MATHEWS; PATRICK M. O'CONNOR; FRANK SINGLETON; THOMAS TANNER,

Petitioners,

v.

MASSACHUSETTS DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, Respondent,

ALGONQUIN GAS TRANSMISSION, LLC, Intervenor.

PETITION FOR REVIEW OF AN ORDER OF THE MASSACHUSETTS DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION

Before

Thompson, Lipez, and Kayatta, Circuit Judges.

Michael H. Hayden, with whom Morrison Mahoney LLP, Nicole I.

Taub and Crystal Huff, Office of the Town Solicitor, Town of Braintree, Kerry T. Ryan, and Bogle, DeAscentis & Coughlin, P.C., were on brief, for petitioner.

Seth Schofield, Senior Appellate Counsel, Office of the Attorney General of Massachusetts, with whom Maura Healey,

Attorney General for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, was on brief, for respondent.

Jeremy C. Marwell, with whom Joshua S. Johnson and Vinson & Elkins LLP were on brief, for intervenor.

December 17, 2021

KAYATTA, Circuit Judge. The City of Quincy, the Towns of Braintree and Hingham, and a group of citizens (collectively, "the City") challenge the final decision of the Massachusetts Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) reaffirming the issuance of an air permit to Algonquin Gas Transmission, LLC (Algonquin) for a natural gas compressor station located in Weymouth, Massachusetts. DEP had previously approved Algonquin's plans to power the Weymouth station using a natural-gas-fired turbine, which emits some amount of nitrogen oxides (NOx). The City and other petitioners convinced this court in a prior appeal that DEP did not follow its own established procedures when it eliminated an electric motor as a possible alternative to the gas- fired turbine. See Town of Weymouth v. Mass. Dep't of Env't Prot., 961 F.3d 34 (1st Cir.), modified on reh'g, 973 F.3d 143 (1st Cir. 2020). We remanded to DEP to assess whether an electric motor was in fact what Massachusetts regulations call the "best available control technology" (BACT) for the new station. After holding a hearing and considering additional record evidence, DEP again concluded that an electric motor was not BACT for the Weymouth compressor station and reaffirmed Algonquin's air permit. Satisfied that the agency's actions on remand were not arbitrary and capricious, we now deny the City's petition for further review and affirm DEP's decision after remand.

I.

Our opinion in Town of Weymouth recounts the factual background and circumstances leading up to the proceedings on remand that form the basis of this petition. See 961 F.3d at 38– 41. We repeat only the essential details, beginning with a brief description of the applicable regulatory framework.

A.

Pursuant to the Natural Gas Act (NGA), 15 U.S.C. § 717 et seq., the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) oversees the certification of interstate natural gas pipeline projects. As part of FERC's review of proposed pipelines, the agency must ensure that each project complies with all relevant federal permitting requirements, including those under the federal Clean Air Act (CAA), 42 U.S.C. § 7401 et seq. See 15 U.S.C. § 717b(d)(2). Congress expressly reserved in the NGA the rights of states to issue or deny permits under the CAA for interstate natural gas projects. See id. (providing that the NGA does not "affect[] the rights of States under . . . the Clean Air Act"); see also Town of Weymouth, 961 F.3d at 39.

For its part, the CAA embraces a "cooperative federalism" approach "such that DEP, in enforcing the Massachusetts CAA, is in fact acting pursuant to the federal CAA." Town of Weymouth, 961 F.3d at 40 n.4; see also id. at 39 n.2. Under its authority, DEP has issued comprehensive regulations

governing the control of air pollutants, including regulations regarding the issuance of air permits for stationary sources of air pollution like the Weymouth compressor station at issue in this appeal. See 310 Mass. Code Regs. § 7.02.

In order to obtain an air permit from DEP, an applicant must show that the proposed facility employs the "best available control technology" for each regulated air pollutant, including NOx. Id. § 7.02(8)(a)(2); see also Town of Weymouth, 961 F.3d at 41. BACT is defined as "an emission limitation based on the maximum degree of reduction of any regulated air contaminant emitted from or which results from any regulated facility" that DEP "determines is achievable for such facility through application of production processes and available methods, systems and techniques for control of each such contaminant." 310 Mass. Code Regs. § 7.00; see also 42 U.S.C. § 7479(3). Simply put, BACT is the most effective emissions control technology for a pollutant that is technologically and economically feasible for the given project.

The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has developed a five-step, "top-down" process for determining BACT. See EPA, New Source Review Workshop Manual: Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Nonattainment Area Permitting B.5–B.6 (1990), https://www.epa.gov/sites/default/files/2015-

07/documents/1990wman.pdf [hereinafter NSR Workshop Manual]. The five steps are as follows:

• Step 1: The applicant identifies and lists all available control technologies that have "a practical potential for application to the emissions unit and the regulated pollutant under evaluation." Id. at B.5. However, a control technology may be excluded at Step 1 of the BACT analysis if it would "redefine the source." Helping Hand Tools v. EPA, 848 F.3d 1185, 1194 (9th Cir. 2016); see also Town of Weymouth, 961 F.3d at 43.1 • Step 2: The applicant eliminates any "technically infeasible options" from the list generated at Step 1. NSR Workshop Manual, supra, at B.7.2 • Step 3: The applicant "rank[s]" the "remaining control alternatives not eliminated in [S]tep 2" based on their

1 A control alternative "redefines the source" and is properly excluded from the BACT analysis if using the technology essentially "requires a complete redesign of the facility." Helping Hand Tools, 848 F.3d at 1194. As a "classic" example, "a coal-burning power plant need not consider a nuclear fuel option as a 'cleaner' fuel because it would require a complete redesign of the coal-burning power-plant." Id. (citing Sierra Club v. EPA, 499 F.3d 653, 655 (7th Cir. 2007)); see also NSR Workshop Manual, supra, at B.13–B.14.

2 A control option is "technically infeasible" if, "based on physical, chemical, and engineering principles, . . . technical difficulties would preclude the successful use of the control option on the emissions unit under review." Id.

effectiveness in reducing controlled pollutant emissions.

Id. at B.7–B.8.

• Step 4: The applicant evaluates "the energy, environmental, and economic impacts" of each control option and eliminates any controls that do not meet certain effectiveness criteria.

Id. at B.8–B.9.

• Step 5: The "most effective control option" that has not been eliminated is selected as BACT. Id. at B.9.

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City of Quincy v. MA Dept. of Envir. Protection, 21 F.4th 8 (1st Cir. 2021).

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