City of Pleasanton and Pleasanton Fire Department v. Gina Malone-Guzman

• Court: Texas Court of Appeals, 4th District (San Antonio)
• Decided: June 24, 2026
• Docket: 04-25-00314-CV
• Status: Published

Opinion

Fourth Court of Appeals San Antonio, Texas MEMORANDUM OPINION

No. 04-25-00314-CV

CITY OF PLEASANTON and Pleasanton Fire Department, Appellants

v.

Gina MALONE-GUZMAN, Appellee

From the 81st Judicial District Court, Atascosa County, Texas Trial Court No. 23-09-0575-CVA Honorable Russell Wilson, Judge Presiding

Opinion by: H. Todd McCray, Justice

Sitting: Rebeca C. Martinez, Chief Justice Adrian A. Spears II, Justice H. Todd McCray, Justice

Delivered and Filed: June 24, 2026

AFFIRMED

This appeal concerns whether the trial court abused its discretion by denying appellants’

motion for sanctions after appellee nonsuited and refiled her remaining claims. Appellant contends

that appellee employed nonsuit procedure to avoid the practical consequences of adverse discovery

rulings and therefore should have been sanctioned. Because appellant has not demonstrated the

trial court abused its discretion in denying the requested sanctions, we affirm. 04-25-00314-CV

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

This litigation arises from a motor vehicle accident involving Gina Malone-Guzman and a

vehicle operated by the Pleasanton Fire Department. Guzman sued the City of Pleasanton and the

Pleasanton Fire Department (“the City”), asserting negligence-related claims arising from the

collision. The case’s procedural history, rather than its underlying merits, controls the disposition

of this appeal.

The City answered Guzman’s suit in November 2023. Under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure

194, Guzman’s mandatory disclosures were due in December 2023 and the statutory discovery

period under Rule 190.3 closed in September 2024. According to the record, however, Guzman

failed to provide the mandatory disclosures until October 2024—approximately ten months after

they were due and after the discovery period had effectively closed. The City subsequently filed

motions seeking exclusion of Guzman’s untimely disclosures, no-evidence summary judgment,

and dismissal related relief. They argued Guzman’s discovery failures prevented meaningful

preparation for trial and deprived the City of the ability to evaluate or challenge Guzman’s

damages and causation evidence within the court’s scheduling deadlines.

The trial court struck Guzman’s untimely disclosures and denied Guzman’s request to

reopen discovery. The court also granted summary judgment on several claims but allowed

Guzman’s negligence and respondeat-superior claims to proceed to trial. Shortly thereafter,

Guzman filed notices of nonsuit. Guzman nonsuited her remaining negligence and respondeat-

superior claims without prejudice and nonsuited her other claims with prejudice. The same day,

Guzman refiled the surviving negligence and respondeat-superior claims in a new lawsuit.

The City objected and sought sanctions under Rule 13 of the Texas Code of Civil Procedure

and Chapter 10 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code. The City argued Guzman’s nonsuit was

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filed for the improper purpose of avoiding the consequences of the court’s discovery rulings and

restarting discovery timelines in a newly filed case. The City requested dismissal with prejudice,

dismissal of the refiled suit, attorney’s fees, and other sanctions. The trial court held a hearing but

did not grant the requested relief. The City’s motions were ultimately overruled by operation of

law.

The City appeals, raising three related issues. It argues the trial court erred by (1) allowing

Guzman’s nonsuit without prejudice to stand; (2) refusing to find the nonsuit was filed for an

improper purpose; and (3) refusing to impose sanctions.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review a trial court’s ruling on sanctions for abuse of discretion. Low v. Henry, 221

S.W.3d 609, 614 (Tex. 2007); Cire v. Cummings, 134 S.W.3d 835, 838-39 (Tex. 2004). A trial

court abuses its discretion when it acts without reference to guiding rules or principles or reaches

a decision so arbitrary and unreasonable as to amount to a clear abuse of discretion. Id. Under this

standard, we do not substitute our judgment for the trial court’s and we view the evidence in the

light most favorable to the trial court’s action. Cox v. Vanderburg, No. 06-20-00078-CV, 2021

WL 4055487, at *10 (Tex. App.—Texarkana Sept. 7, 2021, pet. denied). Accordingly, if the trial

court could reasonably have reached its decision, we must affirm.

The same abuse of discretion framework applies when the trial court is asked to determine

whether a nonsuit was filed for an improper purpose. Referente v. City View Courtyard, L.P., 477

S.W.3d 882, 885–86 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2015, no pet.). To the extent the issue turns

on legal questions, our review is de novo. Id. at 886. But whether a nonsuit was filed to avoid an

unfavorable ruling is a fact-intensive determination entrusted to the trial court. Id. at 885; see DGF

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Holdings, Ltd. v. Air Clinic Air Conditioning & Heating, Inc., No. 05-23-01262-CV, 2025 WL

1558886, at *6 (Tex. App.—Dallas June 2, 2025, pet. denied).

ANALYSIS

This appeal asks us to determine whether a plaintiff who is sanctioned for discovery

failures, and then nonsuits and refiles her remaining claims, necessarily nonsuits for an improper

purpose requiring dismissal-with-prejudice and attorney’s-fee sanctions. Guzman’s procedural

maneuver followed closely on the heels of discovery sanctions that left her with limited evidence

for trial and significantly limited her ability to try her case. She immediately refiled her claims,

which supports the inference that she sought to restart the discovery clock. But the question before

us is not whether Guzman’s nonsuit was strategic, or even whether it could reasonably be viewed

as an effort to avoid the practical consequences of the trial court’s discovery rulings. The question

is whether the trial court abused its discretion by declining to find an improper purpose, declining

to convert the nonsuit into a dismissal with prejudice, and declining to impose sanctions. On this

record, we conclude it did not.

I. Nonsuit and Improper Purpose

Rule 162 allows a plaintiff to nonsuit at any time before she has introduced all of her

evidence other than rebuttal evidence. TEX. R. CIV. P. 162. The rule does not make a nonsuit

improper merely because it is strategic. Nor does it require a plaintiff to explain why she nonsuited.

The rule gives plaintiffs a broad procedural right to abandon claims before resting their case. Aetna

Casualty & Surety Co. v. Specia, 849 S.W.2d 805, 806 (Tex. 1993). While the right is broad, it is

not limitless. A nonsuit does not affect a pending claim for affirmative relief, and it does not impair

the trial court’s authority to decide collateral matters, including sanctions. Travelers Ins. Co. v.

Joachim, 315 S.W.3d 860, 863 (Tex. 2010).

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The City relies on Epps v. Fowler, 351 S.W.3d 862 (Tex. 2011) to support its position that

the nonsuit in this case was filed for an improper purpose and therefore subject to sanctions. We

begin by recognizing the context in which Epps arose. Epps did not involve sanctions for filing a

nonsuit for improper purpose. Rather, the Epps court addressed whether a defendant qualified as

a prevailing party for purposes of recovering attorney’s fees after the plaintiff nonsuited its claims.

Id. at 868-71. While Epps is not factually identical to this case, it is instructive. The supreme court

recognized that courts disfavor nonsuits filed to circumvent adverse legal restrictions or rulings,

and identified circumstances that may support an inference that a litigant nonsuited to avoid an

unfavorable ruling or consequence, including a nonsuit filed after a summary judgment motion, an

unexcused failure to respond to discovery that could support an adverse judgment, a failure to

timely identify experts or critical witnesses, or other procedural obstacles suggesting the defendant

has effectively prevailed. Id. at 870–71.

Many of those factors are relevant here. Guzman’s late disclosures were struck. She had

not timely identified experts or witnesses, and the trial court refused to reopen discovery. Her

nonsuit followed those rulings closely. The City therefore had a legitimate basis to argue Guzman

nonsuited to avoid unfavorable legal consequences.

Importantly, though, Epps uses permissive rather than mandatory language. The supreme

court explains that the circumstances surrounding a nonsuit “may support an inference” and “may

suggest” improper purpose. Id. at 870–71 (emphasis added). This language emphasizes that Epps

authorizes a trial court to draw an inference of improper purpose, but it does not require the court

to draw such an inference in every case in which a nonsuit follows unfavorable rulings, nor does

it compel a trial court to impose sanctions in such circumstances. Cf. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. §

311.016(1) (providing term “may” creates discretionary authority or grants permission or a power).

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In Dargin v. Noble Drilling Services and Lacy v. Castillo, our sister court likewise declined

to treat the existence of Epps factors as dispositive. Dargin v. Noble Drilling Services, 725 S.W.3d

749, 755-56 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2025, pet. filed); Lacy v. Castillo, 580 S.W.3d 830,

837 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2019, no pet.). Although the court recognized that sanctions

may be appropriate when a litigant employs a nonsuit to avoid unfavorable rulings, it rejected the

idea that a suspiciously timed nonsuit automatically requires dismissal-with-prejudice sanctions.

Id.; see Miramar Dev. Corp. v. Sisk, No. 04-13-00777-CV, 2014 WL 1614290, at *6 (Tex. App.—

San Antonio Apr. 23, 2014, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (noting “the timing of a plaintiff’s nonsuit,

following a defendant’s dispositive motion, does not in itself support an inference that the nonsuit

was taken to avoid an unfavorable ruling.” ).

Similarly, Cox v. Vanderburg demonstrates the other side of the same principle. In that

case, the court affirmed the trial court finding that the plaintiffs took a nonsuit to avoid adverse

rulings. Cox v. Vanderburg, No. 06-20-00078-CV, 2021 WL 4055487, at *13 (Tex. App.—

Texarkana Sept. 7, 2021, pet. denied) (mem. op.). Read together, Epps, Dargin and Cox illustrate

that facts implying that a nonsuit was taken for an improper purpose do not eliminate the

discretionary nature of the trial court’s review. Just as a trial court may impose sanctions when it

determines a litigant employed a nonsuit for an improper purpose, a trial court may also decline to

impose sanctions when the record does not compel that conclusion. Whether facts exist that

support an inference of improper purpose is part of a discretionary inquiry that is entrusted to the

trial court. See id. at *12.

Nevertheless, the City contends the record conclusively establishes Guzman nonsuited for

an improper purpose. It points to the timing of the nonsuit, the severity of the discovery sanctions,

Guzman’s immediate refiling, and counsel’s refusal to give any reason for the nonsuit other than

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Guzman’s asserted absolute right to do so. The City argues that these facts line up with the Epps

factors and leave no room for any conclusion other than bad faith. We do not agree that the record

requires that conclusion.

Epps does not make the motive of a nonsuit a brightline inquiry. The presence of one or

more Epps factors permits an inference of improper purpose. But the factfinder must still evaluate

the whole record. Here, the trial court could reasonably consider several countervailing facts. First,

Guzman did not nonsuit before the trial court ruled on the City’s no-evidence summary-judgment

motion. The court had already granted partial summary judgment and had allowed Guzman’s

general negligence and respondeat superior claims to proceed. The claims Guzman nonsuited

without prejudice were the claims that had survived summary judgment and were ordered to trial.

Guzman emphasizes this point, arguing the nonsuit occurred after a favorable ruling that allowed

her core claims to proceed, not before an adverse dispositive ruling.

The City responds that the impending adverse ruling was not the summary judgment but a

likely directed verdict or jury verdict at trial. According to the City, the surviving claims were

doomed because Guzman lacked admissible expert testimony and medical evidence to prove

causation or damages. But the trial court could reasonably decline to consider that speculative

argument for sanctions purposes. The trial court’s denial of no-evidence summary judgment does

not prove the claims were strong, but it does confirm the court had not determined they were

meritless. Accordingly, the trial court was not required to determine that Guzman certainly would

have lost at trial and nonsuited her surviving claims for that reason.

Further, the trial court could have reasonably considered the requested remedy

disproportionate to the facts of the case. Even if Guzman’s counsel mishandled discovery and

sought to avoid the consequences, dismissal with prejudice is an extreme sanction. Texas law

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requires sanctions to be directly related to the offensive conduct and no more severe than necessary

to satisfy their legitimate purpose. Spohn Hosp. v. Mayer, 104 S.W.3d 878, 882–83 (Tex. 2003);

TransAmerican Nat. Gas Corp. v. Powell, 811 S.W.2d 913, 917 (Tex. 1991). The trial court could

reasonably conclude the City had not shown that death penalty sanctions were justified.

The timing of Guzman’s nonsuit and immediate refiling support an inference that Guzman

sought to avoid the practical consequences of the trial court’s discovery rulings. But while Epps

permits such an inference, it does not require one. Our task is not to decide whether we would have

imposed sanctions under the same circumstances. It is to decide whether the record compelled the

trial court to impose the severe sanctions requested such that the refusal to do so was outside the

zone of reasonable disagreement. We conclude that it did not.

II. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Specia

We would be remiss if we did not address Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Specia, 849

S.W.2d 805 (Tex. 1993), given the substantial attention the parties devote to its analysis. Guzman

reads Aetna broadly, arguing that because Aetna recognizes that a plaintiff faced with adverse

discovery rulings may elect to nonsuit and refile rather than proceed to trial under those constraints,

her decision to nonsuit following discovery sanctions cannot, standing alone, establish

sanctionable conduct. Conversely, the City argues that Guzman’s decision to nonsuit and

immediately refile to avoid discovery sanctions was itself sanctionable conduct. According to the

City, Aetna addresses only whether prior discovery sanctions can be enforced in a refiled suit and

cannot be read to authorize a plaintiff to nonsuit for the purpose of avoiding those sanctions.

Although Aetna holds that a discovery sanction excluding witnesses does not carry over

into a refiled lawsuit, it should not be read as shielding every nonsuit from scrutiny simply because

the avoided ruling was a discovery sanction. See id. at 807. Aetna did not involve a sanctions

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request based on the alleged impropriety of such a nonsuit. It therefore does not resolve the Epps

question presented here.

We do not view Aetna and Epps as contradictory, though. They address two different

questions. Aetna addresses the effect of a nonsuit on discovery sanctions in a later-filed suit. Epps

addresses whether a nonsuit may be so abusive or improperly motivated that sanctions are

warranted in the original suit. These holdings coexist. A nonsuit may eliminate the effect of certain

discovery sanctions under Aetna, while still leaving the trial court with authority to consider

whether the nonsuit itself warrants sanctions.

In terms of this case, Aetna does not answer the improper purpose question, but it does

provide additional support for the trial court’s decision to deny the requested sanctions. Thus,

while Aetna did not deprive the trial court of authority to consider sanctions, it reinforces our

conclusion that the trial court acted within its discretion in declining to impose the case-ending

sanctions the City requested.

III. Sanctions Under Rule 13 or Chapter 10

The City also argue that they are entitled to sanctions under both Rule 13 and Chapter 10

because the nonsuit was groundless, filed in bad faith, and filed for the improper purpose of

avoiding discovery sanctions and increasing litigation costs. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 13; TEX. CIV.

PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 10.001. Although framed as a separate issue, his contention rests on

the same premise as the City’s Epps argument discussed above—that Guzman filed the nonsuit for

an improper purpose. Because the trial court was not required to find improper purpose on this

record, it likewise was not required to impose the sanctions the City requested.

Further, the lack of written findings in this case does not help the City enough to require

reversal. The trial court held a hearing and then declined to grant sanctions. When a trial court

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denies sanctions, we may affirm if the record supports a reasonable basis for the denial. See

Higginbotham v. Bonilla, 727 S.W.3d 227, 232-34 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2025,

no pet.), reh’g denied (Dec. 23, 2025). Given Rule 162, Aetna, the discretionary nature of Epps,

and the severity of the sanctions requested, the trial court’s refusal to impose sanctions was within

the zone of reasonable disagreement.

CONCLUSION

While the timing of Guzman’s nonsuit and immediate refiling understandably raised

concern that Guzman sought to avoid the practical consequences of the trial court’s discovery

rulings, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s failure to impose sanctions.

The trial court’s orders are affirmed.

H. Todd McCray, Justice

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