City of Plant City v. Department of Transportation

399 So. 2d 1075, 1981 Fla. App. LEXIS 20304
CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida
DecidedJune 19, 1981
DocketNo. 80-1980
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 399 So. 2d 1075 (City of Plant City v. Department of Transportation) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court of Appeal of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
City of Plant City v. Department of Transportation, 399 So. 2d 1075, 1981 Fla. App. LEXIS 20304 (Fla. Ct. App. 1981).

Opinion

CAMPBELL, Judge.

Plant City appeals an order issued by the State Department of Transportation (DOT) which closed two city streets that crossed the Seaboard Coast Line Railroad. On a cross-appeal, Seaboard seeks review of DOT’s order leaving a third crossing open. [1076]*1076The City argues that DOT lacks authority to close a railroad crossing that is within a city’s street system, absent the city’s approval. Seaboard contends there was not sufficient competent evidence to support that part of the order at issue in its cross-appeal. We find both of these arguments to be without merit and affirm the order.

DOT initiated the proceeding to close three railroad crossings located within the Plant City limits, pursuant to section 338.-21(3), Florida Statutes (1979), and Florida Administrative Code Rule 14-46.03(2).1 Subsequently, Seaboard filed its own applications to close the three crossings. Both DOT and Seaboard acknowledged that these streets were within the City’s jurisdiction.

Public hearings were held at which time the City moved to dismiss the petitions challenging DOT’s authority to close a railroad crossing of a city street. The motion was denied and the administrative hearing officer recommended closing two crossings and leaving the third open. DOT adopted the hearing officer's recommended order.

Section 338.21(3), Florida Statutes (1979), states succinctly: “The department shall have regulatory authority over all public railroad crossings in the state, including the authority to issue a permit for the opening and closing of such crossings.” Such clear and unequivocal language can only be construed to mean that the legislature intended to grant DOT the exclusive authority to issue crossing permits without requiring additional approval from municipalities. It would have been easy for the legislature to have provided an exception for municipalities and yet it did not.

We note that section 357.01, Florida Statutes (1979), provides that a city may require a railroad company to construct a crossing when a railroad crosses a city street. However, as that section was originally enacted in 1911 and section 338.21(3) dates back only to 1955, we must defer to the latest legislation to the extent that a conflict exists in the law.

Upon review of Seaboard’s cross-appeal, we find there was sufficient competent evidence to support the DOT order leaving the one railroad crossing open. DeGroot v. Sheffield, 95 So.2d 912 (Fla.1957).

AFFIRMED.

SCHEB, C. J., and GRIMES, J., concur.

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Related

City of Holly Hill v. Department of Transportation
621 So. 2d 741 (District Court of Appeal of Florida, 1993)

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Bluebook (online)
399 So. 2d 1075, 1981 Fla. App. LEXIS 20304, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/city-of-plant-city-v-department-of-transportation-fladistctapp-1981.