City of Pittsburgh v. Board of Property Assessment

564 A.2d 1026, 129 Pa. Commw. 69, 1989 Pa. Commw. LEXIS 643
CourtCommonwealth Court of Pennsylvania
DecidedSeptember 29, 1989
Docket3067 C.D. 1988
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 564 A.2d 1026 (City of Pittsburgh v. Board of Property Assessment) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
City of Pittsburgh v. Board of Property Assessment, 564 A.2d 1026, 129 Pa. Commw. 69, 1989 Pa. Commw. LEXIS 643 (Pa. Ct. App. 1989).

Opinion

OPINION

CRUMLISH, Jr., President Judge.

The Young Men’s Christian Association of Pittsburgh (YMCA) appeals an Allegheny County Common Pleas Court order denying a property tax exemption for its facility known as the “Downtown Y.” 1 We vacate and remand.

The YMCA applied for exemption from real estate taxation with the Board of Property Assessment Appeals and Review of Allegheny County (Board) for its newly constructed downtown facility; after hearing, the Board granted the exemption. The City of Pittsburgh appealed that decision to the common pleas court which remanded the case to the Board for an additional hearing. The County of Allegheny intervened in the proceeding on remand. The Board subsequently classified approximately eighty-six percent of the “Downtown Y’s” tax assessment as exempt and approximately fourteen percent as taxable. On appeal, the common pleas court held that the facility did not function as a “purely public charity” and thus did not qualify to any extent for tax-exempt status.

*73 Article VIII, Section 2 of the Pennsylvania Constitution provides:

(a) The General Assembly may by law exempt from taxation:
(v) Institutions of purely public charity, but in the case of any real property tax exemptions only that portion of real property of such institution which is actually and regularly used for the purposes of the institution.

In accordance with this constitutional authority, the General Assembly enacted The General County Assessment Law, Act of May 22, 1933, P.L. 853, as amended, 72 P.S. §§ 5020-101—5453-706, which provides in Section 204:

(a) The following property shall be exempt from all county, city, borough, town, township, road, poor and school tax, to wit:
(3) All ... associations and institutions of learning, benevolence, or charity ... with the grounds thereto annexed and necessary for the occupancy and enjoyment of the same, founded, endowed, and maintained by public or private charity: Provided, That the entire revenue derived by the same be applied to the support and to increase the efficiency and facilities thereto, the repair and the necessary increase of grounds and buildings thereof, and for no other purpose.

In Pennsylvania, to qualify for a real estate exemption under Section 204, the property owner must show that the entire institution (1) is one of purely public charity; (2) was founded by public or private charity and (3) is maintained by public or private charity. Woods School Tax Exemption Case, 406 Pa. 579, 178 A.2d 600 (1962).

The question of whether a taxpayer is a “purely public charity” is a mixed question of law and fact and the decision of the trial court will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion or a lack of supportive evidence. Council Rock School District v. G.D.L. Plaza Corp., 91 Pa.Com *74 monwealth Ct. 176, 496 A.2d 1298 (1985), aff'd, 515 Pa. 54, 526 A.2d 1173 (1987). In order to qualify as a purely public charity, the entity seeking tax exemption must prove that it (a) advances a charitable purpose; (b) donates or renders gratuitously a substantial portion of its services; (c) benefits a substantial and indefinite class of persons who are legitimate subjects of charity; (d) relieves the government of some of its burden; and (e) operates entirely free from private profit motive. Hospital Utilization Project v. Commonwealth (HUP), 507 Pa. 1, 487 A.2d 1306 (1985). 2 Statutory provisions exempting persons or property from taxation must be strictly construed. Y.M. C.A. v. Reading, 402 Pa. 592, 167 A.2d 469 (1961).

The purposes and activities of the YMCA are well known. As stated in its membership policy, the YMCA fosters development of the individual through integration of the spirit, mind and body into a complete whole through services provided to all YMCA members and the community at large (Notes of Testimony (N.T.), 11/14-17/88, p. 447.) The YMCA has historically existed as a non-profit organization devoted to charitable undertakings. That it advances laudable humanitarian purposes as an organization is not determinative, however. The question of tax exemption must inevitably focus on the actual use to which this particular property is put and on the distribution of revenue that may be derived from such use.

The Downtown Y was constructed to replace the deteriorating Wood Street facility, which studies determined was not worthy of renovation. Funds for the new eight-floor facility were obtained from the sale proceeds of the Wood Street building, endowment funds, a capital campaign and a loan secured by a mortgage. The Downtown Y, which began operating in December 1986, provides its members with gyms, an Olympic swimming pool, various types of *75 exercise equipment, squash, handball and racquetball courts, running tracks, saunas, steam rooms, showers, related health care facilities, a pro shop and other facilities for meetings and other activities. Child care is available and the YMCA’s central offices are also located within the building. Members pay dues ranging from the more expensive “gold” and “silver” programs to “student” and “youth” memberships with commensurately lower annual fees. Numerous educational and developmental programs are offered at the facility and are often accompanied by a modest fee.

In its opinion, the common pleas court concluded that the Downtown Y facility does not advance a charitable purpose because it does not devote a substantial portion of its assets to the general public but instead primarily exists to provide facilities and services to its dues-paying members. The court found that only a very small number of Downtown Y members are subsidized by fellow members and that additional uses of the facility by other organizations and the general public are likewise insignificant when compared with dues-paying member use. The court further determined that the primary beneficiaries of the Downtown Y’s assets are a small definite membership, a large percentage of whom are businessmen and professionals, not legitimate objects of charity; to the extent that the Downtown Y provided services to the needy, tax funds are provided and thus the facility relieves the government of very little, if any, of its burden; and inasmuch as the Downtown Y exists in competition with other commercial business and child care centers, it is not entirely free of a private profit motive.

The YMCA contends that the trial court’s decision contradicts this Commonwealth’s well-established constitutional, statutory and decisional law and ignores extensive uncontested evidence produced at trial.

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Bluebook (online)
564 A.2d 1026, 129 Pa. Commw. 69, 1989 Pa. Commw. LEXIS 643, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/city-of-pittsburgh-v-board-of-property-assessment-pacommwct-1989.