City of Philadelphia v. Field

58 Pa. 320, 1868 Pa. LEXIS 184
CourtSupreme Court of Pennsylvania
DecidedJuly 2, 1868
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 58 Pa. 320 (City of Philadelphia v. Field) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
City of Philadelphia v. Field, 58 Pa. 320, 1868 Pa. LEXIS 184 (Pa. 1868).

Opinion

The opinion of the court was delivered, July 2d 1868, by

Read, J.

The whole law making power of the state is committed to the legislature with certain restrictions and limitations imposed on that body by the constitution. Independently of those limitations the legislative power is supreme within its proper sphere.

In the exercise of this power the legislature have dug canals, built bridges and railroads, and paid for them by money raised by loans and taxation. This power is indisputable, and upon its constitutionality depends our large state debt. The legislature [325]*325could undoubtedly build this bridge over a navigable river at South street, and pay for it by moneys proceeding from loans or taxes, and in doing it they might employ commissioners to erect it. This must be conceded, and it is but one step further, to impose the cost of erection on the city and county, through which the river passes and empties itself into the Delaware, and across which the bridge is thrown, connecting the east and west banks of the Schuylkill, upon which Philadelphia is built.

It becomes in fact a bridge of necessity, connecting two growing portions of the city, and forming a part of a continuous highway from the Delaware to the remotest parts of West Philadelphia. The city has an area of one hundred and thirty square miles and eight hundred thousand souls, and the question is, cannot the state place the cost of this great public improvement upon a locality and a population directly benefited by it ? This does not appear to admit of argument, for the mere statement of it is sufficient.

But we are not wanting in direct authority upon this point. In Thomas v. Leland, 24 Wendell 65, it was held, that an act of the legislature imposing a tax upon a local district of the state, in reference to a public improvement, such as a canal, is valid and constitutional, notwithstanding that previous to the passage of such act, a number of individuals of such district had entered into a bond to the state, by which they bound themselves to pay the whole expense of the improvement. In answer to some objections Mr. Justice Cowen says, But the argument proves quite too much. It would go to cut off entirely many acknowledged powers of taxation; such as that which raises money to relieve the poor, or establish and keep on foot common schools, to build bridges, or work the highway. It confounds two distinct legislative powers: a simple power of taxation with the power of taking private property for public use. The former acts upon communities, and may be exerted in favorof any object which the legislature shall deem for the public benefit. A tax to build a lunatic asylum may be mentioned as one instance. If the power to impose such a tax were to be rested on the ground of individual pecuniary benefit to each one who should be called on to contribute, it is quite obvious that it would not be maintained for a moment. Yet who would doubt that sueh might be imposed on a local community, a county or even a town ? I admit that this power of taxation may be abused; but its exercise cannot be judicially restrained-, so long as it is referable to the taxing power.”

The same doctrine is laid down in Norwich v. County Commissioners of Hampshire, 13 Pickering 60, and Hingham and Quincy Bridge and Turnpike Corporation v. County of Norfolk, 6 Allen 353. “ It has been the practice,” says C. J. Shaw, from the earliest times to charge the costs of certain large and expensive [326]*326bridges, in whole or in part upon counties; and it is impossible to deny the equity of these provisions.” “ One of the main purposes,” says C. J. Bigelow, “of this .general grant of power, was to vest in the legislature a superintending and controlling authority, under and by virtue of which, they might enact all laws, not repugnant to the constitution, of a police and municipal nature, and necessary to the due regulation of the internal affairs of the •Commonwealth. It is obvious, that the exercise of such a power is absolutely indispensable, in a wisely governed and well ordered community; and among the purposes for which it is to be exerted, none is more essential than a wise and careful distribution of certain public burdens or duties. Of these a leading one is the construction, support and maintenance of roads ahid bridges.” Mr. Sedgwick, in his Treatise on Statutory and Constitutional Law, says, p. 554, “ As a general rule the taxing power has been treated by the judiciary as vested in the .absolute discretion of the legislative bodies. This doctrine has been repeatedly declared both by the state and Federal tribunals.” “ So the Supreme Court of the United States have said, that there is no limitation whatever upon the legislative power of the states, as to the amount or objects of taxation.”

The act before us imposes the cost of erecting this bridge upon the county of Philadelphia, and the money is to be raised by a loan created by the commissioners, and to be deposited with the treasurer of the city of Philadelphia, to be checked out by the officers of the commission, and expended on the construction of the bridge. By the 4th section the councils are to provide for the principal and interest of this debt, which thus will become a part of the city debt. In King & Ross v. The City of Brooklyn, 42 Barbour 627, we find a similar statute in New York for widening Fourth avenue in Brooklyn, by a board of commissioners, the difference being that the city, and not the commissioners, were to issue the bonds.

The object of this act is to build a free bridge over the Schuylkill at the cost of the county. All the present bridges over that river from the Girard avenue bridge to its mouth are free, and they have been made so wholly or partially at the cost of the county.

There were four principal ferries over the river Schuylkill, one at High or Market street vested by the Colonial Act of 1723 in the then corporation of the city, the Upper or Roach’s Ferry as it was then called, at Fairmount, the Lower (then Blunston’s) Ferry, since Gray’s Ferry, and Penrose’s Ferry, near the mouth of the river. The three first named ferries were succeeded by floating bridges which opened to admit vessels. The bridge at High street was superseded by the Permanent Bridge erected under an Act of 16th March 1798, and opened for passengers and [327]*327.transportation on the 1st day of January 1805, and cost $300,000. The first bridge of a permanent character near where the floating bridge of Abraham Sheridan was, known by the name of The Upper Ferry,” was erected under an Act of 28th March 1811, and cost $126,000. This bridge, which had only a single arch of wood of 140 feet span, wyas burned down, and the present wire bridge built at the expense of the county by Charles Ellet, civil engineer, for $50,000, the abutments of the former bridge having been purchased by the district of Spring Garden for $15,000.

Under two Acts jf Assembly of the 24th February and 7th March 1837, the Philadelphia, Wilmington and Baltimore Railroad Company purchased the Gray’s Ferry floating bridge and estate, and erected the present bridge' for railroad and other travel-ling and transportation with a draw in it.

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Bluebook (online)
58 Pa. 320, 1868 Pa. LEXIS 184, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/city-of-philadelphia-v-field-pa-1868.