City of Peoria v. Calhoun

Illinois Supreme Court

City of Peoria v. Calhoun

29 Ill. 317

CourtIllinois Supreme Court

DecidedApril 15, 1862

StatusPublished

Cited by10 cases

This text of 29 Ill. 317 (City of Peoria v. Calhoun) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Illinois Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

City of Peoria v. Calhoun, 29 Ill. 317 (Ill. 1862).

Pincite

Opinion

Caton, C. J.

The instructions given for the defendant, are all wrong, or nearly so. They are based upon an erroneous principle which pervades them all. The fourth and sixth may be selected as especially exhibiting this erroneous principle. They are as follows:

“4. That although-the jury may believe, from the evidence, that the city of Peoria has power, by virtue of her charter, to pass ordinances prohibiting the sale of fresh meats in any other place than the Central Market, yet if the jury further believe, from the evidence, that the ordinances offered in evidence are in restraint of lawful trade, and the trade in fresh meat in itself is not unlawful, then they should find the defendant not guilty.”

“6. That if the jury believe, from the evidence, that the ordinance read in evidence is in restraint of lawful trade, they will still find the defendant not guilty.”

This was virtually telling the jury, that although the city had the right to pass the ordinance, yet if they believed it was in restraint of lawful trade, it was not binding. If the city had power to pass the ordinance, then no trade in violation of it could be lawful. The proposition is repugnant to itself. The third instruction in so many words refers it to the jury to determine, whether the ordinance was valid or not. That was for the court to determine. The judgment is reversed, and the cause remanded.

Judgment reversed.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Caton, C. J.

The instructions given for the defendant, are all wrong, or nearly so. They are based upon an erroneous principle which pervades them all. The fourth and sixth may be selected as especially exhibiting this erroneous principle. They are as follows:

“4. That although-the jury may believe, from the evidence, that the city of Peoria has power, by virtue of her charter, to pass ordinances prohibiting the sale of fresh meats in any other place than the Central Market, yet if the jury further believe, from the evidence, that the ordinances offered in evidence are in restraint of lawful trade, and the trade in fresh meat in itself is not unlawful, then they should find the defendant not guilty.”

“6. That if the jury believe, from the evidence, that the ordinance read in evidence is in restraint of lawful trade, they will still find the defendant not guilty.”

This was virtually telling the jury, that although the city had the right to pass the ordinance, yet if they believed it was in restraint of lawful trade, it was not binding. If the city had power to pass the ordinance, then no trade in violation of it could be lawful. The proposition is repugnant to itself. The third instruction in so many words refers it to the jury to determine, whether the ordinance was valid or not. That was for the court to determine. The judgment is reversed, and the cause remanded.

Judgment reversed.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

29 Ill. 317, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/city-of-peoria-v-calhoun-ill-1862.

Opinion

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack