City of Ord v. Zlomke

149 N.W.2d 747, 181 Neb. 573, 1967 Neb. LEXIS 593
CourtNebraska Supreme Court
DecidedApril 7, 1967
DocketNo. 36418
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 149 N.W.2d 747 (City of Ord v. Zlomke) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Nebraska Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
City of Ord v. Zlomke, 149 N.W.2d 747, 181 Neb. 573, 1967 Neb. LEXIS 593 (Neb. 1967).

Opinion

Kokjer, District Judge.

The personé named as defendants herein, claiming to be all of the owners of abutting lots, filed deeds vacating the plat of parts of the streets and alleys in Hillside Addition to the City of Ord. The city thereafter filed a petition in the district court for Valley County, in which it prayed for the cancellation of those deeds of vacation and that title to the streets and alleys described be quieted in the city. After trial, the district court found that plaintiff had failed to prove the allegations of its petition and that the vacation deeds are valid. We affirm the judgment.

A careful review of the record reveals little, if any, conflict as to the facts. The plat of Hillside Addition to Ord was filed for record on October 8, 1884. Defend[575]*575ants Zlomke own all of Block 12, the west half of Lot 4, all of Lots 5 and 6, and the south half of Lots 7 and 8, less the north 25 feet thereof, in Block 11. Defendants Cicmanec own Lot 3 and the east one-half of Lot 4, in Block 11. Defendants Parkos own the land outside the city limits immediately south of P Street, which is platted, running east and west just south of Blocks 11 and 12. In the east one-half of Block 11, Lots 1 and 2 are owned by the Donald Stewarts; and the north half of Lots 7 and 8, just south thereof, is owned by the Herbert Rickards. Neither the Stewarts nor the Rickards appeared in the case. Lots 1, 2, 3, and 4 make up the north half of Block 11, and Lots 5, 6, 7, and 8 make up the south half. Blocks 11 and 12 are in the extreme southwest comer of the city. Twenty-third Street, which is open, runs north and south just west of Block 12, its southern terminus being the city boundary line near the southwest corner of Block 12. O Street, which is open, runs from the west city limit eastward along the north side of Blocks 11 and 12. Twenty-second Street is platted north and south between Blocks 11 and 12 but between these blocks has never been opened. Twenty-first Street runs from the north past the east side of Block 11 and ends at the city boundary near the southeast comer of Block 11. The east and west alleys in Blocks 11 and 12 have never been opened. P Street, as platted, runs east and west along the city boundary south of Blocks 11 and 12, but has never been opened west of Twenty-first Street. The defendants vacated the plat as to: (1) The east-west' alley of Block 12; (2) the portion of Twenty-second Street between Blocks 11 and 12; (3) the portion of the east-west alley lying between Lots 3 and 4 on the north and Lots 5 and 6 on the south in Block 11; and (4) the portion of P Street lying south of Blocks 11 and 12.

The City of Ord never passed an ordinance accepting the plat of Hillside Addition as required by section 17-567, subsection (6), R. R. S. 1943, which reads as follows: [576]*576“No street or alley which shall hereafter be dedicated to public use, by the proprietor of ground in any city or village, shall be deemed a public street or alley, or be under the use or control of the city council or board of trustees, unless the dedication shall be accepted and confirmed by an ordinance especially passed for such purpose.”

The city could have accepted the plat by using the areas platted for streets and alleys for public purposes. Village of Maxwell v. Booth, 161 Neb. 300, 73 N. W. 2d 177. It did not do so.

The defendants proceeded under the provisions of the following statutes:

“Any such plat may be vacated by the proprietors thereof, at any time before the sale of any lots therein, by a written instrument declaring the same to be vacated, duly executed, acknowledged or proved and recorded in the same office with the plat to be vacated. The execution and recording of such writing shall operate to destroy the force and effect of the recording of the plat so vacated, and to divest all public rights in the streets, alleys, commons, and public grounds laid out or described in such plat. In cases where any lots have been sold, the plat may be vacated, as herein provided, by all the owners of lots in such plat joining in the execution of the writing aforesaid.” § 17-419, R. R. S. 1943.

“Any part of a plat may be vacated under the provisions and subject to the conditions of section 17-419; Provided, such vacating does not abridge or destroy any of the rights: and privileges of other proprietors in said plat. Nothing contained in this section shall authorize the closing or obstructing of any public highways laid out according to- law.” § 17-420, R. R. S. 1943.

All of the owners of lots abutting on the areas vacated have joined in the vacation deeds. This court held in the case of Village of Hay Springs v. Hay Springs Commercial Co., 131 Neb. 170, 267 N. W. 398, that only those [577]*577property owners whose property abuts on the vacated part of the street need join in the deed of vacation.

Section 17-420, R. R. S. 1943, provides that nothing contained in this section shall authorize the closing or obstructing of any public highways laid out according to law. This court held in Village of Hay Springs v. Hay Springs Commercial Co., supra, that this provision does not apply to nominal streets designated on plats which were never used as. public highways. The evidence shows clearly that the parts of streets and alleys vacated by defendants were never opened nor used for the public as streets, nor for any other public purpose. The entire area had been enclosed by fences and used for pasture or the growing of crops.

Plaintiff contended that because the Stewarts and the Rickards did not join in the vacation deeds, they were not effective. The evidence shows that only the portion of the alley in the west half of Block 11 was vacated and that these persons owned lots abutting on the alley in the east half of the block. The only use ever made of this alley for public purposes was the placing of a pole, about one-fourth of the way through the alley from the east, in connection with electric service to the Stewarts and Rickards. The alley was never used for travel through the block. If this alley were to be opened for travel clear to the west end of the block, one using it could go nowhere except to the end of the alley. The east end can still be used for access to their properties by the Stewarts and Rickards if they desire to have it opened and improved. They also both have access from Twenty-first Street and access along the north side of the lots owned by the Rickards may be had from O Street.

The case of Johnson v. Buhman, 98 Neb. 236, 152 N. W. 403, involved the vacation of an area platted in 1886 as an alley, extending east and west through the middle of a block in Leigh, Nebraska, which joined an alley which was open extending north and south through the [578]*578.block. The owners of the lots abutting on both sides of this half-block alley had used it as part of their properties until 1909. In June 1909, the village authorities, by the performance of certain acts not described in the opinion, attempted to take possession of and assume control over the strip, which attempt was resisted by the owners. In April 1910, the owners duly executed and filed a deed vacating the plat so far as it affected this half-block alley. Thereafter, until December 1910, the village desisted from further activities on this stripi and the owners restored their fences around it and repaired the injury which the village had done. On the last-named date the village forcibly removed the fences.

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Bluebook (online)
149 N.W.2d 747, 181 Neb. 573, 1967 Neb. LEXIS 593, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/city-of-ord-v-zlomke-neb-1967.