City of New York v. Allicott

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

City of New York v. Allicott

123 A.D.3d 647, 998 N.Y.S.2d 126

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedDecember 3, 2014

Docket2012-09565

StatusPublished

This text of 123 A.D.3d 647 (City of New York v. Allicott) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

City of New York v. Allicott, 123 A.D.3d 647, 998 N.Y.S.2d 126 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2014).

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Opinion

In an action, inter alia, for a judgment pursuant to RPAPL article 15 declaring that a deed to certain real property is null and void, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Velasquez, J.), dated August 17, 2012, which granted those branches of the separate motions of the defendants Chase Home Finance, LLC, as successor by merger to the defendant Chase Manhattan Mortgage Corporation, also known as Chase Mortgage Services, Inc., and L&M Development, LLC, which were for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against each of them, and granted the motion of the defendant Khaleef Allicott, individually, and as the administrator of the estate of Jacqueline Wood Allicott, for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against him.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with one bill of costs.

Under the particular circumstances of this case, the Supreme Court properly granted the motion of the defendant Khaleef Allicott, and those branches of the separate motions of the defendants Chase Home Finance, LLC, as successor by merger to the defendant Chase Manhattan Mortgage Corporation, also known as Chase Mortgage Services, Inc., and L&M Development, LLC, which were for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against each of them. The evidentiary submissions of the moving defendants established that they had no knowledge of the alleged fraud committed at the 2002 closing, that the plaintiff suffered no economic detriment as a result of the alleged fraud, and that granting the relief demanded by the plaintiff would cause the moving defendants to suffer a substantial forfeiture (see Fifty States Mgt. Corp. v Pioneer Auto Parks, 46 NY2d 573, 577 [1979]; Vanderhoef v Doe, 106 AD3d 1486, 1487 [2013]). Accordingly, we affirm the Supreme Court’s order.

Dillon, J.P., Hall, Austin and Barros, JJ., concur.

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In an action, inter alia, for a judgment pursuant to RPAPL article 15 declaring that a deed to certain real property is null and void, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Velasquez, J.), dated August 17, 2012, which granted those branches of the separate motions of the defendants Chase Home Finance, LLC, as successor by merger to the defendant Chase Manhattan Mortgage Corporation, also known as Chase Mortgage Services, Inc., and L&M Development, LLC, which were for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against each of them, and granted the motion of the defendant Khaleef Allicott, individually, and as the administrator of the estate of Jacqueline Wood Allicott, for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against him.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with one bill of costs.

Under the particular circumstances of this case, the Supreme Court properly granted the motion of the defendant Khaleef Allicott, and those branches of the separate motions of the defendants Chase Home Finance, LLC, as successor by merger to the defendant Chase Manhattan Mortgage Corporation, also known as Chase Mortgage Services, Inc., and L&M Development, LLC, which were for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against each of them. The evidentiary submissions of the moving defendants established that they had no knowledge of the alleged fraud committed at the 2002 closing, that the plaintiff suffered no economic detriment as a result of the alleged fraud, and that granting the relief demanded by the plaintiff would cause the moving defendants to suffer a substantial forfeiture (see Fifty States Mgt. Corp. v Pioneer Auto Parks, 46 NY2d 573, 577 [1979]; Vanderhoef v Doe, 106 AD3d 1486, 1487 [2013]). Accordingly, we affirm the Supreme Court’s order.

Dillon, J.P., Hall, Austin and Barros, JJ., concur.

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Bluebook (online)

123 A.D.3d 647, 998 N.Y.S.2d 126, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/city-of-new-york-v-allicott-nyappdiv-2014.

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