City of Moraine v. Board of County Commissioners
This text of 423 N.E.2d 184 (City of Moraine v. Board of County Commissioners) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Ohio Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
I.
Appellants’ first proposition of law is two-fold.
Initially, appellants assert, in essence, that, since the board of county commissioners is not specifically authorized to reconsider its own prior zoning decision, it must initiate the full procedural requirements as prescribed by R. C. 303.12 before reconsidering its own prior zoning decision.
We find no merit in this contention and hold that the county commissioners do have the inherent authority to reconsider their own legislative decisions.
R. C. 303.121 expressly confers upon the board of county [142]*142commissioners the authority to rezone a parcel of property by amendment of a county’s comprehensive zoning plan. This [143]*143authority to rezone is clearly a legislative function. Forest City Enterprises v. Eastlake (1975), 41 Ohio St. 2d 187, 189; Donnelly v. Fairview Park (1968), 13 Ohio St. 2d 1; Tuber v. Perkins (1966), 6 Ohio St. 2d 155; Berg v. Struthers (1964), 176 Ohio St. 146.
Although there is no specific statutory grant of authority for reconsideration, the board of county commissioners, when acting in a legislative capacity, do have the inherent power to reconsider their own prior legislative zoning decisions. This rationale was espoused in State, ex rel., v. Board of Public Service of Columbus (1909), 81 Ohio St. 218, at pages 224-225, where the court aptly stated:
“* * *That rule, well settled by numerous adjudications, is to the effect that the action of such bodies respecting legislative*** matters is not always conclusive and beyond recall, but that they are possessed of inherent power to reconsider their action in matters of that nature, and adopt if need be the opposite course* * *, the power to thus act being a continuing [144]*144power.***” (Emphasis added.) Accord, Thornton v. Duffy (1918), 99 Ohio St. 120.
In zoning matters, the great weight of authority holds that a legislative body should be allowed to reconsider the passage of prior legislation, to wit: proposed amendments to the comprehensive zoning plan, absent a restrictive statute or ordinance. See 1 Anderson, American Law of Zoning (2 Ed.), 241, Section 4.28. Thus, even though there is no specific statutory authority in reference to reconsideration, the county commissioners have the inherent authority to reconsider unless there is a specific statutory restriction to do so.
In 2 Rathkoft, The Law of Zoning and Planning (1977) (4th Ed.), Section 22-01 [6], the treatise concludes the above-cited section by noting numerous cases for its initial statement that, “[i]n the majority of cases***[when] a new vote was taken, it was held the matter might be reconsidered and a new vote taken without the necessity of a new public hearing.”
Based upon the foregoing, we hold that legislative activity, such as amendments to a comprehensive zoning plan, may be reconsidered only if, as in the instant cause, there is no change or modification from the original proposal.
In the second prong of their first proposition of law, appellants assert, in essence, that appellees’ appeal to the Court of Common Pleas divested the commissioners of any further jurisdiction over this matter. In the cause subjudice, the Court of Common Pleas had no jurisdiction to entertain the appeal, which was filed pursuant to R. C. 2506.01.
It is well settled herein that the denial of an amendment to a comprehensive zoning plan is a legislative function. As such, an appeal, pursuant to R. C. Chapter 2506, is not proper or available. It is rudimentary that legislative decisions are not appealable, pursuant to R. C. 2506.01. Tuber, supra; Berg, supra; Remy v. Kimes (1963), 175 Ohio St. 197; and In re Application of Latham (1965), 5 Ohio App. 2d 187.2
[145]*145Since appellees’ appeal was ineffective to divest the board of county commissioners of jurisdiction over this matter, the board’s reconsideration of its prior legislative action was properly within its powers.
Based upon the foregoing, appellants’ initial proposition of law is without merit.
II.
Appellants, in their second proposition of law, assert, in essence, that the Sunshine law, R. C. 121.22, was violated at the regularly scheduled meeting of the board of county commissioners when the board held an executive session just prior to deciding the issue of controversy of the instant cause. The trial court, when presented with this issue, concluded:
“ * * * In short the executive session was not a prearranged meeting outside of the public hearing wherein considered decision making concerning the landfill rezoning took place. Moreover, the intent of the Sunshine Law, that deliberations concerning public issues be made public, could not be further served by invalidating a decision insofar as such deliberations were laid before the public eye.”
The Court of Appeals, when pressed with this same proposition, concluded that “[t]here is no evidence however that the Board of Commissioners arrived at its decision on the rezoning amendment through the non-public deliberations in executive session.”
Upon a review of the record, we agree with the holding of the lower courts and, thereby, find appellants’ second proposition of law to be without merit.
Therefore, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
Related
Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
423 N.E.2d 184, 67 Ohio St. 2d 139, 21 Ohio Op. 3d 88, 1981 Ohio LEXIS 561, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/city-of-moraine-v-board-of-county-commissioners-ohio-1981.