LOUIS J. CECI, J.
This case is before the court on petition to bypass the court of appeals, pursuant to sec. 808.05, Stats. The issue presented concerns the constitutionality of Milwaukee’s curfew ordinance, Milwaukee Code of Ordinances, sec. 106-23. We find the ordinance constitutional and, therefore, affirm the order of the trial court.
This case arose from citations issued by the Milwaukee Police Department on January 4,1986, to approximately 95 youths who were attending a dance sponsored by the University of Wisconsin Black Student Union for the purpose of promoting higher education. The dance was held at the War Memorial Center in Milwaukee. In addition to approximately 400 youths, several adults were present at the dance, including those overseeing the event and operating equipment, security personnel, and police officers.
One of the Milwaukee police officers who was involved in the enforcement of the ordinance at the dance was a member of the gang squad and testified that he had learned that a gang confrontation which had occurred in another part of the city on January 4, 1986, involving the display of weapons, was to be continued at the War Memorial Center that evening. [29]*29The officer informed the individual in charge of security at the War Memorial Center that there was a possibility of gang activity and advised security personnel to be alert to certain indications of gang activity.
The police returned to the War Memorial Center at about 10:00 p.m. after receiving several complaints of vehicle thefts in the area which, according to the police officer, suggested the presence of gangs. At that time, the officer advised one of the individuals in charge of the dance of the curfew ordinance and requested that an announcement be made that youths under age 17 leave the premises by the 11:00 p.m. curfew time. The parties stipulated that the announcement was made pursuant to this instruction. The officers then departed, but returned shortly after 11:00 p.m., at which time they were summoned by a security guard due to an incident involving the vandalization of vending machines at the War Memorial Center. In the course of investigating this incident, the police discovered graffiti associated with certain gangs.
Subsequently, the police officers entered the dance hall and observed about 400 people in attendance, 70 of whom were estimated to be under the age of 17, including some youths believed to be 11 or 12 years old. The officer advised a supervisor of the dance that because there appeared to be individuals under the age of 17, unaccompanied by a parent or adult, in attendance at the dance after the 11:00 p.m. Milwaukee curfew time, the dance was to be shut down.
When the dance was terminated, individuals who appeared to be under the age of 17 were stopped and questioned. Those who were under the age of 17 were arrested and taken to the police administration build[30]*30ing. The police officer testified that youths whose parents had arrived to pick them up at the War Memorial Center were permitted to leave without the issuance of citations and further stated that any juveniles who had wished to call their parents were afforded the opportunity to do so. However, the appellants testified that they were not permitted to call their parents at the time the dance was terminated.1
The appellants, K.F. and D.A., were at the dance and were issued citations for violation of the Milwaukee curfew ordinance. K.F. was 15 years old, and D.A. was 16 years old at that time. The appellants pleaded not guilty and requested a jury trial. Appellants filed motions to dismiss the charges, challenging the constitutionality of the curfew ordinance on the basis that it was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. The trial court issued a decision on November 25,1986, denying the motion to dismiss and finding the ordinance constitutional. The appellants waived their right to a jury trial, and a trial before the court was held. The trial judge rendered a decision, finding the appellants guilty of violating the curfew ordinance. Suspended sentences were ordered for both appellants. A written order finding K.F. and D.A. guilty of violation of the [31]*31curfew ordinance was entered on April 10, 1987.2 Appellants appealed from this order, which we now affirm.
The text of the challenged Milwaukee ordinance is as follows: [32]*32The appellants challenge the Milwaukee ordinance on separate but related grounds: unconstitutional vagueness and overbreadth, contrary to the first and fourteenth amendments of the United States Constitution and corresponding provisions of the Wisconsin Constitution. See Wis. Const, art. I, secs. 1,3,4, and 18. Both vagueness and overbreadth challenges constitute assertions that the ordinance is unconstitutionally imprecise. However, whereas a vagueness challenge draws its essence from procedural due process, constitutional overbreadth concerns the distinct principle of substantive due process. See Bachowski v. Salamone, 139 Wis. 2d 397, 406, 411, 407 N.W.2d 533 (1987).
[31]*31"Loitering of Minors (Curfew Hours). It shall be unlawful for any person under the age of seventeen (17) years to congregate, loiter, wander, stroll, stand or play in or upon the public streets, highways, roads, alleys, parks, public buildings, places of amusement and entertainment, vacant lots or any public places in the city of Milwaukee, either on foot or in or upon any conveyance being driven or parked thereon, between the hours of 11 p.m. and 5 a.m. of the following day, official city time, unless accompanied by his or her parent, guardian or other adult person having his or her care, custody or control.” Milwaukee Code of Ordinances, §106-23.3
[32]*32We first address the appellants’ vagueness challenge. The concept of vagueness may be generically described as resting on the "constitutional principle that procedural due process requires fair notice and proper standards for adjudication.” State ex rel. Hennekens v. City of River Falls Police & Fire Commission, 124 Wis. 2d 413, 420, 369 N.W.2d 670, reconsideration [33]*33denied 126 Wis. 2d 39, 373 N.W.2d 672 (1985). The constitutional demand of procedural due process is not a requirement that the statute or ordinance be drafted with mathematical exactitude. As stated by the United States Supreme Court in Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 110 (1972): "Condemned to the use of words, we «can never expect mathematical certainty from our language.” Accordingly, the standard applied to examine a statute or ordinance has been expressed as follows: "A fair degree of definiteness is all that is required to uphold a statute or regulation, and a statute or regulation will not be voided merely by showing that the boundaries of the area of proscribed conduct are somewhat hazy.” Hennekens, 124 Wis. 2d at 420 (citing State v. Courtney, 74 Wis. 2d 705, 710-11, 247 N.W.2d 714 (1976)). See also State v. McCoy, 143 Wis. 2d 274, 286, 421 N.W.2d 107 (1988). We have further explained:
"'... Before a ... rule may be invalidated for vagueness, there must appear some ambiguity or uncertainty in the gross outlines of the duty imposed or conduct prohibited such that one bent on obedience may not discern when the region of proscribed conduct is neared, or such that the trier of fact in ascertaining guilt or innocence is relegated to creating and applying its own standards of culpability rather than applying standards prescribed in the ... rule.’” Hennekens, 124 Wis. 2d at 420-21 (quoting Courtney, 74 Wis. 2d at 711).
Prior to embarking upon an analysis of the ordinance upon vagueness grounds, this court must first determine whether the appellants’ conduct is clearly proscribed by the ordinance because "a plaintiff whose conduct is clearly proscribed by the statute [34]*34in question cannot complain of the vagueness of a law as applied to others; the law must be impermissibly vague in all of its applications.” State ex rel. Smith v. Oak Creek, 139 Wis. 2d 788, 802-03, 407 N.W.2d 901 (1987).4 Rules of standing have been liberalized with respect to overbreadth challenges such that even where the challenger’s conduct might constitutionally be regulated, the challenger "may hypothesize situations where the statute is so broad that it would chill legitimate activities and apply to fact situations where the regulation sought to be imposed would violate fundamental first-amendment rights.” State v. Tronca, 84 Wis. 2d 68, 89, 267 N.W.2d 216 (1978). In Oak Creek, first amendment challenges were not implicated, so the court did not resolve the issue of whether standing should be similarly liberalized with respect to vagueness claims. Oak Creek, 139 Wis. 2d at 802. We now determine that even where first amendment rights are implicated, a challenger whose conduct was clearly prohibited by the terms of a statute or ordinance does not have standing to challenge the vagueness of a statute or ordinance as hypothetically applied to the conduct of others; there is absolutely no nexus between the status of an individual whose conduct is clearly prohibited by a regulation and a constitutional challenge asserting an absence of fair notice. See Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 756 (1974). See also Tronca, 84 Wis. 2d at 89; L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law, § 12-32, at 1036 (2d ed. 1988).5See [35]*35also Moedern v. McGinnis, 70 Wis. 2d 1056, 1064, 236 N.W.2d 240 (1975) (standing requisite of logical nexus). Accordingly, our analysis of the challenge to the vagueness of the ordinance must necessarily commence with consideration of whether the ordinance, as applied to the appellants, clearly proscribed their conduct.
At the time the ordinance citations were issued, the youths were under 17 years old and were attending a dance with at least 90 other juveniles at the War Memorial Center in Milwaukee. Whatever possible ambiguities might be hypothetically constructed as to the application of the term "congregate” as used in the ordinance, a function in which such a large number of youths is assembled unequivocally constitutes a "congregation.”
It is equally certain that the War Memorial Center falls within the definition of a "public building” within the terms of the ordinance. As explained by the executive director of the War Memorial Center by testimony during trial, the War Memorial Center is "a public building” by "any definition.” The public nature of the War Memorial Center is made abundantly apparent both by the terms of the agreement between the Milwaukee County War Memorial Center, Inc. and the County of Milwaukee executed for the [36]*36construction of the Center and by the operational policies adopted by the War Memorial Center.6 The building was constructed and is operated for the public for use by veterans’ organizations and for community activities. To the extent that the building is by description "public,” it far exceeds in terms of public use the standards set forth by sec. 101.01(2)(g), Stats., defining public buildings. Section 101.01(2)(g) provides as follows:
"'Public building’ means any structure, including exterior parts of such building, such as a porch, éxterior platform or steps providing means of [37]*37ingress or egress, used in whole or in part as a place of resort, assemblage, lodging, trade, traffic, occupancy, or use by the public or by 3 or more tenants. When used in relation to building codes, 'public building’ does not include a previously constructed building used as a community-based residential facility as defined in s. 50.01(1) which serves 20 or fewer unrelated residents.”
The War Memorial Center is used "in part,” if not exclusively, for "assemblage” by the public. Thus, it must be beyond dispute that the War Memorial Center is a public building by statutory definition and, in fact, would be within any definition which could reasonably be ascribed to that term.7
Finally, while some adults were present at the dance, their presence could not by any interpretation or contortion of the language of the ordinance be deemed to constitute "accompaniment] by [a] parent, guardian or other adult person having ... care, custody or control” of the juveniles. Because the term [38]*38"accompany” is nontechnical, we refer, as we would where interpreting a statute, to a recognized dictionary to ascertain the common and approved usage of the term. McCoy, 143 Wis. 2d at 287. This language unambiguously refers to individualized supervision: the common meaning of the term "accompany” is defined in Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 12 (1961) as "to go with or attend as an associate or companion.”8 While it is undisputed that some adults were present at the War Memorial Center dance, even if it were presumed that the adults present at the dance had "care, custody or control” of the attending youths, such individualized supervision as contemplated by the reference in the ordinance to accompaniment was absent from the event. Accordingly, because it is uncontroverted that the youths were within the regulated age and involved in conduct in a place unambiguously proscribed by the ordinance, the ordinance was not vague in its application as to the appellants, but rather perfectly precise in its [39]*39application to the activities of these youths.9 We thus find that the appellants do not have standing to challenge the ordinance as unconstitutionally vague.
Our resolution of appellants’ vagueness challenge is not dispositive of the question of overbreadth. A statute or ordinance may be entirely clear yet, in its unambiguous application, unjustifiably intrude upon constitutionally protected rights. We have explained the concept of overbreadth as follows:
"A statute is overbroad when its language, given its normal meaning, is so sweeping that its sanctions may be applied to constitutionally protected conduct which the state is not permitted to regulate. Wilson, 96 Wis. 2d at 19. The essential vice of an overbroad law is that by sweeping protected activity within its reach it deters citizens from [40]*40exercising their protected constitutional freedoms, the so-called 'chilling effect.’” Bachowski, 139 Wis. 2d at 411.
As distinct from the doctrine of unconstitutional vagueness which draws its essence from procedural due process, overbreadth concerns substantive due process and is directed to "preventing the limiting, by indirection, of constitutional rights.” Tronca, 84 Wis. 2d at 89.
As explained above, contrary to the analysis under a vagueness challenge, with respect to over-breadth a plaintiff may have standing to challenge the constitutionality of a statute or ordinance even where his or her own conduct could constitutionally be regulated under a narrowly drawn law. State v. Princess Cinema of Milwaukee, Inc., 96 Wis. 2d 646, 656, 292 N.W.2d 807 (1980); City of Milwaukee v. Wilson, 96 Wis. 2d 11, 19, 291 N.W.2d 452 (1980). Accordingly, in asserting an overbreadth challenge an individual may hypothesize situations in which a statute or ordinance would unconstitutionally intrude upon the first amendment rights of third parties. Tronca, 84 Wis. 2d at 89. However, in analyzing the constitutionality of potential applications of a regulation, the court will not deem a statute or ordinance invalid because in some conceivable, but limited, circumstances the regulation might be improperly applied. In this regard, the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Houston v. Hill, 107 S. Ct. 2502, 2508 (1987), is instructive:
"The elements of First Amendment over-breadth analysis are familiar. Only a statute that is substantially overbroad may be invalidated on [41]*41its face. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 769,102 S.Ct. 3348, 3361, 73 L.Ed.2d 1113 (1982); Broadrick v. Oklahoma, supra. 'We have never held that a statute should be held invalid on its face merely because it is possible to conceive a single impermissible application. ...’ Id., at 630, 98 S.Ct., at 2925 (BRENNAN, J., dissenting). Instead, '[i]n a facial challenge to the overbreadth and vagueness of a law, a court’s first task is to determine whether the enactment reaches a substantial amount of constitutionally protected conduct.’ Hoffman Estates v. The Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 465 U.S. 489, 494, 102 S.Ct, 1186, 1191, 71 L.Ed.2d 362 (1982); Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 359, n. 8, 103 S.Ct. 1855, 1859, n. 8, 75 L.Ed.2d 903 (1983).”
See also Boos v. Barry, 108 S. Ct. 1157, 1168 (1988).
In support of the argument that the curfew ordinance is unconstitutionally broad, the appellants delineate several rights upon which the ordinance purportedly impinges. Specifically, appellants assert that the following rights are fundamental and are unconstitutionally intruded upon by the breadth of the curfew ordinance: freedom of movement and travel; freedom of association, assembly, speech, expression, and religion; and, finally, family autonomy.
It is apparent from the face of the curfew ordinance that the ordinance directly restricts the movement and associational rights of juveniles during the proscribed period of six hours and may indirectly or incidentally affect rights of expression and religion. This court has previously discussed the inherent right of freedom of movement:
"The freedom to move about is a basic right of citizens under our form of government, in fact, [42]*42under any system of ordered liberty worth the name. It was not added to our United States Constitution by the enactment of the first ten amendments. It is inherent, not only in the Bill of Rights, but in the original document itself. It has properly been termed 'engrained in our history’ and 'a part of our heritage.’” Ervin v. State, 41 Wis. 2d 194, 200-01, 163 N.W.2d 207 (1968) (footnote omitted).
Cf. Town of Vanden Broek v. Reitz, 53 Wis. 2d 87, 191 N.W.2d 913 (1971), appeal dismissed 406 U.S. 902 (1972). This right to be free to move about within one’s own state is inherent and distinct from the right to interstate travel protected by the commerce clause. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629-30 (1969) (quoting Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 492 (1849)). See also Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 164 (1972). See generally J. Nowak, R. Rotunda, J. Young, Constitutional Law, at 289-91 (2d ed. 1983).
Equally important as the right to freedom of movement are the first amendment rights of free speech and assembly. See U.S. Const, amend. I; Wis. Const, art. I, secs. 3 and 4. See generally Jacobs v. Major, 139 Wis. 2d 492, 504, 407 N.W.2d 832 (1987); State v. Zwicker, 41 Wis. 2d 497, 509, 164 N.W.2d 512, appeal dismissed 396 U.S. 26 (1969); N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958). Appellants argue that the broad language employed within the curfew ordinance precludes youths’ attendance of events involving rights of assembly, speech and expression, including, for example, rallies, meetings, and other public events.
Additionally, to the extent that the ordinance might incidentally interfere with a juvenile’s atten[43]*43dance of religious activities, after curfew hours, a fundamental right is implicated. See U.S. Const, amend. I; Wis. Const, art. I, sec. 18. See generally Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), aff’g 49 Wis. 2d 430, 182 N.W.2d 539 (1971); City of Washburn v. Ellquist, 242 Wis. 609, 9 N.W.2d 121, reh’g denied 242 Wis. 616a, 10 N.W.2d 292 (1943). Appellants assert that the free exercise of religion may be hampered due to the operation of the ordinance by, for example, prohibiting a minor from attending a midnight church service.
Finally, appellants argue that the ordinance unconstitutionally interferes with familial autonomy. Appellants are correct that the freedom of parents to rear their children according to their own system of beliefs is an interest of constitutional magnitude. See, e.g., Yoder, 406 U.S. at 232-33. See also Wynn v. Carey, 592 F.2d 1375, 1385-86 (7th Cir. 1978). That the state must not unnecessarily intrude into the family life has long been recognized:
"It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom include preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, [268 U.S. 510 (1925)]. And it is in recognition of this that these decisions have respected the private realm of family life which the state cannot enter.” Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166, reh’g denied 321 U.S. 804 (1944).
See also H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 410 (1981); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639, reh’g denied 391 U.S. 971 (1968).
[44]*44The right to challenge invalid government intrusion upon constitutionally protected rights is not one which may only be asserted upon the attainment of any particular age. Planned Parenthood of Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976). See, e.g., Zbaraz v. Hartigan, 763 F.2d 1532, 1536 (7th Cir. 1985), aff’d 108 S. Ct. 479 (1987), reh’g denied 108 S.Ct. 1064 (1988) ("The constitutional rights of minors do not receive lesser protection than the rights of adults.”)- However, it has become a well-recognized precept of constitutional law that a statute or ordinance which might be unconstitutional as applied to an adult might be constitutional as applied with respect to juveniles. See Prince, 321 U.S. at 167-70. This principle arises from a state’s legitimate interest in the protection of the welfare of children. Id. at 165; Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 640. Recently, the United States Supreme Court again examined a question involving the first amendment rights of students. Although asserted in the context of a school environment and thus involving additional considerations, it is instructive to observe the Court’s reaffirmation of the notion that while juveniles possess fundamental rights entitled to constitutional protection, they are not "'automatically coextensive with the rights of adults_’” Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, 108 S. Ct. 562, 567 (1988) (quoting Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986)). See also Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 638.
The nature of the authority of the state to regulate juvenile conduct was succinctly expressed by Justice Brennan in Carey v. Population Services International, 431 U.S. 678, 692 (1977), as follows:
[45]*45"The question of the extent of state power to regulate conduct of minors not constitutionally regulable when committed by adult is a vexing one, perhaps not susceptible of precise answer. We have been reluctant to attempt to define 'the totality of the relationship of the juvenile and the state.’ In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13 (1967). Certain principles, however, have been recognized. 'Minors, as well as adults, are protected by the Constitution and possess constitutional rights.’ Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S., at 74. [W]hatever may be their precise impact, neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill of Rights is for adults alone.’ In re Gault, supra, at 13. On the other hand, we have held in a variety of contexts that 'the power of the state to control the conduct of children reaches beyond the scope of its authority over adults.’ Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 170 (1944). See Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968). See also McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971).”
The rationale underlying the need for special sensitivity regarding the application of constitutional principles to children was explained in Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 634 (plurality), reh’g denied 444 U.S. 887 (1979), as a need to accommodate the following: "the peculiar vulnerability of children; their inability to make critical decisions in an informed, mature manner; and the importance of the parental role in child rearing.” Significantly, the state’s augmented authority over children has been recognized as most appropriately exercised with respect to activities carried out in public places where the dangers to the juvenile are the greatest. See Prince, 321 U.S. at 168.
[46]*46Having reviewed the ordinance not only with respect to the particular activities as to which it was applied in the instant case, but also with respect to its hypothetical interference with other rights in different circumstances, we are convinced that given the greater authority of the state or municipality regarding the regulation of the activities of children, the ordinance is not overly broad. Moreover, while parental interests in rearing children without state or municipal interference may be impinged upon by the ordinance, we concur with the United States Supreme Court that where "[a]cting to guard the general interest in youth’s well being, the state as parens patriae may restrict the parent’s control_” Prince, 321 U.S. at 166. The state does indeed have "a wide range of power for limiting parental freedom and authority in things affecting the child’s welfare_” Id. at 167.
We are convinced that the interest of the municipality in the present case in protecting youths and curtailing juvenile crime is compelling and further are of the position that the ordinance, which restricts juvenile activity for only a narrow period of the day in "public” places, is drawn as narrowly as practicable. In this regard, it should be noted that juveniles accompanied by adults having care, custody, or control of the juveniles are free from the constraints of the curfew ordinance. Accordingly, because we find that the ordinance meets the strict scrutiny standard requiring a "compelling state interest,” it is unnecessary to determine whether we would adopt the less [47]*47stringent "significant state interest” test applied in Carey with respect to juveniles. Carey, 431 U.S. 678.10
We note that the appellants’ concerns regarding the enforcement of the ordinance in certain hypothetical contexts are founded upon an extremely liberal and, we posit, preposterous construction of the ordinance. The constitutionality of the ordinance must not be judged by lifting terms such as "stand” from the ordinance and, without regard to the purpose and context of the ordinance, suggesting hypothetical situations as to which the term, antiseptically defined, might apply. As explained in Boos, 108 S. Ct. at 1169, regulatory language should be interpreted in light of that "particular context” for which it is crafted. See also Grayned, 408 U.S. at 112. Furthermore, this court must interpret an ordinance, as it would a statute, to preserve its constitutionality. See, e.g., Bachowski, 139 Wis. 2d at 405. See also Boos, 108 S. Ct. at 1168. [48]*48Accordingly, the appellants’ contention that the ordinance would apply to a minor walking directly home from work or standing while waiting for a bus home is invalid; such activities are certainly not within the proscription of the ordinance, the purpose of which, as indicated in the entitlement of the ordinance, "Loitering of Minors,” is to prevent the undirected or aimless activity of minors during the curfew hours. While it is conceivable that a police officer could mistakenly or even willfully apply the ordinance to a youth who was, for example, walking directly home or standing while waiting for a bus, the potential of such improper application of the ordinance does not destroy its constitutionality: "[T]he fact that a law may be improperly applied or even abused does not render it constitutionally invalid.” Wilson, 96 Wis. 2d at 21.11 Furthermore, as has been stated by the United States Supreme Court, "even if there are marginal applications in which a statute would infringe on First Amendment values, facial invalidation is inappropriate if the 'remainder of the statute ... covers a whole range of easily identifiable and constitutionally pros-cribable ... conduct —’” Parker, 417 U.S. at 760 [49]*49(quoting CSC v. Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 580-81 (1973)).
Finally, we have noted the cases of Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown, 401 F. Supp. 1242 (M.D. Pa. 1975), aff’d 535 F.2d 1245 (3d Cir.), cert. denied 429 U.S. 964 (1976), and Johnson v. City of Opelousas, 658 F.2d 1065 (5th Cir. 1981), relied upon respectively by respondent and appellants.12 We are more persuaded by the analysis applied by the court in Bykofsky. In this regard, we note that the curfew ordinance in Bykofsky was somewhat more liberal than the Milwaukee ordinance, to the extent that it provided exception to the ordinance proscription for first amendment activities where notice, signed by the minor and parent, if practicable, was first given to the mayor. However, the analysis applied in Bykofsky is equally relevant to the present case. As observed in Bykofsky:
"Obviously, the ordinance in fact promotes the safety of younger children by keeping them off the streets after 10:00 P.M. unless accompanied by an adult. ... [I]t is apparent that some juvenile crime is prevented, such as the 'spur-of-the-moment’ nocturnal crime and mischief resulting from group or gang action, because accumulations of juveniles are easily detected and can be dispersed under the curfew.” 401 F. Supp. at 1255-56.
[50]*50The court, giving due consideration to both the fundamental rights of minors and the special interests of society in regulating youth activities, consequently concluded as follows:
"The interest of minors in being abroad during the nighttime hours included in the curfew is not nearly so important to the social, economic, and healthful well-being of the community as the free movement of adults. ... The curfew ordinance recognizes the dangers to which minors are subject if allowed at nighttime to be upon the streets unattended by adults. Legislation peculiarly applicable to minors is necessary for their proper protection. Likewise, due to their immaturity, legislation peculiarly applicable to minors is warranted for the protection of the public, e.g., to protect the community from youths aimlessly roaming the streets during the nighttime hours.” Id. at 1256-57.
We likewise find the Milwaukee curfew ordinance to be supported by the compelling interest of the city in controlling the nighttime activities of youths in order to protect both youths and the community from juvenile crime. Accordingly, for all the above reasons, we affirm the decision of the trial court.
By the Court — The order of the circuit court is affirmed.