City of Miami v. March

409 So. 2d 1107, 1982 Fla. App. LEXIS 19184
CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida
DecidedFebruary 2, 1982
DocketNo. 80-602, 80-927 and 80-928
StatusPublished

This text of 409 So. 2d 1107 (City of Miami v. March) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court of Appeal of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
City of Miami v. March, 409 So. 2d 1107, 1982 Fla. App. LEXIS 19184 (Fla. Ct. App. 1982).

Opinion

PER CURIAM.

The City of Miami appeals from an adverse declaratory judgment entered below ordering it to indemnify two of its employees held liable on a tort judgment. The employees sued each other for simple negligence based on an automobile accident arising out of and in the course of their employment with the City of Miami as police officers.1 The employees had duly received worker’s compensation benefits from the City of Miami on said accident. Neither employee sued, and admittedly could not have sued, the City of Miami in this negligence action as same was barred by the City’s worker’s compensation immunity. § 440.11(1), Fla.Stat. (1977). The employees, instead, chose litigation choice # 3 as stated in District School Board of Lake County v. Talmadge, 381 So.2d 698, 703 (Fla.1980), to wit: a suit against the other “employee alone, without invoking section 768.28, under traditional legal principles regarding tort actions against public employees,” Id. at 703, and rejected litigation choices # 1 and # 2 under Talmadge, supra, which would have made the City a party defendant in the action under Section 768.28, Florida Statutes (1979). As the City of Miami was not and could not be a party to this action, it plainly follows that it cannot be held liable on the judgment entered in the action. See also Seaboard Coastline R. Co. v. Smith, 359 So.2d 427 (Fla.1978).

We, accordingly, reverse the declaratory judgment under review and remand to the trial court with directions to enter a declaratory judgment stating that the City of Miami has no legal obligation to pay on the tort judgment entered against the said employees in this cause. We, also, reverse the order of equitable distribution entered in this cause and under review by this appeal, as the City of Miami was not entitled to any worker’s compensation distribution payment herein. We, also, dismiss the appeal by the City of Miami as to the tort judgment entered in this cause as the City had no standing to appeal said judgment.

Reversed and remanded.

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Related

Seaboard Coast Line RR Co. v. Smith
359 So. 2d 427 (Supreme Court of Florida, 1978)
DISTRICT SCH. BD. OF LAKE CTY. v. Talmadge
381 So. 2d 698 (Supreme Court of Florida, 1980)

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Bluebook (online)
409 So. 2d 1107, 1982 Fla. App. LEXIS 19184, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/city-of-miami-v-march-fladistctapp-1982.