City of Miami v. Jeffers

Miami Municipal Court

City of Miami v. Jeffers

21 Fla. Supp. 169

CourtMiami Municipal Court

DecidedJuly 31, 1962

DocketNo. 94719

StatusPublished

This text of 21 Fla. Supp. 169 (City of Miami v. Jeffers) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Miami Municipal Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

City of Miami v. Jeffers, 21 Fla. Supp. 169 (Fla. Super. Ct. 1962).

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Opinion

MILTON A. FRIEDMAN, Judge.

I refer counsel for defendant to all of the law and my findings in the case of City of Miami v. Diane Ruth Brewer and Zella Mae Penley [21 Fla. Supp. 42].

In this case of the City of Miami v. Carol Jeffers, the corpus delicti has been proven by the testimony of Officer Colgan, who stated that he saw the defendant dancing with a customer named Levy, and also saw her seated at the bar with said customer; that the customer stated, in the presence of the defendant, that he had purchased one-half hour of her time, which was not denied by the defendant; and that the defendant stated she was an employee. It appears to this court that the statement of the customer or patron that he had purchased her time was sufficiently serious for the defendant to have objected if such statement were untrue.

Counsel referred to the fact that the defendant was listed as a dancing instructor and was pursuing this endeavor. However, no license was exhibited for this establishment as a dancing school or studio.

In light of the law referred to in my decision in the Brewer and Penley cases and the facts in this case which conform thereto, all motions and objections by counsel for defendant are denied. This court finds that the City of Miami has made a prima facie case of guilt on the part of this defendant in mingling or fraternizing with a customer while employed in an establishment selling alcoholic beverages.

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MILTON A. FRIEDMAN, Judge.

I refer counsel for defendant to all of the law and my findings in the case of City of Miami v. Diane Ruth Brewer and Zella Mae Penley [21 Fla. Supp. 42].

In this case of the City of Miami v. Carol Jeffers, the corpus delicti has been proven by the testimony of Officer Colgan, who stated that he saw the defendant dancing with a customer named Levy, and also saw her seated at the bar with said customer; that the customer stated, in the presence of the defendant, that he had purchased one-half hour of her time, which was not denied by the defendant; and that the defendant stated she was an employee. It appears to this court that the statement of the customer or patron that he had purchased her time was sufficiently serious for the defendant to have objected if such statement were untrue.

Counsel referred to the fact that the defendant was listed as a dancing instructor and was pursuing this endeavor. However, no license was exhibited for this establishment as a dancing school or studio.

In light of the law referred to in my decision in the Brewer and Penley cases and the facts in this case which conform thereto, all motions and objections by counsel for defendant are denied. This court finds that the City of Miami has made a prima facie case of guilt on the part of this defendant in mingling or fraternizing with a customer while employed in an establishment selling alcoholic beverages.

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Bluebook (online)

21 Fla. Supp. 169, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/city-of-miami-v-jeffers-flamunict3-1962.

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