City of Miami v. Cuban Vill-Age Co.
Opinion
This is the third appearance of this case in this court. On the first wc affirmed the [327] granting of the temporary injunction in this matter. See: City of Miami et al. v. Cuban Vill-Age Co., Fla.App.1962, 136 So.2d 247. On the second we granted a constitutional stay continuing the injunction in force, pending this review. See: City of Miami v. Cuban Vill-Age Co., Fla. App.1962, 143 So.2d 69. This appeal now brings for review the final decree which made permanent the temporary injunction and ordered the City [who was the defendant in the trial court] to issue a night club license to the appellee.
It appears that the license granted was for the fiscal year, which expired on September 30, 1962, and it was conceded at the time of oral argument that there had been no application for a renewal of this license and, in fact, that the night club operations had ceased. Therefore, it appears that all questions relative to the issuance of this particular license for the fiscal year 1961-1962 are now moot and they will not be further considered in this opinion.
The City has requested [and under the points raised in the brief it appears appropriate] that this court render its judicial interpretation of the provisions of its Code relative to the requirements for the issuance of a night club license. The principal point raised is whether or not the number of tables and chairs and area requirements of the Code of the City of Miami, Chapters 4 — 11 and 4 — 26,2 demand that a restaurant business [in order to secure a night club license] be operated entirely in a particular room in a building establishment or may operate its business in an entire building established under one roof. The appellant contends that the former is the appropriate construction and the appellee contends that the latter is the appropriate and reasonable construction of the Code.
It appears that the appellant’s contention that the definition of a night club [as set out by the City ordinances] calls for the .requisite number of tables and chairs and area requirements to be contained within one room is without merit. The law as to construction of ordinances is well settled: the court shall apply reasonable and practical meanings to the ordinance [328] in question. See: McQuillan on Municipal Corporations, 3rd Ed., Vol. 6, § 20-47. From a .reading of the ordinances in the instant case, it is clear that the requirements of the ordinances apply to a place of business located under one roof and not one room.
Therefore, the final decree appealed from is hereby affirmed. However, the affirmance of the final decree shall not be construed as disturbing the City’s right to collect its applicable license fees for the fiscal year 1961-1962.
Affirmed.
Footnotes
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147 So. 2d 326 (City of Miami v. Cuban Vill-Age Co.) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.