City of Marathon v. PROF. FIREFIGHTERS
This text of 946 So. 2d 1187 (City of Marathon v. PROF. FIREFIGHTERS) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court of Appeal of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
CITY OF MARATHON, Appellant,
v.
PROFESSIONAL FIREFIGHTERS OF MARATHON, INC., LOCAL 4396, INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF FIREFIGHTERS, Appellee.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
Stearns Weaver Miller Weissler Alhadeff & Sitterson, and Joan M. Canny and John Herin, Miami, for appellant.
Mierzwa & Associates, and Matthew J. Mierzwa, Jr., Lake Worth, for appellee.
Before GERSTEN, RAMIREZ and ROTHENBERG, JJ.
ROTHENBERG, Judge.
The City of Marathon ("City") appeals a final order issued by the State of Florida Public Employees Relations Commission ("Commission") denying the City's post-election petition, verifying the election results, and certifying the Professional Firefighters of Marathon, Inc., Local 4396, International Association of Firefighters *1188 ("Local 4396") as the exclusive collective bargaining representative of a defined bargaining unit. Because we find that the Commission's interpretation of its governing statutes and rules is not clearly erroneous and is supported by competent substantial evidence, we affirm.
On April 1, 2005, Local 4396 filed with the Commission a representation-certification petition ("petition") seeking to represent a defined bargaining unit of employees employed by the City.[1] In support of the petition, and in accordance with section 447.307(2), Florida Statutes (2005), Local 4396 submitted, along with the petition, dated interest statements signed by at least thirty percent of the employees in the proposed unit, reflecting their desire to be represented for purposes of collective bargaining by Local 4396. The City filed a response objecting to the petition and a motion to dismiss, disputing, in pertinent part, (1) the inclusion of certain employee classifications in the defined bargaining unit sought by Local 4396, and (2) the validity of the interest statements submitted by Local 4396 in support of the petition since the interest statements designated the International Association of Firefighters ("IAFF"), not Local 4396, as the petitioning bargaining organization. The hearing officer denied the City's motion to dismiss and subsequently issued his recommended order concluding that the City's full-time employees in the classifications of firefighter/EMT/paramedic and lieutenant were appropriate for inclusion in the defined collective bargaining unit. The hearing officer recommended the exclusion of "captains" due to supervisory conflict of interest and the exclusion of the "on-call" and "part-time" volunteer firefighters due to their lack of community of interest with the full-time employees. The hearing officer further determined that the interest statements submitted by Local 4396 in support of the petition were valid since the IAFF is the parent organization of Local 4396 and since, as a matter of law, interest statements submitted in the name of a parent organization may serve as the showing of interest for a representation petition filed by a subsidiary of that parent organization. The City timely filed exceptions to the hearing officer's recommended order with the Commission.
On September 16, 2005, the Commission issued an order directing a secret ballot election in the defined collective bargaining unit to determine whether the defined bargaining unit employees desired to be represented by Local 4396. In its order, the Commission provided that the collective bargaining unit would include all full-time employees in the classifications of firefighter/EMT/paramedic and lieutenant, and "on-call" volunteer firefighters. The Commission excluded the "part-time" volunteers from the defined bargaining unit concluding that they were not "public employees" within the meaning of section 447.203(3), Florida Statutes, for purposes of collective bargaining. The Commission, in agreeing with the hearing officer's determination of the interest statements' validity, held that the interest statements submitted by Local 4396 designating IAFF as the bargaining agent were valid to show *1189 sufficient interest for Local 4396's petition. Consequently, a mail ballot election was conducted between October 18 and November 9, 2005, wherein Local 4396 prevailed ten to zero.
The City filed a post-election petition with the Commission requesting to set aside the election results of November 9, 2005. Subsequently, the Commission issued a final agency order denying the City's post-election objections, verifying the election results and certifying Local 4396 as the collective bargaining representative of the defined bargaining unit as specified in its September 16, 2005 order.
The City properly filed the instant appeal pursuant to sections 120.68 and 447.504, Florida Statutes, as a Commission order certifying a collective bargaining unit is a final agency action reviewable by the district courts of appeal. See § 447.307(3)(b), Fla. Stat. (2005)("Certification is effective upon the issuance of the final order by the [C]ommission. . . ."); § 447.504(1), Fla. Stat. (2005)("The district courts of appeal are empowered . . . to review final orders of the [C]ommission pursuant to s. 120.68."); § 120.68(1), Fla. Stat. (2005)("A party who is adversely affected by final agency action is entitled to judicial review."); see also Panama City v. Fla. Pub. Employees Relations Comm'n, 363 So.2d 135, 136 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978)(holding that "[i]n certification proceedings, final agency action is the certification of the employee organization as the exclusive bargaining representative of the employees in the appropriate unit"). Consequently, we have jurisdiction.
In this appeal, the City argues that the final order certifying Local 4396 should be set aside since (1) the Commission improperly determined that the interest statements submitted by Local 4396 in support of its petition were valid; (2) the Commission improperly determined that the "part-time" volunteers were not public employees for purposes of collective bargaining representation; and (3) the voters were deprived of a free and fair choice since the notice of election failed to provide adequate information concerning the composition of the defined bargaining unit.
A district court reviewing a final agency action may modify, remand, or set aside agency action if it finds, in pertinent part, that:
(b) The agency's action depends on any finding of fact that is not supported by competent substantial evidence in the record of a hearing . . .; however, the court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on any disputed finding of fact;
(c) The fairness of the proceedings or the correctness of the action may have been impaired by a material error in procedure or a failure to follow prescribed procedure;
(d) The agency has erroneously interpreted a provision of law and a correct interpretation compels a particular action;. . . .
§ 120.68(7), Fla. Stat. (2005). Thus, where there is competent substantial evidence in the record which supports an agency's determination of fact and the agency's interpretation of the applicable law is not clearly erroneous, the agency's action must be affirmed. § 120.68(8), Fla. Stat. (2005); see City of Winter Park v. Fla. Pub. Employees Relations Comm'n, 349 So.2d 224, 225 (Fla.
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946 So. 2d 1187, 2006 WL 3780853, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/city-of-marathon-v-prof-firefighters-fladistctapp-2006.