City of Madison v. Donohoo

348 N.W.2d 170, 118 Wis. 2d 646, 1984 Wisc. LEXIS 2572
CourtWisconsin Supreme Court
DecidedMay 30, 1984
Docket83-242
StatusPublished
Cited by9 cases

This text of 348 N.W.2d 170 (City of Madison v. Donohoo) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Wisconsin Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
City of Madison v. Donohoo, 348 N.W.2d 170, 118 Wis. 2d 646, 1984 Wisc. LEXIS 2572 (Wis. 1984).

Opinion

SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, J.

This is a review of an unpublished decision of the court of appeals filed August 26, 1983, affirming a judgment of the circuit *647 court for Dane county, Michael B. Torphy, Circuit Judge, convicting Patrick S. Donohoo of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant contrary to an ordinance of the city of Madison. The circuit court concluded that the defendant’s demand for a jury trial was not timely under sec. 345.48(1), Stats. 1981-82. The case was tried to the circuit court judge; the defendant was convicted, and the court of appeals affirmed the judgment. We conclude that the jury demand was filed timely and therefore reverse the decision of the court of appeals and the judgment of the circuit court. We remand the cause for a jury trial.

The facts are not disputed and were set forth at a hearing before the circuit court at which the defendant and the court commissioner testified.

On August 29, 1982, the defendant was issued a uniform traffic citation alleging a violation of the Madison General Ordinance prohibiting the operation of a motor vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant. The citation required the defendant to appear in Dane county circuit court at 9 a.m. on September 2, 1982, for an initial appearance before a court commissioner. Sec. 757.69 (1) (c), Stats. 1981-82.

The defendant arrived at the courtroom at approximately 8:30 a.m. on September 2, 1982, and at approximately 9:00 a.m. was handed a “Traffic Court Information Sheet,” a one-page document that purports to inform persons of their legal rights. It states, among other things, that a defendant is expected to plead that day and that a defendant who wants a jury trial must request one in writing within 10 days of entering his or her plea. 1 The court commissioner explained the pro *648 cedure to be followed that morning in an opening statement that advised all persons present, including the defendant, that each defendant would have to enter a plea that day or the court would enter a plea for the defendant and that if a defendant wanted a jury trial he or she would have to request one in writing within 10 days of that date, that is, within 10 days from September 2, 1982. 2

*649 The time shown on the defendant’s citation proved to be incorrect because his case was scheduled to be called at 1:30 p.m. instead of 9 a.m. Shortly after 10:30 a.m., during a recess, the defendant and the court com *650 missioner spoke in a hallway outside the courtroom. The defendant told the court commissioner that he could not remain until 1:30 p.m. and that he wanted more time so that he could contact a lawyer. The court commissioner discussed with the defendant such alternatives as calling the case then, setting a new court date, and entering a plea, which would give the defendant time to contact an attorney.

After the recess, the defendant’s case was called. The court commissioner did not ask if the defendant wanted to plead, and the defendant testified that he did not enter a plea. The record shows the defendant pled not guilty. The court commissioner testified that he told the defendant he would enter a plea for him and set another court date to give him time to contact an attorney. The court commissioner apparently entered a not guilty plea for the defendant.

The defendant retained counsel and, on September 15, 1982, more than 10 days after the September 2 proceedings, filed a written demand for a 12-person jury trial, along with the required fee. After a pretrial hearing on October 20, 1982, the circuit court ruled that the demand for a jury trial was untimely. On December 3, 1982, the defendant filed a Motion to Confirm Right to Jury Trial. The circuit court ruled that the time for demanding a jury trial had commenced on September 2, 1982, when the defendant appeared before the court commissioner, that the jury demand was untimely, and that the defendant had waived his right to a jury trial.

The defendant contends that the 10-day time limit to demand a jury trial did not begin to run on September 2, 1982, because the defendant had exercised his right not to plead at that time and that the court commissioner had no authority to enter a plea for the defendant.

This ease involves the interplay of five statutory provisions, sec. 345.40, sec. 345.34(1), sec. 345.35, sec. *651 345.36, and sec. 345.43(1), which set forth the procedures for entering a plea in a traffic case and demanding a jury trial. Statutory interpretation is a question of law. This court need not defer to the determination of either the court of appeals or the circuit court since neither is in a better position to interpret the statute than is this court.

Sec. 345.40 describes the pleadings of the plaintiff and defendant. The citation is the plaintiff’s initial pleading; the defendant’s pleas are guilty, no contest, and not guilty.

“A citation which complies with s. 345.11 . . . may be used as the initial pleading [of the plaintiff]. The defendant’s plea shall be guilty, no contest or not guilty and shall be entered as not guilty upon failure to plead. A plea of not guilty shall put all matters in such case at issue.”

Sec. 345.34(1) describes the defendant’s initial appearance in response to a citation. The statute requires the defendant to be informed that he or she has a right to a jury trial and to be asked whether he or she wishes to plead or wishes a continuance:

“(1) If the defendant appears in response to a citation ... he shall be informed that he is entitled to a jury trial and then asked whether he wishes presently to plead, or whether he wishes a continuance. If he wishes to plead, he may plead guilty, not guilty or no contest.”

Secs. 345.35 and 345.36 describe the procedure to be followed if the defendant pleads not guilty. The court ascertains whether the defendant wants an immediate trial or a continuance; if the defendant requests a continuance the court sets trial at a later date. Secs. 345.35 (1) and (2) provide:

“(1) If the defendant pleads not guilty, the court shall ascertain whether he wishes an immediate trial or *652 whether he wishes a continuance. The plaintiff shall also be entitled to a continuance if the defendant pleads not guilty.
“ (2) If the defendant pleads not guilty and states that he waives the right to jury trial and that he wishes an immediate trial, the case may be tried forthwith if the plaintiff consents.”

Sec. 345.36 provides, inter alia:

“If the defendant pleads not guilty and requests a continuance the court shall set a date for trial or advise the defendant that he will later be notified of the date set for trial. . . .”

Sec. 345.43(1) provides the manner and time for demanding a jury trial.

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Bluebook (online)
348 N.W.2d 170, 118 Wis. 2d 646, 1984 Wisc. LEXIS 2572, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/city-of-madison-v-donohoo-wis-1984.