City of Los Angeles v. Industrial Accident Commission

72 P.2d 540, 9 Cal. 2d 705, 1937 Cal. LEXIS 446
CourtCalifornia Supreme Court
DecidedOctober 11, 1937
DocketL. A. No. 16310
StatusPublished
Cited by12 cases

This text of 72 P.2d 540 (City of Los Angeles v. Industrial Accident Commission) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering California Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
City of Los Angeles v. Industrial Accident Commission, 72 P.2d 540, 9 Cal. 2d 705, 1937 Cal. LEXIS 446 (Cal. 1937).

Opinion

THE COURT.

This is a proceeding on behalf of the City of Los Angeles to have reviewed an order of the Industrial Accident Commission awarding compensation.

In 1935 the City of Los Angeles became co-sponsor of a Federal Works Progress Administration project whereby roads and firebreaks were to be constructed in the Santa Monica mountains to facilitate the moving of vehicles and fire extinguishing apparatus into this area, with a view to minimizing the hazard of brush fires in that locality. Under the plans for the project the federal government advanced about ninety-four per cent of the moneys needed therefor, the city advancing the other six per cent. It was the understanding between the city and the government that the city should draw up the plans and specifications for the work, subject, however, to the approval of the federal government. After the plans were drawn up and approved it was found that a gasoline power shovel would be needed in connection with the work. The government accepted bids for this contract and awarded the same to Mrs. Jeanne Robare, the owner of the shovel here involved. Under her contract Mrs. Robare was to receive a stipulated sum of money monthly, to be paid by the federal government for the use of her shovel. She was to furnish the men needed to operate the shovel and to fix and pay for their services. This contract provided further that the workmen on the shovel were to become the employees of Mrs. Robare and not of the federal government. She was also required to procure and maintain compensation insurance covering the men employed in the operation of the shovel.

During the course of the work the oiler, one of the two men comprising the shovel crew, suffered injuries arising out of and in the scope of his employment which resulted in the amputation of one of his legs. The owner of the shovel, the federal government and the city were joined as defendants. At the hearing, the action was dismissed as to the federal [707]*707government upon the grounds that the commission had no jurisdiction over such body. The owner of the shovel and the city being'the two remaining defendants, the award was made against the owner as general employer and against the city as special employer. The owner of the shovel did not procure insurance on the men employed by her in accordance with her contract. However, she is financially responsible, has admitted her liability, and therefore it is not under review herein.

The question presented is: Was the municipality, acting as co-sponsor of a Works Progress Administration project, liable under the Workmen’s Compensation Act for injuries to an employee of a contractor doing work on such project under a contract with the federal government?

The award against the city as special employer was made, it appears, because the city, through its engineers, exercised a certain amount of supervision over the work on the project, including the shovel, in order to see that the work conformed to specifications, and for the further reason that the project was for the immediate benefit of the city.

The city contends that there was no contract of employment, either express or implied, between the injured and the city; that the work was being performed by and for the federal government under its relief program and not for the benefit of the city; and that none of the elements necessary to charge it as a special employer were present.

The record discloses these additional facts: the work on the project was divided into twenty-two “spots” or locations. The particular location upon which the shovel was used herein was known as project number 524. The injured employee was a minor, who was not at the time of the accident and never had been, a relief worker. At the time of the accident there were approximately 950 men employed on the project. These men were relief workers, paid by the federal government, except a very small percentage. Of this latter number the city had on the project a superintendent, Mr. Allen, and about twenty-two foremen. Mr. Ketring, one of these foremen, was in charge of the excavation work of the shovel at the time of the injury to the oiler. The federal government had on the location a project superintendent, Mr. Clow, who it is shown by the evidence, was highest in authority among the men on the project, both city and federal, and who alone had the power to discharge [708]*708or remove an employee found to be undesirable, from the work. Mr. Clow authorized the hiring of the injured person herein, after the work had started and it was ascertained that an oiler was needed in the operation of the shovel. The federal government supplied, among other employees, the time-keepers, first-aid men, and warehousemen. The timekeeping on the work, including that of the shovel crew, was done by federal employees. The employees of the city directed the excavation work by placing stakes in the ground and otherwise indicating where the shovel was to be used. Mr. Allen, the city’s superintendent, when asked about his authority over the work, testified: “Q. If you gave an order on a particular job to do it a certain way, and Mr. Clow would give an order a different way, whose order would govern, do you know? A. Mr. Clow’s. Q. Whose orders in regard to how the work was to be done, where the work was to be done, whose orders would govern,—yours ? A. No ; I never felt at any time that my word was the last word on the job. As a matter of fact I know it was not. If there was ever a cpiestion came up and it was anything of moment, the WPA engineer was superior to me. ... I was subservient to them (the government) at least I always felt I was, and I know I was; I mean that was well fixed; that was definite.” Mr. Ketring testified that he had no jurisdiction over the men working on the shovel; that .lie was only interested as to where the dirt was moved to establish the width of the road according to their specifications. It was further shown that Mrs. Robare received her pay for the use of the shovel direct from the federal government, and that she in turn paid for repairs and gasoline for the shovel, and for the salaries of the two men employed thereon.

No case has been cited by petitioner from this jurisdiction, where under a similar state of facts the injured workman was not a relief worker. However, petitioner cites the cases of County of San Bernardino v. Industrial Acc. Com., 1 Cal. App. (2d) 598 [37 Pac. (2d) 122], and Board of Education v. Industrial Acc. Com., 3 Cal. App. (2d) 411 [39 Pac. (2d) 521], as being in point. While in those eases the injured was in the category of a “relief worker” doing work upon a relief project, and there, as here, it was sought to hold the public entities upon which the work was being done for compensation to the injured, the decisions therein rendered annulling the awards, were not predicated entirely [709]*709upon the fact that the injured were “relief workers”. In those cases the court pointed out that the essential characteristics of a contract of hire entered into between the injured and the entities benefited, were not present.

It has been judicially determined in other jurisdictions that work being done by federal relief agencies is not for the benefit of the local community and that the political entity thereby benefited is not the employer within the meaning of the Workmen’s Compensation Insurance Act. In Hoover v. Independent School Dist., 220 Iowa, 1364 [264 N. W.

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Bluebook (online)
72 P.2d 540, 9 Cal. 2d 705, 1937 Cal. LEXIS 446, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/city-of-los-angeles-v-industrial-accident-commission-cal-1937.