City of Lexington v. Lopp

Supreme Court of North Carolina

City of Lexington v. Lopp

185 S.E. 766, 210 N.C. 196, 1936 N.C. LEXIS 53

CourtSupreme Court of North Carolina

DecidedMay 20, 1936

StatusPublished

Cited by4 cases

This text of 185 S.E. 766 (City of Lexington v. Lopp) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of North Carolina primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

City of Lexington v. Lopp, 185 S.E. 766, 210 N.C. 196, 1936 N.C. LEXIS 53 (N.C. 1936).

Pincite

Opinion

Per Curiam.

In the judgment of the court below is the following: “That the provisions of the charter of said municipality (Private Laws 1907, ch. 14, sec. 23) with reference to street improvements and assessments therefor, and the alleged assessments attempted to be made against the property of the defendants, were and are null and void, for that same not only violated the purpose and intent of the general statutes of North Carolina with reference to street assessments by a municipality, but were *197 and are in contravention of the Constitution, and lacked the essential element of ‘due process of law’ by failing to afford the landowner an opportunity to be heard concerning the legality, justice, and accuracy of the proposed assessment before same was finally made. That the aforesaid alleged curative statutes, relied upon by the plaintiff, are unconstitutional, null, and void in so far as same attempt to dispense with notice to the landowner, and opportunity to be heard, before final assessment.”

The private statute on the subject made no sufficient provision as to notice and an opportunity to be heard. The purported curative statutes could not give life to a null and void assessment.

In Lumber Co. v. Smith, 146 N. C., 199 (204), we find: “Provision for notice is, therefore, part of the ‘due process of law,’ which it has been customary to provide for these summary proceedings; and it is not to be lightly assumed that constitutional provisions, carefully framed for the protection of property rights, were intended or could be construed to sanction legislation under which officers might secretly assess the citizen for any amount in their discretion without giving him an opportunity to contest the justice of the assessment,” citing Cooley Taxation. Markham v. Carver, 188 N. C., 615; Const. of U. S., Art. XIV, sec. 1; Const. of N. C., Art. I, sec. 17.

Prom a careful examination of the record, we think the judgment of the court below correct.

The judgment of the court below is

Affirmed.

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Per Curiam.

In the judgment of the court below is the following: “That the provisions of the charter of said municipality (Private Laws 1907, ch. 14, sec. 23) with reference to street improvements and assessments therefor, and the alleged assessments attempted to be made against the property of the defendants, were and are null and void, for that same not only violated the purpose and intent of the general statutes of North Carolina with reference to street assessments by a municipality, but were *197 and are in contravention of the Constitution, and lacked the essential element of ‘due process of law’ by failing to afford the landowner an opportunity to be heard concerning the legality, justice, and accuracy of the proposed assessment before same was finally made. That the aforesaid alleged curative statutes, relied upon by the plaintiff, are unconstitutional, null, and void in so far as same attempt to dispense with notice to the landowner, and opportunity to be heard, before final assessment.”

The private statute on the subject made no sufficient provision as to notice and an opportunity to be heard. The purported curative statutes could not give life to a null and void assessment.

In Lumber Co. v. Smith, 146 N. C., 199 (204), we find: “Provision for notice is, therefore, part of the ‘due process of law,’ which it has been customary to provide for these summary proceedings; and it is not to be lightly assumed that constitutional provisions, carefully framed for the protection of property rights, were intended or could be construed to sanction legislation under which officers might secretly assess the citizen for any amount in their discretion without giving him an opportunity to contest the justice of the assessment,” citing Cooley Taxation. Markham v. Carver, 188 N. C., 615; Const. of U. S., Art. XIV, sec. 1; Const. of N. C., Art. I, sec. 17.

Prom a careful examination of the record, we think the judgment of the court below correct.

The judgment of the court below is

Affirmed.

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Bluebook (online)

185 S.E. 766, 210 N.C. 196, 1936 N.C. LEXIS 53, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/city-of-lexington-v-lopp-nc-1936.

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