ACCEPTED 04-14-00542-CV FOURTH COURT OF APPEALS SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS 3/4/2015 5:18:52 PM KEITH HOTTLE CLERK
CASE NO. 04-14-00542-CV
FILED IN 4th COURT OF APPEALS IN THE COURT OF APPEALS SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS FOR THE FOURTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT 3/4/2015 5:18:52 PM SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS KEITH E. HOTTLE Clerk
CITY OF LEON VALLEY, TEXAS, UNKNOWN EMPLOYEE(S) OF CITYOF LEON VALLEY and IRENE BALDRIDGE Appellants
v.
WM. RANCHER ESTATES JOINT VENTURE, RAFAEL ALFARO, JOSE ALFARO, CARMAN ALFARO, DANIEL BEE, ROBERT CALDWELL, ANNE CALDWELL, DEFERENCE SERVICE BUSINESS, INC., EARL DODERER, SYLVIA DODERER, JAMES DOWDY, BETTY DOWDY, ISSAC ELIZONDO, SUZANNE ELINZONDO, ROBERTO GALINDO, ERMA GALINDO, SHIRL JACKSON, ANNE JACKSON, AND RICARDO A. PADILLA Appellees
APPELLANTS’ REPLY BRIEF
PATRICK C. BERNAL CLARISSA M. RODRIGUEZ DENTON NAVARRO ROCHA BERNAL HYDE & ZECH, P.C. 2517 N. Main Avenue San Antonio, Texas 78212 Telephone: (210) 227-3243 Facsimile: (210) 225-4481 COUNSEL FOR APPELLANTS
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED IDENTITY OF COUNSEL
Appellants/Trial Court Defendants:
City of Leon Valley, Texas Unknown Employee(s) of City of Leon Valley Irene Baldridge
Appellants’ Counsel:
Patrick C. Bernal Clarissa M. Rodriguez Denton Navarro Rocha Bernal Hyde & Zech A Professional Corporation 2517 N. Main Avenue San Antonio, Texas 78212 Telephone: (210) 227-3243 Facsimile: (210) 225-4481 patrick.bernal@rampage-sa.com clarissa.rodriguez@rampage-sa.com
Appellees/Trial Court Plaintiffs:
Wm. Rancher Estates Joint Venture Rafael Alfaro Jose Alfaro Carman Alfaro Daniel Bee Robert Caldwell Anne Caldwell Deference Service Business, Inc. Earl Doderer Sylvia Doderer James Dowdy Betty Dowdy Issac Elizondo Suzanne Elizondo Roberto Galindo Erma Galindo
ii Shirl Jackson Anne Jackson Ricardo A. Padilla
Appellees’ Counsel:
Mr. O. Rene Diaz Mr. Jason J. Jakob DIAZ, JAKOB, LLC 115 E. Travis Street, Ste. 333 San Antonio, Texas 78205 Telephone: (210) 226-4500 Facsimile: (210) 226-4502 judgediaz@diazjakob.com jjakob@diazjakob.com
iii TABLE OF CONTENTS
IDENTITY OF COUNSEL ...................................................................................... ii TABLE OF CONTENTS ......................................................................................... iv TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .....................................................................................v I. CITY IS IMMUNE FROM STATUTORY CAUSES OF ACTION....................1 A. No Waiver of Immunity Exists for Claims Arising Under the Texas Water Code, Health & Safety Code, Natural Resources Code, Property Code and Due Process Clause of the Texas Constitution. ..................................................................................................1 B. Appellees’ Claims Under the Texas Tort Claims Act Fail. ..........................2 C. Appellees’ Monetary Damages Claims Under the Texas Open Meetings Act and Declaratory Judgment Act Fail. .......................................3
II. LEGISLATIVE IMMUNITY ..............................................................................5 III. CONCLUSION ...................................................................................................7 PRAYER ....................................................................................................................8 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ................................................................................10
iv TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Bogan v. Scott-Harris, 523 U.S. 44, 118 S. Ct. 966, 140 L.Ed. 2d 79 (1998) ................................................................................... 6
Dallas Area Rapid Transit v. Whitley, 104 S.W.3d 540 (Tex. 2003) ....................... 2
Dallas County Mental Health and Mental Retardation v. Bossley, 968 S.W.2d 339 (Tex. 1998) .......................................................................... 1
Joe v. Two Thirty Nine Joint Venture, 145 S.W.3d 150 (Tex. 2004) ................... 5, 7
In re Perry, 60 S.W.3d 857 (Tex. 2001) ................................................................... 7
Lee v. Whispering Oaks, 797 F.Supp. 2d 740 (W.D. Tex. 2011) ............................. 5
Tex. Ass’n. of Bus. v. Texas Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440 (Tex. 1993) ............... 2
Tex. Dep't of Criminal Justice v. Miller, 51 S.W.3d 583 (Tex. 2001).......................... 2
Texas Dep’t of Trans. v. Jones, 8 S.W.3d 636 (Tex. 1999)...................................... 1
Texas Nat. Res. Conserv. Com’n v. IT-Davy, 74 S.W.3d 849 (Tex. 2009) .............. 5
Statutes
Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. §101.057 (West 1985) ..................................... 3
Tex. Gov’t. Code Ann. § 311.034 (West 2005)........................................................ 1
Tex. Gov’t. Code Ann. § 551.142 (West 1993)........................................................ 4
Texas Gov’t Code Ann. §551.146 (West 2013) ....................................................... 3
Tex. Occ. Code Ann. § 1101.557 (West 2005) ........................................................ 6
Tex. Occ. Code Ann. § 1101.558 (West 2003) ........................................................ 6
v Constitutional Provisions
TEX. CONST. art. I, § 17 ......................................................................................... 2
TEX. CONST. art. I, § 19 ......................................................................................... 2
vi I. CITY IS IMMUNE FROM STATUTORY CAUSES OF ACTION
Appellees misconstrue the requirement under Texas law for properly invoking
the Court’s jurisdiction to state a viable claim for monetary damages against a
governmental entity.
A. No Waiver of Immunity Exists for Claims Arising Under the Texas Water Code, Health & Safety Code, Natural Resources Code, Property Code and Due Process Clause of the Texas Constitution.
To properly invoke the Court’s jurisdiction against a governmental entity,
Appellees must reference a clear and unambiguous waiver of immunity. Under the
Bossley Texas Supreme Court case and the Texas Code Construction Act, a plea to
the jurisdiction of the court can properly raise a question of governmental immunity.
Dallas County Mental Health and Mental Retardation v. Bossley, 968 S.W.2d 339,
341 (Tex. 1998); see, Tex. Gov’t. Code Ann. § 311.034 (West 2005). When that is
done, the plaintiff must invoke the court's jurisdiction by identifying the language of
a statute that waives governmental immunity by clear and unambiguous language.
Texas Dep’t. of Trans. v. Jones, 8 S.W.3d 636, 638 (Tex. 1999).
Appellees made no attempt in the trial court, nor do they do so here, to identify
language in the following statutes where the Texas Legislature has clearly and
unambiguously waived governmental immunity for Appellees to sue the City of
Leon Valley:
1 • Texas Water Code. See, Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Original Petition, pp. 35-36, ¶¶ 130-134 [CR V7 144-145];
• Texas Health and Safety Code, §343.001(c)(11). See, Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Original Petition, pp. 18, 34, ¶¶ 59, 125-129 [CR V7 127; 143-144];
• Article 1, §19 of the Constitution of the State of Texas. See, Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Original Petition pp. 27-29, ¶¶ 88-94, 97 [CR V7 136-138];
• Texas Property Code. See, Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Original Petition pp. 41-42, ¶155 and ¶ XIII Prayer for damages in the amount not greater than $3,975,000.00 [CR V7 150-154]; and
• Texas Natural Resources Code.1 See, Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Original Petition pp. 41-42, ¶155 [C.R. V7, 150-154].
• Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act. See Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Original Petition pp. 26-27, ¶ 83, 86 [CR V7 135-136].
B. Appellees’ Claims Under the Texas Tort Claims Act Fail.
Even when a statute clearly and unambiguously waives governmental
immunity, a plaintiff must affirmatively demonstrate the court's jurisdiction by
alleging facts to establish a valid waiver of immunity. See, Tex. Dep't. of Criminal
Justice v. Miller, 51 S.W.3d 583, 587 (Tex. 2001); Tex. Ass’n. of Bus. v. Texas Air
Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 446 (Tex. 1993). Appellees attempt to argue that the
involvement of equipment is sufficient to invoke liability for property damages
under the Texas Tort Claims Act. Their argument fails. Dallas Area Rapid Transit
1 Appellant City did not assert immunity from a claim arising under Article I, § 17 of the Texas Constitution. This claim remains pending against the City in the trial court.
2 v. Whitley, 104 S.W.3d 540, 543 (Tex. 2003) (nexus between the operation or use of
motor-driven vehicle or equipment and a plaintiff’s injuries requires more than mere
involvement of property to waive governmental immunity; rather, the vehicle’s or
equipment’s use must have actually caused the injury).
Furthermore, Appellees’ claims asserting intentional tort liability, i.e.
trespass, does not satisfy the limited waiver of immunity under the Tort Claims Act
Section 101.057 Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code, which explicitly preserves
the City’s immunity from intentional tort claims. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann.
§101.057 (West 1985).
C. Appellees’ Monetary Damages Claims Under the Texas Open Meetings Act and Declaratory Judgment Act Fail.
Appellees avoid the clear and unambiguous waiver requirement to seek
monetary damages from Appellants under TOMA. Instead, they attempt to argue
that they do not directly seek an award of monetary damages but then argue that the
setting aside of a decision of the City Council in violation of TOMA would result in
monetary damages flowing for the breach of TOMA and the Declaratory Judgment
Act. [C.R. V7, 136 ¶¶84-86; Appellees’ Brief p. 36]. Appellees do not disagree
with Appellants’ position that only one section in TOMA, which is inapplicable to
the facts underlying this dispute, authorizes the recovery of limited monetary
damages. See, Texas Gov’t Code Ann. §551.146 (West 2013). Nonetheless,
Appellees attempt to argue that an act allegedly taken by the City Council in
3 violation of TOMA automatically results in monetary damages to Appellees for the
loss of the sale of their property. [C.R. V7, 136 ¶¶84-86].
The proper construction of TOMA is that a waiver of governmental immunity
is clear and unambiguous according to the provisions of the Act. Accordingly, a
court may consider an action to void a vote of the City Council under §551.142 if
TOMA provisions are not followed. Tex. Gov’t. Code Ann. § 551.142 (West 1993).
However, under the facts of this case, the only material act of the City Council
occurred on March 1, 2011, when the City Council voted on appeal of the denial of
a zoning request applicable to Appellees’ property. [C.R. V1, 8; C.R. V7, 119; C.R.
V6, 28-37; 281-284]. Tex. Gov’t. Code Ann. § 551.142 (West 1993). The City's
Zoning Commission initially denied the Appellees' request for a zoning designation.
[C.R. V2, 175-184]. Appellees appealed the denial to the Leon Valley City Council
which ultimately voted on the matter on March 1, 2011. [C.R. V2, 28-30; 190-199;
200-207; 224; C.R. V2, 38-40; 200-209; 210-217; 231]. The City Council, by a
unanimous vote of five to zero, denied the appeal. [C.R. V2, 28-30; 185-186; C.R.
V6, 38-40; 195-196; 218-230]. The only possible voidability of the denial would
result in no action taken rather than a "yes" vote resulting automatically in monetary
damages. Appellees’ construction of the provisions of TOMA is, therefore,
unsupportable and contrary to case law construing whether governmental immunity
4 has been waived by an act of the legislature. Texas Nat. Res. Conserv. Com’n. v. IT-
Davy, 74 S.W.3d 849, 854 (Tex. 2009).
II. LEGISLATIVE IMMUNITY
There is only one meaningful and material action related to Appellees’ claim
for damages in this lawsuit – a vote of the City Council on March 1, 2011, affirming
the Zoning Commission’s denial of Appellees’ request for a zoning change.2 [C.R.
V1, 8; C.R. V7, 119; C.R. V6, 28-37; 281-284]. Appellees assign bad motives and
moral imperatives to Appellant Baldridge's vote, which is not uncommon in the
various cases discussing a legislator's immunity from a claim for monetary damages.
See, Joe v. Two Thirty Nine Joint Venture, 145 S.W.3d 150 (Tex. 2004) (attacking
leadership role of councilmember voting for moratorium on new construction
against law firm client’s interest); see also, Lee v. Whispering Oaks, 797 F.Supp. 2d
740 (W.D. Tex. 2011) (accusing councilmember of illegal conspiracy with citizens
over zoning action). Appellees’ shotgun approach in raising attacks aimed at
numerous meetings of the City Council and Zoning Commission avoids one basic
premise: voting and attending meetings as a member of a public governing body
clearly falls within the sphere of legitimate legislative activities that are the heart of
the legislative immunity doctrine. [C.R. V7, 129-134]; see, Joe v. Two Thirty Nine
2 In her Plea to the Jurisdiction, Appellant Baldridge seeks legislative immunity in her official capacity as a member of the Leon Valley City Council, not in any other capacity.
5 Joint Venture, 145 S.W.3d at 157, citing, Bogan v. Scott-Harris, 523 U.S. 44, 53,
118 S. Ct. 966, 140 L.Ed. 2d 79 (1998).
Appellees not only attempt to claim monetary damages against Appellant
Baldridge for casting a vote, but also, for attending meetings where various topics
were discussed, including the hiring of a city manager and discussing City-related
issues such as zoning, tax abatements and other economic development issues.
Appellees’ Brief pp. 33, 39-40. Appellees’ allegations clearly invoke legislative
activities by Councilmember Baldridge.
Appellees concede Appellant Baldridge had no written contract for
representation of anyone interested in Appellees’ property at the time she voted on
the zoning appeal. Appellees’ Brief pp. 40. Without a written contract of
representation, Appellant Baldridge could not have possessed a conflict of interest
in the subject property as a real estate agent as a matter of law. Real Estate License
Act, Tex. Occ. Code §§ 1101.557-558. Notwithstanding Appellees insertion of
“moral obligations” on Appellant Baldridge, there is no legal basis to assert a conflict
of interest against Appellant Baldridge without a written contract of representation.3
Appellees’ Brief p. 33.
3 Appellants objected in the trial court to Appellee Bee’s attempt to characterize secretly recorded telephone conversations with Ms. Baldridge in violation of a Rule 11 Agreement entered into by all counsel of record on September 11, 2013. Appellees again reference excluded evidence to support this contention. The trial court sustained the objection. [C.R. V1, 232-238; R.R. (May 19, 2014) 84-86].
6 Appellees cite to In Re Perry as the basis for Appellants’ immunity defense.
However, Appellees make no mention of the Joe v. Two Thirty Nine Joint Venture
case which involved a similar set of circumstances presented here. Appellees’ Brief
pp. 64. In the Joe case, a councilmember had a presumptive conflict of interest but
the court refused to deny legislative immunity to a vote imposing a moratorium on
new construction. Joe v. Two Thirty Nine Joint Venture, 145 S.W.3d at p.158.
Similarly, in the case at bar, Appellant Baldridge, as a member of a City Council, is
immune from casting a vote to uphold the denial of a zoning request.
Again, Appellees miss the point of Appellant Baldridge's immunity from a
damages claim under the Texas Open Meetings Act and Declaratory Judgment Act.
Her immunity does not stem from compliance with the provisions of TOMA but
from Appellees’ attempt to seek monetary damages against her under TOMA and
the TDJA. Even assuming a conflict of interest existed at the time of her vote on
March 1, 2011, the meeting of the City Council was not an illegal meeting under
TOMA. Appellant Baldridge does not claim immunity from complying with the
procedural provisions of TOMA; however, monetary damages are not available to
Appellees for any of the alleged violations of the Act.
III. CONCLUSION
The Appellants are immune from the various causes of action asserted by
Appellees as discussed herein. Appellees failed to properly invoke the trial court’s
7 jurisdiction for statutory claims asserted against the City of Leon Valley.
Additionally, Appellees cannot hold Irene Baldridge liable for damages in her
capacity as a member of the City Council of the City of Leon Valley because of her
absolute legislative immunity. Accordingly, the trial court erred in denying the
Appellants’ Pleas to the Jurisdiction.
PRAYER
WHEREFORE PREMISES CONSIDERED, Appellants City of Leon Valley,
Texas, Unknown Employee(s) of the City of Leon Valley, and Irene Baldridge pray
this Court:
1. reverse the trial court’s denial of Appellant City and City’s Unknown
Employees’ Plea to the Jurisdiction and render a dismissal of Appellees’
statutory causes of action brought under the Texas Water Code, Health &
Safety Code, Natural Resources Code, Property Code, Tort Claims Act, Open
Meetings Act or Declaratory Judgment Act;
2. reverse the trial court’s denial of Appellant Irene Baldridge’s Second
Amended Plea to the Jurisdiction and render a dismissal of Appellant
Baldridge in her capacity as a member of the City Council of the City of Leon
Valley;
3. remand this cause to the Trial Court with instructions according to the Court’s
opinion and judgment; and
8 4. for such further relief, in law and in equity, to which the Appellants may show
themselves justly entitled.
Respectfully submitted,
DENTON, NAVARRO, ROCHA, BERNAL HYDE & ZECH A Professional Corporation 2517 N. Main Avenue San Antonio, Texas 78212 Telephone: (210) 227-3243 Facsimile: (210) 225-4481 patrick.bernal@rampage-sa.com clarissa.rodriguez@rampage-sa.com
By: /s/ Patrick C. Bernal PATRICK C. BERNAL State Bar No. 02208750 CLARISSA M. RODRIGUEZ State Bar No. 24056222 ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANTS
9 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
This is to certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing instrument has been served in accordance with the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure on this 4th day of March, 2015, to the following:
CMRRR # 9171 9690 0935 0067 1638 82 Mr. O. Rene Diaz Mr. Jason J. Jakob DIAZ, JAKOB, LLC 115 E. Travis Street, Ste. 333 San Antonio, Texas 78205 Attorneys for Plaintiffs
CMRRR # 9171 9690 0935 0067 1638 754 Darby Riley Riley & Riley, Attorneys at Law 320 Lexington Avenue San Antonio, Texas 78215 Attorneys for Irene Baldridge
/s/ Patrick C. Bernal PATRICK C. BERNAL CLARISSA M. RODRIGUEZ