City of Lebanon v. Commonwealth

912 A.2d 338, 2006 Pa. Commw. LEXIS 621
CourtCommonwealth Court of Pennsylvania
DecidedNovember 22, 2006
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 912 A.2d 338 (City of Lebanon v. Commonwealth) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
City of Lebanon v. Commonwealth, 912 A.2d 338, 2006 Pa. Commw. LEXIS 621 (Pa. Ct. App. 2006).

Opinion

OPINION BY

President Judge COLINS.

We consider the preliminary objections filed by the Commonwealth and by the City of Lebanon Authority (Authority) to the City of Lebanon’s (City) Petition for Review in the form of a Complaint for a Declaratory Judgment that seeks a declaration that Chapter 8 of Act No. 28 of 2006, Act,1 violates Article III, Section 32 of the Pennsylvania Constitution which prohibits “local or special laws,” and the equal protection and due process clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution by imposing certain conditions on the City’s acquisition of the Authority, a water and sewer system serving the City and twelve municipalities outside the City. We sustain the objections, in part, and transfer this matter to the Court of Common Pleas of Lebanon County.

The city is a City of the Third Class operating under home rule adopted pursuant to the Optional Third Class City Charter Law, 58 P.S. §§ 41101-41625.2 The Authority is a municipal authority created pursuant to the Municipality Authorities Act, 53 Pa.C.S. §§ 5601-5623. The Authority owns and operates a water and sewer system serving residents of the City and twelve surrounding municipalities. On December 9, 2005, the City, acting pursuant to 53 Pa.C.S. § 5622,3 adopted an ordinance directing the Authority to transfer its assets to the City. A condition precedent to the City’s takeover of the Authority under Section 5622 is that the City must assume all of the liabilities of the Authority. The City alleges that it is working to comply with that requirement but that passage of the Act has made the securing of financing difficult and more expensive because Section 302 of the Act, 53 P.S. § 3102.302, which was signed into law on April 14, 2006, requires the approval of 75% of the outside municipalities serviced by the Authority before it may be conveyed to the City. The City responded to the Act by filing its petition for review.

The Commonwealth has objected preliminarily on the grounds of: 1) insufficient service in that the petition was served by regular mail rather than in person or by certified mail, Pa. R.A.P. 1514(c); 2) lack of subject matter jurisdiction because the Commonwealth is not a proper party as it is not indispensable and the Authority is not a proper party as it is not the Corn-[340]*340monwealth for purposes of this litigation; 3) lack of a case or controversy in that the City has no interest to assert until the PUC has approved the takeover of the Authority by the City; and 4) the legal insufficiency of the claims raised under the Fourteenth Amendment alleging violations of due process and equal protection.

The Authority has objected preliminarily on the grounds of: 1) insufficient service in that the petition was served by regular mail rather than in person or by certified mail, Pa. R.A.P. 1514(c); 2) lack of subject matter jurisdiction because the Commonwealth is not a proper party in that it is not indispensable and because the Authority is not a proper party in that it is not the Commonwealth for purposes of this litigation; 3) lack of a case or controversy in that the City will have no interest to assert until it has failed to receive approval of the transfer by the surrounding municipalities; 4) failure to join the outside municipalities as indispensable parties; 5) inclusion of scandalous and impertinent matter in that paragraphs 28, 29, 31, and 32 of the petition contain allegations regarding the motivation of individual members of the General Assembly in passing the Act, including allegations of a violation of the Speech and Debate clause;4 6) a demurrer to Count I on the ground that there is no violation of Art. Ill, § 32 of the Pennsylvania Constitution because the General Assembly has the power to deny or restrict the power of a home rule municipality and the City does not have the power to challenge the Act under our constitution; 7) a demurrer to Count II in that the City may not invoke the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; and 8) a demurrer to Count III in that the City may not invoke the due process clause of the 14 Amendment.

The questions we are asked to determine are 1) whether proper service has been effected; 2) whether the suit should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because the Commonwealth is not an indispensable party;5 3) whether there is an actual case or controversy; 4) whether the City has failed to join the municipalities other than the City that are served by the Authority as indispensable parties; 5) whether the material complained of in paragraphs 28, 29, 31 and 32 of the petition should be stricken under the speech and debate clause; 6) whether the City has the authority under our constitution to challenge the Act; 7) whether the Act is special legislation; and 8) whether the City may invoke the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.6

[341]*341The City re-served the petition via certified mail; service is not an issue.

Section 761(a) of the Judicial Code, 42 Pa.C.S. 761(a), provides, “The Commonwealth Court shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions or proceedings: (1) Against the Commonwealth government....” “[F]or this Court to have exclusive original jurisdiction over a suit against the Commonwealth and another party, the Commonwealth must be an indispensable party to the action.” Piper Aircraft Corporation v. Insurance Company of North America, 53 Pa.Cmwlth. 209, 417 A.2d 283, 285 (1980). “Generally, an indispensable party is one whose rights are so connected with the claims of the litigants that no relief can be granted without infringing upon those rights.... The mere naming, however, of the Commonwealth or its officers in an action does not conclusively establish this court’s jurisdiction, and the joinder of such parties when they are only tangentially involved is improper.” Pennsylvania School Boards Association, Inc. v. Commonwealth Association of School Administrators, Teamsters Local 502, 696 A.2d 859, 867 (Pa.Cmwlth.1997), appeal dismissed, 550 Pa. 228, 704 A.2d 631 (1998).

Thus the City bears the burden of demonstrating that the rights of the Commonwealth are “so connected with the claims of the litigants” that the relief it seeks, a declaration that Act 28 violates either the Pennsylvania or United States Constitutions, cannot be granted unless the Commonwealth is a party. The City argues that the Commonwealth is indispensable because the Attorney General is the appropriate representative for the “large number of potentially interested parties which could include all customers of the Authority outside the municipal limits of the City plus ... the twelve municipalities in which the customers reside.” (Brief of the City, p. 12) and because the Public Utility Commission (PUC), which will regulate the water service to residents outside the City, must issue a certificate of public convenience to the City and, under Act 28, has the right to approve the City’s take-back attempt. The Attorney General may be an

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
912 A.2d 338, 2006 Pa. Commw. LEXIS 621, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/city-of-lebanon-v-commonwealth-pacommwct-2006.