City of Joliet v. Szayna

2020 IL App (3d) 180332-U

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Decided: February 5, 2020
• Docket: 3-18-0332
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

2020 IL App (3d) 180332-U

Order filed February 5, 2020 ____________________________________________________________________________

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

THIRD DISTRICT

CITY OF JOLIET, ) Appeal from the Circuit Court ) of the 12th Judicial Circuit, Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Will County, Illinois. ) v. ) Appeal No. 3-18-0332 ) Circuit No. 10-OV-2535 MALGORZATA SZAYNA, ) ) The Honorable Defendant-Appellant. ) Carmen Goodman, ) Judge, presiding. ____________________________________________________________________________

JUSTICE McDADE delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice Lytton and Justice O’Brien concurred in the judgment.

____________________________________________________________________________

ORDER

¶1 Held: (1) The trial court did not err in refusing to readdress the issue of Defendant Malgorzata Szayna’s liability for the ordinance violation; (2) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in reducing Defendant’s fine from $239,240 to $2,000.

¶2 Defendant, Malgorzata Szayna, appeals from a judgment modifying her fines for failing

to abate violations of the City of Joliet’s ordinance code from $239,240 to $2,000. Szayna

requests that we vacate the judgment and remand with instructions that she be given the

opportunity to further challenge the City’s proof regarding the fines. We affirm. ¶3 FACTS

¶4 This case is before us once again on appeal following a remand in City of Joliet v.

Szayna, 2016 IL App (3d) 150092. Our opinion in the previous appeal contains a full statement

of the events of this case. We therefore only repeat those facts necessary to resolve the issue now

before us on appeal.

¶5 I. Facts Related to the Previous Appeal

¶6 The City filed a two-count complaint against Szayna, the former owner of a multiple-unit

apartment building located in Joliet. Count I of the complaint alleged that she committed the

offense of failure to abate violations of the ordinances of the City of Joliet. Count I alleged that

each violation was subject to a fine of up to “$750.00 per day each violation is allowed to exist in

violation of Ordinance Section 8–355 of the Ordinances of the City of Joliet.”

¶7 The City attached to the complaint a list of the ordinance violations it claimed she failed

to abate. The list of violations was based upon an inspection of the property dated March 3,

2010, and included the following ordinance violations:

(1) building windows missing screens;

(2) building screen door defective;

(3) building doors needed to be scraped and painted;

(4) the east porch's foundation defective;

(5) garage siding needed to be scraped and painted;

(6) dining room broken glass window in unit 1;

(7) master bath toilet in unit 1 defective or missing;

(8) unit 2 vacant;

(9) unit 3 no entry and inspection needed; 2 (10) unit 6 no entry and inspection needed;

(11) light fixture cover missing in unit 8; and

(12) kitchen light fixture defective in unit 8.

¶8 Count II of the complaint alleged that Szayna committed the offense of “failure to allow

an inspection of a rental unit.” Count II alleged that this violation was subject to a fine of up to

$750 per day each violation is allowed to exist.

¶9 After six years of court proceedings, with multiple failures of Szayna to appear, the trial

court entered a default judgment against her. Instead of a written order, the court entered its

findings in the docket sheet.

¶ 10 As to count I (failure to abate municipal violations), the trial court found Szayna guilty.

Unlike the complaint, which alleged she violated section “8–355 of the Ordinances of the City of

Joliet,” the docket entry cites “8–335” as the applicable statute Szayna violated.

¶ 11 Similar to count I, the trial court entered its finding on count II in the docket sheet.

Unlike count II of the complaint, which alleged Szayna committed the offense of “failure to

allow an inspection of a rental unit,” the court entered a finding of guilt for count II under the

offense “unlawful occupancy of a rental.”

¶ 12 The trial court imposed fines and costs in the amount of $119,620 for each count. The total

judgment against Szayna amounted to $239,240. Szayna appealed.

¶ 13 On appeal, this Court held “the trial court properly entered default judgment against

[Szayna] as to liability” for each count in the City’s complaint. Szayna, 2016 IL App (2d) 150092,

¶53. However, we found “the trial court erred in entering fines in the amount of $239,240 without

requiring [the City] to prove up its damages.” Id.

¶ 14 We explained:

3 “[The City] did not present the trial court with an affidavit from a city

official identifying the amount of days any of the violations listed in the

complaint were in existence. *** Without any evidence regarding the length of

the defaulted violations, the trial court’s entry of fines in the amount of $239,240

is erroneous. Stated another way, [Szayna] was properly defaulted as to the

existence of the violations contained within the complaint; however, [the City]

never proved up the duration of the defaulted violations.” Szayna, 2016 IL App

(3d) 150092, ¶54.

¶ 15 We thus remanded the case for a “limited hearing on the issue of fines, where Szayna will

have the opportunity to be heard on the matter of damages.” Szayna, 2016 IL App (3d) 150092,

¶56. We admonished the City “that it [could] only seek damages on remand for violations

[Szayna] was actually defaulted on, i.e., violations contained within [the] complaint.” Id. at ¶58.

We also admonished Szayna “to ensure her availability at any future proceedings, or

alternatively, to obtain counsel to represent her interest at said proceedings.” Id.

¶ 16 II. Facts Occurring before the Notice of Appeal

¶ 17 On June 27, 2017, Szayna filed pro se a motion to compel, contending that the City

“failed to provide any accounting of fines imposed on [her], specifically an accurate and

consistent accounting for any fines that were imposed from the date the original complaint was

filed in Court until the date violation cited therein were satisfied.” With the motion she attached

an exhibit titled “Interrogatories” that contained twenty-nine questions. She requested that the

trial court order the City to provide her with “written answers” to the questions. She also filed a

“motion to correct” alleging that Villa Sophia LLC had owned the building at issue since January

13, 2015.

4 ,i 18 At a hearing on JU11e 27, 2017, the City requested extra time to respond to the

"intenogatories." Szayna, appearing on her own behalf, requested a hearing be set on September

26, 2017. Without objection from the City, the trial comt continued the case to September 26,

2017. At the hearing on September 26, 2017, the trial comt again continued the case on Szayna's

motion.

,i 19 On December 12, 2017, Szayna filed a prose document entitled "Defendant's Response

to city Filings of September 26, 2017." She contended that she received "the most recent list of

fines *** on September 26, 2017" from "the City' s legal representation." She attached the list

she received. It contained an accounting for nine of the ordinance violations the City for total

amount of $6,508. The acc01mting was as follows:

Ordinance Violation Complaint Total Days Daily Fee Total Date Building Windows Missing Screens 11/1/2010 219 $4.00 $876.00 Building Screen Door Defective 2/1/2011 311 $4.00 $1,244.00 Building Doors Scrapted & Painted 11/23/2010 241 $4.00 $964.00 East Porch Defective Foundation 11/23/2010 241 $4.00 $964.00 Garage Siding - Scraped & Painted 9/1/2010 158 $4.00 $632.00 Dining Room Broken Glass Window 8/27/2010 153 $4.00 $612.00 Master Bath Toilet Unit 1 Defect. /Missing 9/1/2010 158 $4.00 $632.00 Unit 8 - Light Fixture Cover Missing 8/20/2010 146 $2 .00 $292.00 Unit 8 - Kitchen Light Fixture Defective 8/20/2010 146 $2.00 $292.00

,i 20 In her pro se filing, Szayna challenged the accmacy of the City' s accoU11ting. She argued:

(1) item #2 is incorrect because the building does not have a screen door; (2) the broken window

in item #6 was conected on JU11e 6, 2009, before the complaint was filed; (3) items #8 and #9

were the same item, which the tenant had corrected on March 20, 2010; and (4) item #4 was

conected " with City approval on October 29, 2010," and not as reported on November 23, 2010.

Szayna also argued that more inf01mation was required from the City to address the other

violations in the complaint not present in the accoU11ting sheet.

5 ¶ 21 The trial court held a hearing on May 8, 2018. Szayna argued that the issue on remand

was whether the City proved its allegations. The City explained that the case was before the trial

court “only for fees, and that the City had reduced it from $250,000 to $6,500.” The court

rejected Szayna’s argument, saying that it would only address the fee issue. Szayna explained

that she “lost the building” as a result of the case. The trial court then ruled as follows:

The bank owns the building. And, you see, that’s separate and apart and it

has to be set up to code. And my family owned a lot of property, so I understand

how all of that can go. And someone made a complaint at one point in time that

sent you down this road. So, it’s not the city's fault. And their fines and costs are

up under the statute. This is what I am going to do. We are going to cut in half,

and we are going to put that she owes – taking a judgment of 2,000 and close

this case.

¶ 22 III. The Notice of Appeal and Subsequent Proceedings

¶ 23 On June 4, 2018, Szayna filed a notice of appeal. She stated that she was appealing the

trial court’s judgment entered on May 8, 2018. She explained that the court’s “order [had]

violated [the] Appellate Court’s directions.”

¶ 24 The City filed a motion on June 18, 2018, requesting the trial court to clarify its judgment

entered on May 8, 2018. Szayna filed a motion in opposition to the City’s request for

clarification. She contended that the City’s motion “attempts to modify *** matters embraced

within or affected by the judgment which is the subject of the appeal.” She argued that the trial

court lacked “jurisdiction to hear [the City’s] motion.”

¶ 25 The trial court held a hearing on the city’s motion on July 10, 2018. Szayna was not

present at that hearing. The City noted that she filed a motion in opposition but stated that she

6 could not be at the hearing. The City explained that Szayna was appealing the decision and that

the City wanted a clarification explaining the order to pay a judgment of $2000. The Court

issued a written order, stating:

When this Court issued its May 8, 2018 Court Order, the Court relied on

the entirety of the record, including but not limited to a document included in

the December 2017 filing of Defendant ("Defendant's Response to City Filings

of September 26, 2017") which included a recommendation from the City of

Joliet requesting a fine of $6,508.00 (Count I). To clarify its May 8, 2018 Order,

the Court rejected the City's request and instead entered a fine of $1,000.00 in

Count I ($111.11/violation - 9 violations) and $1,000.00 in Count II (noting this

Court had the option of entering a fine of $750.00/day per violation as set forth

in the City Code of Ordinances and State Statutes).

¶ 26 This appeal now follows.

¶ 27 ANALYSIS

¶ 28 On appeal, Szayna again challenges the merits of the judgment of liability against her.

She argues that the City failed to present enough evidence to show that she was liable for the

ordinance violations. In response, the City argues that the judgment was properly entered and

that the trial court was correct in not readdressing the merits on remand. Szayna’s challenge to

the trial court’s jurisdiction to clarify its ruling has not been pursued in this appeal so we do not

address it.

¶ 29 Over three years ago, we addressed the issue Szayna now raises on appeal. We found that

Szayna never filed an answer to the City’s original complaints. City of Joliet v. Szayna, 2016 IL

App (3d) 150092, ¶ 48. We held hat “the trial court properly entered default judgment against

7 [her] as to liability.” Id. at ¶ 53. “The law-of-the-case doctrine limits relitigation of a previously

decided issue in the same case. and encompasses not only the court's explicit decisions, but those

issues decided by necessary implication.” Rommel v. Illinois State Toll Highway Auth., 2013 IL

App (2d) 120273, ¶ 15. “The doctrine applies to questions of law on remand to the trial court, as

well as on subsequent appeals to the appellate court.” Id. There are, however, two exceptions

tothis doctrine: “(1) when, after a reviewing court's original decision, a higher reviewing court

makes a contrary ruling on the same issue; and (2) when a reviewing court finds that its prior

decision was palpably erroneous.” Id. at ¶ 17. Neither exception is applicable here.

¶ 30 Our prior decision relied on a ruling stating that “where a party has not answered [a

complaint], there are no factual issues raised, and a trial court has the discretion to enter default

judgment without an evidentiary hearing.” Szayna, 2016 IL App (3d) 150092, ¶ 47 (citing Direct

Auto Ins. Co. v. Beltran, 2013 IL App (1s) 1211 28, ¶ 66). Szayna does not contest this ruling,

nor does she offer any evidence raising factual issues or suggesting that the facts underpinning

our decision are no longer operative. See People v. Patterson, 154 Ill. 2d 414, 468 (1992) (noting

“a rule established as controlling in a particular case will continue to be the law of the case, as

long as the facts remain the same”). We thus reject Szayna’s request to reconsider the merits of

the judgment against her. We hold that the trial court did not err when it did not readdress the

issue of Szayna’s liability for the ordinance violations on remand.

¶ 31 We find that the trial court’s reduction of the fines from $239,240 to $2000 was not

against the manifest weight of the evidence. As noted, Szayna was properly found liable for the

alleged violations. Once a violation occurred, the trial court could impose “a fine of not more

than seven hundred fifty dollars ($750.00) for each day the ordinance violation exists,” so long

as the city could establish the number of days for each the violation. Szayna, 2016 IL App (3d)

8 150092, ¶ 54 (quoting Joliet Municipal Code § 1–8(a) (eff. Mar. 19, 1996)). On September 26,

2017, the City sent Szayna a list accounting its alleged ordinance violations for total amount of

$6,508. As we required, the City also alleged the total number of days for each violation and the

costs of the daily occurrences. In turn, and as we instructed, Szayna was granted an opportunity

to challenge the City’s accounting, which she exercised.

¶ 32 There is nothing in the record showing that the trial court abused its discretion in

imposing fines for only the first day of each violation. “An abuse of discretion occurs when no

reasonable person would rule as the trial court did.” In re Marriage of Sadovsky, 2019 IL App

(3d) 180204, ¶ 24. In reviewing the City’s accounting, the trial court determined that Szayna no

longer owned the property at issue. It determined that the evidence could only support a finding

that the violations occurred during Szayna’s ownership of the property. The court also

determined that the evidence failed to show that she was still the owner of the property beyond

the first day of the violations. Thus, the trial court imposed a fine of $111.11 for each violation.

We do not find that decision to be an abuse of its discretion.

¶ 33 CONCLUSION

¶ 34 The judgment of the circuit court of Will County is affirmed.

¶ 35 Affirm.