City of Johnstown, Aplt. v. WCAB (Sevanick)

• Court: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
• Decided: July 21, 2021
• Docket: 28 WAP 2020
• Status: Published

Opinion

[J-23-2021] IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA WESTERN DISTRICT

BAER, C.J., SAYLOR, TODD, DONOHUE, DOUGHERTY, WECHT, MUNDY, JJ.

CITY OF JOHNSTOWN, : No. 28 WAP 2020

Appellant Appeal from the Order of the Commonwealth Court entered May 6, 2020 at No. 1156 C.D. 2019, V. affirming the Order of the Workers' Compensation Appeal Board dated July 30, 2019 at No. A18-0040. WORKERS' COMPENSATION APPEAL BOARD (SEVANICK), : ARGUED: April 13, 2021

Appellees

OPINION

JUSTICE DONOHUE DECIDED: JULY 21, 2021

Section 301(c)(2) of the Workers' Compensation Act ("the Act") provides that for

disability or death caused by an occupational disease to be compensable, the death or

disability must occur within 300 weeks of the claimant's last date of employment in the

occupation that exposed the claimant to the conditions that led to the disease. 77 P.S.

§411(2). Pursuant to Section 108(r), claims made by the firefighters for certain types of

cancer fall under the Act. See id. §27.1. These firefighter cancer claims are subject to

Section 301(f), which provides that "[n]otwithstanding" the 300-week requirement in

Section 301(c)(2), firefighter cancer claims made pursuant to Section 108(r) "may be

made within [600] weeks after the last date of employment" in an occupation that exposed the firefighter to the cancer-causing hazards. Id. §414. Appellant, the City of

Johnstown ("Johnstown"), contends that a party asserting a firefighter cancer claim

must satisfy the requirements of both Section 301(c)(2) and Section 301(f) to establish a

viable claim. For the reasons that follow, we disagree and conclude that the time for

filing a Section 108(r) firefighter cancer claim is governed by Section 301(f) alone. We

therefore affirm the ruling of the Commonwealth Court.

I. Statutory Framework

To center our discussion, we briefly review the pertinent statutory provisions. As

referenced above, Section 301(c)(2) of the Act provides that a compensable injury

includes death or disability caused by the occupational diseases enumerated in Section

108. 77 P.S. §411(2). Section 301(c)(2) also requires that when a claim is based on

an occupational disease, the disability or death must occur within 300 weeks of the last

date of employment in which the claimant was exposed to the disease-causing

conditions. Id. In 2011, the General Assembly enacted Act 46,' which amended the

Act so as to provide coverage for cancers traceable to firefighting. To that end, Act 46

amended Section 108 to include "[c]ancer suffered by a firefighter which is caused by

exposure to a known carcinogen which is recognized as a Group 1carcinogen by the

International Agency for Research on Cancer[]" ("IARC") as an occupational disease.

Id. § 27.1(r). In addition to adding cancer suffered by firefighters to the list of

occupational diseases, through Act 46 the General Assembly also enacted Section

301(f), "Compensation for cancer suffered by a firefighter." This provision, which we

discuss at length infra, establishes the criteria that must be met for aclaim of firefighter

Act of July 7, 2011, P.L. 251.

[J-23-2021] -2 cancer raised under Section 108(r) to be compensable under the Act. See id. §414. 2 In

addition to the filing period contained therein, Section 301(f) requires that the firefighter-

claimant must have served for four or more years in continuous firefighting, must

establish direct exposure to acarcinogen of the class referred to in Section 108(r), and

must have passed a physical examination that revealed no evidence of cancer prior to

engaging in firefighting duties or asserting aclaim thereunder. Id.

II. Factual & Procedural History

Michael Sevanick was a firefighter for the City of Johnstown ("Johnstown") for

twenty-nine years, from June 1, 1977 until September 10, 2006. 3 After retiring from the

fire department, Sevanick worked at a car dealership. In 2015, he was diagnosed with

kidney cancer. Sevanick sought treatment for approximately eight weeks, and returned

to a part-time position with the dealership in May 2015. In 2016, he filed a claim for

workers' compensation benefits, alleging that his cancer was caused by exposure to a

carcinogen recognized as a Group 1 carcinogen by IARC during his time as a

firefighter. 4 The Workers' Compensation Judge found in Sevanick's favor, and

Johnstown appealed. Before the Workers' Compensation Appeals Board, Johnstown

2 Although not at issue in this appeal, Act 46 also modified Section 301(c)(1) so as to bring its language in line with the requirements established by Section 301(f). See 77 P.S. §411(1).

3 During his time with the fire department, Sevanick rose to the positions of captain and

assistant chief. He was never treated for cancer during his time as afirefighter.

4 Sevanick sought both disability benefits for the period during which he was unable to work as well as medical benefits. See Workers' Compensation Appeal Board Opinion, 7/20/2019, at 1.

[J-23-2021] -3 argued that Sevanick's claim was barred by Section 301(c)(2)'s 300-week manifestation

requirement, which provides that

whenever occupational disease is the basis for compensation, for disability or death under this act, it shall apply only to disability or death resulting from such disease and occurring within three hundred weeks after the last date of employment in an occupation or industry to which he was exposed to hazards of such disease[.]

77 P.S. §411(2). The Board found that Section 301(c)(2) did not apply, but rather that

the limitations on Sevanick's claim were governed by Section 301(f), which provides as

follows:

Compensation pursuant to cancer suffered by a firefighter shall only be to those firefighters who have served four or more years in continuous firefighting duties, who can establish direct exposure to a carcinogen referred to in section 108(r) relating to cancer by a firefighter and have successfully passed a physical examination prior to asserting a claim under this subsection or prior to engaging in firefighting duties and the examination failed to reveal any evidence of the condition of cancer. The presumption of this subsection may be rebutted by substantial competent evidence that shows that the firefighter's cancer was not caused by the occupation of firefighting. Any claim made by a member of a volunteer fire company shall be based on evidence of direct exposure to a carcinogen referred to in section 108(r) as documented by reports filed pursuant to the Pennsylvania Fire Information Reporting System and provided that the member's claim is based on direct exposure to a carcinogen referred to in section 108(r). Notwithstanding the limitation under subsection (c)(2) with respect to disability or death resulting from an occupational disease having to occur within three hundred weeks after the last date of employment in an occupation or industry to which aclaimant was exposed to the hazards of disease, claims filed pursuant to cancer suffered by the firefighter under section 108(r) may be made within six hundred weeks after the last date of employment in an occupation or industry to which a claimant was exposed to the hazards of disease. The presumption provided for under this

[J-23-2021] -4 subsection shall only apply to claims made within the first three hundred weeks.

77 P.S. §414 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added). The Board reasoned that Section

301(f) creates anew timeframe for cancer-related occupational disease claims made by

firefighters. Because Sevanick raised his claim well within 600 weeks from his last date

of employment as afirefighter, the Board concluded that the claim was timely.

On appeal, the Commonwealth Court agreed with this determination. The court

initially recognized that in 2011, cancer claims were added to the list of occupational

diseases for firefighters subject to the Act by virtue of Act 46. City of Johnstown v.

WCAB (Sevanick), No. 1156 C. D. 2019, 2020 WL 2187759, at *5 (Pa. Commw. May 6,

2020). It then considered Johnstown's argument that Sevanick's claim was untimely

because he failed to prove that he was exposed to acarcinogen that could have caused

his cancer within 600 weeks of the date he filed his claim petition. Id. Johnstown

argued that it was error to use the last date of Sevanick's employment as afirefighter

(August 1, 2006) as the date from which to calculate the 600 weeks because Sevanick

did not establish that he was exposed to aqualifying carcinogen on that date. Id. The

Commonwealth Court rejected this argument on the basis that the "triggering event" for

purposes of Section 301(f) is not the date of disability or injury, but rather the claimant's

last day of exposure to a known Group 1carcinogen. Id. at *7 (citing Fargo v. WCAB

(City of Phila.), 148 A.3d 514, 521 (Pa. Commw. 2016)).

The court then turned to Johnstown's claim that Sevanick's petition should be

denied because he was not disabled within 300 weeks of his last exposure to the

carcinogen, as required by Section 301(c)(2). In support of its position, Johnstown cited

Szymanski v. Workers' Compensation Appeal Board (City of Philadelphia), No. 494

[J-23-2021] -5 C.D. 2016 (Pa. Commw. Feb. 14, 2017) (non-precedential decision), in which the

Commonwealth Court rejected the firefighter's argument that the discovery rule applied

to extend the 300-week period of time for a claimant to obtain the benefit of the

causation presumption contained in Section 301(f). Although the Szymanski court

discussed some interplay between Sections 301(c)(2) and 301(f), the Commonwealth

Court in this case distinguished that discussion based on the fact that Szymanski's

cancer manifested before the effective date of Act 46. Sevanick, No. 1156 C.D. 2019,

2020 WL 2187759, at *7. Finding Szymanski inapplicable, the Commonwealth Court

concluded that Sevanick was not required to file his claim within the 300-week period

contained in Section 301(c)(2), but rather that he was afforded 600 weeks to do so

pursuant to Section 301(f). Since there was no dispute that Sevanick filed his claim 490

weeks after his last date of employment, the Commonwealth Court found the petition

timely. 5 Id.

Johnstown filed a Petition for Allowance of Appeal and this Court granted review

to determine whether afirefighter making aclaim under Section 108(r) must comply with

the timing requirements of Section 301(c)(2). 6

III. Parties' Arguments

In service of its argument, Johnstown delineates its perceived parameters of both

Section 301(c)(2) and Section 301(f). Johnstown's primary contention is that the 300-

5 The Commonwealth Court further concluded that because Sevanick filed his claim more than 300 weeks after his last date of employment, he was not entitled to Section 301(f)'s statutory presumption. Sevanick, No. 1156 C.D. 2019, 2020 WL 2187759, at *7 (Pa. Commw. May 6, 2020).

6 Johnstown also requested review of the calculation of Sevanick's weekly wage, which request was denied.

[J-23-2021] -6 week period in Section 301(c)(2) is a "jurisdictional boundary" such that no injury -

including Section 108(r) firefighter cancer claims -may be covered under the Act unless

the disability or death from the occupational disease manifests within 300 weeks from

the last date of employment. Johnstown's Brief at 13. Johnstown argues that in Tooey

v. AK Steel Corporation, 81 A.3d 851, 856 (Pa. 2013), this Court rejected the notion that

Section 301(c)(2) is a statute of repose and held that Section 301(c)(2) is strictly

jurisdictional. Johnstown's Brief at 13-14. It is Johnstown's position that per Section

301(f), a claimant seeking to file a firefighter cancer claim is afforded 600 weeks in

which to file the claim, but in so doing, the claimant must establish that the cancer

manifested within 300 weeks of the last day of employment in order to establish that the

claim is cognizable under the Act. See id. at 16-17, 26. Johnstown contends that the

Commonwealth Court has consistently treated the time limitation periods in Sections

301(c)(2) and (f) as "distinct and separate." Id. at 24 (discussing Fargo, 148 A.3d at 519;

Szymanski, 494 C.D. 2016 at *8).

From this premise, Johnstown argues that Act 46 does not alter the General

Assembly's scheme in which Section 301(c)(2)'s terms control whenever any

occupational disease is the basis for compensation. It notes that while the General

Assembly amended other portions of the Act to resolve conflicts that would occur

because of Act 46's terms, it did not amend Section 301(c)(2) to remove its application

from claims for firefighter cancer raised under Section 108(r). Id. at 28. By way of

illustration, Johnstown points to Section 301(c)(1), which provides that an injury may be

compensable regardless of an employee's previous physical condition. Because

Section 301(f) requires that a firefighter must be cancer-free before becoming a

[J-23-2021] -7 firefighter for a viable claim thereunder, the General Assembly amended Section

301(c)(1) to provide that an employee's physical condition was irrelevant "except as

provided under subsection (f)[.]" Id. (quoting 77 P.S. § 411(1)). Through Act 46, the

General Assembly could have eliminated the application of Section 301(c)(2)'s terms to

Section 108(r) claims, Johnstown maintains, but it did not and this Court cannot ignore

its failure to do so. Id. at 28-29.

Johnstown rejects the suggestion that the use of "notwithstanding" in Section

301(f) acts to substitute the provision's 600-week filing limitation for Section 301(c)(2)'s

300-week rule. Citing the definition provided by Black's Law Dictionary and its use in

contractual matters, Johnstown explains that "notwithstanding" means "irrespective,"

and that its use "does not make the superseding provision subordinate to the preceding

one; it simply indicates that both are true[.]" Id. at 29. This is particularly the case,

Johnstown contends, when the provisions addressed by "notwithstanding" are not

mutually exclusive. Id. Sections 301(c)(2) and (f) are not, in Johnstown's interpretation,

mutually exclusive because they do not serve the same purpose or have the same

effect. Section 301(c)(2) is "controlled" by the manifestation of disease or death, which

Johnstown notes is "completely out of aclaimant's control[] and dictates whether the Act

will apply to aclaim ... resulting from occupational disease." Id. (citing Tooey, 81 A.3d at

865) (internal quotations omitted).

In contrast, Johnstown argues, the operation of Section 301(f) is "controlled" by

the date a claim is filed (which requires an affirmative action by a claimant), and it

serves as "a method of controlling the application of the presumption" by providing a

filing limitation. Id. at 30. As such, Johnstown argues that the use of "notwithstanding"

[J-23-2021] -8 in Section 301(f) indicates that the provisions operate exclusively from each other and

that both can be applied in cases of firefighter cancer claims, with Section 301(c)(2)'s

terms dictating whether aclaimant can proceed with aclaim under the Act, and Section

301(f) providing a filing limitation for the application of the presumption therein. Id.

Applying this interpretation to the facts before us, Johnstown concludes that the Act

does not apply to Sevanick's disability claim for firefighter cancer, as he was disabled

more than 400 weeks after his last date of possible exposure to carcinogens.' Id.

Johnstown urges this Court to reverse the Commonwealth Court's contrary conclusion

and hold that Section 301(c)(2) applies in all instances where occupation is the basis for

aclaim under the Act. Id. at 30-31.

Sevanick argues that the plain language of Section 301(f) indicates the General

Assembly's intent to create adistinct "two-tiered" limitations period for firefighter cancer

claims occurring after the effective date of Act 46. 8 Sevanick points out that at the time

firefighter cancer claims were added to Section 108, the General Assembly also

enacted Section 301(f), thereby establishing a distinct limitations period for firefighter

cancer claims. Sevanick's Brief at 13-14. Pointing to the use of "notwithstanding," he

argues that the plain language of Section 301(f) reveals that the General Assembly

Johnstown arrived at this figure by calculating the time between September 2006 (an approximation of Sevanick's retirement from the fire department) and March 27, 2015 (the date Sevanick became disabled from his job with the car dealership). See Johnstown's Brief at 30.

8 Sevanick concedes that for firefighter cancer claims occurring before the effective date of Act 46, Section 301(c)(2)'s terms control and contends that the Commonwealth Court has consistently held this to be the case. Sevanick's Brief at 12-13 (citing Caffey v. WCAB (City of Phila.), 185 A.3d 437 (Pa. Commw. 2018); City of Warren v. WCAB (Haines), 156 A.3d 371 (Pa. Commw. 2017)).

[J-23-2021] -9 intended the limitations period set forth in Section 301(f) to apply to Section 108(r)

claims, to the exclusion of the terms of Section 301(c)(2). Id. at 14-15. Sevanick also

relies on the Black's Law Dictionary definition of "notwithstanding" as meaning

"irrespective of, despite; in spite of[,]" and further refines this aspect of his argument by

pointing to the definition of "irrespective" as "without considering, not needing to allow

for." Id. at 15 (citing Irrespective, Cambridge Dictionary,

http://www.dictionary/cambridge.org/dictionary/engIish/irrespective). Thus, Sevanick

reads Section 301(f) as providing that its terms are to be applied "without considering"

the 300-week limitation period contained in Section 301(c)(2). Id. at 16. Sevanick

emphasizes that the enactment of Section 301(f) marks the first time the General

Assembly created a distinct limitations period for a Section 108 occupational disease.

Thus, his proposed interpretation is in keeping with the "uniqueness" of the firefighter

cancer presumption. Id. at 16-17.

Sevanick further disagrees with Johnstown's claim that the Commonwealth

Court's decision in this case is inconsistent with its precedent. Challenging Johnstown's

reliance on Tooey, he points out that Section 301(f) was not at issue in that case, as the

claimant there was not afirefighter and had not made aclaim under Section 108(r), thus

rendering any pronouncement therein inapposite to the issue presently before the

Court. Id. at 22. Despite the statement in Tooey that the General Assembly "did not

intend the Act to apply to claims for disability or death resulting from occupational

disease which manifests more than 300 weeks after the last occupational exposure[,]"

Sevanick argues that neither a Section 108(r) claim, nor the distinct limitations period

created for Section 108(r) claims, were at issue in Tooey, and so it would be myopic to

[J-23-2021 ]-10 apply this holding to the present facts. Id. (quoting Tooey, 81 A.3d at 865). Further,

Sevanick argues that Fargo and Szymanski support his position, as both cases involved

Section 108(r) firefighter cancer claims and in both cases, the Commonwealth Court

held that the discovery rule is not applicable to such claims and applied Section 301(f)

to conclude that the claim petitions were not timely. Id. at 19-20.

Finally, Sevanick argues that Johnstown's proposed interpretation is contrary to

the purpose of Act 46, which embodies a legislative acknowledgment of the hazards of

firefighting and the regular exposure of firefighters to known carcinogens. Id. at 23

(quoting City of Phila. v. WCAB (Sladek), 195 A.2d 197, 208 (Pa. 2018)). Sevanick

contends that his proposed interpretation furthers this acknowledgment. Id. at 24. Not

only does Johnstown's proposed interpretation run contrary to the legislative recognition

of the dangerous nature of firefighting by further restricting access to workers'

compensation benefits, but, Sevanick claims, it also violates the humanitarian purposes

of the Act and vitiates the General Assembly's intent in Act 46 to benefit firefighters

stricken with work-related cancers. Id. at 25.

IV. Analysis

At issue in this appeal is the interpretation of Section 301(f). When presented

with issues of statutory interpretation, this Court's standard of review is de novo and our

scope of review is plenary. Whitmoyer v. WCAB (Mountain Country Meats), 186 A.3d

947, 954 (Pa. 2018). We are mindful, as always, that the object of statutory

interpretation is to ascertain the intent of the General Assembly, the best indicator of

which is the plain language of the statute itself. 1Pa.C.S. § 1921(a)(b); Dept of Labor

& Indus. v. WCAB (Lin & E. Taste), 187 A.3d 914, 922 (Pa. 2018). Where statutory

[J-23-20211 -11 language is clear and unambiguous, this Court must give effect to the words of the

statute. Crown Castle NG E. LLC v. Pa. Pub. Util. Commh 234 A.3d 665, 674 (Pa.

2020). When interpreting a statute, courts may not look beyond the plain meaning of a

statute under the guise of pursuing its spirit. Id.; see also Warrantech Consumer Prod.

Servs., Inc. v. Reliance Ins. Co. in Liquidation, 96 A.3d 346, 354 (Pa. 2014).

We begin by examining the language of Section 301(f), which provides as

Compensation pursuant to cancer suffered by a firefighter shall only be to those firefighters who have served four or more years in continuous firefighting duties, who can establish direct exposure to a carcinogen referred to in section 108(r) relating to cancer by a firefighter and have successfully passed a physical examination prior to asserting a claim under this subsection or prior to engaging in firefighting duties and the examination failed to reveal any evidence of the condition of cancer. The presumption of this subsection may be rebutted by substantial competent evidence that shows that the firefighter's cancer was not caused by the occupation of firefighting. Any claim made by a member of a volunteer fire company shall be based on evidence of direct exposure to a carcinogen referred to in section 108(r) as documented by reports filed pursuant to the Pennsylvania Fire Information Reporting System and provided that the member's claim is based on direct exposure to a carcinogen referred to in section 108(r). Notwithstanding the limitation under subsection (c)(2) with respect to disability or death resulting from an occupational disease having to occur within three hundred weeks after the last date of employment in an occupation or industry to which a claimant was exposed to the hazards of disease, claims filed pursuant to cancer suffered by the firefighter under section 108(r) may be made within six hundred weeks after the last date of employment in an occupation or industry to which a claimant was exposed to the hazards of disease. The presumption provided for under this subsection shall only apply to claims made within the first three hundred weeks.

77 P.S. §414 (footnotes omitted).

[J-23-2021] -12 We find no ambiguity in the terms of Section 301(f). Critical to our resolution of

the question before us is the General Assembly's use of "notwithstanding." This Court

understands the use of "notwithstanding" to be an unambiguous expression of the

General Assembly's intent to distinguish the law applicable to the circumstances

addressed within the "notwithstanding" clause from the law applicable to the

circumstances that follow that clause. When interpreting a provision of the First Class

City Business Tax Reform Act that provided, "Notwithstanding a contrary provision

of law of the Commonwealth, ... every person engaging in any business in a city of

the first class ... shall pay an annual tax at the rate or rates specified by the city

council[,]" the Court explained that "[t]he meaning of the emphasized introductory

language is straightforward: regardless of what any other law provides, first class cities

are authorized by this act to collect a tax from every person engaging in any business

within the city. City of Phila. v. Clement & Muller, Inc., 715 A.2d 397, 399 (Pa. 1998)

(emphasis in the original).

Here, the General Assembly's use of "notwithstanding" is an unambiguous

indication of its intent to separate Section 108(r) firefighter cancer claims from Section

301(c)(2)'s operation. Thus, we interpret the use of "notwithstanding" to mean

regardless of the 300-week requirement in Section 301(c)(2), claims brought pursuant

to Section 108(r) may be filed up to 600 weeks after the last date of employment in the

occupation that exposed the claimant to the cancer-causing agent. Through the use of

"notwithstanding," the General Assembly removed Section 108(r) claims from the

application of Section 301(c)(2)'s 300 week requirement in favor of the limitations period

it created in Section 301(f). Section 301(f) distinguishes between the time period for

[J-23-2021] -13 filing a claim (600 weeks after the last date of employment) and the application of the

presumption, which is only applicable to claims filed within the first 300 weeks. The

language is clear, and so our interpretation thereof must give it effect.

Johnstown's argument to the contrary is premised entirely on its understanding of

Tooey as establishing Section 301(c)(2) as ajurisdictional bar that all claims must meet

in order to be cognizable under the Act. 9 In Tooey, the plaintiff developed

mesothelioma twenty-five years after he ended his career as a salesman of asbestos

products. He and asimilarly-situated party filed tort actions against various defendants,

including their former employers. Tooey, 81 A.3d at 856. The employers sought

summary judgment, arguing that the Act's exclusivity provision, Section 303(a), barred

the claims. The trial court denied the motions, but the Superior Court reversed. Id. The

case presented this Court with the question of whether the exclusivity provision of the

Act applied to cases involving occupational diseases that manifest outside of the 300-

week period set forth in Section 301(c)(2) so that the plaintiff was precluded from

pursuing recovery through a tort action against an employer. Id. at 857. The parties

offered competing interpretations of Section 301(c)(2), with the employers arguing, inter

alia, that by its terms, Section 301(c)(2) acted as astatute of repose, placing atemporal

limitation on a claimant's ability to seek any recovery, as opposed to a jurisdictional

boundary of the Act. Id. at 862. This Court (as Johnstown recognizes) rejected this

argument and concluded that the General Assembly did not intend the Act to apply to

claims for disability or death related to occupational disease that manifest more than

300 weeks after the date of last exposure. Id. at 865.

9 We note that Act 46 was enacted in 2011, two years before our decision in Tooey.

[J-23-2021] -14 While in Tooey this Court held that claims subject to Section 301(c)(2) must meet

the 300-week requirement to be cognizable under the Act, there is no basis upon which

to extend this temporal pronouncement to claims that the General Assembly has

expressly removed from Section 301(c)(2)'s terms, as is the case here. By providing a

time period specifically for the filing of Section 108(r) firefighter cancer claims, and

expressly providing that this period applies regardless of the 300-week period specified

in Section 301(c)(2), the General Assembly manifested its intent that Section 108(r)

claims stand apart from the occupational disease claims that fall under Section

301(c)(2) and that they are subject to Section 301 (O's terms alone.

Johnstown cites the Fargo decision to buttress its claim that although the

Commonwealth Court has ruled that the limitations periods in Section 301(c)(2) and

Section 301(f) are "distinct and separate," it has never held that a claimant asserting a

Section 108(r) claim does not have to satisfy both Section 301(c)(2) and Section 301(f).

Johnstown's Brief at 24-25. 10 In Fargo, a workers' compensation judge denied a

Section 108(r) claim because the claimant filed it more than 600 weeks after his last

date of employment. Before the Workers' Compensation Appeal Board, the claimant

argued that Section 301(f)'s 600-week period was an extension of Section 301(c)(2)'s

10 Johnstown also cites Szymanski v. WCAB (City of Philadelphia), 494 C.D. 2016 (Pa. Commw. Feb. 14, 2017), an unpublished decision, as further support of this position. The claimant in that case raised the same argument as did the claimant in Fargo (contending that Section 301(f) extended the manifestation -rather than filing -period). The Commonwealth Court interpreted Fargo as providing that aSection 108(r) claimant must satisfy both Section 301(c)(2) and Section 301 (f). Szymanski, 494 C. D. 2016 at *6. Although the court did not so state, the claimant's cancer manifested prior to the effective date of Act 46 and thus, it is of no relevance to the case before us. Moreover, its interpretation of Fargo is inconsistent with our and the Commonwealth Court's discussion of Fargo in this case.

[J-23-2021] -15 300 week manifestation period, such that Section 301(f) merely required a claimant to

establish that the disease manifested within 600 weeks, and that aclaim could be filed

outside of the 600-week period. Fargo, 148 A.3d at 518. The Board rejected this

argument, reasoning that Section 301(f) created an independent filing period for Section

108(r) claims. The Commonwealth Court agreed, holding that Section 108(r) firefighter

cancer claims are subject to a "two-tiered limitations period" that is wholly distinct from

Section 301(c)(2). Id. at 520. In so doing, the Commonwealth Court characterized both

Section 301(c)(2) and (f) as time limiting provisions, with Section 301(f) not only

providing the 600-week temporal outer limit for the filing of a Section 108(r) claim, but

also providing a300-week temporal limitation for application of the presumption created

by Section 301(f). See id. Because the claimant's claim was filed more than 600 weeks

after the last date he could have been exposed to the hazardous workplace conditions,

the Commonwealth Court agreed that his claim was untimely. Id. at 522.

The issue before the Court today was not before the Commonwealth Court in

Fargo, and to its credit, Johnstown does not represent that it was. Rather, Johnstown

suggests that Fargo illustrates the Commonwealth Court's understanding that the

requirements of both Section 301(c)(2) and (f) must be met for a viable Section 108(r)

claim. See Johnstown's Brief at 24-25. We disagree with Johnstown's reading of

Fargo. On the issue of exclusive application of Section 301(f) to firefighter cancer

claims, there is no ambiguity in Fargo.

Finally, to the extent that Fargo or its progeny left any room for doubt, we resolve

the issue here. By its unambiguous terms, aclaim by afirefighter under Section 108(r)

of the Act is controlled by Section 301(f) and the limitation period in Section 301(c)(2)

[J-23-2021] -16 has no application to the firefighter's claim. We have the benefit of clear and certain

language in Section 301(f) and we interpret it as written.

Order affirmed.

Chief Justice Baer and Justices Saylor, Todd, Dougherty, Wecht and Mundy join

the opinion.

[J-23-2021] -17