City of Jennings Police Department v. Dorr

736 So. 2d 366, 98 La.App. 3 Cir. 1921, 1999 La. App. LEXIS 1866, 1999 WL 393686
CourtLouisiana Court of Appeal
DecidedJune 16, 1999
DocketNo. 98-1921
StatusPublished

This text of 736 So. 2d 366 (City of Jennings Police Department v. Dorr) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Louisiana Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
City of Jennings Police Department v. Dorr, 736 So. 2d 366, 98 La.App. 3 Cir. 1921, 1999 La. App. LEXIS 1866, 1999 WL 393686 (La. Ct. App. 1999).

Opinions

hGREMILLION, Judge.

In this complex workers’ compensation case, the defendant, Jo Anna Dorr, appeals the judgment of the workers’ compensation judge finding that the treatment by her treating physician, Dr. Donald Harper, was neither reasonable nor necessary and that the plaintiff, the City of Jennings Police Department (Jennings), was no longer responsible for that treatment. We reverse and render judgment in favor of Dorr.

FACTS

Dorr, a detective with Jennings, suffered a work-related injury in May 1987, and was adjudged permanently and totally disabled in 1991. In 1993, Jennings filed a disputed claim with the Office of Workers’ Compensation alleging that it had terminated Dorr’s benefits because she refused to be examined and treated by a physician of its choice. Dorr contested Jennings’ claim, arguing that, although it |2could have her examined, it could not compel her to be treated by its physician. This matter was later settled and an ex parte judgment of dismissal was submitted by Jennings. This judgment was later vacated as an invalid judgment at the request of Dorr, who was awarded attorney’s fees. City of Jennings Police Dep’t. v. Dorr, 96-244 (La.App. 3 Cir. 6/26/96); 676 So.2d 1128.

The present appeal arises from a disputed claim for compensation filed by Jennings on December 3, 1997, alleging that the medical treatment administered to Dorr by Dr. Harper is unreasonable and unnecessary. Dr. Harper has been treating Dorr’s chronic pain with time-release and immediate-release morphine sulfate since 1992. Jennings requested an independent medical evaluation and then filed a motion to compel Dorr to attend a physical examination by Dr. Adrian Blotner, a psychiatrist. Dorr answered Jennings’ claim, arguing:

The employee has been declared totally and permanently disabled and has been undergoing the same medical treatment regimen for her chronic condition (failed back syndrome) for many years. The Employer/Carrier is now claiming that this treatment, which is one of the legitimate treatment options available to the treating physician selected by the Employee, is not reasonable and necessary. This is simply another in a series of attempts by the Employer/Carrier to compel the Employee to submit to medical treatment by a physician chosen by the Employee/Carrier. The Employee is therefore entitled to attorney’s fees and penalties.

The workers’ compensation judge denied Jennings’ motion to compel the examination by Dr. Blotner but ordered an independent medical examination by Dr. Robert Franklin, a physiatrist.

Following a hearing on the merits, the workers’ compensation judge held that Dr. Harper’s treatment was neither reasonable nor necessary and that Jennings was no longer responsible for this treatment. Subsequently, Dorr moved for a |,-¡suspensive appeal and sought a stay of the judgment pending this appeal based on affidavits submitted by Drs. Harper and Franklin stating that an abrupt discontinuance of morphine treatment could result in severe abstinence syndrome, including cardiovascular collapse, and would likely result in severe depression which could also be life threatening. The workers’ compensation judge granted Dorr a suspensive appeal without the payment of costs but refused to stay the judgment pending this appeal.

ISSUES

On appeal, Dorr has assigned three errors committed by the workers’ compensation judge:

1) The workers’ compensation judge erred with regard to her findings regarding Dr. Harper’s exercise of professional medical judgment, which [369]*369are not supported by competent evidence in the record.
2) The workers’ compensation judge erred in holding that Jennings is not responsible for any treatment provided by Dr. Harper, her choice of physician.
3) The workers’ compensation judge erred in refusing to award penalties and attorney’s fees.

LAW

La.R.S. 23:1203(A) mandates that an “employer shall furnish all necessary medical, surgical, and hospital services, and medicines, or any nonmedical treatment recognized by the laws of this state as legal.... ” Necessary medical treatment includes palliative treatment necessary to relieve an employee of the pain she suffers as a result of her disability as well as that designed to cure her work-related injury. Brasseaux v. Abbeville Gen. Hosp., 97-1062 (La.App. 3 Cir. 3/18/98); 710 So.2d 340, writ granted in part and denied in part, 98-1066 (La.6/5/98); 720 So.2d 673; Ferrier v. Jordache-Ditto’s, 94-1317, 94-1318 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/17/95); 662 So.2d 14, writ denied, 95-2865 (La.2/2/96); 666 So.2d 1100.

The workers’ compensation judge’s finding as to whether a particular medical treatment is necessary is factual in nature and will not be disturbed on review in the absence of manifest error or unless it is clearly wrong. Freeman v. Poulan/Weed Eater, 93-1530 (La.1/14/94); 630 So.2d 733. Accordingly, the issue on review is not whether the trier of fact was right or wrong but whether its conclusion was reasonable in light of the entire record. Id. Even though a reviewing court feels that it would have decided the case differently, reasonable evaluations of credibility and reasonable inferences of fact will not be disturbed upon review if conflict exists in the testimony. Stobart v. State Through DOTD, 617 So.2d 880 (La.1993). The manifest error standard applies even when the evidence consists of written reports, records, and depositions. Alexander v. Pellerin Marble & Granite, 93-1698 (La.1/14/94); 630 So.2d 706.

NECESSARY TREATMENT

In her first assignment of error, Dorr argues that the workers’ compensation judge erred in making findings which are not supported by competent evidence regarding Dr. Harper’s exercise of professional medical judgment. She contends that when an employer questions the reasonableness and necessity of medical treatment prescribed for an employee, the employer is, in essence, questioning whether the prescribing physician has breached the applicable standard of care. However, since the applicable standard under the Workers’ Compensation |sAct is whether the treatment is necessary, we will address Dorr’s assignment under that standard.

In support of its claim, Jennings submitted a report by Dr. Blotner, who performed a case review of Dorr’s medical records. After reviewing her records through 1997, most of which are not in the record, he arrived at a diagnostic impression:

Axis I. 1. Narcotic abuse and dependence
2.Mood disorder due to narcotic dependence.
Axis II. Rule out mixed personality disorder.
Axis III. 1. Orthodpedic history of chronic pain and lumbar surgeries, as noted above.
2. Status post thyroidectomy.
3. Status post total abdominal hysterectomy.
4. Status post appendectomy.
5. Status post cholecystectomy.
6. Long history of migraine headaches reported since the age of 15 years old.
7. Past history of breast cysts — benign, noted as above.
8. Obesity.
[370]*370Axis IV.

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Related

Mistich v. Volkswagen of Germany, Inc.
666 So. 2d 1073 (Supreme Court of Louisiana, 1996)
Stobart v. State Through DOTD
617 So. 2d 880 (Supreme Court of Louisiana, 1993)
Freeman v. Poulan/Weed Eater
630 So. 2d 733 (Supreme Court of Louisiana, 1994)
Alexander v. Pellerin Marble & Granite
630 So. 2d 706 (Supreme Court of Louisiana, 1994)
Ferrier v. Jordache-Ditto's
662 So. 2d 14 (Louisiana Court of Appeal, 1995)
City of Jennings Police Dept. v. Dorr
676 So. 2d 1128 (Louisiana Court of Appeal, 1996)
Williams v. Western Preferred Cas. Ins. Co.
465 So. 2d 191 (Louisiana Court of Appeal, 1985)
Brasseaux v. Abbeville General Hosp.
710 So. 2d 340 (Louisiana Court of Appeal, 1998)
Gautreau v. Gautreau
697 So. 2d 1339 (Louisiana Court of Appeal, 1997)

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Bluebook (online)
736 So. 2d 366, 98 La.App. 3 Cir. 1921, 1999 La. App. LEXIS 1866, 1999 WL 393686, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/city-of-jennings-police-department-v-dorr-lactapp-1999.