City of Huntington Beach v. City of Westminster

57 Cal. App. 4th 220, 66 Cal. Rptr. 2d 826, 97 Daily Journal DAR 10933, 97 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 6743, 1997 Cal. App. LEXIS 667
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeal
DecidedAugust 21, 1997
DocketG015484
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 57 Cal. App. 4th 220 (City of Huntington Beach v. City of Westminster) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering California Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
City of Huntington Beach v. City of Westminster, 57 Cal. App. 4th 220, 66 Cal. Rptr. 2d 826, 97 Daily Journal DAR 10933, 97 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 6743, 1997 Cal. App. LEXIS 667 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997).

Opinion

Opinion

CROSBY, J.

For $250,000 the Cities of Huntington Beach and Westminster settled a lawsuit brought by a robbery victim who was accidentally bitten by a police dog, 1 but the cities could not agree on an allocation of the loss between them. The trial court somehow found neither city at fault, but nonetheless applied the doctrine of equitable indemnity to require one city to completely indemnify the other. “That dog,” as we say out west, “won’t hunt.”

There is no equitable basis for a total shifting of a loss from one fault-free party to another. The cities have not cited any statute or agreement to justify such a judicial redistribution of liability. As the court noted in Gentry Construction Co. v. Superior Court (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 177, 180 [260 Cal.Rptr. 421], in refusing to allow one strictly liable codefendant to recover full indemnity from a second strictly liable codefendant, “ ‘Judicial paternalism is to loss shifting what garlic is to a stew—sometimes necessary to give full flavor to statutory law, always distinctly noticeable in its result, overwhelmingly counterproductive if excessive, and never an end in itself.’ ”

We will conclude the statutory right of contribution (Code Civ. Proc., § 875) requires the cities to share the burden of the judgment equally between them. Pro rata contribution is precisely the type of obvious practical solution that could (and should) have avoided this needless municipal dogfight and rabid mutilation of public resources.

I

On March 12, 1991, shortly before 11 p.m., Huntington Beach police officers responded to a report of an armed robbery in progress at a local restaurant. In accordance with an “informal mutual assistance pact,” police in the adjoining Cities of Westminster and Fountain Valley also were notified and dispatched assistance.

Huntington Beach Sergeant Anthony Sollecito took command of the crime scene. The armed suspects were believed to have fled to another restaurant in *223 the same shopping center. To determine whether others were hiding in the trash bin area behind the second establishment, Sollecito requested a canine unit. The Huntington Beach dog handler was off duty, however, and unavailable for at least an hour. A Westminster sergeant volunteered the services of his city’s canine officer, Robert Fowks, and his dog, “Xello,” who were at the scene.

Not knowing whether there was another way out of the trash bin enclosure, Fowks asked Sollecito whether the area was “secure.” Sollecito thought the question was whether police officers were positioned around the perimeter of the crime scene and replied, “Yes.” It turned out the trash bin area was not enclosed; neither officer knew that. Accordingly, Fowks deployed the stalwart Xello without a leash. The dog went into the trash area, but exited through the rear.

Xello ran past several other police officers, two handcuffed suspects, and right up to one of the robbery victims, Mary McCarty-Devlin, who was seated outside and sobbing. Xello attacked and severely bit her. He refused to loosen his grip until Fowks arrived and forced him to do so.

In April 1993, the cities, neither admitting liability, settled McCartyDevlin’s action for a total of $250,000. The court entered judgment pursuant to the stipulated settlement, holding both cities jointly and severally liable. That, of course, should have been the end of it.

Several months later, however, the cities tried their respective indemnity cross-complaints before a judge. The trial consumed three days of valuable courtroom time. The judge heard testimony from Sollecito, Fowks, several other police eyewitnesses, and experts on police dog handling and training.

The judge found “no negligence on the part of any employee of the Huntington Beach Police Department nor of the Westminster Police Department. [Sergeant] Sollecito, Officer Muller and Officer Fowks acted reasonably under an emergency situation.” But he ordered Huntington Beach to bear 100 percent of the responsibility because “[u]sing Xello lessened the exposure of Huntington Beach officers to deadly harm thereby greatly benefiting that city. There was no benefit to the City of Westminster in the use of Xello.” The court concluded, “By asking for assistance and using that assistance, the requesting agency should bear the financial responsibility for unfortunate and unforeseen consequences of the inherent risk of police activities which are not caused by the assisting agency’s negligence.”

The court signed and filed a statement of decision and entered judgment in favor of Westminster. Huntington Beach filed a timely notice of appeal from *224 the judgment on the cross-complaints and the order denying its posttrial motion to vacate the judgment. Typical of this litigation, Westminster cross-appealed from the judgment in its favor. 2

II

The cities do not challenge the superior court’s factual findings that neither was directly responsible for the incident, whether by negligent deployment of the animal, miscommunication, or by some bungled division of responsibility. The record reveals no contractual agreement between Huntington Beach and Westminster concerning allocation of fault and no evidence regarding any purported “benefit” from one city to the other. We must therefore proceed on the dubious premise that both cities were fault-free and that each, at most, was derivatively or vicariously liable for the incident.

Rather than recognizing different forms of equitable indemnity, California has but a single comparative indemnity doctrine “which permits partial indemnification on a comparative fault basis in appropriate cases.” (Far West Financial Corp. v. D & S Co. (1988) 46 Cal.3d 796, 808 [251 Cal.Rptr. 202, 760 P.2d 399].) Comparative equitable indemnity includes the entire range of possible apportionments—from no indemnity to total indemnity. Rather than being different in kind from comparative indemnity, total equitable indemnity is merely a possible result at one end of the spectrum when one party bears 100 percent of the fault and another bears none. Even with a total shifting of loss, “the indemnitee’s equitable indemnity claim does not differ in its fundamental nature from other comparative equitable indemnity claims.” (Ibid.)

At the heart of the doctrine is apportionment based on fault. At a minimum equitable indemnity “requires a determination of fault on the part of the *225 alleged indemnitor . . . .” (Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Lucky Stores, Inc.

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57 Cal. App. 4th 220, 66 Cal. Rptr. 2d 826, 97 Daily Journal DAR 10933, 97 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 6743, 1997 Cal. App. LEXIS 667, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/city-of-huntington-beach-v-city-of-westminster-calctapp-1997.