Opinion issued December 6, 2012
In The
Court of Appeals For The
First District of Texas ———————————— NO. 01-11-00877-CV ——————————— THE CITY OF HOUSTON, Appellant V. GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES INSURANCE COMPANY, AS SUBROGEE, Appellee
On Appeal from the County Civil Court at Law No. 4 Harris County, Texas Trial Court Case No. 976794
MEMORANDUM OPINION
In this interlocutory appeal, the City of Houston appeals from the trial
court’s denial of its plea to the jurisdiction on the negligence claims of Government Employees Insurance Company, as Subrogee of Erik Ustruk.1 In its
sole issue, the City contends that the trial court erred because it enjoys immunity
pursuant to subsection (b) of the election-of-remedies provision of the Texas Tort
Claims Act.2
We affirm.
Background
GEICO sued the City and Donnell Kennedy, its employee, for Kennedy’s
negligent operation of his vehicle, alleging that it’s insured, Ustruk, sustained
property damage from an accident involving Kennedy. Under the doctrine of
respondeat superior, GEICO claimed Kennedy was acting in the course and scope
of his employment and, as such, the City is liable for Kennedy’s negligent conduct.
The trial court granted the City’s motion to dismiss all of GEICO’s claims
against Kennedy pursuant to section 101.106(e) of the Tort Claims Act. 3 The City
then filed a plea to the jurisdiction, contending that, because GEICO’s suit against 1 See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014(a)(8) (West Supp. 2012) (permitting interlocutory appeals from court order that grants or denies plea to jurisdiction by governmental unit). 2 See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 101.106(b) (West 2011) (“The filing of a suit against any employee of a governmental unit constitutes an irrevocable election by the plaintiff and immediately and forever bars any suit or recovery by the plaintiff against the governmental unit regarding the same subject matter unless the governmental unit consents.”) 3 See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 101.106(e) (West 2011) (“If a suit is filed under this chapter against both a governmental unit and any of its employees, the employees shall immediately be dismissed on the filing of a motion by the governmental unit.”)
2 Kennedy regarded the same subject matter as its claims against the City, all of
GEICO’s tort claims against the City were barred by section 101.106(b) of the Tort
Claims Act’s election-of-remedies provision.4 The trial court denied the City’s
plea to the jurisdiction and this interlocutory appeal followed.
Discussion
A plea to the jurisdiction challenges the trial court’s subject-matter
jurisdiction, Bland Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Blue, 34 S.W.3d 547, 554 (Tex. 2000), the
existence of which is a question of law that we review de novo. State Dep’t of
Highways & Pub. Transp. v. Gonzalez, 82 S.W.3d 322, 327 (Tex. 2002); Kamel v.
Univ. of Tex. Health Sci. Ctr., 333 S.W.3d 676, 681 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st
Dist.] 2010, pet. denied). Subject-matter jurisdiction is not to be presumed, rather,
the burden is on the plaintiff to allege facts affirmatively demonstrating it. See
Tex. Ass’n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 443–44, 446 (Tex.
1993); Kamel, 333 S.W.3d at 681.
Whether a governmental unit is immune from suit is a question of subject-
matter jurisdiction. Tex. Dep’t of Transp. v. Jones, 8 S.W.3d 636, 638 (Tex. 1999).
Determination of that issue here turns on construction of the Tort Claims Act’s
election-of-remedies provision. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE
ANN. § 101.106 (West 2011). In construing a statute, our primary objective is to
4 See id. § 101.106(b). 3 determine and give effect to the Legislature’s intent. Gonzalez, 82 S.W.3d at 327.
In doing so, we “read the statute as a whole and interpret it to give effect to every
part.” Id. (citation omitted). With respect to a statutory waiver of immunity, as in
the Tort Claims Act, we interpret the waiver narrowly, as the Legislature’s intent to
waive immunity must be clear and unambiguous. Mission Consol. Indep. Sch.
Dist. v. Garcia, 253 S.W.3d 653, 655 (Tex. 2008) (citing TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN.
§ 311.034 (West 2005)).
The City argues that a plaintiff who sues both a governmental employee and
a governmental unit cannot maintain suit against either. The City contends that if a
plaintiff, such as GEICO, originally files suit against both a governmental unit and
its employee, on the government’s motion, the plaintiff’s claims against the
governmental unit must be dismissed under subsection (b), which grants it
immunity from suit. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 101.106(b). The City
further maintains that the employee, too, is entitled to dismissal under subsection
(e). Id. § 101.106(e). Based on this interpretation, the City asserts that, in this
case, it was entitled to immunity and dismissal under subsection (b). Id.
§ 101.106(b).
This Court has previously decided the question of statutory interpretation
presented in this case in City of Houston v. Esparza. 369 S.W.3d 238, 253–54
(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, pet. filed) (op. on reh’g). There we
4 determined that subsection (b) does not grant the City immunity from suit—thus
requiring its dismissal—when the plaintiff sues both the City and its employee in
the original petition. See id. at 249. Giving effect to the Legislature’s plain
language and reading section 101.106’s provisions in harmony, we determined that
a plaintiff’s initial filing of suit against the City and its employee invoked
subsection (e), not subsection (b), resulting in an election of the governmental unit
as the exclusive defendant, should the governmental unit, as in Esparza, file a
dismissal motion on behalf of the employee. See id. at 253. We held that
subsection (b) did not bar the plaintiff’s claims against the City, and affirmed the
trial court’s denial of the City’s dismissal motion.5 See id. at 253–54.
As settled by Esparza,6 we conclude that subsection (b) provides no
immunity to the governmental unit when both the governmental unit and its
5 This interpretation is in accord with language in Mission Consolidated Independent School District v. Garcia in which the Supreme Court of Texas recognized that a governmental unit may be sued when the suit is filed against it and its employee. 253 S.W.3d 653, 657 (Tex. 2008). 6 The City is critical of our opinion in Esparza. Since its issuance, we have relied on and reaffirmed the reasoning of Esparza in a number of opinions. See, e.g., City of Hous. v. Atkins, No. 01-12-00190-CV, 2012 WL 2357488, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] June 21, 2012, pet. filed) (mem. op.); City of Hous. v.
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Opinion issued December 6, 2012
In The
Court of Appeals For The
First District of Texas ———————————— NO. 01-11-00877-CV ——————————— THE CITY OF HOUSTON, Appellant V. GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES INSURANCE COMPANY, AS SUBROGEE, Appellee
On Appeal from the County Civil Court at Law No. 4 Harris County, Texas Trial Court Case No. 976794
MEMORANDUM OPINION
In this interlocutory appeal, the City of Houston appeals from the trial
court’s denial of its plea to the jurisdiction on the negligence claims of Government Employees Insurance Company, as Subrogee of Erik Ustruk.1 In its
sole issue, the City contends that the trial court erred because it enjoys immunity
pursuant to subsection (b) of the election-of-remedies provision of the Texas Tort
Claims Act.2
We affirm.
Background
GEICO sued the City and Donnell Kennedy, its employee, for Kennedy’s
negligent operation of his vehicle, alleging that it’s insured, Ustruk, sustained
property damage from an accident involving Kennedy. Under the doctrine of
respondeat superior, GEICO claimed Kennedy was acting in the course and scope
of his employment and, as such, the City is liable for Kennedy’s negligent conduct.
The trial court granted the City’s motion to dismiss all of GEICO’s claims
against Kennedy pursuant to section 101.106(e) of the Tort Claims Act. 3 The City
then filed a plea to the jurisdiction, contending that, because GEICO’s suit against 1 See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014(a)(8) (West Supp. 2012) (permitting interlocutory appeals from court order that grants or denies plea to jurisdiction by governmental unit). 2 See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 101.106(b) (West 2011) (“The filing of a suit against any employee of a governmental unit constitutes an irrevocable election by the plaintiff and immediately and forever bars any suit or recovery by the plaintiff against the governmental unit regarding the same subject matter unless the governmental unit consents.”) 3 See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 101.106(e) (West 2011) (“If a suit is filed under this chapter against both a governmental unit and any of its employees, the employees shall immediately be dismissed on the filing of a motion by the governmental unit.”)
2 Kennedy regarded the same subject matter as its claims against the City, all of
GEICO’s tort claims against the City were barred by section 101.106(b) of the Tort
Claims Act’s election-of-remedies provision.4 The trial court denied the City’s
plea to the jurisdiction and this interlocutory appeal followed.
Discussion
A plea to the jurisdiction challenges the trial court’s subject-matter
jurisdiction, Bland Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Blue, 34 S.W.3d 547, 554 (Tex. 2000), the
existence of which is a question of law that we review de novo. State Dep’t of
Highways & Pub. Transp. v. Gonzalez, 82 S.W.3d 322, 327 (Tex. 2002); Kamel v.
Univ. of Tex. Health Sci. Ctr., 333 S.W.3d 676, 681 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st
Dist.] 2010, pet. denied). Subject-matter jurisdiction is not to be presumed, rather,
the burden is on the plaintiff to allege facts affirmatively demonstrating it. See
Tex. Ass’n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 443–44, 446 (Tex.
1993); Kamel, 333 S.W.3d at 681.
Whether a governmental unit is immune from suit is a question of subject-
matter jurisdiction. Tex. Dep’t of Transp. v. Jones, 8 S.W.3d 636, 638 (Tex. 1999).
Determination of that issue here turns on construction of the Tort Claims Act’s
election-of-remedies provision. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE
ANN. § 101.106 (West 2011). In construing a statute, our primary objective is to
4 See id. § 101.106(b). 3 determine and give effect to the Legislature’s intent. Gonzalez, 82 S.W.3d at 327.
In doing so, we “read the statute as a whole and interpret it to give effect to every
part.” Id. (citation omitted). With respect to a statutory waiver of immunity, as in
the Tort Claims Act, we interpret the waiver narrowly, as the Legislature’s intent to
waive immunity must be clear and unambiguous. Mission Consol. Indep. Sch.
Dist. v. Garcia, 253 S.W.3d 653, 655 (Tex. 2008) (citing TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN.
§ 311.034 (West 2005)).
The City argues that a plaintiff who sues both a governmental employee and
a governmental unit cannot maintain suit against either. The City contends that if a
plaintiff, such as GEICO, originally files suit against both a governmental unit and
its employee, on the government’s motion, the plaintiff’s claims against the
governmental unit must be dismissed under subsection (b), which grants it
immunity from suit. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 101.106(b). The City
further maintains that the employee, too, is entitled to dismissal under subsection
(e). Id. § 101.106(e). Based on this interpretation, the City asserts that, in this
case, it was entitled to immunity and dismissal under subsection (b). Id.
§ 101.106(b).
This Court has previously decided the question of statutory interpretation
presented in this case in City of Houston v. Esparza. 369 S.W.3d 238, 253–54
(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, pet. filed) (op. on reh’g). There we
4 determined that subsection (b) does not grant the City immunity from suit—thus
requiring its dismissal—when the plaintiff sues both the City and its employee in
the original petition. See id. at 249. Giving effect to the Legislature’s plain
language and reading section 101.106’s provisions in harmony, we determined that
a plaintiff’s initial filing of suit against the City and its employee invoked
subsection (e), not subsection (b), resulting in an election of the governmental unit
as the exclusive defendant, should the governmental unit, as in Esparza, file a
dismissal motion on behalf of the employee. See id. at 253. We held that
subsection (b) did not bar the plaintiff’s claims against the City, and affirmed the
trial court’s denial of the City’s dismissal motion.5 See id. at 253–54.
As settled by Esparza,6 we conclude that subsection (b) provides no
immunity to the governmental unit when both the governmental unit and its
5 This interpretation is in accord with language in Mission Consolidated Independent School District v. Garcia in which the Supreme Court of Texas recognized that a governmental unit may be sued when the suit is filed against it and its employee. 253 S.W.3d 653, 657 (Tex. 2008). 6 The City is critical of our opinion in Esparza. Since its issuance, we have relied on and reaffirmed the reasoning of Esparza in a number of opinions. See, e.g., City of Hous. v. Atkins, No. 01-12-00190-CV, 2012 WL 2357488, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] June 21, 2012, pet. filed) (mem. op.); City of Hous. v. Vallejo, 371 S.W.3d 499, 505–06 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, pet. filed); City of Hous. v. McMahon, No. 01-11-01037-CV, 2012 WL 1249567, at *3–4 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Apr. 12, 2012, pet. filed) (mem. op.); Metro. Transit Auth. v. Light, No. 01-11-00747-CV, 2012 WL 252187, at *2–3 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Jan. 26, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op.); City of Hous. v. Tsaig, No. 01-11-00432-CV, 2012 WL 170606, at *2–3 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Jan. 19, 2012, pet. filed) (mem. op.); Tex. Dep’t of Aging & Disability Servs. v. Johnson, No. 01-11-00526-CV, 2012 WL 27728, at *2 (Tex. App.— 5 employee are sued. See id. at 249, 253–54. If it has otherwise complied with the
jurisdictional requisites of the Tort Claims Act, GEICO is not barred by subsection
(b) from pursuing its claims against the City. See id. at 253–54.
Accordingly, we hold that the trial court properly denied the City’s plea to
the jurisdiction. We overrule the City’s sole issue.
Conclusion
We affirm the order of the trial court denying the City’s plea to the
jurisdiction.
Jim Sharp Justice
Panel consists of Justices Jennings, Higley, and Sharp.
Houston [1st Dist.] Jan. 5, 2012, pet. filed) (mem. op.); City of Hous. v. Marquez, No. 01-11-00493-CV, 2011 WL 6147772, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Dec. 8, 2011, pet. filed) (mem. op.); City of Hous. v. McClain, No. 01-11-00194-CV, 2011 WL 6015697, at *2–3 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Dec. 1, 2011, pet. filed) (mem. op.); City of Hous. v. San Miguel, No. 01-10-01071-CV, 2011 WL 5429048, at *2–3 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Nov. 10, 2011, pet. filed) (mem. op.). Here, we again reaffirm Esparza and apply its holding. We also note that two of our sister courts have relied on our reasoning in Esparza to reject the same argument made by the City in this case. See, e.g., Tex. Tech Univ. Health Scis. Ctr. v. Villagran, 369 S.W.3d 523, 531 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2012, pet. filed); Tex. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Deakyne, 371 S.W.3d 303, 311 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2012, pet. filed).