City of Hopewell v. Shree Arihant Motel, Inc.

• Court: Supreme Court of Virginia
• Decided: July 16, 2026
• Docket: 251193
• Status: Published

Opinion

PRESENT: All the Justices

CITY OF HOPEWELL, VIRGINIA OPINION BY v. Record No. 251193 JUSTICE TERESA M. CHAFIN JULY 16, 2026 SHREE ARIHANT MOTEL, INC.

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF HOPEWELL

In this interlocutory appeal, the City of Hopewell (the “City”) contends that it is immune

from certain claims arising from the controlled burn of a vacant shopping center. We agree with

the City. For the following reasons, we reverse the judgment denying the City’s plea in bar and

remand this case for further proceedings.

I. BACKGROUND

Shree Arihant Motel, Inc. (“Shree Arihant”) owns real property in the City near the

intersection of Interstate 295 and State Route 36. Colonial Corner, a shopping center built in the

1970s, was located on the property. Following two unsuccessful attempts to redevelop the

property in 2008 and 2014, Colonial Corner became vacant.

In a letter dated February 25, 2019, a City building official informed Shree Arihant that

Colonial Corner was blighted. The official explained that the “dilapidated” and “deteriorated”

buildings on the property “endanger[ed] the public’s health, safety or welfare.” Additionally, the

official noted that the buildings had been declared “unsafe” and “unfit for human occupancy”

pursuant to the pertinent section of the Virginia Residential Code. The official advised Shree

Arihant that it had 30 days to submit a written abatement plan detailing the manner in which

Shree Arihant would address the blighted condition of the property.

Shree Arihant did not submit a written abatement plan to the City. In a letter dated June

27, 2019, a building official informed Shree Arihant that he and other members of the City’s staff had recommended the demolition of Colonial Corner. The official invited Shree Arihant to

address the blighted property before the City Council at a public meeting on July 9, 2019.

Bharat Shah, a representative of Shree Arihant, spoke to the City Council at the public

meeting. Shah explained that he was trying to find new tenants for Colonial Corner, and that he

had spoken to restaurant chains that were interested in renting space in the shopping center.

After considering Shah’s comments, the City Council ordered Shree Arihant to “board up”

Colonial Corner and “work with the City to develop a plan concerning the property.” The City

Council planned to revisit the issue at its next meeting on August 20, 2019.

Following the public hearing, a building official proposed to demolish Colonial Corner

by a controlled burn conducted by the City’s fire department. Although neither Shree Arihant

nor Shah agreed to allow the City to burn Colonial Corner, Shah told the building official that he

would consider the proposal and asked the City to provide an estimate of the anticipated costs of

the project.

On August 20, 2019, the City Council voted to move forward with planning the

demolition of Colonial Corner. The City Council advised building officials to begin planning the

controlled burn and pursue a written contract with Shree Arihant concerning the demolition of

the property. The City Council’s clerk, however, erroneously recorded that the City Council

voted to burn the shopping center. The City Council never adopted a specific ordinance

addressing Colonial Corner.

In May 2020, the City grew concerned about trespassing on the Colonial Corner property.

To deter trespassing and secure the property, the City ordered Shree Arihant to construct a fence

around the shopping center. Shree Arihant complied with this directive and paid for a fence to

be installed around Colonial Corner.

2 On January 12, 2021, the City Council again discussed the controlled burn of Colonial

Corner. When discussing bidding for the removal of asbestos and debris from the property, the

City Council noted that Colonial Corner did not present an emergency that required immediate

action.

Approximately two weeks later, a building official informed the City Council that

squatters and trespassers continued to access Colonial Corner. The official emphasized that the

trespassers included children. The official asserted that Colonial Corner was “unsafe,” and that

the building posed an “immediate danger” to the public. Therefore, the official requested to

proceed with the demolition of the shopping center.

In a letter dated February 12, 2021, a building official advised Shree Arihant that the City

would burn Colonial Corner “on or soon after February 26, 2021.” The official clarified that the

City was acting pursuant to its authority to abate “spot blight.” With the assistance of fire

departments from neighboring jurisdictions, the City’s fire department burned Colonial Corner as

scheduled on the evening of February 26, 2021. The resulting debris was later removed from the

property.

On February 21, 2024, Shree Arihant filed a civil complaint against the City in the

Circuit Court of the City of Hopewell. The complaint asserted that the City took Shree Arihant’s

property without providing just compensation, in violation of the pertinent provisions of the

United States and Virginia Constitutions. The complaint also requested a declaratory judgment

regarding Shree Arihant’s liability for certain costs and administrative penalties imposed by the

City.

The City removed the case to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of

Virginia. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). Shree Arihant then filed an amended complaint, dropping its

3 takings claim based on the provisions of the United States Constitution. The case was

subsequently remanded to the circuit court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447.

With leave from the circuit court, Shree Arihant filed a second amended complaint

asserting numerous claims against the City and the contractors who removed asbestos and debris

from the Colonial Corner property. The second amended complaint alleged that the City

committed intentional trespass, statutory business conspiracy (pursuant to Code §§ 18.2-499 and

18.2-500), tortious interference with a business expectancy, and waste (pursuant to Code

§§ 8.01-178.1 and 8.01-178.2). The second amended complaint also asserted a takings claim

against the City based on Article I, Section 11 of the Virginia Constitution, and requested a

declaratory judgment regarding Shree Arihant’s liability for certain costs and penalties imposed

by the City.

The City filed a plea in bar based on sovereign immunity, arguing that it was engaged in

a governmental function when it burned Colonial Corner. The City maintained that it

demolished the shopping center to abate blight and “promote the health, safety, and general

welfare of the citizens of Hopewell.” While the City acknowledged that it was not immune from

Shree Arihant’s takings claim, the City contended that it was immune from the other claims

asserted by Shree Arihant.

In response, Shree Arihant argued that the City was not entitled to sovereign immunity

for two reasons. First, Shree Arihant claimed that the City’s actions were ultra vires—

emphasizing that the City failed to comply with statutory and municipal provisions governing

spot blight abatement. Second, Shree Arihant argued that the City was not engaged in a

governmental function when it burned Colonial Corner—noting that the second amended

complaint alleged that blight abatement was merely a pretextual justification for the demolition.

4 Shree Arihant maintained that the City burned Colonial Corner to facilitate the redevelopment of

the property.

The City did not present evidence to support the plea in bar, submitting the matter to the

circuit court based solely on the allegations of the second amended complaint and the attached

exhibits. The circuit court denied the City’s plea in bar. When ruling from the bench at the

conclusion of the pertinent hearing, the circuit court explained that it could not determine

whether the City’s actions “were solely or partially within its governmental function.”

Following the ruling, the City noted an interlocutory appeal pursuant to Code §§ 8.01-626 and

8.01-670.2.

II. ANALYSIS

The City contends that the circuit court erred by denying the plea in bar. Focusing on the

nature of the underlying conduct, the City maintains that it is immune from the majority of Shree

Arihant’s claims.

Code § 8.01-670.2 permits the interlocutory appeal of an order granting or denying a plea

in bar asserting sovereign immunity. In pertinent part, the statute states:

When, prior to the commencement of trial, the circuit court has entered in any pending civil action an order granting or denying a plea of sovereign, absolute, or qualified immunity that, if granted, would immunize the movant from compulsory participation in the proceeding, the order is eligible for immediate appellate review.

Code § 8.01-670.2(A).

We recognize that the City’s plea in bar will not fully immunize it from compulsory

participation in further proceedings. The City acknowledges that it is not immune from Shree

5 Arihant’s takings claim.1 Nonetheless, we exercised our discretionary authority to grant the

City’s petition for an interlocutory appeal to address the City’s contention that it is entitled to

sovereign immunity from the other claims asserted by Shree Arihant. When an aggrieved party

files a petition for an interlocutory appeal, the Court “may take such action thereon as it

considers appropriate under the circumstances of the case.” Code § 8.01-626.

“A plea in bar is a defensive pleading that reduces the litigation to a single issue, which,

if proven, creates a bar to the plaintiff’s right of recovery.” Stevens v. Jurnigan, 305 Va. ___,

___, 927 S.E.2d 799, 804 (2026) (quoting Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Melendez, 260 Va. 578, 594

(2000)). “[W]here no evidence is taken in support of a plea in bar, the trial court, and the

appellate court upon review, consider solely the pleadings in resolving the issue presented. In

doing so, the facts stated in the plaintiff’s [complaint] are deemed true.” Massenburg v. City of

Petersburg, 298 Va. 212, 216 (2019) (quoting Lostrangio v. Laingford, 261 Va. 495, 497

(2001)). We have explained that this approach “results in functionally de novo review of the

trial court’s judgment.” Id.

In numerous cases, we have reiterated that the “doctrine of sovereign immunity is alive

and well in Virginia.” Niese v. City of Alexandria, 264 Va. 230, 238 (2002) (quoting Messina v.

Burden, 228 Va. 301, 307 (1984)). “Virginia has long recognized that local governments share

in the Commonwealth’s sovereign immunity. Unlike counties, which share fully in the

sovereign’s immunity from tort, whether a municipal corporation is entitled to sovereign

1 We note that sovereign immunity does not apply to claims that are based on self- executing provisions of the Virginia Constitution, including the takings provisions set forth in Article I, Section 11. See School Bd. of Stafford Cnty. v. Sumner Falls Run, LLC, 303 Va. 253, 256 (2024).

6 immunity protection depends on the type of function it exercises when liability arises.”

Massenburg, 298 Va. at 217-18 (citations omitted).

Sovereign immunity protects municipalities from claims arising from the performance of

governmental functions. Id. at 218. “A function is governmental if it entails the exercise of an

entity’s political, discretionary, or legislative authority.” City of Chesapeake v. Cunningham,

268 Va. 624, 634 (2004). “Governmental functions are powers and duties performed exclusively

for the public welfare.” Id. at 633. A governmental function is “directly tied to the health,

safety, and welfare of [a municipality’s] citizens.” Niese, 264 Va. at 239 (quoting Edwards v.

City of Portsmouth, 237 Va. 167, 171 (1989)).

In contrast, sovereign immunity does not protect municipalities from claims arising from

the performance of proprietary functions. Massenburg, 298 Va. at 218. “If [a] function is a

ministerial act and involves no discretion, it is proprietary.” Cunningham, 268 Va. at 634.

“Proprietary functions are performed primarily for the benefit of the municipality.” Id.

Sovereign immunity does not apply to claims arising from these functions, “even though ‘the

general public may derive a common benefit’ from their performance.” Massenburg, 298 Va. at

218 (quoting Hoggard v. City of Richmond, 172 Va. 145, 148 (1939)).

In the present case, the City did not comply with the statutory and municipal provisions

governing spot blight abatement. The City Council was required to adopt a specific ordinance

declaring Colonial Corner to be a blighted property. See Code § 36-49.1:1(C), (D); Hopewell

City Code § 19-135 (1981). The City Council, however, never adopted such an ordinance.

Moreover, the City Council never formally voted to demolish Colonial Corner. After the City

Council voted to move forward with planning the controlled burn, its clerk erroneously recorded

that the City Council had voted to burn the shopping center.

7 The City’s immunity from the claims at issue, however, is not contingent upon the City’s

compliance with statutory and municipal provisions. We have consistently held that municipal

sovereign immunity is contingent upon the nature of the actions underlying the claims at issue.

See, e.g., Massenburg, 298 Va. at 217-18 (“[W]hether a municipal corporation is entitled to

sovereign immunity protection depends on the type of function it exercises when liability

arises.”); Niese, 264 Va. at 241 (“In this State, we have long determined the liability or non-

liability of a city for acts committed by it according to whether the act was done in its

governmental or proprietary character.” (quoting Burson v. City of Bristol, 176 Va. 53, 63

(1940))). If a claim arises from the performance of a governmental function, a municipality is

generally entitled to sovereign immunity from that claim—even when the municipality exercises

its authority in a “‘negligent or improper manner.’” See Niese, 264 Va. at 238 (quoting

Hoggard, 172 Va. at 147).

When viewed together, the allegations of the second amended complaint and the attached

exhibits 2 establish that the City was—at least partially—engaged in a governmental function

when it burned Colonial Corner.

The second amended complaint and the attached exhibits plainly show that the City was

attempting to abate blight when it demolished the shopping center. In the notices that the City

sent to Shree Arihant (which were attached to the second amended complaint), the City expressly

noted that Colonial Corner was a “blighted” property. The City also explained that Colonial

Corner was “dilapidated,” “deteriorated,” “unsafe,” “unfit for human occupancy,” and a danger

to the “public’s health, safety, [and] welfare.”

2 An attached exhibit is considered part of a complaint. See Rule 1:4(i).

8 Blight abatement is a governmental function. It involves the exercise of a municipality’s

discretionary authority and promotes the health, safety, and general welfare of a municipality’s

citizens. When the City exercised its discretionary authority to demolish a blighted shopping

center that posed a threat to public safety, it engaged in a governmental function that triggered

the protection of municipal sovereign immunity.

We acknowledge that the allegations of the second amended complaint suggest that the

City may have been motivated by the potential redevelopment of the Colonial Corner property

when it demolished the shopping center. The abatement of blighted property often promotes

economic development, especially when the property at issue is zoned for commercial or

industrial uses. The City’s pursuit of economic development opportunities, however, is

irrelevant to the outcome of this case. 3

At most, the second amended complaint establishes that the City burned Colonial Corner

for dual purposes. While the City may have considered the redevelopment of the Colonial

Corner property when it decided to burn the shopping center, it also burned the shopping center

to eliminate blight. Therefore, the claims at issue in this case arise—at least in part—from the

performance of a governmental function. When governmental functions coincide with other

functions, the “governmental function is the overriding factor and the doctrine of sovereign

immunity will shield the locality from liability.” Cunningham, 268 Va. at 639 (quoting City of

Va. Beach v. Carmichael Dev. Co., 259 Va. 493, 499 (2000)).

As the second amended complaint established that the City was performing a

governmental function when it burned Colonial Corner, the circuit court erred by denying the

3 In this case, it is unnecessary to determine whether economic development, in itself, may constitute a governmental function.

9 City’s plea in bar. The City has sovereign immunity from Shree Arihant’s common law tort

claims (i.e., intentional trespass and tortious interference with a business expectancy), Shree

Arihant’s statutory tort claims (i.e., business conspiracy and waste), 4 and the majority of Shree

Arihant’s requests for declaratory relief (i.e., the requests based on liability for certain costs and

penalties imposed by the City). 5 Accordingly, we reverse the circuit court’s judgment and

remand this case for further proceedings addressing Shree Arihant’s takings claim and any

claims asserted by and against third parties.

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated, we reverse the judgment of the circuit court and remand this case

for further proceedings.

Reversed and remanded.

4 The statutes underlying these claims (i.e., Code §§ 8.01-178.1, 8.01-178.2, 18.2-499, and 18.2-500) do not expressly waive municipal sovereign immunity. “A waiver of sovereign immunity will not be implied from general statutory language but must be explicitly and expressly stated in the statute.” Montalla, LLC v. Commonwealth, 303 Va. 150, 165 (2024) (quoting Alliance to Save the Mattaponi v. Commonwealth Dep’t of Env’t Quality, 270 Va. 423, 455 (2005)). 5 Although sovereign immunity does not apply to declaratory judgment actions that are based on self-executing constitutional provisions, see, e.g., School Bd. of Stafford Cnty., 303 Va. at 256, sovereign immunity bars other declaratory judgment actions that arise from a municipality’s performance of a governmental function, see, e.g., id. at 255; Afzall v. Commonwealth, 273 Va. 226, 231 (2007).