City of High Point v. Clinard

Supreme Court of North Carolina

City of High Point v. Clinard

167 S.E. 690, 204 N.C. 149, 1933 N.C. LEXIS 344

CourtSupreme Court of North Carolina

DecidedFebruary 8, 1933

StatusPublished

Cited by7 cases

This text of 167 S.E. 690 (City of High Point v. Clinard) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of North Carolina primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

City of High Point v. Clinard, 167 S.E. 690, 204 N.C. 149, 1933 N.C. LEXIS 344 (N.C. 1933).

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Opinion

Stacy, C. J.

The case falls within a very narrow compass. It is simply this: Defendants say that when they failed to pay the installment due on 25 November, 1925, plaintiff’s right of action accrued, was barred at the expiration of three years thereafter, and that the statutes of 1929 and 1931, passed after the bar of the statute was complete, could not revive the right of action. For this position, they rely upon the following decisions: Morganton v. Avery, 179 N. C., 551, 103 S. E., 138; Greensboro v. McAdoo, 112 N. C., 359, 17 S. E., 178; In re Beauchamp, 146 N. C., 254, 59 S. E., 687; Whitehurst v. Dey, 90 N. C., 542; Note 36 A. L. R., 1316, et seq.

The position of the defendants, however, overlooks the fact that by virtue of the statute, chapter 56, Public Laws, 1915, under which the *151 assessment was originally levied, tbe confirmation of “the assessments embraced in the assessment roll” is made a “lien on the real property against which the same are assessed, superior to all other liens and encumbrances.” Schank v. Asheville, 154 N. C., 40, 69 S. E., 681. This brings the case under the ten years statute, as decided in Drainage District v. Huffstetler, 113 N. C., 523, 92 S. E., 368, rather than under the three years statute, as contended for by the defendants. Compare Statesville v. Jenkins, 199 N. C., 159, 154 S. E., 15.

In this view of the matter, it becomes unnecessary to consider the question, debated on brief, whether a right of action already barred may be revived by a change in the statute of limitations. Dunn v. Beaman, 126 N. C., 766, 36 S. E., 172; Varner v. Johnston, 112 N. C., 570, 17 S. E., 483; Campbell v. Holt, 115 U. S., 620; Note, 36 A. L. R., 1316, et seq. See, also, Wilkes County v. Forester, post, 163.

Affirmed.

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Stacy, C. J.

The case falls within a very narrow compass. It is simply this: Defendants say that when they failed to pay the installment due on 25 November, 1925, plaintiff’s right of action accrued, was barred at the expiration of three years thereafter, and that the statutes of 1929 and 1931, passed after the bar of the statute was complete, could not revive the right of action. For this position, they rely upon the following decisions: Morganton v. Avery, 179 N. C., 551, 103 S. E., 138; Greensboro v. McAdoo, 112 N. C., 359, 17 S. E., 178; In re Beauchamp, 146 N. C., 254, 59 S. E., 687; Whitehurst v. Dey, 90 N. C., 542; Note 36 A. L. R., 1316, et seq.

The position of the defendants, however, overlooks the fact that by virtue of the statute, chapter 56, Public Laws, 1915, under which the *151 assessment was originally levied, tbe confirmation of “the assessments embraced in the assessment roll” is made a “lien on the real property against which the same are assessed, superior to all other liens and encumbrances.” Schank v. Asheville, 154 N. C., 40, 69 S. E., 681. This brings the case under the ten years statute, as decided in Drainage District v. Huffstetler, 113 N. C., 523, 92 S. E., 368, rather than under the three years statute, as contended for by the defendants. Compare Statesville v. Jenkins, 199 N. C., 159, 154 S. E., 15.

In this view of the matter, it becomes unnecessary to consider the question, debated on brief, whether a right of action already barred may be revived by a change in the statute of limitations. Dunn v. Beaman, 126 N. C., 766, 36 S. E., 172; Varner v. Johnston, 112 N. C., 570, 17 S. E., 483; Campbell v. Holt, 115 U. S., 620; Note, 36 A. L. R., 1316, et seq. See, also, Wilkes County v. Forester, post, 163.

Affirmed.

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167 S.E. 690, 204 N.C. 149, 1933 N.C. LEXIS 344, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/city-of-high-point-v-clinard-nc-1933.

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