NO. 97-021
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
CITY OF HELENA, STATE OF MONTANA,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
JAMES C. MEYERS,
Defendant and Appellant
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the First Judicial District, In and for the County of Lewis and Clark, The Honorable Thomas C. Honzel, Judge presiding.
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
James C. Meyers, Pro Se, Helena, Montana
For Respondent:
Robert J. Wood. Helena City Prosecutor, Helena, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: July 17, 1997
Decided: August 18, 1 9 9 7 Filed: Justice Terry N.Trieweiler delivered the opinion of the Court.
Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c), Montana Supreme Court 1995 Internal
Operating Rules, the following decision shall not be ctted as precedent and shall be published
by its filing as a public document with the Clerk of the Supreme Court and by a report of its
result to State Reporter Publishing Company and West Publishing Company.
James C. Meyers appealed to the District Court for the First Judicial District in Lewis
Court of Helena for driping with a suspended and Clark County from a conviction in the C ~ t y
license and for failure to have liability insurance. Following a jury trial, he was found guilty
of both charges and sentenced by the Dtstrtct Court. Meyers appeals. We affirm in part and
vacate in part the judgment of the Distr~ct Court, and remand for further proceedings.
There are two issues on appeal:
1. Did Meyers' conviction result from bias shown by District Judges, the Clerk
of the Distrtct Court, or the attorney who represented him?
2. Did the District Court err when tt sentenced the defendant or assessed costs to
him'?
FACTUALBACKGROUND
On September 9, 1995, Officer Mutk Ekola of the Helena Police Department stopped
Meyers' vehicle for a defective taillight. Meyers could not produce a driver's license or proof
of insurance. After Ekola learned that Meyers' driver's license had been suspended, Meyers was cited for driving while his license was suspended and for failure to have liability
insurance, in violation of $9 61-5-212, MCA, and 61-6-301, MCA, respectively.
Meyers was found guilty of both charges by a jury in the City Court of Helena, and
on December 27, 1995, he filed a notice of appeal to the District Court. After determining
that Meyers was indigent, the District Court appointed counsel to represent him. Meyers
filed a number of motions, seeking. among other things, to disqualify the District Court
Judge for cause, to substitnte counsel. and to remove the matter to Federal District Court.
On May 1, 1996, District Judge James Purcell conducted a hearing to determine whether
there was cause to disqualify the District Court Judge. He subsequently denied that motion.
On October 24, 1996, Meyers withdrew his request for counsel and proceeded pro se.
Following a jury trial on November 26, 1996, Meyers was found guilty of driving while his
license was suspended and of failure to have liability insurance. The District Court sentenced
Meyers to 190 days in jail, with 188 of those days suspended. In addition, it assessed fines
in the total amount of $600, and court costs, jury costs, and charges in the amount of
$650.48.
ISSUE I
Did Meyers' conviction result from bias shown by District Judges, the Clerk of the
District Court, or the attorney who represented him? Meyers has alleged that due to the bias of both the District Court and Judge Purcell,
as well as the Clerk of Court and hls own attorney, he was denied effective representation,
his right to a speedy trial, due process, and his rlght to put forth a proper defense.
From review of the record, we find no evidence to demonstrate bias against Meyers.
Meyers' principal claim regarding the District Court (other than claims related to the
Judges' religion) are that he was denled a speedy trial and that he was precluded from
offering evidence critical to his defense, However, most delay was attributable to Meyers'
own motions and no prejudice has been shown from delay.
Furthermore, the determination of whether evidence is relevant and admissible is left
to the sound discretion of the trial judge and wlll not be overturned absent a showing of
abuse of discretion. State v Gollehon (1993), 262 Mont. 293, 301, 864 P.2d 1257. 1263.
Here, the District Court's decision that evidence pertaining to Meyers' prior convictions in
1989 and 1992 was irrelevant to the charges made against him in this proceeding was not an
abuse of discretion, and therefore, it does not indicate bias against Meyers. For these
reasons, we conclude that Meyers' conviction was not the result of bias by the District Court,
Judge Purcell, the Clerk of Court, or Meyers' attorney.
ISSUE 2
Did the District Court err when it sentenced the defendant or assessed costs to him? "This Court has consistently held that if a sentence is within the limits provided by
statute, it is not an abuse of discretion." State v. Lemmon (1984), 214 Mont. 121, 129?692
P.2d 355,459 (citing State v. Gurrido (1981), 190 Mont. 525,52") 621 P.2d 1105, 1108).
Section 61-5-212, MCA, provides that a defendant convicted of driving with a
suspended license "shall be punished by i~nprisonment not less than 2 days or more than for
6 months and may be fined not more than $500." Here, the District Court sentenced Meyers
to serve 180 days in jail, but suspended all but the two days required by the statute. In
addition, the District Court assessed a $250 fine. Each sentence is clearly within the limits
of the statute. Accordingly, we conclude that the District Court did not abuse its discretion
when it imposed Meyers' sentence for driving with a suspended license.
Section 61-6-304, MCA, states that a second conviction for failure to have liability
insurance is "punishable by a fine of $350 2r by imprisonment in the county jail for not more
than 10 days, or both." The District Court fined Meyers $350 and sentenced him to the
maximum ten days in jail, although the jail sentence was suspended; each sentence is within
the limits of the statute. Accordingly, we conclude that the District Court did not abuse its
discretion when it imposed Meyers' sentence for failure to have liability insurance.
In addition to the sentences imposed, the District Court required that Meyers pay a
total of $650.48 for costs and surcharges. Section 46-18-201(d), MCA, permits the District
Court to require payment of costs and jury expenses pursuant to 8 46-18-232, MCA;
5 46-18-236(l)(a), MCA, requires all courts of original jurisdiction to assess a $15 charge
5 for each misdemeanor conviction, and $ 3-1-317(1)(a), MCA, requires imposition of a $5
user surcharge for each conviction of criminal conduct. Although the District Court did not
specify these statutes as the basis for its charges, it ordered Meyers to pay $40 as surcharges
for the convictions in District Court and $40 for court costs and surcharges per violation to
the City Court. The District Court also ordered that Meyers pay District Court jury costs in
the amount of $296.48, and City Court jury costs in the amount of $234.
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NO. 97-021
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
CITY OF HELENA, STATE OF MONTANA,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
JAMES C. MEYERS,
Defendant and Appellant
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the First Judicial District, In and for the County of Lewis and Clark, The Honorable Thomas C. Honzel, Judge presiding.
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
James C. Meyers, Pro Se, Helena, Montana
For Respondent:
Robert J. Wood. Helena City Prosecutor, Helena, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: July 17, 1997
Decided: August 18, 1 9 9 7 Filed: Justice Terry N.Trieweiler delivered the opinion of the Court.
Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c), Montana Supreme Court 1995 Internal
Operating Rules, the following decision shall not be ctted as precedent and shall be published
by its filing as a public document with the Clerk of the Supreme Court and by a report of its
result to State Reporter Publishing Company and West Publishing Company.
James C. Meyers appealed to the District Court for the First Judicial District in Lewis
Court of Helena for driping with a suspended and Clark County from a conviction in the C ~ t y
license and for failure to have liability insurance. Following a jury trial, he was found guilty
of both charges and sentenced by the Dtstrtct Court. Meyers appeals. We affirm in part and
vacate in part the judgment of the Distr~ct Court, and remand for further proceedings.
There are two issues on appeal:
1. Did Meyers' conviction result from bias shown by District Judges, the Clerk
of the Distrtct Court, or the attorney who represented him?
2. Did the District Court err when tt sentenced the defendant or assessed costs to
him'?
FACTUALBACKGROUND
On September 9, 1995, Officer Mutk Ekola of the Helena Police Department stopped
Meyers' vehicle for a defective taillight. Meyers could not produce a driver's license or proof
of insurance. After Ekola learned that Meyers' driver's license had been suspended, Meyers was cited for driving while his license was suspended and for failure to have liability
insurance, in violation of $9 61-5-212, MCA, and 61-6-301, MCA, respectively.
Meyers was found guilty of both charges by a jury in the City Court of Helena, and
on December 27, 1995, he filed a notice of appeal to the District Court. After determining
that Meyers was indigent, the District Court appointed counsel to represent him. Meyers
filed a number of motions, seeking. among other things, to disqualify the District Court
Judge for cause, to substitnte counsel. and to remove the matter to Federal District Court.
On May 1, 1996, District Judge James Purcell conducted a hearing to determine whether
there was cause to disqualify the District Court Judge. He subsequently denied that motion.
On October 24, 1996, Meyers withdrew his request for counsel and proceeded pro se.
Following a jury trial on November 26, 1996, Meyers was found guilty of driving while his
license was suspended and of failure to have liability insurance. The District Court sentenced
Meyers to 190 days in jail, with 188 of those days suspended. In addition, it assessed fines
in the total amount of $600, and court costs, jury costs, and charges in the amount of
$650.48.
ISSUE I
Did Meyers' conviction result from bias shown by District Judges, the Clerk of the
District Court, or the attorney who represented him? Meyers has alleged that due to the bias of both the District Court and Judge Purcell,
as well as the Clerk of Court and hls own attorney, he was denied effective representation,
his right to a speedy trial, due process, and his rlght to put forth a proper defense.
From review of the record, we find no evidence to demonstrate bias against Meyers.
Meyers' principal claim regarding the District Court (other than claims related to the
Judges' religion) are that he was denled a speedy trial and that he was precluded from
offering evidence critical to his defense, However, most delay was attributable to Meyers'
own motions and no prejudice has been shown from delay.
Furthermore, the determination of whether evidence is relevant and admissible is left
to the sound discretion of the trial judge and wlll not be overturned absent a showing of
abuse of discretion. State v Gollehon (1993), 262 Mont. 293, 301, 864 P.2d 1257. 1263.
Here, the District Court's decision that evidence pertaining to Meyers' prior convictions in
1989 and 1992 was irrelevant to the charges made against him in this proceeding was not an
abuse of discretion, and therefore, it does not indicate bias against Meyers. For these
reasons, we conclude that Meyers' conviction was not the result of bias by the District Court,
Judge Purcell, the Clerk of Court, or Meyers' attorney.
ISSUE 2
Did the District Court err when it sentenced the defendant or assessed costs to him? "This Court has consistently held that if a sentence is within the limits provided by
statute, it is not an abuse of discretion." State v. Lemmon (1984), 214 Mont. 121, 129?692
P.2d 355,459 (citing State v. Gurrido (1981), 190 Mont. 525,52") 621 P.2d 1105, 1108).
Section 61-5-212, MCA, provides that a defendant convicted of driving with a
suspended license "shall be punished by i~nprisonment not less than 2 days or more than for
6 months and may be fined not more than $500." Here, the District Court sentenced Meyers
to serve 180 days in jail, but suspended all but the two days required by the statute. In
addition, the District Court assessed a $250 fine. Each sentence is clearly within the limits
of the statute. Accordingly, we conclude that the District Court did not abuse its discretion
when it imposed Meyers' sentence for driving with a suspended license.
Section 61-6-304, MCA, states that a second conviction for failure to have liability
insurance is "punishable by a fine of $350 2r by imprisonment in the county jail for not more
than 10 days, or both." The District Court fined Meyers $350 and sentenced him to the
maximum ten days in jail, although the jail sentence was suspended; each sentence is within
the limits of the statute. Accordingly, we conclude that the District Court did not abuse its
discretion when it imposed Meyers' sentence for failure to have liability insurance.
In addition to the sentences imposed, the District Court required that Meyers pay a
total of $650.48 for costs and surcharges. Section 46-18-201(d), MCA, permits the District
Court to require payment of costs and jury expenses pursuant to 8 46-18-232, MCA;
5 46-18-236(l)(a), MCA, requires all courts of original jurisdiction to assess a $15 charge
5 for each misdemeanor conviction, and $ 3-1-317(1)(a), MCA, requires imposition of a $5
user surcharge for each conviction of criminal conduct. Although the District Court did not
specify these statutes as the basis for its charges, it ordered Meyers to pay $40 as surcharges
for the convictions in District Court and $40 for court costs and surcharges per violation to
the City Court. The District Court also ordered that Meyers pay District Court jury costs in
the amount of $296.48, and City Court jury costs in the amount of $234.
There is no indication, however, that the District Court applied the other provisions
of the statutes which provide for an exception where the defendant is unable to pay. Sections
46-18-236(2) and -232(2), MCA, both provide that if the convicting court determines that
the defendant is not able to pay the costs or surcharges, those expenses n~ust waived. be
Section 3-1-317(2), MCA, provides that in the event a defendant is unable to pay, the
surcharge may be waived. These sections have significance in this case in which the District
Court found that Meyers was mdigent. Normally imposition of surcharges, costs, and jury
expenses pursuant to these statutes would be inconsistent with a determination of indigence.
Therefore, we vacate that part of the District Court's judgment which assessed costs and
surcharges in the combined amount of $650.48 and remand to the District Court for
determination of whether Meyers is financially able to pay that amount.
We affim~ part and vacate part of the judgment of the District Court, and remand in
for further proceedings consistent wtth this opinion. We Concur: August 18, 1997
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that the following certified order was sent by United States mail, prepaid, to the following named:
JAMES C. MEYERS 472 RUSSELL #6 HELENA MT 59601
HON. JOSEPH P. MAZUREK, ATTORNEY GENERAL @ ELIZABETH GRIFFING, ASSISTANT 215 NORTH SANDERS HELENA MT 59620
ROBERT J. WOOD ASSISTANT CITY ATTORNEY BOX 133 HELENA MT 59624-0133
ED SMITH CLERK OF THE SUPREME COURT STATE OF MONTANA