City of Helena v. Ittner

• Court: Montana Supreme Court
• Decided: April 7, 2026
• Docket: DA 25-0413
• Status: Unpublished
• Author: Bidegaray

Opinion

04/07/2026

DA 25-0413 Case Number: DA 25-0413

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

2026 MT 74N

THE CITY OF HELENA,

Plaintiff and Appellee,

v.

SKYLAR DEXTER ITTNER,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the First Judicial District, In and For the County of Lewis and Clark, Cause No. DDC-2023-402 Honorable Christopher D. Abbott, Presiding Judge

COUNSEL OF RECORD:

For Appellant:

Skylar Dexter Ittner, Self-Represented, Helena, Montana

For Appellee:

Austin Knudsen, Montana Attorney General, Katie F. Schulz, Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana

Rebecca Dockter, Helena City Attorney, Matthew Petesch, Assistant City Attorney, Helena, Montana

Submitted on Briefs: March 18, 2026

Decided: April 7, 2026

Filed:

__________________________________________ Clerk Justice Katherine M. Bidegaray delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶1 Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c), Montana Supreme Court Internal Operating

Rules, this case is decided by memorandum opinion and shall not be cited and does not

serve as precedent. Its case title, cause number, and disposition shall be included in this

Court’s quarterly list of noncitable cases published in the Pacific Reporter and Montana

Reports.

¶2 Skylar Ittner appeals pro se the October 2024 order of the Montana First Judicial

District Court affirming the judgment of the City of Helena Municipal Court ordering Ittner

to pay $1,254.90 in restitution. The District Court also affirmed Ittner’s July 2023

conviction on bench trial for the misdemeanor offense of Changing Lanes When Unsafe to

Do So (§ 61-8-328(1), MCA), but Ittner does not appeal that aspect of the District Court’s

judgment. On appeal, Ittner contends that the Municipal Court’s restitution award was not

supported by substantial evidence and therefore erroneous. He also alleges that his due

process rights were violated at sentencing.

Background

¶3 Around 4:30 p.m. on April 22, 2023, Ittner was involved in a traffic accident near

the intersection of Sanders Street and Custer Avenue in Helena, Montana. Near the

intersection, Sanders is three lanes: one heading north, one heading south, and a center

lane for turning left, depending on the direction of travel. Southbound approaching the

stop light, Mark Smith occupied the center lane in a full-size pickup truck towing a 16-foot

trailer loaded with lumber, preparing to turn left from Sanders onto Custer. Ittner attempted

to merge into the lane in front of Smith’s truck where there was not room and collided with

2 Smith’s 16-foot trailer. After interviewing both drivers and other witnesses and being

shown Ittner’s dash camera footage at the scene, the responding Helena Police officer

issued Ittner a citation under § 61-8-328(1), MCA, for changing lanes when it was unsafe

to do so.

¶4 Ittner pleaded not guilty and waived jury trial but demanded a bench trial on the

citation. He appeared pro se and cross-examined Smith and the responding officer. Smith

testified that Ittner came into his lane and crashed into his trailer, causing damage to his

truck and trailer. The officer testified that eyewitness accounts corroborated Smith’s

version of events. The officer also testified that Ittner’s car and Smith’s trailer each

suffered damage due to the accident, and specifically that the collision broke off the “grease

caps” on the hubs of Smith’s trailer wheels. Ittner testified and submitted his dash camera

footage into evidence. Ittner’s defense theory was that Smith was illegally travelling in the

center lane before it became a left-turn lane at the intersection and that, when Ittner

attempted to merge into the turn lane, Smith aggressively “closed the gap,” causing the

collision. The Municipal Court judge advised that she would render a decision in the

coming weeks and confirmed Ittner’s mailing address.

¶5 The Municipal Court issued its judgment in July 2023, finding Ittner guilty. The

court mailed Ittner notice of a sentencing hearing for Monday, August 14, 2023. That day,

the court reset sentencing for Monday, August 28, 2023; its order noted that Ittner had

failed to appear. Three days later, Ittner filed a motion to continue sentencing and waiver

of speedy trial, stating he was “unable to be in court on Mondays because of a prior and

ongoing commitment with the United States government.” The next day, the court reset

3 sentencing for Wednesday, August 30, 2023, at 9:15 a.m. and mailed Ittner notice. The

morning of sentencing, Ittner arrived late.

¶6 Prior to Ittner’s arrival, Smith testified as to his restitution claims. Smith said he

was out (1) $500 for his insurance deductible; (2) $600 in two days’ lost wages; (3) $88.92

in mileage calculated at the State rate; (4) $32.99 each for two “bearing buddies” (caps that

cover wheel hubs to facilitate greasing) to replace those that were broken off and smashed

flat in the collision; and (5) $3,242 for a new rear bumper for his truck, based on a

preliminary estimate. Smith testified that the impact with Ittner’s vehicle caused the load

of lumber in the trailer to shift into the truck’s rear bumper, damaging it. As soon as Smith

offered this testimony, Ittner appeared, about 8 minutes after the start of the hearing. The

judge summarized and restated Smith’s testimony for Ittner and then Smith continued,

restating his restitution claim. Smith clarified that he had not yet paid his insurance

deductible but was going to “have to pay” it because, after contacting Ittner’s insurance,

Smith was notified in writing that Ittner’s insurance would not cover the damages to

Smith’s truck.

¶7 When the judge gave Ittner an opportunity to respond to Smith’s testimony or ask

him any questions, Ittner stated only that Smith’s insurance “wasn’t paying” for damages

to Ittner’s vehicle “either.” The judge reminded Ittner that Smith’s insurance would not be

expected to pay where Ittner was adjudicated at fault for the accident. Ittner “respectfully

disagreed” with the court’s ruling. Then, without prompting, Smith began speaking on

questions Ittner had posed at the June 2023 bench trial, stating it had not occurred to him

at the time of his testimony, but that, when driving a full-size pickup towing a 16-foot

4 trailer, he could not “enter a turning lane like a normal car” and “just swoop in” and that

“any vehicle pulling a trailer has to enter that lane sooner.”

¶8 The City prosecutor then cut off Smith, noting they should just stick to the restitution

issue. The judge agreed, stating they were “not going to argue the case” after the court had

already made its ruling. Ittner interrupted the judge, saying, “I’ve also driven a trailer at

an intersection—” but was admonished not to reargue the case. When asked for further

comments or questions regarding restitution or sentencing, Ittner described the damages to

his vehicle and the loss of use. He also added that Smith’s “aggressive driving where he

didn’t let me in was the actual real cause—” before the judge stopped him again, stating

they were not going to reargue the case.

¶9 The Municipal Court awarded Smith $1,254.90 in restitution: $500 for the insurance

deductible; $600 for lost wages; $88.92 for mileage; and $65.98 for the bearing caps. The

court did not award Smith any money for damage to the truck bumper, noting that insurance

was going to cover that cost. Ittner appealed his conviction and the restitution award to the

District Court, which affirmed on both issues by written order on October 8, 2024.

¶10 Ittner appeals pro se, arguing that Smith’s restitution claims were inflated and

unsubstantiated and the court’s $1,254.90 award therefore erroneous. He also argues that

he was denied due process because the sentencing/restitution hearing started without him

and he “lacked data to respond in real time” and because the court “suppressed” Smith’s

“attempted admission of fault,” denying Ittner an opportunity to dispute causation of

damages.

5 ¶11 The State argues that Ittner failed to timely object to restitution and therefore waived

any appellate review. Although Ittner frames his argument as a challenge to the sufficiency

of the evidence supporting restitution, he further contends that the restitution award

constitutes an illegal sentence not subject to preservation requirements. Accordingly, the

threshold question is whether his challenge implicates an illegal sentence—reviewable

regardless of preservation—or an evidentiary challenge to the amount of restitution, which

must be preserved. A sentence is illegal if it imposes a form of punishment not authorized

by statute. By contrast, challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting restitution

for otherwise authorized categories of loss are objectionable sentencing claims subject to

the contemporaneous objection rule. See State v. Johnson, 2011 MT 286, ¶ 14, 362 Mont.

473, 265 P.3d 638; State v. Simpson, 2014 MT 175, ¶¶ 11-12, 375 Mont. 393, 328 P.3d

1144.

¶12 Here, the Municipal Court awarded restitution for an insurance deductible, lost

wages, mileage, and property damage—each a category of pecuniary loss expressly

contemplated by §§ 46-18-241 and -243, MCA. Ittner does not challenge the court’s

statutory authority to award restitution for these types of losses; rather, he challenges

whether the evidence sufficiently established that the claimed amounts were incurred,

substantiated, and causally connected to the offense. These are evidentiary challenges to

the amount of restitution, not claims that the sentence is illegal. Accordingly, they were

subject to preservation requirements.

¶13 While we sit in review of the Municipal Court as if the issues were directly appealed

to this Court, we also simultaneously review the District Court’s decision on appeal.

6 See Hennon v. Weber, 2025 MT 260, ¶¶ 11, 18-20, 425 Mont. 14, 579 P.3d 151. Although

Ittner did not object to the restitution evidence at sentencing, we nevertheless address the

merits because the District Court considered and resolved the issue on appeal and the

record is sufficient for review. Our analysis should not be understood to excuse the failure

to preserve such claims in the ordinary case.

¶14 Regarding restitution, we review conclusions of law de novo for correctness and

underlying factual findings for clear error. A factual finding is clearly erroneous if not

supported by substantial evidence. Substantial evidence is that which a reasonable mind

might find sufficient to support a conclusion. State v. O’Connell, 2011 MT 24, ¶ 7,

362 Mont. 171, 261 P.3d 1042; Simpson, ¶ 8. Our review of constitutional questions,

including alleged due process violations, is plenary. State v. Villanueva, 2021 MT 277,

¶ 23, 406 Mont. 149, 497 P.3d 586.

The Municipal Court’s Restitution Award was Supported by Substantial Evidence

¶15 A sentencing court shall require an offender to make full restitution to any victim

who has sustained pecuniary loss. Section 46-18-241(1), MCA. “Pecuniary loss” means

“all special damages . . . substantiated by evidence in the record that a person could recover

against the offender in a civil action arising out of the facts or events constituting the

offender’s criminal activities, including without limitation out-of-pocket losses, such

as . . . loss of income . . . [and] expenses reasonably incurred in attending court

proceedings related to the commission of the offense” and “the full replacement cost of

property taken, destroyed, harmed, or otherwise devalued as a result of the offender’s

criminal conduct.” Section 46-18-243(1)(a), (b), MCA.

7 ¶16 “Restitution is not criminal punishment, but a civil remedy administered by the

courts for the convenience of victims.” State v. McClelland, 2015 MT 281, ¶ 10, 381 Mont.

164, 357 P.3d 906. “When a presentence report is not requested, the court shall accept

evidence of the victim’s loss at the time of sentencing.” Section 46-18-242(2), MCA. “The

restitution amount will be upheld if calculated by use of reasonable methods based on the

best evidence available under the circumstances and specific documentation is not

required.” McClelland, ¶ 10; Simpson, ¶ 14. “When the defendant does not present

contradictory evidence, the District Court does not err in relying on a victim’s estimates of

loss.” McClelland, ¶ 10; Simpson, ¶ 14.

¶17 Ittner argues that the $65.98 award for “bearing buddies” was unsubstantiated and

inflated because Smith failed to provide “receipts or invoices” proving their replacement

value and because Ittner purportedly later found the same parts for much cheaper online.

Both the responding officer and Smith testified that Ittner’s hitting Smith’s trailer stripped

and destroyed the bearing caps on the two right-side trailer wheels. Smith testified that the

price for each cap was $32.99 on Amazon. Smith’s uncontroverted testimony was enough

to establish the value of the bearing buddies and specific documentation was not required.

McClelland, ¶ 10; Simpson, ¶ 14.

¶18 Ittner also argues that the $600 lost wages award was unsubstantiated and inflated.

However, § 46-18-243(1)(a), MCA, expressly includes “loss of income” and expenses

reasonably incurred in attending court proceedings related to the offense. Thus, time

reasonably spent attending trial and sentencing proceedings constitutes compensable

pecuniary loss. Smith appeared at the June 2023 bench trial and August 2023 sentencing.

8 Smith testified that he calculated his lost wages for two days’ work “on the low end” at

$600. He also testified that he did not include wage-time lost appearing for the rescheduled

sentencing hearing. Ittner now contends that Smith, a business owner who sets his own

hours, could have worked the rest of the day both days. However, Ittner’s after-the-fact

assertions do not undermine the evidentiary value of Smith’s uncontroverted testimony.

The Municipal Court properly relied on Smith’s testimony as to lost wages. McClelland,

¶ 10; Simpson, ¶ 14.

¶19 Ittner also argues that Smith was not entitled to restitution for his $500 insurance

deductible because, as of sentencing, Smith had not paid the deductible, and the loss was

therefore only a “speculative” and “hypothetical future obligation.” Smith obtained a

preliminary estimate to replace his truck bumper for $3,242. Smith testified that, before

filing a claim with his own insurance, he contacted Ittner’s insurance to see if they would

pay for the damages to his pickup truck. Ittner’s insurance refused in writing to cover any

damages to Smith’s truck. Smith testified that he therefore had to and would pay his $500

insurance deductible to get his truck fixed. The Municipal Court awarded restitution only

for the deductible, not the total damages, because Smith’s insurance would cover that cost.

The $500 deductible was not a speculative or contingent loss, but a reasonably certain

financial obligation arising from the damage caused by Ittner’s criminal conduct.

¶20 Finally, Ittner also claims that there was no causal connection between the damage

to Smith’s pickup and the collision based on Smith’s testimony that, upon impact, the load

of lumber in the trailer shifted back into the truck’s rear bumper, damaging it. Ittner

attributes this damage to Smith’s using a “single strap” to secure the load, ignoring that

9 Ittner was adjudicated the cause of the traffic accident in the first instance, notwithstanding

his disagreement with that judicial determination.

¶21 The Municipal Court’s award of $65.98 for destroyed bearing caps, $600 for two

days’ lost wages, and $500 for the insurance deductible was supported by substantial

evidence and not clearly erroneous.

Ittner Was Not Denied Due Process

¶22 Ittner does not explain why he arrived late to the sentencing/restitution hearing that

he specifically asked the court to reschedule, attributing his tardiness only to “a scheduling

error.” Ittner also does not deny that the Municipal Court fully and accurately summarized

Smith’s testimony upon Ittner’s arrival. Nonetheless, he claims that his tardiness inhibited

his ability to respond to Smith’s testimony “in real time.”

¶23 First, both Smith and the responding officer testified at the June 2023 trial regarding

damages, including damages to Smith’s truck’s rear bumper and the trailer wheels’

“bearing buddies.” Based on this testimony, Ittner was reasonably on notice of possible

damages that Smith would claim at the restitution hearing. Second, the record reflects that,

at the restitution hearing, the court asked Ittner twice if he had any questions for Smith or

comments for the court. Instead of disputing or challenging Smith’s claimed losses, Ittner

took both opportunities to describe his own damages, disagree with the court’s July 2023

judgment, and dispute who caused the April 2023 traffic accident. “A defendant has a due

process right to explain, argue, and rebut any information presented at sentencing.”

Simpson, ¶ 14. The record shows that Ittner was afforded all process due under the

10 circumstances; the fact that he did not seize the opportunity does not mean he was denied

due process, nor does it undermine the fairness of the restitution proceedings.

¶24 As for Ittner’s claim that the Municipal Court “suppressed” Smith’s “attempt to

admit his own fault” and thereby denied Ittner the ability to contest causation of damages,

the record does not support Ittner’s characterization. First, Ittner was able to, and did, argue

that Smith’s “aggressive driving” and “not letting him in” to the lane was the “actual cause”

of the accident and damages. Second, Smith did not admit or attempt to admit fault at the

sentencing/restitution hearing. Instead, Smith doubled-down on his trial testimony—

elaborating on why he was properly in the turn lane when Ittner entered it unsafely and

crashed into his trailer. The court curtailed Smith’s impromptu musings, stating it had

already rendered a decision regarding the accident and would not revisit it at sentencing.

Once liability is established, the sentencing court need not relitigate fault but must

determine whether the claimed losses bear a causal connection to the offense.

¶25 Moreover, the court did not need direct testimony regarding causation of damages—

it could find the “requisite causal nexus . . . by implication from proof of the elements” of

Ittner’s previously-adjudicated criminal conduct. State v. Pierre, 2020 MT 160, ¶ 13,

400 Mont. 283, 466 P.3d 494. Contrary to Ittner’s characterizations, Smith did not admit

fault and the court did not deny Ittner an opportunity to rebut or refute Smith’s restitution

claims.

¶26 Ittner received all process due at sentencing. The Municipal Court’s restitution

award was based on substantial evidence and not erroneous. The District Court’s October

2024 judgment affirming the Municipal Court is affirmed.

11 ¶27 We decide this case by memorandum opinion pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c)

of our Internal Operating Rules. In the opinion of the Court, the case presents a question

controlled by settled law or by the clear application of applicable standards of review.

/S/ KATHERINE M. BIDEGARAY

We Concur:

/S/ CORY J. SWANSON /S/ BETH BAKER /S/ INGRID GUSTAFSON /S/ JIM RICE