City of Gulf Shores v. Coyote Beach Sports, LLC (Appeal from Baldwin Circuit Court: CV-21-900648).

• Court: Supreme Court of Alabama
• Decided: April 12, 2024
• Docket: SC-2023-0637
• Status: Published

Opinion

Rel: April 12, 2024

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.

SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA OCTOBER TERM, 2023-2024

_________________________

SC-2023-0637 _________________________

City of Gulf Shores

v.

Coyote Beach Sports, LLC

Appeal from Baldwin Circuit Court (CV-21-900648)

SC-2023-0839 _________________________

v. SC-2023-0637 and SC-2023-0839

SELLERS, Justice.

Following a series of complaints and accidents involving motor

scooters, the City of Gulf Shores ("the City") passed a municipal

ordinance regulating the motor-scooter-rental business. Section

22-101(a) of that ordinance -- Ordinance No. 2013 -- states, in relevant

part:

"Without regard to the person who may be the nominal rental customer, no rented motorcycle or motor-driven cycle shall be provided for operation by any person who is under the age of eighteen (18) years or who does not personally possess and produce for copying at the time of rental a valid current Alabama Class M motorcycle license or Class M license endorsement or, if a resident of a state other than Alabama, a valid current license from the state of residence expressly authorizing the operation of a motorcycle by the person in the person's state of residence."

Coyote Beach Sports, LLC ("Coyote"), is a Louisiana-based limited-

liability company that has rented motor scooters -- deemed motor-driven

cycles under state law, see § 32-1-1.1(36), Ala. Code 1975 -- in Gulf Shores

since 2014. According to Coyote, its business effectively ceased when the

City approved Ordinance No. 2013 because most customers, past and

potential, did not have the required Class M license endorsement and 2 SC-2023-0637 and SC-2023-0839

were thus not licensed to operate a motor-driven cycle under Alabama

law.

After its business ground to a halt, Coyote filed in the Baldwin

Circuit Court a complaint against the City on June 15, 2021, requesting

a judgment declaring the ordinance invalid, monetary damages, and

attorney fees and costs. The City timely filed an answer denying Coyote's

claims.

After discovery, a jury trial commenced on August 14, 2023.

Following the close of evidence on August 17, 2023, the trial court

declared Ordinance No. 2013 preempted by state law. Thereafter, the

jury awarded Coyote $200,416.12 in compensatory damages. The trial

court entered a final judgment on all claims, and the City timely filed its

notice of appeal of the trial court's judgment on September 6, 2023. On

September 28, 2023, Coyote filed a motion for attorney fees, and, on

November 6, 2023, the trial court, without having held a hearing, entered

an order, which contained no written findings, awarding Coyote $59,320

in attorney fees. The City timely appealed that order, and we

consolidated the prior appeal with the appeal of the order containing the

attorney-fee award.

3 SC-2023-0637 and SC-2023-0839

Standard of Review

The issue of the preemption of a municipal ordinance by state law

involves a pure question of law; therefore, we apply a de novo standard

of review. See Alabama Recycling Ass'n v. City of Montgomery, 24 So. 3d

1085, 1088 (Ala. 2009).

Discussion

Although the City raises several arguments on appeal, the only

question we need address is whether the trial court erred in ruling that

state law preempted the City's municipal ordinance. We conclude that it

did, and we reverse.

Given state constitutional and statutory constraints on the ability

of municipalities to pass ordinances inconsistent with state laws, this

Court has recognized three circumstances under which municipal

ordinances are preempted by state law. See Breland v. City of Fairhope,

337 So. 3d 741, 753 (Ala. 2020). First, "[a] state statute may preempt a

municipal ordinance expressly when the statute defines the extent to

which its enactment preempts municipal ordinances." Ex parte Tulley,

199 So. 3d 812, 821 (Ala. 2015). Second, a municipal ordinance may be

preempted "when [it] attempts to regulate conduct in a field that the

4 SC-2023-0637 and SC-2023-0839

legislature intended the state law to exclusively occupy." Id. Finally, a

municipal ordinance may be preempted "when [it] permits what a state

statute forbids or forbids what a statute permits." Id. The trial court ruled

as a matter of law that Ordinance No. 2013 was preempted under either

the second or third theory of preemption. We hold that the ordinance is

not preempted under any of these theories.

I. Alabama's Motorcycle-Licensure Statutes Do Not Preempt the Field of Motorcycle-Rental Regulations

"For state law to preempt an entire field, ' " ' "an act must make

manifest a legislative intent that no other enactment may touch upon the

subject in any way." ' " ' " Breland, 337 So. 3d at 753 (quoting Peak v. City

of Tuscaloosa, 73 So. 3d 5, 19-20 (Ala. Crim. App. 2011), quoting in turn

other cases). Before reviewing "the text of the relevant statutes," id.

(citing Ex parte Waddail, 827 So. 2d 789, 794 (Ala. 2001)), in search of

clear preemptive intent, we must ensure that the "conduct in [the] field

that the legislature intended the state law to exclusively occupy," Ex

parte Tulley, 199 So. 3d at 821, is the same type of conduct regulated by

the ordinance.

Coyote directs our attention to §§ 32-5A-240 and 32-12-22, Ala.

Code 1975, which establish the licensure requirements for Alabama 5 SC-2023-0637 and SC-2023-0839

residents operating motorcycles in Alabama and for Alabama residents

operating motor-driven cycles in Alabama, respectively. Conversely,

§ 22-101(a) of Ordinance No. 2013 establishes requirements for

regulating the rental of motorcycles or motor-driven cycles in Gulf

Shores. Thus, even if we were to assume that the statutes Coyote

references do preempt the field of licensure requirements for the

operation of motorcycles and motor-driven cycles in Alabama, there

would be no preemptive effect on Ordinance No. 2013 because the conduct

it regulates -- the renting of motorcycles and motor-driven cycles -- is not

the same conduct regulated by the aforementioned statutes. There is a

distinct difference between the state's requiring a license for a citizen to

operate a motorcycle or motor-driven cycle in Alabama and a

municipality's adopting an ordinance to regulate the rental of

motorcycles or motor-driven cycles within its jurisdiction. Accordingly,

Ordinance No. 2013 is not preempted under the theory of field

preemption.

II. The City's Ordinance Does Not Conflict with State Law

For similar reasons, Ordinance No. 2013 does not conflict with state

law because it neither "permits what a state statute forbids [n]or forbids

6 SC-2023-0637 and SC-2023-0839

what a statute permits." Ex parte Tulley, 199 So. 3d at 821. Coyote

contests this, believing Alabama to have "a detailed statutory scheme

regarding the licensure requirements of individuals operating motor

vehicles within the state." Coyote's brief at 20. But, as explained above,

the conduct licensed by state law is the operation of motorcycles and

motor-driven cycles, not the rental of them. Indeed, Coyote can point to

no statute in Alabama concerning the rental of motorcycles or motor-

driven cycles, and we can find no state law addressing that issue. If there

exists no statute specifically regulating, forbidding, or permitting the

rental of motorcycles or motor-driven cycles, then there can be no

inconsistency between Ordinance No. 2013 and state law such that the

ordinance is thereby preempted. See Alabama Recycling Ass'n, 24 So. 3d

at 1088-89. Thus, Ordinance No. 2013 does not conflict with state law

such that the ordinance is preempted.

Conclusion

Therefore, because the City's Ordinance No. 2013, regulating the

rental of motorcycles and motor-driven cycles, is not preempted by any

state law, the judgment of the circuit court is reversed and, consequently,

7 SC-2023-0637 and SC-2023-0839

the order awarding Coyote attorney fees is also reversed; these matters

are remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

SC-2023-0637 -- REVERSED AND REMANDED.

SC-2023-0839 -- REVERSED AND REMANDED.

Parker, C.J., and Wise, Stewart, and Cook, JJ., concur.