City of Greenville v. Pridmore, Supervisor

160 S.E. 144, 162 S.C. 52, 1931 S.C. LEXIS 167
CourtSupreme Court of South Carolina
DecidedSeptember 3, 1931
Docket13237
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 160 S.E. 144 (City of Greenville v. Pridmore, Supervisor) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of South Carolina primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
City of Greenville v. Pridmore, Supervisor, 160 S.E. 144, 162 S.C. 52, 1931 S.C. LEXIS 167 (S.C. 1931).

Opinion

The opinion of the Court was delivered by

Mr. ChiEP Justice Brease.

The petitioners, municipalities of Greenville County, of this State, presented to Mr. Justice Cothran of this Court their petition, which alleged, briefly stated, the following matters: ■

That under the law, it is the privilege and duty of the petitioners and their officers to sentence to the county jail or to hard labor upon the public works of the County of Greenville those persons found guilty of violation of ordinances of the respective municipalities, and that it is the duty of the respondents, the county supervisor and the jailer of Greenville County, to admit to the county jail or public works of the county such persons sentenced, and to care for and use said prisoners in the same manner as they are required to do as to prisoners sentenced by the magistrates or county Court or the Court of General Sessions of Greenville County; that the respondents have refused to accept the prisoners so sentenced in the municipal Courts, and have announced that they will continue in their declination to accept them.

Upon the prayer of the petitioners, Mr. Justice Cothran, on March 18, 1931, made his order requiring the respondents, A. F. Pridmore, as supervisor, and W. F. Christopher, as jailer of Greenville County, to show cause to this Court, if any they could, why they should not be enjoined from continuing in, and carrying out, their refusal to admit to, and to receive in the jail, or on the public works, of Green- *55 ville County, all prisoners sentenced thereto by the petitioning municipalities, or any of them; and in the meantime, the respondents were restrained from refusing to admit to the county jail or the public works the; prisoners so sentenced.

At the appointed time, the respondents, in this Court, submitted their return to the rule to show cause. Therein, they admitted that formerly, and for many years, as a matter of custom, the county authorities of the County of Greenville had received prisoners sentenced by the municipalities of that county, but that they were not bound to continue that custom. They said, too, that the custom grew up during a time when the supervisor of Greenville County could use the labor of the prisoners sentenced by the municipalities on its chain gang advantageously to the county’s interest, but that recently, because of a great change in the condition of road working, convicts of the class of those sentenced in the municipal Courts could not be employed to an advantage, since machinery, which only could be operated by trained persons, was used in the building and maintaining of roads, and that the municipal convicts, sentenced for a very short time, usually only thirty days, could not operate such machinery.

Respondents took the legal position that, under the law, the respective municipalities have to care for and maintain their own prisoners and are required to form their own chain gangs, and that the county officials cannot be required to accept, in the county jail and on the county chain gang, prisoners sentenced by the municipalities. The respondents also allege, in justification of their position, that the amounts appropriated by the General Assembly for the year 1931 for the care of convicts of Greenville County was insufficient to properly provide for both the county convicts and convicts sentenced by municipalities.

Under the view we take of the case, the main questions presented for our determination are these; (1) Has a municipality the power to sentence a violator of its ordinances *56 to the county jail, and, if so, should it or the county bear the necessary expenses for the care of the prisoner? (2) Has a municipality the power to sentence a violator of its ordinances to labor upon the public works of the county in which it is situate, and, if so, shall the municipality or the county pay the prisoner’s expenses? Correlatively, we have to say whether there is imposed upon the county authorities the duty of receiving such prisoners. In connection with these questions, we think it proper to pass also on a few incidental matters.

In deciding the questions, we turn to the sections of the Code of Laws 1922, which we, as well as the attorneys on both sides, regard as being applicable. They are Sections 60, 62, 63, 125, and 126 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Volume 1), and Sections 1077, 1078, 1079, and 1080 of Volume 3.

Our “chain gang” legislation started, so far as we have ascertained, with the Act of December 22, 1885 (19 Stat., 125), entitled, “An Act to Utilize the Labor oftjail and Municipal Convicts, and to Empower the Courts and Municipal Authorities to Impose the Punishment of Labor Within Their Respective Jurisdictions.” Prior to that time, prisoners who committed offenses less than capital crimes were sentenced to the state penitentiary, or to the county jails, or to town guardhouses. Since the enactment of the original Acts from which the several sections come, there have been many amendments thereto. Except for the purpose of aiding in construing the language of the sections of the Code, it is not necessary to go into the full history of all this legislation, for, under the constitutional provision (Article 6, § 5), we are bound to recognize the Code of 1922, and the statutes passed since its adoption, as the only general statutory law of the State. State v. Meares, Superintendent, etc., 148 S. C., 118, 145 S. E., 695. We have not been cited to any Act amendatory of the sections mentioned affecting the issues for determination.

*57 In our quotations from the Code, we have added the emphasis.

Subdivision 3 of Section 60, Code of Criminal Procedure, which relates to “Punishments by municipal Courts,” provides that, “every person sentenced to imprisonment, either directly or in consequence of a failure to pay a fine imposed, shall be subject to work upon the public roads or streets of said city or town, or of the county in which such city or town is situate, during the term of such imprisonment.”

In Section 62, ibid., in the first paragraph, it is provided that mayors or intendants or city or town councils shall have the power to arrest and upon conviction “to commit to the town guardhouse * * * any person or persons who may be guilty of disorderly conduct in said town to the annoyance of the citizens thereof.” In the second paragraph of that section, it is stated that the mayors or intendants and' aldermen, councilmen, or wardens, may arrest, or cause to be arrested, certain persons, and are given the power “to commit to the guardhouse * * * or to the county jail or to the county chaingcmg. * * * ” The paragraph contains this proviso : “That if the offender be committed to jail it shall be done at the expense of the said city or town.”

Section 63 of the Code of Criminal Procedure relates generally to municipal convicts. The enactment is to this effect: When a municipality has not a sufficient number of convicts sentenced to work on the public works of the town to warrant the expense of maintaining a town chain gang, then the municipal authorities are authorized “to place said convicts on the county chaingang for the time so sentenced.”

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Independence Ins. v. Independent Life & Acc. Ins.
61 S.E.2d 399 (Supreme Court of South Carolina, 1950)
Jackson v. City of Columbia
177 S.E. 158 (Supreme Court of South Carolina, 1934)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
160 S.E. 144, 162 S.C. 52, 1931 S.C. LEXIS 167, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/city-of-greenville-v-pridmore-supervisor-sc-1931.